The Subaltern:
Speaking Through Socialism

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE SUBALTERN: SPEAKING THROUGH SOCIALISM

Front Matter

Editor's Introduction

The temptation is to open this Introduction with the clichéd "we're baaaaack"! But, of course, one must avoid temptations such as these in a scholarly journal. So, instead, I will simply state that I am pleased to present this issue and provide a brief update about where we've been and where we are going for future issues.

First, I want to acknowledge the tremendous work of Dr. Elaine Coburn who edited the Journal from 2009 – 2014 (initially as co-editor with Dr. Chad D. Thompson). In their inaugural issue, effectively a re-launch of *Socialist Studies/Études socialistes*, the Editors noted the desire to raise the profile of the Journal. In the years between the re-launch and Dr. Coburn's last issue, that has certainly been achieved. Interest in the Journal, submissions and readership have all grown. Significantly, since 2006, the Journal has been committed to open source and online delivery to ensure that there are as few barriers as possible to its distribution.

With the growth of the Journal also came "growing pains" and the need to find management mechanisms that could sustain continued expansion of the Journal. With this in mind, we have made some significant "behind the scenes" changes to the Journal. Importantly, we have entered into a *Memorandum of Understanding* with the University of Alberta Libraries for hosting/OJS support. The University of Alberta provides this service free of charge and it means that we always have access to the latest, stable version of OJS and continuous technical support. While making the transition, there have been technical "road bumps" and I know not every user enjoys the "OJS experience"; however, it is necessary to manage and produce an online Journal.

With our technical platform in place, it is now time to turn my attention to the regular publication of the Journal and to ensuring that the good reputation established by Dr. Coburn continues into the future. This leads me to one very significant hurdle that I have faced and I know is a challenge for many academic journals today – building a sustainable, qualified database of reviewers. If you are able and willing, please go to the website, www.socialiststudies.com and either login or register to add yourself to our reader and reviewer database. Because of the critical and transdisciplinary nature of the submissions we receive, there is virtually no limit to the range of expertise we require in reviewers. Your support in this regard will be greatly appreciated.

Finally, I wish to close by thanking everyone from readers to authors to reviewers to the members of the Socialist Studies Society for their patience and support as the various transitions have been on-going for the past many months. Please do not hesitate to contact me with questions, comments and suggestions.

Forthcoming Special Issue

The Ghadar Movement

edited by Radha D'Souza and Kasim Tirmizey

The beginning of the twentieth century was a turning point in contemporary history. It was the moment of imperialist wars that redrew the boundaries of the Third World, a moment of popular upsurges against colonialism and capitalism that challenged the Empires of the time. Today the issues that were centre-stage before and during the World Wars are back again. The mandate territories, the Balkans, Ukraine and Russia are once again in turmoil, arms build up proceeds in South, South-East and East Asia as it did one hundred years ago and economic depression and social polarisation has once again thrown up movements for social justice across the world. Social movements a hundred years ago intervened in those cataclysmic events in particular ways. Their interventions had profound ramifications for the world order that was instituted at the end of the World Wars.

Whereas Social Movement Studies has come of age in the academy as a distinct subfield, the scholarship has largely focused on New Social Movements. This narrow focus dims the historical memory of social movements, in particular anti-colonial struggles. Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, the Ghadar Movement in South Asia has many 'firsts' to its credit. It was an anti-colonial movement that signalled the beginning of the end of the British Empire. It was the first truly internationalist movement of working people. Whereas the Socialist internationals were limited largely to Europe and the United States, the Gadharites organised internationally throughout the British Empire. Their networks included Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East with a significant presence in Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Aden, Kenya, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Central Asian Republics, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and China amongst other countries.

The Ghadar movement had its roots in the South Asian migrant workers in the United States and Canada. The movement was located in a contextual understanding that linked racism in the West and colonialism at home. The Ghadar movement's analysis of racism, migration and colonial oppression is significant in the present context. Whereas Gandhi, a political leader closely aligned to landlord and merchant classes is acclaimed in the West, the Ghadar movement that had its social base amongst peasants, workers and soldiers is less known to English readers. The special issue seeks to bridge that knowledge gap.

Keynote Address

POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY

THE SOCIETY FOR SOCIALIST STUDIES ANNUAL CONFERENCE, OTTAWA 2015

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Biographical Note

Himani Bannerji is a Professor Emeritus and Senior Scholar in the Department of Sociology at York University, Toronto, Canada. Her research and writing life extends between Canada and India. Her interests encompass anti-racist feminism, marxism, critical cultural theories and historical sociology. Publications include *Demography and Democracy: Essays on Nationalism, Gender and Ideology* (2011), *Of Property and Propriety: The Role of Gender and Class in Imperialism and Nationalism* (edited and co-authored with S. Mojab and J. Whitehead, 2001), *Inventing Subjects: Studies in Hegemony, Patriarchy and Colonialism* (2001), *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Racism* (2000) and *Thinking Through: Essays on Feminism, Marxism and Anti-Racism* (1995). Her most recent research on Marx has appeared as chapters in A. K. Bagchi and A. Chatterjee (eds), *Marxism: With and Beyond Marx* (2014), E. Dua and A. B. Bakan, *Theorizing Anti-Racism* (2014) and S. Mojab (ed), *Marxism and Feminism* (2015). She has a book forthcoming on the modernity and radical humanism of Rabindranath Tagore.

Abstract

In this article I wish to exemplify how an anti-ideological critique on "violence against women'" in the era of neoliberal India may be conducted. My main source lies in Marx's critique of ideology as a body of content, of "ruling ideas" which are hegemonic, as well as the epistemological process of their production. With this understanding I want to speak about the current conjuncture in India of global neoliberal imperialism, of ideological and political use of religion and patriarchy. It appears to me that this fascistic agenda is present elsewhere in the world, where expanding neoliberal capitalism and fundamentalist religious ideology enter into a holy alliance.

Keywords

Capitalism, neoliberalism, fascism, primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, violence, gang rape, ideology

Acknowledgement

I sincerely thank the organizers of The Society for Socialist Studies for inviting me to present this talk. I hope that I will be able to provide an overview of some issues and suggest approaches for further consideration for students of socialist thought.

Introduction

As I spent the last five months in India I decided not to go through writing about a survey of various versions of the notion of 'ideology' in Marx and among marxists. When in India, which I am almost every year, certain issues impressed themselves on me. There is a veritable maelstrom worked up by predations of neoliberalism (code-named 'development') and the ideological agenda of the hindu supremacist national government Bharatiya Janata Party (National People's Party - BJP) and its civil society organizations, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteers' Organization - RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Association - VHP). In the last years there has been an exponential increase in violence against women – especially of gang rapes, including those by the police, the paramilitary and the army. None of these are 'new' phenomena, as they are developing over decades, but with the coming of the BJP to power federally and in some states/provinces and their civil society groups gaining greater organizational and ideological influence, things seem to have reached a tipping point. The roots of these increased occurrences lie, however, not only in the BJP combine, or as they say, their Sangh Parivar (monastic family), but also in the types of economic, political, social relations and moral regulations developing in the Indian civil society and the ideological apparatus of the state over time. There is, therefore, a continuity between the previous liberal democratic secular state and its social agenda and the present era, which shows the beginnings of a political and social fascism.[1]

I was struck by the enormities of violence against women, particularly by the increase in gang rapes and the grotesque ways in which they were conducted. They included tearing apart of women's bodies – in most cases raped to death – inserting objects into the genitalia, the number of men involved and the fact that the perpetrators were publicly known. Equally striking were police involvement in these and other activities as well as their negligence, and the lack of implementation of laws that already exist. These phenomena, accompanied by the hindutva[2] agenda of the BJP and its civil society groups' stance of moral high ground,

[1] On fascism, see Himani Bannerji "Demography and democracy: Reflections on violence against women in genocide and ethnic cleansing" in *Demography and democracy: Essays on nationalism, gender and ideology*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press (2011). See also Chirashree Das Gupta, *Neoliberalism and neofascism in India* in Vikalp: People's Perspective for Change, http://www.vikalp.ind.in/2015_06_01_archive.html.

[2] *Hindutva* (hinduness) is an essentialized version of a heterodox diverse set of ideas, gods and practices of hindus. It is rather a mythic civilizational construct – it has elite intellectual adherents as well as adherents among 'the people'. This task of creating the hindu subject of the nation is not a matter of ideas and

preaching the sacredness of women in hindu culture and in the family, the national imaginary of a perfect hindu/Indian Civilization, have placed me and others in a desperate need of understanding and appropriate action. The need for an explanation of why – despite large protests mounted across the country – the impact of the resistance is so little? What is giving this near total social violence the strength to grow?

In search of answers I decided to call Marx's critique of ideology to my aid. This critique I consider not to be restricted within the intellectual sphere alone, but to be found in the knowledge which discloses social formations and the interconstitutive relations between them and their prevailing forms of consciousness (political, economic and social). A critique of ideology provides revolutionary, not just interpretive knowledge.[3] In this paper I wish to exemplify how an anti-ideological critique on 'violence against women' in the era of neoliberal India may be conducted. I am developing my method of inquiry and its presentation and still need to formulate a more appropriate type of presentation. Presentation, as Marx said, faces us with another set of problems from those of research.[4] I am at the early stages of both. My main source lies in Marx's critique of ideology as a body of content, of 'ruling ideas' which are hegemonic, as well as the epistemological process of their production.[5] With this understanding I want to speak about the current conjuncture in India of global neoliberal imperialism, of ideological and political use of religion and patriarchy. It appears to me that this fascistic agenda is present elsewhere in the world, where expanding neoliberal capitalism and fundamentalist religious ideology enter into a holy alliance.

An anti-ideological critique which is conjunctural and not directly causal should display in its method of presentation the critique itself. This issue is captured in the debate on realism and representation among Brecht, Benjamin, Bloch, and Lukaćs in an edited

proselytization alone, but of mass reconversion ceremonies which suck back those who once in history sought to escape the violence of the hindu caste system. See Himani Bannerji, "Making India hindu and male: Cultural nationalism and the emergence of the ethnic citizen in contemporary India", in *Ibid.*

[3] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Theses on Feuerbach" in *The German Ideology*, ed. C.J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers (1970). See 11th Thesis.

[4] See Marx, *Capital,* Vol I, Moscow: Progress Publishers (1971): "Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, to trace out inner connexion [sic]. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere *a priori* construction." (Afterword to the Second German Edition, p. 28)

[5] "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance"(Marx and Engels, *German Ideology,* p. 64, original emphases).

collection with an afterward by Fredric Jameson.[6] In this collection the Aristotelian linear narrative advocated by Lukaćs is pitted against the expressionist epic/episodic form adopted by Brecht in his theatre and by Benjamin's advocacy of a theory of bricolage. Attempting to direct attention to and reflecting in the method of presentation the simultaneity of reality, these anti-ideological expressionists proved the superiority of bringing disparate, seemingly unconnected images and happenings together – thereby creating a mosaic or a do-it-yourself art or knowledge form. If the erasure of fissures, differences, of social contradictions and their coexistence marks the social organization and reproduction of capital, it cannot be narrated in a seamless and causal way. Our presentation must be a mimesis of these complexities using a wide range of mosaics of happenings and their diverse placements. From this presentational method – rarely used by social scientists but more by literary writers – we can cobble together a reality not 'always already there' and in sequence but occurring more as 'always, all at once'. My approach will be one of juxtaposition of various aspects of capitalism now to create a collage by using seemingly unconnected pieces of news along with those of violence against women. Marx's critique of ideology is deeply concerned with part-whole, general-particular relations – not allowing one to usurp the position of the other while building the big picture. Marx himself in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* begins with the idea of a pageant or a masque ball, in which several characters present a story (history) in which the mythical elements play a deeper part than they realize.[7] This type of critical exercise consists of flashing the fragments of current or past events next to each other as a method of encouraging the reader/audience to look deeper. One of the ways of achieving this simultaneity and multilayered dimension is in the Brechtian dramaturgy, especially of the alienation effect achieved by the use of an episodic form of narration.[8] It is as though we were rotating the newspaper items around the focal event(s) that we are trying to both describe and understand at the same time – thus, for example, reports of gang rapes and rapes of nuns can be juxtaposed with those of land bills for expropriation of peasants, attacks on churches and pressured re-conversion of muslims and christians to hinduism.

No one thinks alone, so I want to thank at the outset some who have been of particular help for me. Many names will have to be left out, but with no less gratefulness. Of direct relevance are Dorothy E. Smith, David McNally, Judith Whitehead, Maria Mies, Silvia Federici, Jasodhara Bagchi, Uma Chakravarty, Amiya Bagchi, Samir Amin, Utsa Patnaik, Prabhat Patnaik, Shahrzad Mojab and Nahla Abdo. At a distance Raymond Williams, Louis Althusser, David Harvey come to mind. Over my long stretch of learning life, Karl Marx has always been the basic source of illumination and inspiration. The footprints of all these authors will be found in my text.

[6] *Aesthetics and Politics*, tr. ed. R. Taylor, afterward by Fredric Jameson. London: New Left Books (1977).

[7] K. Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, New York: International Publishers (1991)

[8] See Brecht on epic theatre in Bertolt Brecht, *The Messingkauf Dialogues*, Tr. J. Willett. London: Methuen (1965)

Part I On Ideology – a Recapitulation

At the outset we need to get a basic idea of what I mean by a critique of ideology. In this I follow Marx. His critique of ideology is most explicitly stated in *The German Ideology* and *The Holy Family*, and contra Althusser and his followers, I believe that this critique has provided a major part of his analytical thinking throughout his intellectual and political life. *The 18th Brumaire*, for example, exemplifies an anti-ideological reading of writing and making of history and provides us with a template of materialist historiography. *Capital* takes apart the ideological pretensions of the political economists and displays their occlusive, dehistoricizing presentation of capitalism's development. It is through this method of inquiry that we see that 'capital' is not a 'thing' but a social relation and achieve a demystified, de-fetishized look into its systemic and subtle workings.

In *The German Ideology* Marx situates 'ideology' at the point of bifurcation of manual and mental division of labour, which has been interwoven with and built upon previous sexual and social divisions of labour. The section on ideology provides us a comprehensive method for analyzing forms of consciousness produced by certain conceptual/epistemological practices which arise with social relations of any given, but especially, of the capitalist mode of production. Marx's critical epistemology admits of and enquires into different kinds/forms of consciousness and methods of knowledge production which are comprehended by the overall complexities of the mode production. By analyzing their specific constitution Marx's method can expose the ideological composition of seemingly independent discourses or textualities, the modes of generation and deployment of particular concepts. Thus we can pursue ways of knowing which reveal what is actually happening currently in society or had happened in social history. Thus we gain access to the complex (dialectical) composition of the social.[9]

Thus, though not apparent to many, Marx attended to both the 'content' of the ideological concepts or ideas and their process of production and textual deployment, which assumes and creates a separation of theory from practice, from social organizations and relations. His critique exposes an extrapolatory device of abstraction and deployment of ideas which shifts them from their situationally grounded status to timeless, ahistorical, immaterial metaphysical forms.[10] Thus ideology is not to be treated only as a body of bad 'ruling ideas', especially political ones, but consists of using seemingly critical ideas to an historically occlusive effect. The interlinking process of creating ideology involves the connecting of ideas to other ideas, instead of social existence and practices, thereby creating a second level, solipsistic representational form. Thus ideas produced for different reasons

[9] Dorothy E. Smith, *Writing the Social: Critique, Theory and Investigations*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1999). See in particular the essays in the sections "Theory", "The ruling relations" and "Telling the truth after postmodernism".

[10] Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1977). See the chapter "Ideology".

and contexts are brought together, obeying solely a theoretical logic, thus influencing the relationship between the knower and the known and among the knowers themselves. A proper critique of ideology, therefore, is not to be found by exploring within a statement, or in counterposing one interpretive mode with another. For an idea or statement to be called ideology, we need to situate ideas and assumptions and so on to their socio-historical contexts, their imperatives and the mode of knowledge production. That certain ideas render the world meaningful for a subject is no guarantee of their being true. Internal coherence is not all that matters, the basic premises on which they are articulated need to be scrutinized. Ideology is thus not quite the same as an interpretation or worldview, either articulated or tacit, but rather a particular type of knowledge production.[11] As pointed out by Dorothy Smith and others, the hegemonic apparatuses of the modern capitalist state make categorization and standardization indispensable for governing and formation of necessary institutions. We can also see in the workings of capital certain epistemological stances which produce reification and commodity fetishism. These structuralization necessities convert descriptive, empirical, contingent knowledge forms to categorical reifications. These categories assume the status of generality and lack transparency. The empirical, thus, takes an ideological flight transferred onto an ahistorical, non-materialist ground. Any particular behaviour of a social group or an individual in the context of a given time and space is then abstracted into quintessentiality, e.g. the idea of 'race'. Certain cultural traits are reified and homogenized as 'human' or 'savage', or whole complexes of social consciousness are synthesized into civilizational essences.

Marx's concept of ideology enjoins us to remember that though the ruling ideas of any age are crucial to our social critique and politics, it is also important to know how these ruling ideas are produced and how they are connected to the formation and realities of the ruling class itself. We should now bring in Marx's much neglected 'three tricks' for producing ideology - the tricks of metaphysicalization or immaterialization and reification of the social nature of ideas and their relations to each other. Expanding the epistemological purview, *The German Ideology* also tells us that there are some forms of knowledge which are ideological but others are not, for example, knowledge generated through practical consciousness. These knowledges are both historical and experiential, gleaned through doing in tandem with thinking. The example Marx provides for practical consciousness is language itself, which is wholly social and practical, and also enabled by biology.[12] This historical and concrete way of

[11] An inquiry into it discloses congelations of social relations of power at all levels and thus helps to solve the riddle of hegemony. Dorothy Smith's inquiry into 'social organization of knowledge' combined with her consonant 'institutional ethnography' shows how knowledges are formed and reified into 'ruling categories'. Distributed in her writings throughout, a very important collection of essays is *The conceptual practices of power: A feminist sociology of knowledge* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), especially on Marx's method and critique of ideology. See also Smith's demonstration of Marx's method in *Institutional Ethnography: A sociology for people* (Toronto: AltaMira Press, 2005)

[12] Along with discussing "primary historical relationships", Marx speaks of "consciousness…which here makes

knowing which keeps an eye on the many determinations of ideas, when rubbed against the ideological ones, by putting history against mythology, experience against stereotypes, practice against theory, can produce 'scientific' [13] as opposed to simple interpretive knowledge for revolutionary social transformation.

Thus all expressions, concepts or phrases can become ideological if used categorically to substitute or displace a contextual, historical way of using them. Certain uses of the notion of 'woman' or 'women' can illustrate an ideological use when treated as an unsituated, exclusive, universal or abstract category. Similarly concepts such as 'man', 'race', or 'development', for example, can serve as ideology to create illicit generalizations which deflect criticism and legitimize the status quo. They admit no epistemological disclosure as to their own construction. Pulled apart from their ordinary, descriptive and locative usage such concepts or words are arbitrary interpretive devices. They are pulled away from their historical materialist axes and transported elsewhere to serve another need. Examples can be found in liberal feminists' theoretical use of the word "woman", where one uniform idea of woman stands for all. [14] The complex and contradictory social location and relations of different groups of women are then lost. The understanding of patriarchy found here is one-dimensional, isolated from the social organization as a whole. This serves to occlude the relations and processes through which women become individuated social subjects in history and develop agency for self and social emancipation. The space created by the erasure of social relevancies and historicity then fills up with the concerns of those who theorize in the strict context of intellectual division of labour. Consciously or unconsciously these women are members of the elite, part of the ruling classes, and help to create relevant conceptual apparatuses. Devoid of concreteness, the unadjectivized use of the concept 'development' serves the same hegemonic purpose. Missing the qualifiers of 'economic', 'capitalist', 'class' or 'racialized', such a 'development' can only serve the purpose of racist patriarchal capitalism. On the contrary, an anti-ideological critique informs us that differently located people inhabit different spaces in the topography of the social, while such topographies are constructed and connected in reference. [15] To resist and defeat patriarchy we have to situate

its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language *is* practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness arises, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men." *The German Ideology,* p. 51.

[13] Marx's use of this notion of 'science' is not positivist or empiricist. It is materialist in the sense of a social inquiry suitable to its object of investigation, and historical. Historical materialism is this sort of 'scientific' knowledge. *The German Ideology* discusses this topic extensively, as do Marx's various 'prefaces' and 'afterwords' to *Capital* Vol I.

[14] On the ideological use of classificatory and descriptive categories, see H. Bannerji, "But who speaks for us?" in *Thinking Through: Essays on feminism, marxism and anti-racism,* Toronto: Women's Press (1995). See also H. Bannerji, "Ideology" in S. Mojab (ed), *Marxism and Feminism,* London: Zed Books (2015).

[15] In *Writing the Social* Smith teaches us a method of mapping, connecting the local with the extra-local, which allows us to step out of the binary use of the notions of 'here' and 'there'. See especially pp. 125-130.

our struggles within the social. Conversely, the notion of class and the phenomena of class struggles cannot be conducted outside of this differentiated and composed social terrain. Struggles against the state must be waged on the ground of civil society, while transformation of the everyday life of civil society must attend to the constitutive impact of roles of the state.

Part II An Anti-Ideological Understanding Of Violence Aimed Towards Understanding Violence Against Women

In the last few years there has been an exponential increase in violence against women in India. Rapes, gang rapes, rapes in police custody, rapes by members of the Indian army – ranging from urban centres and villages to forest and agricultural lands inhabited by peasants and tribes – are ubiquitous. These activities have been accompanied by acid attacks, sexual harassments of all kinds, and have become staples of the news media. They have expanded earlier and established practices of rapes, dowry murders, female foeticide or infanticide, dictates of caste *panchayats* (caste councils), rapes of all kinds in communal riots and pogroms against muslims (Gujarat 2002). We should also explicitly mention marital rapes, whose sanitized expression is 'domestic violence' which hard-wires family lives in all patriarchal societies.

The pervasiveness of violence, of hatred and degradation of women of all ages, has made 'violence against women' a legal category not only in India but everywhere else, including international agencies. Time and again great resistance of women's and other social movements, left and liberal political parties has led to the establishment, extension and amendments of laws. But even so the executive apparatuses of the Indian central and provincial governments have not displayed any great effectiveness in this matter. This is revealed by police negligence and by the slowness of the justice system in taking up and deciding cases, along with the occurrence of rapes in police custody or by Indian armed forces enjoying the immunity of the Armed Force Special Powers Act (AFSPA). Justice is not only denied by delay, but rendered inconceivable for many by the absence of proper police records and implementation of laws, and by court acquittals of perpetrators. This 'violence against women' and neglect by institutions of law enforcement demand an historical, materialist/anti-ideological analysis. This requires that we place this current state of affairs in the prevailing socio-economic, political situation and dominant ideologies.

This critique needs to refer to the anti-ideological epistemological method I mentioned earlier through bringing disparate, seemingly unconnected topics together. To critique 'violence against women' we need to introduce our knowledge of history as a part of the collage. In the immensely long persistence of patriarchy we have noted the symbiosis between social and sexual divisions of labour in all aspects of the mode of production. They are manifested in the social organization and relations and in the accompanying forms of consciousness. In every mode of production which is based on private property and its apparatus of administrating and ruling we find patriarchy as a core element implying overt

and covert violence against women.[16] This is a structural economic as well as a cultural-moral and religious matter. Countless writings on women and sexuality have uncovered constitutive relations between property and propriety.[17] The mode of production is inclusive of civil society and the state, which are elaborated from a synthesis of patriarchy, class and other cultural-social relations of production, reproduction and power. Common sense of morality and religious institutions contain, for instance, definitions of female morality, of good and bad women and the resulting triptych of the virgin, the mother and the whore. All religions, even those which are otherwise antagonistic to each other, subscribe to the same or similar proscriptive norms regarding women, grounding them in a hierarchical space. Ideologies of femininity have co-existed with simultaneous deifying mythologies and demonization of women. It is never trite to remember that sexual, social and labour ownership of women and their children, whether in marriage or not, have provided the moral and administrative apparatuses of the church, the state and the family. Until now, and even now in most countries, the family is conceived possessively and is the possession of the father, not the mother. Not only are the patriarchal ('normal') familial institutions intrinsically violent, especially violating of women's bodies and minds, but many societies and states contain legal threats of disciplining and punishing the deviants. With the waning of feudalism and the rise of capitalism societies changed somewhat, but patriarchy did not disappear. It actually elaborated and mutated, became materialized in and through spatial and labour segregation between the private and the public spheres – production and reproduction – with continuing moral patriarchal valence as well as religious authoritarianism.

It is evident that patriarchal capitalism has normalized violence of many kinds for centuries within and outside of family lives. Many dehumanizing practices and their legitimating forms of consciousness enshrined in the economy, the state, religion and social conventions proliferated. This normalization of violence in protean forms threatening life itself is brutally evident in Marx's critique of "so-called primitive accumulation" mocking Adam Smith *et al's* ideology of piety and hard work (work ethic) of the rich/the capitalist.[18] Primitive accumulation affects not only men but equally women, though differentially,

[16] On family as a form of slavery through sexual division of labour, see *The German Ideology* and F. Engels, *The origin of the family, private property and the state*, New York: International Publishers (1964).

[17] H. Bannerji, S. Mojab and J. Whitehead (eds), *Of Property and Propriety: The role of gender and class in imperialism and nationalism,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press (2001). See 'Introduction'.

[18] Marx, *Capital*, Vol I, Part VIII: "In times long gone by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent and, above all, a frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living… . Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell but their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such insipid childishness is everyday preached to us in the defence of property." (p. 667)

combined with the violence of commodity fetishism and alienation. This is what we need to remember to understand the present-day onslaught of global neoliberalism – the form of capitalism of our times – and its impact on lives of people. 'Primitive accumulation' as it obtains now in India and elsewhere is in a continuum with a wide range of on-going violence against all, and especially women.

Primitive accumulation is both prior and coterminous, external and internal to the process of capitalist development. Though it infiltrates as well as directly invades and destroys the lives, labours and societies which were pre-capitalist, it cannot be still relegated to history. The eviction and dispossession that happened in the earlier phases also exists within the economic system with the help of the evolving and expanding capitalist state. This apparently socio-legal, yet brute and armed force, while not directly within the circuit of capital, still undergirds the whole mode of production and should be seen both as the source of capital's birth and its mode of renewal. Not only was primitive accumulation once written in 'annals of blood and fire', in wars, invasions, colonization, slavery and bonded labour, but it is continually being rewritten up to now. No sustained distinction can be maintained, therefore, between primitive accumulation of growth and dispossession, as some have done.[19] Territory is still vital for capital, thus land is a crucial element, but along with that, labour, bodies, natural and industrial resources are constantly annexed and re-colonized. The ideological use of the notion of 'development' covers this truth and sanitizes the entire violence of the accumulation project and its processes. Capital's expansion depends on the annexation of spaces and speeding up of time. Lives hitherto outside capitalism come into its grip and are constantly re-worked. Older forms of capitalist spaces and time schemes re-settle the earlier settled spaces, thus re-invent spaces of capital. Capitalist growth and human dispossession are twins. This constant reworking of the same grounds can be metaphorically captured by the trope of 'gang rape', where the same body is repeatedly violated. In spite of claims to the contrary, human and capitalist development cannot really happen together. Capital's grab for natural resources, markets, human labour and bodies are composites of a total violence. Furthermore this violence nourishes the symbiotic relations of the state and the civil society in their porousness and circulatory constitution. Spaces for expansion and reproduction of capital are conquered and re-invented within a time frame of hyper-rationalized labour that resonates with the taking over, breaking down and re-construction of productive spaces.[20] I

[19] See David Harvey, for instance, the originator of the notion of 'accumulation by dispossession' in *The new imperialism,* Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005), taking his cue from Rosa Luxembourg. There have been debates on the difference between those who espouse primitive accumulation as understood (supposedly) by Marx, and Harvey's position. Bill Dunn, in "Accumulation by Dispossession or Accumulation by Capital? The Case of China" in *Journal of Australian Political Economy* No 60, pp. 5-27, gives a rundown on these discussions/debates. Judith Whitehead, in *Development and dispossession in the Narmada Valley,* Delhi: Longman (2010), tries to mediate between these positions, and in my opinion succeeds, as she demonstrates through her study of eviction and resettlement of people victimized by the Narmada dam project in India.

[20] See 'creative destruction', a term coined by Joseph Schumpeter and later used with reference to neoliberalism

will return to this frenetic sense of time later.

We must, therefore, see both the continuity and change in capital's development. The territorial expropriation and devastation presently growing in India and elsewhere means also the eviction of the inhabitants and the extreme exploitation and repression imposed on them. Not only cheap labour but sexual and biological bodies of the world's majority who cannot find a space in the labour market are thrust through capital's workings and turnovers into homelessness and dangerous flights resulting in various kinds of 'slavery', including what I call bio-slavery.[21] The quintessential violence of all these factors is both obvious and subtle and present every day. It is not a surprise, therefore, that the violence of patriarchy, in conjunction with the penetration of the market in every aspect of life, has been erupting so powerfully in India in its convulsions to birth neoliberal capitalism.

According to an Indian proverb, land and women are spoils of heroes. A crucial mode of entry into Indian patriarchal neoliberalism is through the struggles waged over land and common natural resources. Villages, water, forests and other resources are sought to be privatized, of which one method is through amendments introduced to the 2013 Land Acquisition Act now being rushed through by the BJP government through the promulgation of ordinances.[22] Though a 'development' agenda has existed under the earlier phases of Congress government, there has been a redirection in the last few years from a modicum of concern for the rendered poor, to the present, when such people are not seen as deserving protection in any way, neither as shareholders nor as stakeholders. This Land Acquisition Act, which was pushed through under pressure from the left and progressive political elements, had tried to stem, if limitedly, the primitive accumulation through the devastation of agriculture, forest lands, rivers and water systems, and of the environment in general. It had clauses pertaining to impact assessment on the population, on their livelihood and the environment, compensation and rehabilitation for the evicted and the displaced. Though it has had no time to be actualized, this Act offers a formal and minimal recognition of popular possession through prior occupation of land or use of resources. The ordinances brought in by the Modi government are bent on destroying that. This is done to "open up" India for 'free trade', with no barriers for foreign as well as national private investments, freeing the investors to 'develop' at will with no liabilities or compensation, privatizing state based enterprises. Instead the Indian government is offering to pay minimally for the harms inflicted by these private corporations from the public exchequer. Though slowed down somewhat by the

by Harvey, Marhall Berman and others.

[21] I use this term to express the near absolute dispossession and bondage of this evicted, 'surplus' labour, whose very bodies and body parts become commodities, rather than their embodied labour. 'Harvesting' organs to patenting genes, to the renting of wombs and producing of babies as commodities, are all part of this process. The notion of 'slavery' here is iconic in the sense in which the nazi holocaust is the central representation for measuring extermination of 'others'.

[22] See T.K. Rajlakshmi, "Land Bill hits a wall" in *Frontline*, March 20, 2015, pp. 26-29; also Prafulla Dasi, "Hill of Resistance – Fight against bauxite mining in Niyamgiri", *Ibid*. pp. 30-32.

complexities and resistances of a parliamentary political system, regional and state government disagreements and the resistance of the left political parties, unions and left popular movements, primitive accumulation of the neoliberal era is fast accelerating. In this attempt at invention of space for 'growth', not only are the 'undeveloped' (forest, mountain terrain and other mineral rich) areas being annexed, but previously developed agricultural holdings of middle to better off farmers are also constantly preyed upon and their assets de-developed and land sold for other purposes. The perils of loans sustaining competition with larger capital can be measured in thousands of suicides by indebted farmers.

The violence of this primitive accumulation is sought to be concealed by the ideological discourse of 'development' with its feel good, fuzzy quality.[23] Modi's enormously funded election campaign was fought on this platform of promise of development (*vikas*) for all expressed in slogans of *acche din sabke liye* (good days for everyone), and *sabke sath, sabke pas* (with everyone, near everyone), spinning a rhetorical web of inclusivity. The Indian state's earliest aspiration to take on the guardianship of the poor to some extent in their food security, livelihood, health and education, as well as to strengthen the national industrial bourgeoisie, is being mowed down by a storm of structural adjustment imperatives resting on privatization and foreign direct investment. The significant tense shift in Modi's governmental rhetoric to "make in India" (becoming the outsourcing site for foreign capital) from the earlier governments' "made in India" (of import substitution) marks the distance traversed by the Indian state between the much earlier and the current stages of capitalist development.

In India, as elsewhere, 'development' through strong industrial organizations of the state and private capital is being destroyed, but 'development' for profit is taking place in the countryside by predatory private capital in mining, lumber and agribusiness. This phenomenon has been discussed by social scientists and journalists from India and elsewhere, but not to much effect.[24] State sector enterprises are predominantly privatized now, and sold off as time passes. In the new scheme of affairs the city eats up the countryside. Building construction for housing (for the rich/middle class), land deals, corporate office towers, production and call centres figure prominently on this list, as also do shopping malls, recreational and leisure facilities (resorts, spas, golf courses). The penetration of agriculture by biotech, chemical and pharmaceutical companies have been attested by great destructive

[23] On Modi's development agenda see Varghese George, "A leader and his narrative" in *The Hindu*, Magazine Section. "Modi's doctrine in civilizational terms has proposed a new social contract in which the minorities and Dalits have limited or no place in political power. In Parliament, State Assemblies and councils of ministers at the centre and states, the Muslims' representation has become negligible; for the first time in India there is not a single Muslim MP in the leading party of the ruling coalition. This way the proposed social contract suggests development not as a participatory process." P. 1

[24] See *Economic and Political Weekly*, which has carried a large amount of material on Indian development agenda both in its current and past issues. A qualitative change in the idea of 'development' and its euphemistic uses in India and elsewhere may be traced through this journal.

chaos. Vast numbers of people live in great poverty and die from malnutrition due to near starvation. The country is constantly traversed by fleeing voluntary or involuntary internal migrants. They are people rejected by the labour market, denied subsistence on agriculture, many living and dying on city sidewalks. Neoliberalism has forced the growth of 'cities of slums' and trafficking of women, children and men for domestic or other lowest paid labour, including sexual.

Everything I have touched upon is a matter of capitalist development and violence. Violence is the foundation of the metabolic system of the capitalist mode of production, and neoliberal capitalism is its most logical and mature phase up to now. As feminist scholars have shown, capitalism's organizational necessity of patriarchy – both in production and reproduction – is also foundational. Cultural mores of high profit margin are made with moral regulation. They work constitutively between the social relations of the state and civil society and together subjugate women and the majority of the population. What Althusser called 'the ideological apparatus of the state' is central to this mix. In this era of super mobile and developed technology primitive accumulation now is not only securing cheap and almost unpaid labour, but nationally/locally or internationally active transportive organizations are supplying bodies for 'harvesting'. In this sense the model/ideal type of 'primitive accumulation' found in *Capital* (Volume I) needs a stretch as capital is no longer in crucial need of an older style proletariat for putting in place industrial enterprises of scale or for populating colonies. In the global south as well as north a precarious, semi-bonded labour is found in the special economic zones of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Philippines and in piece-work factories in/around California. The eviction through various forms of primitive accumulation in 17th – 20th century Britain, led to the substantial creation of a working class for giant industries which were spatially located, as for example in Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield. The colonial conduits and the army relocated European populations at the cost of indigenous peoples of the Americas. The neoliberal form of commodity producing capital does not need either a huge or a spatially concentrated, long term labour force. Through the manipulation of high technology the poorest labour, often women, can be inserted in the labour process. It has robbed people entirely of their life entitlements, preventing them from selling their labour except under strict conditions of others' mercy. For many in India, Africa and elsewhere, to be alive is a privilege. They can participate in the market neither as consumers nor as producers. What has been called 'precarious' life or 'bare' life is their permanent mode of chance existence.[25]

Under these circumstances what was called 'formal' - i.e. normal - labour with a degree of predictability in duration and physical concentration and better wages has been replaced by the new normalcy of what was once called 'informal', i.e. occasional, casual or flexible labour. This new normalcy has resulted in a growing decline in the older forms of

[25] See G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life,* Stanford: Stanford University Press (1998); also J. Butler, *Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence,* London: Verso (2004)

trade unions or labour organizing in terms of their strategies of class struggle. The older ideas and practices need innovating and expansion. This is happening very slowly due to the persistence and expansion of the now normalized precarious and temporary labour force. For the majority of Indians their living bodies and labour are *de facto* redundant and their life spaces and sustenance are out of reach.

In earlier communist literature, beginning with Marx, there was an expectation of 'withering away of the state' when communism becomes the mode of production. The agents of this withering were the conscious proletariat and its growing democratic participation in shaping all aspects of life. But that has not been the case in communist states and societies we have seen so far. Before they could reach this state they were caught in the stranglehold of world capitalism led by the U.S or the trammels of capitalist development in their own countries. Instead the slogan of less state has been raised by neoliberalism. 'Free trade' stands for this 'freedom'. But is there an actual withering away of the state by neoliberalism? It is certainly the case that from the mid-1980s or so there has been a withdrawal of the state through the structural adjustment fiats. The state was pulled away from a protective or ameliorative role toward the poor into eventually wholly augmenting free enterprise. India from the mid-1980s onwards embarked on this venture and submitted to conditionalities of 'austerity' forced for the submergence of or the integration between Indian (national) and global imperialist capital. Doing this required much violence and continues to do so. SAP devastated the global south – the new European 'austerity' measures faced by Greece are now devastating the north in a similar fashion.

In India the privatization mandate has forced an orgy of de-institutionalizing of the state in its social welfare and democracy promoting functions. Has this anything to do with the inertia of the Indian state in dealing with violence against women, for example through police negligence and contribution towards crimes against women and the poor?[26] Has it also not exponentially increased a cynicism about 'law and order', so that we see a rise in mob justice and so-called conflict resolution privately? The state in the global south, with its colonial inheritance of loss and 'progressive' development, had an element of a comprador state and is now matured to a great collusion with national and foreign capitalist classes. In India and elsewhere it quickly gave up the idea of public good. Has this anything to do with the corruption and crimes that have been overwhelming India? The Indian state's withdrawal is nearing its completion in handing over the poorer segments bound hand and foot to the freedom of the market and finance capital. Thus for the poor an 'end' of the state as an enabler is truly in sight, its due diligence for public good is ended by becoming a total instrument of

[26] For an example of police contribution to violence against women in India see *Times of India,* January 2, 2014, p. 1, a news report under the headline: "Cops tell gang-rape victim's family to go back to Bihar: forcibly try to cremate body at night". The article begins: "Gang-raped twice and dumped in government hospital for three days with fatal burns, the 16-year old victim had no peace even after death. Police hijacked the hearse carrying her body on Tuesday night and forcibly took it to Nimtolla Ghat for cremation, ignoring the family's request to wait until Wednesday."

capitalism. In its capacity of a national state it has signed away the rights and resources of the majority of the people.[27] In matters of financial liability, insurance, legalization of all forms of primitive accumulation, the state has created a landing pad for invading foreign and national private capital. This entails a derangement in Indian lives and societies. The situation is tantamount to a state of war which is both economic and military.

Global neoliberalism, the imperialism of our time, is a human, social and ecological disaster. Rife with wars and civilizational destruction, we see masses plunged into abysmal existence and death. The very content of the word "human" is being emptied out and filled with screams of agony of those condemned to it. In this atmosphere of violence how can violence against women not intensify, almost as an excrescence of this ordered disorder? Newspapers in India report occurrences of gang rapes, rapes of children and the elderly routinely. Patriarchy has been violently activated through the loss of livelihood and the ferocity of the market. Violent masculinism pumps up the ethic of grabbing fast all 'goods' including bodies of women. The whole social scene is one of a display of bodily and economic prowess. A proper understanding of violence against women, then, needs to be mapped within the polity and economy of neoliberalism that I have outlined so far. [28]

Having described the lethal combination of patriarchy and neoliberalism which structure social life in India, we will now move on to discuss how 'violence against women' can be deployed as an ideological category to limit its efficacy and to keep it apart from being an essential component of class struggle. Here we need to remember how phrases or words achieve an ideological status through a certain epistemological grammar, through linguistic and reconnective usages that wrench them out of their specific socio-historical contexts and locations. As stated above, ideological practice involves the conversion of a descriptive word into a self-standing conceptual category – which then has to connect with spheres of discursivities which generate elsewhere. Also ideas which have no real connections with each other are bound together with ruling and exploiting relations and intentions. Here we can see how Marx's three tricks for producing ideology can be applied to the notion of violence against women. Rather than being an analytical category it serves as an interpretive one. Rather than describing social behavior of a particular social moment, this becomes a standardizing category relating to the current state and governance, mainly for sociological coding and legal reform. This move helps to abstract what is happening to women in a particular sphere but does not necessarily encourage us to link it back to the relevant

[27] The role of the state in neoliberalism needs to be understood not only in its withdrawal but in its instrumental crucial role as the host of neoliberalism, signing away to private corporations all of what belongs to the people of India. See Chirashree Das Gupta, *op, cit*, ; also David McNally, *Global Slump: The economics and politics of crisis and resistance,* Blackpoint, N.S.: Fernwood (2011).

[28] See C. Das Gupta, *op. cit.* and Elizabeth Armstrong, *Gender and Neoliberalism: The All India Democratic Women's Association and globalization politics,* New York: Routledge (2014) on neoliberalism's multiple violences on lives of Indian women, including sexual violence. See also V. Butalia and T. Sarkar (eds), *Women and Right-Wing Movements: Indian Experiences,* London: Zed Books (1995)

historical, socio-economic and political contexts. This is apparent if we juxtapose 'violence against women' as a bounded legal category, a textually mediating term, with the descriptive and situating use made in the reporting of events pertaining to women. The newly abstracted category can be used instrumentally and manipulated to devise exclusive laws which do not provide elements for creating wider political and social struggles for women's emancipatory subjectivities and agencies. This same ideological conversion of notions such as 'development' can be found in the workings of the Indian economy and other social laws in the interest of the capitalist classes. We can claim that binary concepts, the constructions of public and private social spaces, social and sexual divisions of labour, commoditization and degradation of labour and human bodies, especially of women's productive and reproductive bodies, normalize violence in the family and society at large. This normalization is itself a violence and provides the ideological core of 'violence against women'. What has to be stressed is that without rendering capitalist patriarchy invisible as violence, without normalizing the violence against humanity implied in capitalism, violence against women cannot arise, sustain or increase. The extreme violence of gang rapes, dowry murders, witch burning, *satidaha* (burning women on their husbands' pyre) and cruelties of caste or community organizations towards women could not arise without the 'normal' violence of entire ways of life. Neither women nor men, neither the poor nor the rich, are immune to this overall dehumanizing ethos.

Lest we give the impression that 'violence against women' cannot be used as a concept or to describe or to fight for justice because capitalism is inherently patriarchal and we must wait until it ends, we need to stress that latent violence in social organization attains blatant forms under some circumstances more than others. In the present neoliberal social condition in India and elsewhere the conjuncture of forces is right for this extreme blatancy as all parts of societies are undergoing a massive upheaval through dispossessions of life sustenance, wars and invasions. As a ruthless primitive accumulation is tearing up Indian society by its roots to institute neoliberalism's legitimation mechanisms, violence or brute strength has become the dominant political modality. Casting aside social bonds in favour of profit and consumption, in the neoliberal phase of capitalism the imperatives of the 'base' have themselves become the 'superstructure'.[29] As we have seen in the last decades, riots, pogroms against muslims and other minorities and militancy and police confrontations in wars for resources have become mobilizing political maneuvres of political parties of the right.[30] We also need to remember the importance of ideology in such situations and note that violence takes its most extreme forms when legitimized by moral justification or faith in religion, for

[29] See D. Harvey, *New Imperialism*, ch. 4: 'Accumulation by Dispossession'. See also Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and its discontents*, New York: New Press (1998).

[30] On riot and pogroms as modes of mobilization for the BJP and other hindu right wing parties, such as the Shiv Sena, Maharashtra Navanirman party, etc., see H. Bannerji, "Making India hindu and male"; also A.G. Noorani, *The RSS and the BJP: A division of labour,* New Delhi: Left Word (2000), and T. Basu *et al*, *Khaki shorts, saffron flags: A critique of the hindu right,* New Delhi: Orient Longman (1993).

example, or in ethnic nationalism. When violent imperatives are thus embedded in popular moral, emotional and imaginative lives they take on an unconditional existence. This is where the extensive civil society based ideological fieldwork of the Sangh Parivar since 1925 provides their inputs. Their ideal of *hindutva*, a distillation of casteist hinduism, is a moral-political ideology poisoning the entire society. Presented as moral imperatives in the name of the hindu pantheon and a pure and exalted form of civilization, this ethnic nationalism calls hindus to social/political action against their 'enemies', namely the muslims. Armed with this moral and divine strength, wearing masks of gods and heroes, violence against women, muslims or any other group assumes a great public and spectacular form. Spectacles of force of religion and the state are the order of the day, and gang rape is also such a spectacular display of masculine power, which invests its perpetrators with a more than life-size brute force – a full synthesis of embodied masculinity. The deathly acts of the cadres of hindu supremacism are projected as social/collective punishment for 'erring' women and overreaching religious minorities. Muslim and other minority women women are specially targeted because hindu brahmanical masculine virtue must undertake it as a duty to preserve social order. These punishing acts range from caste panchayat (council) fiats to honour killing to gang rapes, all under the rubric of preserving moral purity. Rape then branches out from within the marital and family fold and private actions of individuals to the status of social or civilizational corrective. In the age of neoliberalism, where the idea of the social and binding social relations are sought to be erased and deranged, we are left with a macabre collage of patriarchal neoliberal capitalism with its ethics of hyper consumption, fundamentalist hinduism and the nation state based on ethnic supremacy. 'Violence against women', taken as a singular legal category, as a solely 'patriarchal' behavior rather than an expression of violent social relations, deflects our scrutiny from this composite reality and encourages us to treat women's maltreatment as a single issue, that of the power of men over women. Without the acknowledgement of this complexity of social formation not even a hint of an answer can be provided when people ask why violence against women in India is so rapidly increasing.

Neoliberalism's use of religious fundamentalism rather than secular modernity is a consciously undertaken ideological-political project. The moral appeal of this stance can be found the world over. The religio-ethnic/communalist hindu supremacism is thus not different in essence from islamic or zionist fundamentalisms that become state ideologies, nor is their union with neoliberalism so exceptional. Christian civilizational supremacism and all these other national and imperial projects rely on the evocation of the religious past and invented cultures and traditions. Mythification of history and politicization of myths to create ideological foundations for nation states are particularly important in an era that grows by fracturing the social space. These religio-ideological stances are loaded with hatred against the 'other', invented enemies such as women, ethnic 'others' and poor labouring people. Women according to this view are not quite 'human', but equated both with nature and as cultural objects of male consumption. They are also treated as plinths of the hindu family

edifice and as properties of men and masculinist society. This owned and subordinate status of women in all patriarchal societies has given rise from times immemorial to the idea of shaming the male 'others' of another group by raping 'their' women – India is no exception.

The pseudo-historical recuperation by mythic ethnic nationalisms, the pageants of holy war and claims of being the chosen of god, nurture a cult of heroes with a violent dark side. In fact without having the power of inflicting arbitrary violence, no one can be a hero at all. *Purushatwa* (masculinity) is the vital force of this domination. The code of conduct for the heroic and holy nation is of a perpetual war and the need to treat society as a battlefield. This war is against those designated as both dangerous and inferior, in the case of India they consist of religious minorities, communists, feminists and secularists. But their war is also against the weak, the poor, the defenseless, who hold the nation 'back'. They are the 'inferior' people whose lives are solely meant to provide services for the upper classes and upper castes. Women, religious minorities and the other 'others' must thus be held down in their place by the 'order' of this aggressive fundamentalist and capitalist masculinity in its most marketized and advertised form. There is an active and pre-emptive war going on against any popular democratic aspiration on the people's part. Any desire on the part of women and 'others' to control their own bodies, livelihoods and rights to justice is wholly unacceptable to these holy-minded illiberal neoliberals. In the Indian instance the word *purush,* signifying a quintessential maleness, performs an ideological function for the recruits of the hindu right. This high caste or brahmanical male typology projects rectitude, valour and sternness which conceal in an ideological cloak of austerity the reality of a rapacious mode of production and societal injunctions. This political vision is not so different from the social vision of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, in which society is a man-made jungle with its 'natural' laws of cannibalizing and ruthlessly eliminating those who are weak and fall behind.

Conclusion

It should be clear by now that due to the frenetic speeding up of time in the rationalization of labour in the present phase of capital, enabled by exponential growth in information technology and extreme financialization, there is a constant undoing and resettling of the same social and productive spaces. The resulting constant fracturing calls for a unifying ideological device if it is not to spin out of control politically. This makes neoliberalism an age of ideology, making working class consciousness which needs a larger segment of maturing time very difficult to emerge. Thus a clearly articulated class struggle on the part of the working class or the unemployed is more difficult to sustain, while the bourgeoisie are replete with their own class power and self-validation and have their victory for the time being. We can speculate as to how to theorize and analyze this rapidity of breakdown and the setting up of neoliberal capital, with its sandstorm of appearances, and what socio-political forms these frantic activities add up to. This makes it all the more urgent to explore and critique the emerging forms of consciousness, the outpourings of ideologies

both religious and secular and their co-existence. To make matters worse, neoliberal hindu fascism is loaded with imagistic and narrative forms. The myth filled, ritualistic nature of hinduism blends in with competitive consumerism and heroic conquest of 'others'. In the latest Republic Day parade attended by Barak Obama – the largest ever held in India – the hindu civil society groups also celebrate hitherto unseen traditional hindu rituals in a more than life-size manner. Processions of towering god figures and religious-patriotic ones, pageants based on the epic Ramayana, the use of caparisoned elephants and horses, hundreds of thousands of men with tridents and spears, marked the Republic Day, along with the state's military paraphernalia. These were accompanied by a dizzying assemblage of sounds, colours and light. The word "overwhelming" is inadequate for description. What is offered is a stimulous for vision and a synaesthetic representational totality that *blocks* seeing itself.

I would like to return to the themes of class and class consciousness based on a Fordist model of capitalism – involving industries of scale, large shop floors, huge assemblage of workers and long durée business plans – and its contrast to neoliberal work places and working modes. The earlier industrial capitalism has needed a collectivist workplace organization and a coordinated continuous labour process over a long period. Vast numbers of relatively skilled workers then worked together for reliable periods of time, which created possibilities of seeing themselves as bound by the same conditions, employers and interests and, as such, as members of a 'class'. This gave scope both to forging labour unions and forming 'proletarian' consciousness. This type of organization of production has been declining in India and other countries, instead falling back on earlier capitalist forms of home-work, putting-out, piece and temporary work, rendering gigantic overall work forces of free trade and export zones practically invisible as a proletarian labour force. These and other semi-slave labour modes found in India, Bangladesh, Mexico, etc. have not yet created legal or substantial social possibilities for organizing of unions or associations. As the former long term workers are being substituted by 'informal', 'flexible', 'temporary', 'part-time', and 'seasonal' labourers spread across different production sites globally, they are presenting needs for innovation in class politics. It is not true that commodity production has disappeared or that value is not really dependent upon concrete labour. But where, how, by whom and for how long – this concrete labour with its massive alterations has rendered earlier theories and practices analytically and organizationally inadequate. A fissiparous, competitive, transient mode of social being has produced a new productive subject whose imagined self and agentic consciousness become those of a vendor.

The steadiest economic activities now facing people are those of corporate capital or micro business enterprises which are constantly proliferating and dying. The primary social continuity and identity lies in being a consumer. The worker and the businessman see themselves as entrepreneurs and consumers. This makes sense as, despairing of proper employment or of any control over their life circumstances, the majority of the population are constantly veering towards small entrepreneurialization. They have been offered a fiction of independence. This petty entrepreneurial consciousness is aided by the training they have

been long receiving through creeping neoliberalism, NGOs, the remedy of micro credit, all for their 'empowerment'. Women in particular have been the trainees of this empowerment, through projects of small loans and so on. As such, a petty-bourgeois consciousness has become normalized as everybody's subjective consciousness. This subjectivity and its agentic forms are ideological ones, moving from the perception of 'people as makers' and producers of value to 'people the sellers and consumers' of whatever is around. This situation fosters primordialist types of consciousness which evade rational understanding. Class consciousness of such socio-economic subjects becomes a prey to competition, envy, and possessive individualism and develops political allegiances which are anti-worker, thus self-destructive. The thugs who now prevent or destroy working class organizing and class struggle from developing were, after all, former or would-be workers, now transformed into market hangers-on. The shock troops of right-wing political parties often come from these groups. They are the economic clientele and patronage seekers of these parties, clearing for them in exchange the social undergrowth of left resistance. This makes the established types of democratic resistance increasingly difficult to mobilize.

It is not a surprise, therefore, to see the appeal of religious communalist ideology or the intensification of violence against women among these subjects. New traditions and re-interpreted ethnicities have been poured into old right wing ideological containers of religion, of nationalisms of blood and belonging and the ethic of ownership of women and land. These are rich sources for group identification sought by the oppressor to pacify the oppressed. These invented and synthesized religions are deeply inegalitarian but create an illusion of equality within the group. Through this process of identity politics of religion and ethnic nationalism the disempowered experience an illusory closure of the gap between themselves and their rulers, and differences between themselves and others. This is the sop that the *hindutva* project of the Sangh Parivar offers to hindus as they destroy life certainties of the 'others'. To create a hindu nation they propose 're-conversion' to increase the national space, making actual social relations of class, caste and patriarchy invisible. This ideology embraces neoliberalism, seeking to conceal violent poverty and inhuman life conditions. Pragmatically speaking, there is also the seduction of the hope of getting closer to those in power who may provide even a meagre livelihood. These ideological expansions are not long sustaining. So they have to be sustained by frequent aggressive actions of superiority, hence the necessity of pogroms, of lynching and riots, and finally – of rape to keep the mothers of the nation in place. Religion and capitalism have now entered into a murderous union and we can see that modernity is not the intrinsic tool for capitalist development. A powerful symbology which cathects social deprivation, frustration and angers to anti-socialism is spreading rapidly. Thus, popular anger is deflected towards the weak, towards people like themselves, rather than attacking the real merchants of misery.

Critical Commentary

DECOLONIZING THE UNIVERSITY: THE CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES OF INCLUSIVE EDUCATION

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Biographical Note

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Abstract

This article argues for a reframing of the curriculum within the academy in order to make the academy more inclusive and more accessible to a diverse student body. Reframing the curriculum is seen as an aspect of decolonizing the university. Many questions emerge from this argument to include the following: What curriculum informs the education contemporary learners receive and how do they apply this to their academic and work lives? How do educators re-fashion their work as educators and also as learners to create more relevant understandings of what it means to be human and to determine what is human work? What are the limits and possibilities of visions of and counter and anti-visions to contemporary education? How do educators and learners challenge colonizing and imperializing relations within the academy and that influence the academy and its learners? How does curriculum become inclusive through teaching, research and graduate training and how does it make space for Indigeneity and multi-centric ways of knowing? How do we frame an inclusive, anti-racist, and anti-colonial global future and what is the work that is required to collectively arrive at that future? These complex questions, stimulated by my decolonizing curriculum work and experience, are engaged through the body of this article.

Keywords

Inclusivity, indigenity, multicentricity, schooling, education

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Overview

This article argues for decolonizing the university in order to make the academy more inclusive and more accessible to a diverse student body. Many questions emerge from this argument to include the following: What curriculum informs the education contemporary learners receive and how do they apply this to their academic and work lives? How do educators re-fashion their work as educators and also as learners to create more relevant understandings of what it means to be human and to determine what is human work? What are the limits and possibilities of visions of and counter and anti-visions to contemporary education? How do educators and learners challenge colonizing and imperializing relations within the academy and that influence the academy and its learners? How does curriculum become inclusive through teaching, research and graduate training and how does it make space for Indigeneity and multi-centric ways of knowing? How do we frame an inclusive, anti-racist, and anti-colonial global future and what is the work that is required to collectively arrive at that future? These complex questions, stimulated by my reframing curriculum work and experience, are engaged through the body of this article.

Seven sections make up this paper. In the first section, the Introduction, I establish my location in relation to this paper's argument and the colonial context out of

which the academy and this argument emerge. This is followed by a discussion of what it means to decolonize the university in section two and is based on my experience as leader and learner in this field. The case for an inclusive decolonizing curriculum follows in the next section and rests on its capacity to destabilize the power arrangements that embed and limit the academy and its local and global transformative capacity. The concepts of inclusion, curriculum, and decolonization permeate this paper from beginning to end and are explained fully in section four. Section five theorizes a decolonizing and an inclusive education within, but not limited to, the academy. Practical considerations follow in section six and are of critical importance to the mobilizing decolonizing intention of this paper. These considerations emphasize specific and concrete practices and processes that enhance the decolonizing and inclusive curriculum's traction within the academy and eventually beyond the academy. The last and final section, Discussion, brings together salient elements of the prior sections; foregrounds colonial education's easy submission to and reinforcement of neoliberal market forces; and identifies ways to enhance the capture of an "inclusive and decolonial curriculum agenda" through programming and training within the academy. I end with an acknowledgement of the deep importance of establishing, maintaining, and strengthening a decolonizing and inclusive curriculum within the academy as essential and urgent social justice work. This work extends beyond the boundaries of the academy to condition multiple scales of transformation. Because of this, decolonizing and inclusive curricula cause much energetic contestation and are often actively and (un)consciously undermined. In such cases a "politic of rage" is required to ensure its survival and the mobilization of transformative human potential that, not limited to humans, extends to and through the land to impact the natural world. This is the challenge that I consider myself part of, and it is the challenge I invite us all to engage more critically, more transparently, and with more Indigeneity.

I. Introduction

Let me begin by recognizing our Ancestors and our past and present Elders as I pay homage to the Indigenous Turtle Island where I currently reside and Ghana my home. I share with the Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island, known to many as North America, a past and a present of land dispossession, genocide and colonization by outsiders whom we graciously welcomed. And I share with Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island and throughout the world an understanding of land as a site and a source of teachings and of spiritual regeneration. When the land is engaged through its teachings and its spirit by every soul it offers up healing paths that allow us to wrestle collectively and holistically (earth-centrically and multi-centrically) with the challenges of contemporary life and to unburden those deeply inscribed by the unfreedoms that have

for too long been denied, ignored, submerged, repressed, compressed, thwarted, re-written, and forgotten to profit the colonial. My project through this article, both academic and political, and beneath these spiritual, is one of decolonization broadly and reframing the curricula more specifically. To effect this project I invite the reader to join me in a purposefully and a necessarily provocative conversation, one that began long before this article among our Ancestors and our Elders and one that must continue in order to expose the concealed and embedded processes and practices of colonization that persist this day in the institution of school. Both the broader global project and the specific focused school curricula project of reframing that I endorse demand a courageous confrontation with colonization; it must be named clearly, called by this name and faced directly; it must be mined thoroughly to expose its cumulative scaffolding and its long penetrating roots; and we must mobilize collectively and indigenously as we do so to effect a transformative momentum. I provide an entry point into this process of mobilization by employing several African proverbs that catalyze the indigenizing trajectory that underwrites my scholarship generally and this article specifically. African proverbs are shared as wise sayings that have deeply conceptual meanings as well as simple and literal meanings. At these two interdependent and coincident meaning levels African proverbs can be experienced within communities as enhancing and altering knowledge through their cryptic capacity to: expand and collapse meaning; facilitate embodiment of that which is important, contentious, abstract, or requires synthesis and integration; and empower the educator/provider and the learner/receiver through the provision of a structure that seeds resolution or determines direction for a problem, an issue, or an experience. In this way proverbs like this article are political/relational and academic/confrontational and so serve my purposes well. I however limit my analysis of and engagement with these proverbs solely to the extent that they advise the school curricula decolonization project.

The first proverb I bring forward is from the Akan people of Ghana. The Akan people say that "*if you want to know how heavy a bag of salt is ask the one carrying it*" [*Wo pese awuhu nkyene mu duro a bisa dea eso nno].* From this we are directed to ask the bearer of knowledge as knower of this knowledge, its contents and its spirit for information. The Akan people suggest through this proverb that knowledge cannot be acquired through observation or through the fragmentation of measurement. Knowledge comes from and can only be voiced by one, the one who bears the felt and lived experience of this knowledge, the bag of salt, and therefrom knows. This proverb challenges and confronts the historical and contemporary assertion of dominance in relation to their right to know, to show, and to tell that which they have not experienced, do not or have not embodied or sensory-somatically engaged. Through this process dominance assumes the role of expert; assigns itself primary and global discursive authority; ascribes value to appropriated knowledge; and easily dispenses with the emptied knower. This, the Akan proverb argues, and many Indigenous people would

argue is not knowledge. We have come however to understand this method of knowledge appropriation as the formulaic assertion of power that characterizes dominance and its colonial work. We are invited through this proverb to critique knowledge; the knower; and how one has come to assert, contest, capture and purportedly to embody knowing. This proverb also gestures a return to the human who bears knowledge and its knowing while simultaneously acknowledging and legitimizing the bearer as knower. This return is what Indigenous, inclusive, and decolonizing education desire and rely on also. In this article I ask that we find ways to unveil the colonial and its distortions, fragmentation, and uneven usurpation and disavowal of knowledge through and in colonial curricula. I envision this happening by including knowers, their ways of knowing, their knowledges, and their voices in curricular content, its design, and the processes of its transmission, discernment, contest, and embodiment. The Igbo People of Nigeria argue through two proverbs that when particular things are taken back this taking back or return cannot be concealed they make too much noise: *"stealing a drum is very easy but where to play it is the challenge" [Izuru ịgba dị mfe ma ebee ka a ga-anọ kụọ ya]*; and *"crabs legs cannot be stolen and eaten in secret"* [*"anaghi ata okpa nsiko n'ulu"].* I bring these proverbs forward as teachings and as warnings for those involved in decolonizing work. Decolonizing work requires critique both from within and without and it is work that must not be hidden. The proverbs suggest that when we think we are decolonizing we may not be at all, the drum must be played and the crab legs consumed openly for the full decolonizing turn. Decolonizing works and projects cannot be hidden and I would say that we should feel proud when we challenge the status quo around issues of social justice, fairness and equity. I say this because I view our capacities to contest, communicate, and establish reference points and trajectories for the ideals of social justice, fairness, and equity; and our capacity to materially express these ideals make us human and are what restore Indigeneity. Our humanness is founded on these capacities in relation to these ideals which I suggest flow from and reinforce a caring ethic.

By "reframing curriculum", I mean a way to think through and pursue the school curriculum primarily as a decolonizing project. I am fully aware of the contested meanings of 'decolonization' and how the term can be problematic, especially in the North American context, when it is liberalized as not to address key issues of Land, Indigeneity and settler colonialism (see Tuck and Yang, 2012 - when they write about "decolonizing is not a metaphor"!). There are many paths to decolonization. Thus, I am also different readings and interpretations to decolonization in search of an international appeal. Today "decolonization" is mainstreamed and when a decolonial practice is mainstreamed it is no longer decolonial. As critical anti-racist and colonial scholars cannot give up on the term to liberal articulations. We must be asking new questions. The importance of grounding scholarship in Indigenous perspectives and the epistemic traditions of knowledge of colonized/oppressed/Indigenous peoples. The land constitutes a basis of onto-epistemological existence and pursuing strategies of resistance and anti-colonial

politics. Colonialism did its dirty job over/on Indigenous peoples Lands. Indigeneity and, particularly the question of Land, is significant unifier of the colonial encounter and experience among Indigenous and colonized peoples. Yet, we must bring multiple readings of the relations to Land so as to trouble/complicate ontological claims to the primacy of the Lands as starting point for all decolonial/anti-colonial engagements (see Dei, 2016). For example, while Land is sacred, revered and has a sanctity that is shared by all Indigenous peoples, it is also important to understand Land as a site of violence, pain and suffering. To this end decolonization as a knowledge consciousness about identity, sense of place, location, the ways we produce and legitimize knowledge and social existence, as well the climates, environments and social organizational aspects of education as broadly defined is significant to my project of "decolonizing the academy'. Within global educational systems one of the major problems we are dealing with is the subjectification and delegitimation of particular bodies, experiences, histories and local cultural resource knowledge base as constitutive significant aspects of education practice.

Similarly, there exists a corpus of work on "inclusive education" from the social justice perspective that highlights significant theoretical, philosophical, conceptual and practical questions about inclusive education (see Ainscow and Dyson, 2006; Ainscow and Miles, 2008; Ainscow and Sandhill, 2010; Amstrong , Amstrong, and Spandagou, 2010; Peters 2005; Peters and Oliver, 2009; Slee 2001; 2011; Slee and Allan, 2005). I am taking inclusion as "radical inclusion", i.e., beginning or creating anew realizing the limits of integrating into what already exists when 'that which already exists' (i.e., the current school/education system) is the source of the problem in the first place! Appreciating, sharing and validating values, histories, experiences, knowledges and experiences are relevant; yet these are still not enough. What we need is a fundamental structural change for a deeply flawed system notwithstanding educators and administrators "good intentions". Hence, the question of how much of inclusive education is about teaching Indigeneity and resistance and rewarding [rather than punishing] resistance on the part of young learners is important to me.

Consequently, a discussion of "decolonizing the academy" through a reframed school curriculum is about subversion, putting a critical gaze on structures and processes of educational delivery (structures for teaching, learning, and administration of education) that continually create and reproduce sites of marginality and colonizing education for learners. It is also about how we see race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, class, religion, language and disability as important identities that learners bring to school; and also, as significant social categories and relations of power and domination. Decolonizing the academy through a reframed curriculum helps me bring to the fore as well, spiritual, emotional and socio-environmental dimensions of schooling and education.

Decolonizing/ation is to my mind radical politics and this work must always be visible; it must be always be part of academic discourse; it must infuse academic projects

and systems of governance; and must be popularly disseminated to move it from places of fringe or *undercover scholarship* to its true, transparent, and multiple centers. This transparency however puts decolonizing scholarship and communities at risk. I have witnessed and have experienced some of these risks through time as have so many others going back to our Ancestors and our Elders. I acknowledge this because the colonial is still present and it will not allow itself to be pushed over or out without contest. Risk is inherent in all decolonizing and all transformative processes and we must not let this stop the advancement of our work. The consequences of not risking and not engaging are destructive, not only for those persons, communities, collectivities and nations who carry the unfreedoms and non-freedoms of the colonizing project but also for the land and natural world who suffer colonial unfreedoms and non-freedoms also. Subversive work that is truly decolonizing is also about radical inclusion. This work will allow us to collectively and multi-centrically mobilize to indigenize our relationships to each other, the natural world, and the land and facilitate indigenizing processes within the academy, through its curricula, and will transform our shared world. We must face the risks and consequences of engaging in this work transparently; of hidden engagement in this work; and of not engaging in this work. Each path has risks and each has consequences. The consequences of not centering this work and addressing the issues of social justice and inclusion within the academy will see the progressive and global emptying not only of knowledge but of bodies, of diversity, of creativity, of potential and kinetic energy, and of life. Transformation can only be realized when there is a space and place for the natural world, the land and for bodies that hold and carry knowledge to engage their right to know, to show, and to tell their knowing their way transparently and without negative repercussion or obliterating neutrality.

Colonizing /colonial/ imperial knowledge has long been with us. Ever since the colonization of time, knowledge production has been eurocentrically imbued and hegemonically installed within the structure, the hallways and the consciousness of academia. Decolonizing work must point to the varied aspects of the "crisis of knowledge" some of which include: the acceleration and reach of colonizing knowledge with globalization; the colonial mining of knowledge within Indigenous communities and within Indigenous bodies that decontextualize and disembody knowing and view the knowers as disposable or objects to be emptied; the colonial tendency to measure, name and claim as their own; and the colonial tendency to evaluate and hierarchically stratify knowledge based on parameters that it has designed and to which it subscribes. As a scholar of African descent and as I continue to trouble my own work in the academy I must constantly ask myself, again and again, how do we come into theory and practice as embodied through our African human-hood?

For educators and learners we must ask questions about radicalizing education to begin our inquiry. I present a list of questions to begin the process of unlocking the analysis of contemporary colonizing education and to invite a decolonizing education.

These questions will not be answered specifically but provide multiple trajectories for inquiry through problematizing contemporary education and the desired decolonizing education. These questions follow below and although do not exhaust the possibilities for inquiry provides us with a good beginning:

1. How do we frame an inclusive anti-racist and anti-colonial global future and what is the nature of the work required to collectively arrive at that future?
2. What education are learners of today going to receive and what are they going to do with it? The era of neo-liberalism and global capitalist modernity has not only implicated us in terms of how we think of our identities and subjectivities, but fundamentally, what collective meanings we produce and bring to the sense and purpose of education;
3. How do we "refashion" our work as a teaching faculty to create more relevant understandings of what it means to be human? And how do we work with the knowing and cultivate and instill the knowing that "something different is possible".
4. What sort of education should be taking place in the academy today?
5. How do we equip today's learners now, using multiple lenses of critical inquiry of knowledge? What I am gesturing to here is that fact that no one tells the full/complete story, so how do we tell multiple stories to get the whole story? How do learners of today read and understand our worlds in different ways, and further to this share such multiple knowings as a "community of learners"?
6. How do we challenge colonizing and imperializing relations of the academy? If we are to be critical scholars, then we must challenge our investments in colonial intellectuality and understand the relations of "politics to territoriality" (see Abraham 2011) as far more complex than simply who owns and claims to be entitled to certain spaces. It also involves the particular subject and intellectual praxis and politics that the "coming into a given space/land" requires us to uphold.
7. How do we engage "theory with a practice to boot"? That is ensuring that the theories we work with in the academy truly have "legs" and a "grounding" in local peoples' experiences;
8. How do we bring "humility of knowing" to our work? And how do we acknowledge and disrupt the power of "not to know" and replace the fears of reprisal of "to know" in the academy.

II. "Reframing the Curriculum": A Theory of Change

Reframing the curriculum calls for a critical reconsideration of the history of the academy/University itself. The academy is a site of uneven access, exclusion, one that sheds bodies and knowledges, and through spatial arrangements and absences limits the reach of alternative knowledges to colonial knowledges. It may be argued that "university curriculum" is really in the hands of the individual professors and deans. If that is so then how do we suggest changes that do not impinge upon the "academic freedom" that professors and researchers' value and "keep the university marketable"? Can we rethink this question by calling for academic responsibility and the need to make education more relevant to the diverse communities our institutions they serve? The main issue is what bodies, histories and philosophies are conjured in our academies when our disciplines are named in the current conventional way? What bodies (students) are in the classroom and who is teaching, and who is the teacher ultimately speaking to and what and who is being represented in the text, what theoretical framework are taken up, how and in what ways are lived experiences spoken about? Also, there are questions about what constitutes an academic text, what is the form of this text and who is given authority of voice, what courses are offered, and what is the purpose of curriculum – is it to meet market needs or is it to promote genuine learning?

In effect, there are fundamental questions around the silences and negations that routinely occur in many courses and departments. A reframed curriculum would mean addressing race, gender, class, sexuality, and disability in all disciplinary areas and within all faculties. We must challenge the troubling trends, especially during difficult economic times, of taking very liberal approaches to difference, which undermine race particularly, and progressively streamline out or siphon the academy of critical thought. Said another way the tendency is to eliminate that which is on the edge and not centered, that which troubles the status quo and the bodies it serves and that would include the study of inequality in anti-racist, anti-colonial, feminist, disability, and disability programs as well as others. To the liberal emptying I ask how we can develop new approaches to inclusion when for example departmental posters mention innumerable social issues but exclude race and class. The focus of Faculties of Education in Canada is now on teacher education in specific subject areas (such as math and language), and less on the broader sociology and equity themes that undergird education! Issues of equity and race are often discussed in a limited way or over the course of one week; they are never truly integrated in the curriculum in way that forces teacher candidates to think about race and to incorporate equity issues in their own practices in a meaningful way. In this way decolonizing work becomes arrested by the reduction of sociology and equity issues to a topic, a lesson, a special issue, and this work (decolonizing, critical, inclusive) consequently operates non-performatively (Ahmed).

To move forward and to mobilize a radical curricula there needs to be some attention paid to the centrality of the issues of race, gender, and class in all scholarly disciplines, and we need to consider how budget considerations force faculty and departments to consider how they address issues of race, equity, and diversity and whether they in fact do this at all. When departmental re-organization occurs there is also the risk of further diminishment and fragmentation. This has significant implications for recruiting faculty who may be interested in critical race studies for example and the support and collaboration of critically informed and engaged faculty.

Paying attention to the scope of topics covered in courses in a department or faculty so that a well-rounded, critical education is at least possible for those who choose to pursue it is very important to the spirit of decolonizing schools and decolonization globally.

Universities also have a responsibility to address public education system gaps and to develop courses that expose new students to critical equity thinking and knowledge of racism and its various forms and practices. As an example black face and racist graffiti need to be understood as racism and when practiced there must be severe consequences. My experience in this regard however has been that black face and racist graffiti have minor consequences which is itself is a teaching or pedagogical, this is part of the broader curriculum that I will discuss in the next section. These events must be critically analyzed for what they teach, for whom, at whose expense and why. In the case of the graffiti it is both text and pedagogy, and the tokenistic disciplinary response is as well and they communicate the ongoing presence of racist violence and racist work. There also needs to be support for scholars who are doing critical race and equity work, who often are subject to negative student evaluations, which in turn, consequently affects their tenure applications. Critical race and anti-racist courses are very confrontational to students of the dominant culture. And these students do not always appreciate being unsettled by the deeper workings of societies and nations and globalizations. Such courses challenge their sense of the everyday and this generates multiple tensions that are directed at their educator, the critical race scholar.

III. Making the Case for an Inclusive and Reframed Curriculum

History and Eurocentric science have always been tools of colonization. Science has been colonizing by its omission of certain bodies of knowledge and by its celebration of certain bodies and knowledges. A critic might ask how "reframing" curriculum and education impacts the natural sciences. I would argue that it is precisely the so-called natural and physical sciences that are at greatest risk for landing on the colonial runway and sliding quickly into reductivity, arrogance, and exclusivity. Indeed, this is a familiar path for science, natural or otherwise. The truth is that all subjects and their curricula –

whether physical, biological or medical to name a few – have histories of developing, interpreting, applying, testing, and collecting knowledge in oppressive, if not genocidal ways. What come to mind in this regard are, but certainly not only, the following uses of science and its knowledge: the Tuskegee experiments; the development and deployment of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; eugenics; lobotomy and bloodletting practices of psychiatry; and craniometry. It is difficult to simply claim that applications such as these were objective knowledge used in objectionable ways. At the time, all would have said they were simply involved in pure and objective science and indeed all have and this rationalization persists through multiple scales that span the classroom, the court room, policy development and its absence, and global responses to deprivation, violence, and transnational practice as a starting point. I raise this because there needs to be a serious acknowledgement of these histories with a view to understanding the politicized nature of all knowledge, and how it is mobilized in the interest of power and hegemony. And I raise this too so that I might underline the ethic of a reframing curriculum as one that is inclusive and does not harm and engages in critical analysis of what science is asking and for what purposes and for whom. Since we have not solved the problems of social power imbalances, we need to acknowledge how vulnerable we all are to misuse science in the interest of power. These discussions need to be had in conjunction with "learning the facts" that science provides and continuously engaging them in a critical analysis and comparative analysis with the facts that non-western science offer. Any other approach is irresponsible to say the least and violent, to be more frank. Other approaches that are not critical and not inclusive and allow power to mobilize science selectively ethically are evidence of colonial work which science has through time been willing to serve.

I know there are ethics courses – particularly in medicine, but even these tend not to (as far as I know) take a critical equity stance that takes up issues of race, gender, class, and such issues seriously. It seems that medical ethics for instance has walked through the sociological reality to land with hands on the human body and to engage in ethical analysis from this vantage point and without engaging in a full analysis of race or class or gender although perhaps attending to apparent vulnerabilities without necessarily organizing these vulnerabilities sociologically or from a critical equity perspective. Attention is being paid to the social determinants of health which do bring the issues I mentioned to the foreground although the response is not to change the burden of these social determinants it is to have them inform and guide the intervention. In essence situations such as these add something to their science that may or may not change their approach and does not always address these issues in a way that changes the health care system to one that is more inclusive. In fact racism, for example, precludes and interferes with care and with health.

Contemporary education then must deal with the "coloniality of Eurocentric science", "knowledge" and "history" and this Coloniality determines what it is that

science must know and the knowledge that science must disseminate through courses, books, research, curricula and what it celebrates knowing. This colonial germination selects for and excludes certain types of knowledge, engages in a downstream analysis of science and its applications, and misses, ignores, and denies the colonial as source or generator of the variables that condition the knowledge of science. In this way colonially germinated and informed science is severely constricted and is unable to tolerate the tension of multi-centric knowledges and approaches to science and limits itself to a single interpretation that is viewed as superior and as the only valid and reliable knowledge. How then do we come to know multiple perspectives of science and knowledge that provide new analysis of phenomenon and therefrom new responses to phenomenon? Also dominant conceptualization of Eurocentric "science" must be thoroughly questioned since Indigenous science knowledge has its own ontological, conceptual, philosophical, methodological, and axiological groundings (Asabere-Ameyaw, Dei & Raheem, 2012). There are other robust theories and philosophical perspectives that inform Indigenous Science knowledge that are as rigorous as Eurocentric science. It is delusional to view one's reality as the only reality worth talking about and one's tools for assessing this reality as the only tools available for understanding this reality. These delusions are the most dangerous of all delusions and these delusions allow colonial striving to ensue unabated taking hostage a substantive portion of the world's peoples, the world's land, and their knowledges. Colonial harms have and continue to be rationalized through this system of delusion through the knowledge of colonial science.

Our students must be informed about the complete genesis of ideas, events, occurrences, and developments that have shaped and continue to shape human history and development. This challenge in part calls for responding to the question of representation as bodies, as well as knowledges, through our curriculum and classroom pedagogies. That is, engaging multiple voices, bodies, knowledges, and experiences through a representation of who teachers are, what is taught, why, and how? We engage philosophies of circularity, knowledges of multi-centricity, as a way of coming to know holistically. It may also imply engaging the connectedness of body, mind, soul and spirit and other; and the nexus of nature, culture, and society to know more wholly.

We must be "teaching to transform" (hooks, 1994) – that is, to be self-reflective in our teachings and to ensure our teaching leads to structural transformation. We must use expansive pedagogies – i.e., expanding our pedagogical frameworks for teaching, including our curricula and texts. As educators it is imperative that we acknowledge and work with our vulnerabilities through critical inquiry and regarding critical inquiry to both prepare and strengthen our capacity to "enter the unfamiliar territory" that such inquiry opens up and to endure the risks of this entry. The risks of entry include dissonance, discomfort, disorganization and disturbance generally or broadly and although desirable for the transformative learning that bell hooks speaks of, transformative learning is not always desired and in such cases these embodied

disturbances of consciousness are not welcome and will be resisted. This is particularly the case in the departmental restructuring and collapsing that is occurring. Those departments that stir "trouble" tend to be threatened at various scales in subtle and overt ways. So the crucial question then becomes how do we bring teaching and learning into a "full circle for everyone involved" (Simpson, 2006, p. 196). And how do we establish this circle within the academy and eventually globally? I suggest that we use texts and other curricular and instructional materials to assist learners to engage from positions of power, resistance, and agency. For educators in particular, it is crucially important to acknowledge there are multiple literacies and multiple ways of coming to know and of "reading" information. As educators we must bring an embodied connection to our teaching, research, and scholarship. In other words, we must connect the relationship between the "body", as self, identity and the subject, and "embodiment" as a constitutive set of relations that structure, feelings and values. Embodied connection is also about ethics, consciousness, and responsibility.

IV. Key Concepts for Decolonization

a) The Curriculum

The curriculum can be understood as broadly encompassing the hidden and tacit elements of the academy. Curriculum is about everything in the school system that is felt and directs both the body, mind, strivings, aspirations and desire. These include such subtle pedagogies regarding: the implicit and explicit order of society; what is valued and how these values must be expressed; what paths are available for different strata of society; what actions are worthy of denial, recognition, humor, discipline and eviction and who and what is desired and how is this desire pursued; a path to follow, a course of action to take, etc. (Apple, 2004; Giroux, Penna & Pinar, 1981). Curriculum includes the official written rules and regulations of the school, as well as the hidden norms and unwritten codes and stipulations that capture and release bodies differently. I have used the term "Deep Curriculum" elsewhere to denote the intricate relations of culture, climate, environment, and the social organizational lives of schools, including the texts, instruction and pedagogies which crystalize into the form of the taught curriculum (Dei, et al., 1997). The curriculum, "Deep" and taught, is power-saturated and it is deeply social in its ordering and evaluating and severe in its discipline when this order and evaluation are not conformed to. To speak of curriculum in any meaningful way or from a critical equity frame we must ask: who has the power to construct, validate and legitimize knowledge, and what is acceptable and what is not and does what is acceptable change with the body that is performing the acceptable or the not acceptable? Curriculum then is about values, ideas, practices, as well as identities, race, class, gender, sexuality, disability

and more; and these values and identities are linked and placed through the curricular processes of instruction to produce and induct knowledge that vascularizes the colonial. Curriculum and instruction go hand in hand given that a curriculum only achieves its effect through its instruction to learners. In fact, curriculum and instruction can be said to be interlocking and to interdepend to give learning the desired inflection. Neither can generate the inflection fully in isolation and each requires the other for the final inflection and final measure to determine how important what is being learned truly is. One cannot function in isolation of the other. This acknowledgment also speaks to the power saturated issues around selection and engagement of texts, the content and forms of these texts, what mode of instruction and pedagogies are used to convey or dismiss meanings of texts, and how experiences of students and teachers become central to knowledge production.

b) Notion of Inclusion

Notwithstanding the insistence on inclusion as about beginning anew, we must still engage multiple readings of the term. A critical view of "inclusion" highlights questions of power and social difference and addresses questions of difference, diversity and power as defined through the lens of race, ethnicity, class, gender, disability, sexuality, religion, language and Indigeneity. The meaning of inclusion can be so liberalized as to imply merely adding to what already exists and in fact strengthening what exists through this process. However, a more subversive take on inclusion is about beginning "anew" and to engage this through creating new tools, spaces/places with a new vision. Inclusion is not bringing people into what already exists; it is making a new space, a better space for everyone. Such space is about structures and instructional processes and places. As educators and policy makers we must ponder over a question: How we can hope to address an existing problem by simply adding to what already exists when what already exists is the source of the problem to begin with? Inclusion works with an understanding of multiplicity of views, ideas, knowledge and practice. For example "success" in the academy is very different from "success" within a critically inclusive academy. Critical inclusion demands that we redefine success more broadly. That is, moving away from a model of education which reserves attention and praise solely for those who fit narrow definitions of success, for example the best and brightest, toward an accessible framework for student achievement which recognizes not only barriers to success for many, but also multiple paths to success for all and multiple endpoints and time frames and configurations to completion for success. Success from a decolonizing framework is not confined to the singular path of liberalism; it is many paths with many openings and many endpoints. Moreover, the best and brightest (and often whitest) definition of success assumes that the achievement is atomistic, it is an individual

achievement and the process and people involved in achievement are not considered as part of the outcome which steeps us further in the atomizing and individualizing process of liberalism. We rarely pay attention to the processes that condition success despite knowing that success is never an individual effort but involves collective efforts. Learning among peers for example depends on that entire peer group and occurs through the collaborative efforts of peers or alternatively can occur for some at the expense of certain peers so that learning is variegated and uneven. The later typifies a liberally informed educational environment that includes the atomistic and independent individual; competition; stratification; power bargaining; and not the least of which is primacy of reason and the exclusion of the body.

c) Decolonization

As alluded to earlier, decolonizing is about reframing and decolonizing the curriculum and entire approach to schooling and education. Decolonization is an on-going, and an unending process; it is a collective journey and one that has not yet arrived (see also Benita, 1995; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1989; Loomba, 1998). Maori scholar Linda Smith (2012) argues "*decolonization is a process which engages with imperialism and colonialism at multiple levels*" (p. 21). In this way it is a process that proceeds in stops and new starts as different levels of colonialism and imperialism need to be approached and a path for the next phase of decolonization cleared. Decolonization requires an "epistemic community" to develop and nurture hope, dreams, and aspirations and to transmit the energy for this work. Decolonizing goes against the norm and is work that is opposed in practice, in theory, in the material, and not least in the (un)conscious. If decolonization efforts end up being normalized or domesticated then it is hardly subverting the status quo. Decolonizing work must refuse the seduction of incorporation and inclusion that will disable it. In fact, the project and politics of decolonizing generally and of curricula specifically threatens identities, histories and subjectivities. The struggle over such dominant knowledge in the Western academy can only take place in the field of intellectual combat. Within this field of combat, we sow the seeds of our own decolonization (see Fanon 1963; Abraham, 2011; Cesaire, 1972). "Decolonizing Education" teaches and engages students in the discourses of colonialism, Indigeneity, anti-racism, social oppression, ableism, heteronormativity and patriarchy. It is also about instructors and learners co-creating a learning space for resistance. "Decolonizing the academy" is as much about "Indigenizing the Curriculum" (see also wa Thiong'o, 1986) as it engages Indigenous and non-Western concepts, philosophies of education, ethics, values, and social norms in the education of the contemporary learner. It also about the academy working with Indigenous principles of community responsibility, mutual interdependency, ethics, sharing and reciprocity. "Decolonizing education" is about an

educational approach, a practice that questions knowledges and bodies. It includes a search for an anti-colonial curriculum that allows us to re-engage questions of pedagogies, classroom instruction, teaching materials, including texts and other non-texts that may include: social events, oral cultural stories, and arts-informed pedagogies (see also Dei, 2012). Decolonizing curriculum takes an inquiring stance in terms of how what is presented came to be what is being presented and what purpose could imaginably be served by this and how has this purpose been enacted with or against. Ultimately, it is a position of intelligent inquiry that is meant to unsettle and disturb, which when synthesized transforms. Decolonizing curriculum is a changing curriculum, one that engages bodies in the spaces and places of living and strengthens the capacity to engage politically, socially, spiritually, bodily and most importantly intimately with themselves, their communities and collectivities and their surround of land and built and natural worlds.

V. Re-Theorizing from Decolonial Perspectives, Inclusive Education: Multicentricity, Indigeneity, Reflexivity

Multicentricity

Fundamentally, "decolonizing education" involves three central tenets – Idea of "multicentricity", "Indigeneity", and "Reflexivity". These tenets are appropriate to all disciplines and academic interests and apply across disciplines. Regarding "multicentricity", there is a need to fully acknowledge multiple civilizations in the human world. Multicentricity requires a critical review of university curricula to identify the pervasive universalization of particular knowledge frame, more specifically a colonial, neoliberal and Western knowledge frame. For example, political theory is poorly served if Western democracy has primacy at the expense of the exclusions of ideas and practices of other civilizations like Chinese, Egyptian, Indian and Mayan. Furthermore, students would be best served if they were encouraged to establish dialogic relations between these sets of ideas and practices. And indeed I suspect that subjects that would quickly become of interest, and indeed are of interest, and would elicit more creativity and new formulae, content and contest with respect to practice, theory, and research. This of course says nothing about opening up space within the academy for students who have these knowledges to some or great degree and whose experience of exclusion and devaluation of this knowledge has also resulted in their exclusion and their devaluation. The academy would in this way seem interested in the things that interest others who have not previously secured membership within the academy either as student or faculty. Multicentricity would be a potent stimuli to the academic community and would open up very interesting converges, divergences, and points that connect and repel that would open up new theorizing and deepen it as well for all areas of study.

Indigeneity

I bring international perspective to Indigenous/Indigeneity. Indigeneity is about Indigenous knowings; it is the knowings of bodies in relation to the spaces and places in which they have long been orchestrating and been orchestrated by life and lives. Indigeneity is advanced in the earlier proverb as the knowings of the salt bearer. I view Indigeneity as process and as identity. In either case, process and identity, Indigeneity emphasizes context and it emphasizes the engagement of local communities and students as active knowers. Knowledge is not limited to the esteemed faculty of the Western Academy it is within communities, collectivities and societies that are not Western or who create spaces of Indigeneity within the Western. It is this non-Westerness and the contextual embodiment that occurs from the dialogue with and through, and then responsibility to, the land that makes for an earth-centric knowing and responsive knowledge that is about relationship not about objectification and reduction and then recuperation into measure, theory, and practice that characterize Western knowledge. It encourage us not to perpetuate the lineage of European scholarship and practice, but to bring education down to and back to the earth, to indigenize it so that education reflects the lived experience and lives of our students and their communities.

It is impossible to capture truly and to cover meaningfully all ideas that have emerged from the thousands of year devoted to the human civilizing project. And I suspect that there are many ideas, theories and practices that are well bound and secure within the world's Indigenous knowings that the Western world has not yet even imagined nor has it acquired the capacity to sense or to gather meaning from. I say this because I do not think it is necessary nor conducive to student intellectual development to know or to learn <u>all</u> and I do not view the knowing of <u>all</u> as a condition for engaging with and transforming the world. I do believe however that Indigeneity and multicentricity will make this realizable and so view strongly their inclusion within the academy and within curricula. To my mind, the starting point and the finish line of education are most desirably, most meaningfully, and most ripe transformatively when it is the place and the space of students' immediate lived experience. Because students cannot be expected to know all, and because through Indigeneity and multicentricity we encourage place based engagement, theorizing, and knowledge development it is imperative that we engage students in a learning process that is problem-based and a teaching process that is inquiry based and that both gesture toward social action and ethical practice. This is how the curricula, the academy, their learners and educators can seed the global movement of decolonization.

Curricula and instruction interdepend through the complementary actions of problem-based learning and inquiry-based teaching to prepare learners and to continuously vitalize educators and researchers. With the acceleration of knowledge and its production we must prepare learners for life-long learning and so I emphasize the

importance of the tools of continuous learning that students gather through problem-based learning approaches and inquiry based teaching approaches. Learners must develop the flexibility to move into and through these two locations, as learner and as educator, to prepare for present and future work and to prepare for present and future engagement with their communities and the earth or global community. Failures to engage in problem based learning and inquiry based teaching results in fixed knowledge sets that are time specific and relentlessly obsolete. They become obsolete because of the acceleration of knowledge exchange, acquisition, and production and the acceleration of sophisticated knowledge supporting and knowledge building technologies that transmit, mutate, and disseminate new knowledge immediately and constantly. An example will provide clarification of the point I am trying to make.

An engineering science student enters university and spends a minimum of four years in their program. At the end of their academic experience engineering knowledge may have gone through several revolutions to result in an almost completely new body of knowledge and a new or almost new knowledge terrain when seeking employment. These engineers must be equipped with the skills of critical inquiry to ensure that despite the absence of specific present knowledge they have the skill to: locate new knowledge; critique this knowledge; unpack this knowledge; and to determine its efficacy, its ethics, and its sustainability; and then to discern how best to interrogate this knowledges capacity to generate the desired outcomes in relation to the contexts and zones of its deployment. These skills go beyond science that has typified colonial education and I argue that the critical inquiry and interrogation that embeds decolonizing education and the multicentricity that it invites prepare the Western engineering student far more effectively than the presiding and/or prior alternative. The only ethical way to equip learners today, I argue, is to teach them how to problem solve; how to employ multiple lenses and to seek out multiple circles of knowledge and multiple knowers for supportive collaboration and a deepening critique; and to develop skill in their capacity to attune themselves fully to the context of the problem they are solving and the methods that have been used and work from the point of exploring how these methods can be enhanced for sustainability and to honor and support Indigeneity.

I summarize the analysis of the engineering student by speaking of decolonizing education less specifically and more broadly. Decolonizing education is one that prepares students through relationship for relationships at multiple scales and across scales. The capacity to develop relationships is essential for a decolonizing education that demands as education include: many knowers; the built and natural worlds both familiar and new; and clear-sightedness and responsivity to colonialism's deep prints and capacity to track these prints through structures, through project design, through the knowledge that they produce or that they secure for new production, and the knowledge that its presence must necessarily exclude for its centering, and most importantly they must track the vestiges of the colonial in their approach to and tools for solving the problems that are there work.

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is required to (re)connect individuals and environments, self and society, identity and reality in social and scientific inquiry. Every discipline, be it the humanities, pure science, medicine and other professional trainings, must invariably include the interrogation of interconnectivity of self and external world, and our responsibilities to our social, physical, and ecological environment. Reflection, particularly in the field of education, allows the practitioner to think about what works, what does not work, what can I change next time with this lesson plan/curricula, and how is what I am doing applicable to my practice? We need to ensure that the theory and practice of reflexivity is included in our curricular. Practically speaking this can occur or be structured in a variety of ways some of which include: reflective journaling; creative group inquiry; mentorship; and community project participation. Reflexivity helps to capture and lift out of the culture and (un)consciousness of academia that which is repressed, suppressed and disavowed. This can include very interesting and disturbing findings which may include: the absence of specific cultures and collectivities; the hidden rules and concealed practices that service without full conscious engagement particular academic goals and structuring; and also through exclusions and inclusions and the varied inflection and intonation within each that establish bodily sensed norms and assumptions of schooling. Through reflexivity educators bring integrity to their curricular and pedagogical practices. And through reflexivity the subtle perfusions of the colonial and its concealed self-reinforcing mechanisms and forms can be exposed for contestation and therefrom changed.

VI. Decolonizing the University from the Perspective of a Reframed Curriculum: Some Practical Institutional Approaches

At the wider institutional level, as part of the practical institutional action strategies to decolonize the university from the perspective of a reframed curriculum I strongly urge that we develop an "Institutional Policy Framework". What I mean by this is that we work to collaborate on the development of a specific policy document. This document, through the contest of the collaborative process, must have clear and concrete strategies to generate and to strengthen inclusive practices within the academy. This documents clarity must not be compromised and it must state clearly specific the mandate and the tasks of faculty, staff, students, families, and of communities. This would provide a shared responsibility for and shared right to inclusion and for inclusive teaching. The shared sense of purpose of this sanctioned direction would provide the impetus for transformation within the academy and would germinate conditions for a broader social transformation. Higher education has an important role and must act as

catalyst for a transformation that must extend into the global world. The academy must recognize and come to terms with its role in global transformation through the development of a culture and praxis of inclusion and decolonizing education and it must overcome its infatuation with the market and the promises it easily makes and breaks.

To begin this policy framework process we must start by troubling the institutional exclusions that Sara Ahmed (2006) aptly describes as the "non-performative speech acts" of institutions. Sara Ahmed warns that written policies can be the terminal act toward the goal of inclusion. That the policy is written and emplaced administratively relieves institutions of the practice of inclusion and the clear action directives to realize inclusion. Institutions need only say for example that we have a diversity policy and we encourage and value diversity but do not move beyond this. The policy becomes a speech act from which right action or the action required to realize the policy do not and are not expected to follow. For a policy to be performative it must materially realize inclusion not simply aspire to it. For this reason I suggest that the university must have a clear policy that identifies processes and practices and ways to measure the realization of inclusivity, diversification of programs, and decolonizing methodologies. The concrete expression of timelines, academic expectations, and specific accountability determinants must be included in this document. In addition it must provide a mechanism and process for an annual review to determine how it is or is not applied.

To augment the institutional decolonizing and inclusive policy framework the university is best advised to develop an equity standard that is implemented across all courses and faculty groups. While I remain mindful of the academic freedom desired by and provided to university faculty it is imperative that university courses and the deep curriculum of the university speak too and reflect the broader ethical issues of equity and fairness. I ask that faculty members, like me, engage this freedom from an ethically inclusive foundation that is fully attuned to the responsibility all faculty and universities share in terms of using their privilege of freedom in such a way that does not harm through exclusion, irresponsible freedom, and/or a colonially informed and enacted culture. I suggest we approach the current state of exclusion that underpins the colonial history and present of the academy from a position of absence not as an attempt to impose political views upon students and faculty within the academy. What I mean is that it is best to assume that the discussion has not happened but needs to and there is urgency in the need to foreground the discussion of equitable, inclusive, multi-centric, indigenizing and decolonizing education and how this is imagined to impact on faculty freedom. It is necessary to connect, through this dialogue, "academic freedom" and/with "academic responsibility". After all, there is nothing "free" about freedom! Freedom is fought for and is maintained at the expense of the non-freedoms and the cumulative unfreedoms of others. I strongly assert that there is no freedom without matching responsibilities and an ethically conscious engagement in this freedom.

To extend the practical work that the academy must engage in I ask that faculty

take an ethical stance in relation to the various front end exclusions and engage the academy courageously in dialogue that illuminates and responds to these. Tuition fees are a clear example of these front end exclusions which disproportionately impact and exclude marginalized an impoverished groups. The question of entry into the academy must not be determined solely by budgets and finances and a decolonizing academic culture must act on behalf of marginalized, impoverished and/or absent student groups and communities who are not represented or under-represented in the academy. We must make entry accessible to all groups not some at the expense of or on the backs of others. The university must solve this accessibility issue and refrain from making it a budgetary or financial issue.

I will step back from the particularities of change for a moment to open this article more broadly to a change in the foundation of the academy as a colonial institution after which I will proceed to highlight once again particular entry points through strategic action policy. I make particular suggestions because they provide the living traction for a decolonizing and an inclusive educational culture and curricula. What I am suggesting here is that the academy begins from a different beginning, a non-colonial beginning. I suggest that the academy begin with inclusivity and world representation as its root value, its primary goal, and its greatest measure of achievement. A foundational value of inclusivity that invites a world's breadth of human experiencing, knowings, and knowledge systems would immediately alter the culture of the university. If the university reflected the world community there would be different dialogic potential and learning trajectories cast in each class room and the informal learning spaces of the university. This change would lead to other changes and if engaged fully by the academy could develop into more expansive initiatives both within and beyond the university. To ground the value of inclusion and to stabilize and strengthen the more expansive membership of the university community several steps need to be taken with haste.

First the university must implement an academic requirement that cuts across all degrees to include course work and study that focuses on critical analysis of knowledge systems. These courses would provide students with tools for engaging in deeper academic and transformative work within their classrooms, the research and study circles, and through their research projects. These courses would teach students about and also teach them how to uncover bias, exclusions, hegemonies, and deliberate productions of knowledge to serve specific ends such as colonization, capitalism, individualism and all varieties of fundamentalisms. Another performative policy action would include equity development initiatives that course through each department, unit, and/or division within the university to include both academic and non-academic clusters. An example of such an initiative follows: every cluster within the university would be engaged in the frank analysis of how and who is permitted entry into their cluster. A simple visual scan of the department and the placement and space allotment for certain bodies can reveal vast amounts of information about the actual entry filters and

practices despite the reference to non-performative policies or speech acts that Sara Ahmed so very effectively illuminates for us.

What would be required and demanded to ensure performativity is a problematizing and inquiry based approach to the expressed mission, mandate, objectives, policies, and practices and their thorough interrogation for exclusion in each cell of the university. It is best to my mind to approach this work by assuming, not necessarily wrongly, that each cell does in fact operate exclusively. The collaborative and interrogative work of each cell is to unpack the mission, mandate, objectives, policies, and practices in terms of the following questions: where does exclusion happen; under what conditions is it happening both within and beyond the university; how does it actually happen; and who does it exclude and when; and importantly what are the exceptions to exclusion. This process would ensue most thoroughly if in fact a tracking sheet of assumed exclusion was designed and each point of exclusion had a box where specific features of the particular category could undergo thorough analysis. Exposing exclusion in its particularities and in its exceptions would provide clear pathways to remove the barriers to inclusion and thereafter to monitor inclusion in cell specific ways. An example of some starting points may include: review of admission committee membership; review of students who apply to programs and who and why certain students get in and what impact this has for the cell or department; review of specific hiring and firing procedures and the conditions and exceptions for each; review of tenures function in the university and under what conditions professors are granted or not granted tenure and what the visual scan of tenured members reveals about the concealed policy directives; review of how students are supported during the first year of the program, which students this support engages and misses and what efforts are made to include new students in departmental activities and processes and who in fact participates. I offer many possible entry points into inclusivity that if pursued with full effort with begin to catalyze the change necessary for a more inclusive deep curriculum.

Curriculum review is of critical importance and is a more material step along the transformative trajectory. Curriculum review calls for academic programming that ensures inclusive education. Having diverse student, staff and faculty and developing a decolonized curriculum all require leadership, foresight and sustained support from the academy. Curriculum review has additional importance beyond critiquing what is already installed; review is essential to create resonance between what is within the academy and its relevance the real world and real lives outside the academy. Alignment and design of curricula and programmes that stimulate an inside-outside resonance bring emerging realities into the university where they can be engaged critically and subjected to a deepening ethical analysis. Program planning for emerging and minority interests draw different bodies with different knowledges into the university who seek faculty members who can engage them critically in these interests and facilitate the development of new practices and methods of analysis and study. To say this differently, if the university offers

courses that engage this emerging and minority areas of interest students will come and they will stay if their engagement with these areas and knowledges is meaningful, rigorous, and substantive.

My experience has been that the number of racial minority students increased with racial minority presence among faculty. Minority faculty presence conveys to these students that the experiences of their lives matter to the academy and there is space for you, your experiences, and your interests here. This has been communicated to me over and over again by courageous students who wanted to share their experience and to share their knowings through the study of race, social justice, Indigeneity, colonization, marginalization, violence, gender and (in)equity for example. With each additional minority faculty member more diverse students came and then more diverse faculty. The point I wish to make is simple the students will come if the deep curriculum says yes to them and is visible through faculty members, the courses offered, and the alternative approaches to research methodologies. The other important point that cannot be missed in this is that these students strengthened the faculty and their work and expanded and deepened the emphasis on race and equity issues which elicited further curriculum development work and new and more complex research projects. The students add to what is there and expose what is not when there, not beforehand, and then faculty respond with new courses, new study groups, and new article and research topics. This generative and cyclical process occurs when minority presence is installed; minorities do not make demands of the university from outside. When the deep curriculum and the curriculum say yes to minority students, and when they can see reflections of themselves in the bodies of faculty members they will be more interested in coming. When this is not the case minority students and faculty do not come because of the long history of exclusion of particular bodies from these "high places of learning". So if the university chooses to act on this understanding and begins to build initiatives and to develop trust with communities this code can be broken and the student membership will reflect this. If however it is not broken the student membership will show us this also. We must, therefore, be critical of what David Theo Goldberg (1993) calls "consumer directed discrimination". In other words, the justification that is constantly used to silence what I and others suggest is that the market should drive the course offerings. David Theo Goldberg and my own experience however say the complete opposite. The market logic excludes certain bodies long before they even get to the point of applying to the university which is rife with exclusions that continue at every juncture thereafter. The academy is a closed door and there is no one there to meet them.

The supply and demand argument is used in a variety of ways in the academy. Very often it is used to silence requests and demands for respecting diversity mandates, policies, and implementation strategies. These arguments appear to conceal a more complicated and seemingly in-articulable politic, a prodrome of sorts of something coming or the beginnings of an unfavourable turn. I bring the supply and demand

argument to the increasing recruitment of international students. International students pay the full cost of university and are relied on to cover the rising cost of higher education. We must stop here and ask many questions. Of the many I ask these: Who is served by this selection process? What does financially incentivized inclusion do to and for the bodies and identities that it includes and what does it do for those it does not? What are the long range impacts of this inclusion and its complementary exclusion? How did this become the solution rising costs? Who is appeased by this practice and by what means? We must ask what deeper motivations and strivings are operating within the academy and how have these deeper motivations and strivings been sated in the past?

I am brought now to proactive strategies. The most important of these are the proactive inclusive recruitment and representation within the university. We include diversity as part of the ethical praxis of leadership. Department heads have the ethical imperative then to ensure diverse faculty presence and must be willing and also be rewarded for providing diverse faculty members with the resources they need to engage fully in their roles and with the students and their communities. Acknowledgement and/or incentives would desirably be forthcoming to those departments that reach diversity and inclusivity goals. For example, funds can be created and initiatives developed that strengthen diversity within departments and also celebrate diversity. These funds and initiatives can be used: to develop mentorship and financial resources for racial minority students; and to promote counter and oppositional discourses such as non-Western epistemologies, anti-colonial thought, among others. The possibilities of decolonizing research and of having courses that aim to promote multiple/Indigenous Knowledges and critical perspectives is enhanced when we have Indigenous and racial minority faculty in the teaching pool. No one needs any research to confirm this. It is common sense. With a diversified faculty we stand a better chance of developing strengthening practices for the mentoring young faculty and students who are diverse and who bring this experience to the academy when the academy says yes to them and joins them.

All proactive strategies interdepend on all the others and become more effective through this interdependence. Educational outreach is the next proactive strategy that I highlight. There must be a plan of action around educational outreach for diversity policies to be performative. Educational outreach however will not happen if our academic work does not have any relevance to communities, to societies and to the natural world. It is imperative then that our work if it is truly decolonizing and inclusive and through these transformative, must be community-centric and have relevance to the problems that occur in the real world. We must make our work relevant to the diverse communities from which we draw our students. This outreach and engagement in and with diverse communities breaks the perception of the university as ivory tower. Departments and universities must continue to work collaboratively with communities to engage in truly transformative work that benefits all and includes: faculty, students,

institutions, local and distant communities, and ultimately responds to the crisis of knowledge and the global problematique that opened this paper. Through this of course there are strands of power that will inevitably trip up our objective and our plans. We must have sufficient grounding to first know this will happen and second to mobilize a response and recovery to these experiences. These moments will certainly come and no planning, pro-action, or forethought can defend against this.
It is in fact the very nature of our work and these moments, painful and disorganizing, when we overcome or derail them strengthen our work and our approach.

I extend the proactive strategy for outreach a little further before moving onto the next strategy. I want to be very clear about the position I take and about the position that universities must ethically assume in terms of diversity and inclusivity and the necessity of outreach to effect realize these goals. Students will not simply walk in to the university as a colonial space of exclusion even if they are interested. It is important to "stand in their shoes" and to acknowledge first that schools have been places of multiple forms of violence for marginalized and minority groups. They have also been places that in innumerable ways have said no to them and have not recognized them. The impact of the violences and the erasures within schools is sensibly a space that is to be avoided. With this in mind it is unfair and David Theo Goldberg's consumer discrimination is clearly operative here. To bring students who have been excluded into the university means that we must go to them and meet them on their terms. We must make this effort because this is what will make it possible for these bodies to imagine themselves in the academy, a school and so too a place of many negative associations, and then to move to considering what they might do if they were to participate in the academy. And then of course they must know what the academy will do to help them get there and to help them through to completion. It is important to go to reach these students through community initiatives and community mentorship programs. We must share with them possible paths and learning trajectories that are of interest to them. We must also be able to find places for them in power saturated programs such as science and medicine. And we must inspire them through our own work in their community and our engagement with them. It is important too that connections are made across educational settings and diverse groups of university students visit high schools and grade schools within multiracial communities as ambassadors and as inspiration. Programs could be developed that reverse the flow of ambassadorship and inspiration also, high school youth with specific interests can be encouraged to develop and present these interests at universities through special programs or events. These programs and events give the university a glimpse into the community and convey that which is meaningful or of concern to them. It is clear that the bidirectional flow and stimulation would prove valuable for the university and for the community, and ultimately for society as whole. These efforts can lead to transformation by bringing in different perspectives and using them to affect policies and procedures that facilitate rather than interfere with entry. Educational outreach must aim

to ensure the presence of a diverse student body on our campus and must do what is necessary to help them to complete their education, attention to entry is not sufficient. Links must be made between identity, knowledge production and schooling and we must make the university accessible to diverse student groups through proactive measures that support their engagement all the way through.

Turning to the issue of pedagogy and methodologies we must take practical steps to diversify the curriculum through the infusion of multiple teaching methodologies, pedagogies, courses and study groups. For example, Indigenous and Aboriginal initiatives have been pursued and developed to affect both pedagogy and methodologies. These initiatives have broadened and extended our critical understandings Canada, Canadian history, and Canada's relationship with Indigenous and Aboriginal communities. Pedagogy and methodologies could be further advanced through ethics and the establishment of ethical protocols and ethical methodologies that would place value on and allow value to gain from oral history and other non-traditionally academic sources including for example the voices of Elders and Healers. And as mentioned earlier advancement of and space for the development of a robust dialogical curriculum that is co-created through relationships and links between students of the academy and members of the local communities. University faculty and universities broadly need to advance methodology training opportunities for undergraduates and graduates; and provide opportunities and sessions for faculty to study anti-colonial methods and anti-colonial sources of knowledge. For instance faculty may be provided with a period of study where the learn how to use traditional knowledges to address contemporary or global problems and issues; or faculty may participate in a period of study that helps to develop their understandings and research methodologies for holistic and sustainable approaches to teaching and learning where there are no "trained" teachers. Curriculum development and program initiatives would flow easily from these types of experiences and it would seem worthwhile for universities to invest in such efforts particularly those which enhance or germinate diversity and inclusion both within the academy and to foster multi-centering processes within the global community.

When we broach the topic of evaluation and assessment we are deep in colonial territory and must deal with the rigid Euro-centered evaluation methods. Reconceptualization of evaluation and reconceptualization that is non-Eurocentric are possible and can easily be generated within the classroom by students. The decentering of the written text would allow orality to be considered an equal and equally efficacious medium. With this in mind students could engage in oral assignments instead of or as well as written assignments. The voiced or the oral text is equal to the written text in terms of its capacity to articulate theory and praxis; as is the educators capacity to track and evaluate the students ability to synthesize and integrate class materials, readings, and lived experiences through the oral of voiced analysis and the visual-cognitive of written analysis. Further to this I suggest that we do not limit text to academic projects only and

that we include community based events and experiences as sites of learning and as multi-sensory texts. To validate this position and the community as multi-sensory text I feel strongly that students at all levels of education be given opportunities to attend community events and to participate in the organization of community events. These experiences provide reflexive opportunities that could be written or spoken of and presented to the class so that the multiplicity of experience can be conveyed and provide opportunities for deepening dialogue and theorizing. Often community events provide access to Elder, healers, community leaders, and other "teachers" which can open up different modes of inquiry and of problematizing what is learned in the academy to deepen, contest, and expand knowing and knowledge. Learners must be able to connect community work to their learning for it to be meaningful. Community agencies and community partners however are often so divorced from academia that the conceptualizations of each appear on the surface difficult to integrate or to engage in comparative analysis. This must not arrest the work of collaboration and in fact I view collaboration and the fortification of links as a way to establish a shared language or alternatively to understand each other's frames of analysis and through this to deepen each other's analysis and to revise these analyses to reflect new knowings. To act on this, the academy needs to encourage student's participation in and preparation and presentation of non-traditional papers through arts based and multimedia methods. In this way students are not only given the opportunity to be creative and to think outside the box, but educators reciprocate and complement this through recognizing and honouring multiple ways of knowing and being.

There must be sufficient research and infrastructural support to promote decolonized curriculum an inclusive education in our universities. We can seek more partnership opportunities with the public and private sectors to expand and "normalize" the use of anti-colonial knowledge. We can also have research partnership development initiatives where issues of funding, release time, and related supports for more trans-cultural and progressive academic partnerships can be negotiated. An example of this would be to partner with Indigenous scholars and Elders across communities in multiple world spaces in regards to the issue of youth leadership development processes. Our universities would do well to serve their diversity and inclusivity goals by lobbying funding agencies and private funders to expand and reframe success criteria to include the use of qualitative (anti-colonial) research methods and topics. We can also expand partnerships with access programs that are provided with secure, dedicated funding to achieve their goals. For example, in Ontario, Canada we have the Pathways to Education and the Transitional Year Programs at the University of Toronto, Trent University and Sir Sandford Fleming College to name a few. In eastern Canada we have similar programs at Dalhousie University as well as other eastern colleges and universities. These programs provide bridges for young adults and adults generally who may have been out of school for a while to re-enter through the University education system where they can advance

toward higher education. These programs have been highly valued by the communities and the students they serve and have proven valuable to the university also in terms of drawing upon a larger and more diverse student body with diverse knowledges and who through participation in these and regular university programs change the university and help to produce it in a new way. Universities must fully support and sustain transitional programs geared at bringing marginalized, Indigenous bodies into the academy rather than cutting these programs as part of austerity measures. Secure funding and the academies dedication toward these programs will ensure that the academy is a transformative space and place through its processes and programs of inclusion.

Besides institutional practices and policy changes towards equity and inclusivity the university classroom teacher is ultimately responsible for bringing about change through effective teaching. We can pay closer attention to the whole area of classroom teaching strategies. It is important that besides what we expect of our students we also highlight the responsibilities of educators in today's classrooms. It may be argued that a major constraint any faculty/teacher faces when trying to create an inclusive teaching approach and classroom is the absence of texts and other resource information to achieve such educational ends. While we may argue that our university libraries are well-resourced there is still an argument to be made that our resources are not diverse enough to speak to concerns of inclusion and decolonization as articulated in this article. The counter argument is that there are enough resources around us to effectively engage these resources in the work of inclusive teaching. To respond to this argument one can only call for creativity and resourcefulness on the part of educators. We can do more with what we have if we develop skills and engage in training that teaches us to find ways to put into action inclusive and decolonized education. Below I highlight some of the sites and sources of resource information and teaching strategies an educator/faculty might employ in their classrooms to make possible inclusive and decolonized education.

On the use of teaching and instructional resources for reframed education, faculty/teachers must critically engage the available texts at hand. Where possible we can use cultural events and other "non-conventional" teaching resources and we must bring in Indigenous guest speakers, parents/Elders and community workers in meaningful and relevant ways in response to and to address power and colonial relations. Teachers can regularly organize and use conferences, workshops, seminars involving students and particular local communities as key players. Students can be encouraged to engage the print media and television and to write articles and commentaries on social justice, human rights and environmental concerns or other hot button social issues. Such engagement should ensue responsibly and ethically and must situate discussion in their appropriate historical contexts which is often not done by the media. Absences such as these reveal the complicity of the current generation in historical wrongs associated with colonialism, imperialism and genocide of Indigenous peoples and local cultures. The use of alternative bookstores usually located in more peripheral communities or on the

margins of mainstream communities are important. Most often these community-based sources carry books very critical of society and/or have works by radical scholars that hardly find their way into conventional/mainstream bookstores. Also, the use of public, local and academic libraries is important as usually the public libraries have resources for the lay public more than the academic. The provision of visual aids to augment what is being communicated by educators is helpful to learners generally by providing multiple portals of entry for new or complex material in addition to being specifically helpful to students who learn in primarily or more powerfully in visual ways. My earlier assertion of meeting students where they are at compels educators to engage in popular culture and to join students here in processes of critical inquiry and analysis. Online resources (visual, audio, talk, etc.) can also be augmentive when used critically to engage issues related to social justice, human rights and environmental matters. These resources to can seed social transformational purposes and must be viewed from that perspective.

Effective classroom instructional strategies should involve students, parents, Elders, and community knowledges. Classroom teaching must stress history and context; aim to centre the learner; and must pursue critical teaching for the purposes of social and educational transformation. Classroom instruction must also draw on the school-community interface in order to address the relevance of academic knowledge for local communities. Faculty/Educators can have students speak to their own experiences in order to critically analyze the traditional curriculum of academia; but not in tokenistic way. This pedagogic approach must be from standpoint knowledge, which centers personal experience and recognizes the epistemic saliency of the voices of the oppressed, marginalized, excluded and/or colonized peoples. Educators must critically use history as an access point to develop inclusive teaching practice through student and local community experiences. Instructors must aim to co-produce knowledge with their students by creating the synergies of teacher and student knowledge production introduced earlier. The importance of using teachable moments; social or case scenarios or studies; and the media and other forms of texts cannot be overemphasized. They bring knowledge down to earth for learners who are able to identify with the complexity of what is being taught and can easily express a sense of ownership for this knowledge.

The success of an effective reframed curriculum cannot be measured simply in terms of how students do on test scores. Educators can determine the instructional effectiveness of an inclusive, decolonized curriculum by asking and responding to key questions: Are students able to ask new and critical questions from what they are learning? How are students defining/articulating questions of ethics and social responsibility? How do students apply their learning in their classroom to their own communities? Are learners able to identify power relations and to deconstruct the curriculum? How do students place social justice, equity, fairness within their understanding of character and moral education? While answers to these questions can be contested, simply creating a space to ask and discuss these questions is itself productive

as it potentiates the opening of students' minds and nurtures multiple ways of knowing. Validating students' knowledge is about power and empowerment. Students must be made to feel a sense of ownership and control of their knowledge and the knowledge production process. This means a need to rethink the way we assess what students say or know. For example, an educator must also engage multiple assessment methods, including students' assessments of themselves and each other. Educators must also provide learners with tools and language to name and to articulate their experiences, anxieties, fears, hopes and aspirations.

In order to identify the relevance and practicality of inclusive curriculum and instruction for learners, faculty/educators and school administrators must engage local communities and students in the enactment and development of curriculum. Students' can demonstrate an ability to apply the curriculum in everyday life and to social practice if they have been part of its enactment and development. The practicality of the curriculum emerges when students demonstrate critical thinking skills; they come into their full voice by speaking out; and they show the ability to match rights with responsibilities to their communities. In other words, there is more to education than students having acquired mastery of the knowledge. We have to begin to think beyond test and academic performances to broader questions of social relevance; community impact; students and educators' collective responsibilities; citizenship and community building of purpose into education; and what it means to engage in and to do anti-colonial social justice education in the first place.

VII. The Start of a Conversation

In broaching the subject of "reframing the curriculum" we must think about education broadly and not just in university, school or college. Decolonizing processes must perfuse all of societies institutions including but not limited to the following: the media; the legal and penal system; workplaces; hospitals; community centers; food banks; banks; and churches. All of these institutions need to be "decolonized" and can only do so by taking "inclusion" into consideration more critically and more profoundly. Inclusion in this way is not truly occurring although it may be longed for by some. Interrogation and action policies are the antidote to non-performativity and are the method that I suggest continue ceaselessly to challenge the limits of inclusion. Heightened consciousness about the need for inclusion is not enough something more substantive has to occur and to it must be consciously enacted.

Discussions about inclusion and decolonization cannot avoid questions of who occupies positions of power in universities, schools, colleges, workplaces and other institutional spaces; and who has decision making, space and voice power. Inclusion is about power and accountability so we must ask the following question when an

individual in a position of power ministers to "inclusivity": who is this person or body accountable to? Inevitably, this means an explicit discussion about power. A major concern for universities as they turn too corporate funding, signaled through endowed chairs, are their diminishing connections with the public whom corporate groups have little democratic accountability to or interest in. This complicates the work of scholars who emphasize critical anti-racist, feminist, and Indigenous knowledge for example and who also want to engage communities and value community based and community collaborated initiatives. Support is not easily forthcoming for such scholars because their work is not viewed as market-friendly nor is it considered monetarily profitable and hence not valuable at all. Corporate funding for scholars whose work is to wake people up from the pathos of the status quo is difficult to come by. Through this increasingly neoliberal period, who decides what to include and what not to include in the academy is increasingly out of public hands and in corporate hands and private "philanthropic" hands. This is quite scary for progressive critical research especially that which includes Indigenous knowledges and approaches, and critical race work. This becomes more profound when one takes the stance as I do, that decolonizing the curriculum is as much about indigenizing the curriculum as it is about inclusion or anything else for that matter. Indigenizing the curriculum interferes with the neoliberal momentum and the corporate trajectory. Consequently they are not considered for investment and because of this are at best devalued and at worst obliterated.

Embarking upon the "decolonizing project" comes with huge risks and uncertainties. As of yet decolonization is still early in its work. It is an on-going process and our arrival is still a long way off. Decolonizing processes are long journeys that demand our courage and capacity to sustain ourselves and not to lose faith in our end goals and inspirited objectives for better communities and a more equitable world. In pursuing decolonizing practices, we are undoubtedly going to ruffle feathers and be seen as subversive. Decolonization requires "pedagogy of rage" as we wrestle with and contest the existing order of things. Change of course does not come easy nor happen immediately. We must therefore be prepared to challenge the resistance to decolonization that we will encounter. We must also embrace a radical politics that seeks genuine social transformation through equity, social justice, Indigenous, anti-racism, feminist and anti-oppressive work. Those who fight oppressions and colonizing relations never walk alone. In thinking through how we make our communities and their institutions inclusive, we cannot ignore the fact that we are all intimately and profoundly connected. We must use our privilege well and we must collectively share in the deep frustration of communities whose voices are not heard, and who are continually dismissed or discounted when they offer possible radical solutions to the colonial challenges that we all face. Despite this it must continue to be our collective hope that all will one day join the pursuit of justice and equity for all. Let us pick up the torch and keep the dream of a decolonizing education for all alive and let us work together collectively to strengthen the

material realization of this dream. A community is as good as we collectively work to make it and indeed we must work! And we must collectively develop the courage to subvert any form of conventional education that leads our youth along the path of cultural, spiritual, emotional, physical and mental destruction. The need to resist the colonization of minds begins by thinking outside the dominant norms and values of society. For example, in today's schools all learners must be empowered to search for their own intellectual footing outside of the dominant paradigms and hegemonies of the Eurocentric. For many learners of today the decolonizing project has become a matter of social and intellectual survival and engagement in its work is not an option.

This article has tackled the important issue of being inclusive in radical pedagogy. It has raised pertinent questions about what teaching and teachers should do laced with some practical suggestions. For educators to ask how our educational practices make us human and how we can effectively promote multiple perspectives in the classroom is not without merit. The contents of the discussion may appear overly ambitious and indeed it may be and it must be. As an overview of critical pedagogical practices, this paper must acknowledge the importance of discussions about the tensions and risks of such radical pedagogical work. There are risks for all involved in this work and we have seen teachers experience and must endure career damage for their open engagement in decolonizing education work. This type of punishment has many repercussions not the least of which is the absence of teachers who courageously create inclusive educational spaces and develop educational aspirations. The discussion has broached curriculum, universal science, embodied connection, Indigeneity, mentorship and outreach and the dilemmas of how to bring local communities into classrooms and schools. The overarching learning objective has not been to give a full discussion to all of the issues but at least to be able to connect the possibilities and limitations of inclusive education as decolonized education. Clearly, the risks of potentially shortened careers for critical pedagogues when they embrace decolonized, anti-racist education cannot be underestimated. Similarly, the risk of not decolonizing the academy means alienating most populations from schools, colleges and universities settings. The risks and consequences of both action and inaction are large and reverberate multi-directionally. To give one example, teaching anti-racism courses in the academy will generate negative evaluations which impact career advancement, particularly from white male students. We cannot reduce the risk for the male student nor the faculty member by not teaching these courses nor can we limit anti-racist analysis and study to a fragment of time within a course. To be clear one week in the year, or one lecture in the year on the issue of racism, gender, class, ableism, patriarchy and heteronormativity can not be conceived as ethical nor does it provide a viable or sustainable entry point into these complex areas of education and social workings. Clearly, it takes courage to buck a conventional system, the academy and school, designed for middle class white students.

Education is itself power saturated. The construction of curriculum, the domain

of Western science, the ability to connect bodies, embodiment and knowledge, and the whole recourse to Indigeneity as a legitimate site of knowing beyond the process of identity are fraught with key questions of power. An anti-capitalist critique of schooling and education must be courageous and embrace race and Indigeneity. These are the areas least talked about even in progressive movements. In many ways this paper has highlighted the political economy of education. Race, gender, sexuality, ability, and other inequalities are part of the contemporary capitalist political economy. Education today is generally in the context of Western capitalism. Schooling cannot escape questions of marketability and academic freedom even as critical educators begin to questions what bodies are present in our schools; who is doing what and why; and what histories and knowledges are told in conventional classroom discussions. In so far as socialism is about actually challenging existing world capitalism, this essay (as an intellectual exercise as well as concrete classroom practice and research orientation) can inform socialist studies in entirely relevant ways. We need to rethink the current brand and practice of socialism that has aggressively ignored some of the concerns raised in the paper. Communists have not been supporters of decolonization but socialists might have a better record on that score. But the work of socialists in transforming our schools has to center questions of race, Indigeneity and the "terror of Whiteness".

In conclusion I would reiterate that when teaching is subjected to market pressures this in itself constitutes tremendous "challenges" for educational change and social justice work. During these times the colonial matrices lifts out of its deep bed within the institution and begins to align the deep and overt curriculum of the academy with its desires and strivings to keep things on course. These challenges we can see are not simply about the academy and money only they extend far beyond the academy and extend far back in time. For this reason these challenges must be faced squarely and approached directly knowing that something more is at work. For instance, pressures to offer "marketable" courses often means anti-racist, feminist and anti-class bias. These courses and others that are of interest to racially minoritized students and students of other oppressions and violences must be in place and we cannot expect that requests will be made within a dominant institution for courses that are of interest to those who are excluded and for whom exclusion is ensured through the different scales of curriculum. Combating this pressure will require mobilizing simultaneously against current neoliberal pushes for the commodification of formerly public services, including education, with a strong message, backed by community support, in favor of anti-racist, feminist and anti-class bias coursework. Consequently, such work inside the classroom must be linked to anti-capitalist struggles across scales and they must be linked to building community solidarity and to movements outside the walls of the Western academy. The struggles of the academy are the struggles of the global world and frank acknowledgement of this will prove valuable in future mobilizing work.

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This blog is from a graduate student in BC. She's from the Tsilhqot'in Nation who is currently pursuing graduate studies in Okanagan territory and curriculum development. She posts a great deal of information on different articles and reviews articles, etc. http://twinkleshappyplace.blogspot.ca/2011/12/learning-place-penticton-indian-band.html

Article

CREATIVE SOCIALIST-FEMINIST SPACE: CREATING MOMENTS OF AGENCY AND EMANCIPATION BY STORYTELLING OUTLAWED EXPERIENCES AND RELATIONAL AESTHETIC

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Abstract

This article argues that creative socialist-feminist spaces, where art-based knowledge is created, can provide opportunities for creating new knowledge with emancipatory moments for those who are marginalized and have had marginalizing experiences. In so doing, commodified existence (Hennessey 2002) becomes disrupted through the emergence of new knowledge entwined with emotion. The outcome of this kind of endeavor includes transformational knowledge of self, relations of power, and a vision of alternative possibilities in relation to that knowledge. A relational aesthetic emerges where meaning for political change is co-created through the exploration of personal experience using an arts-based medium that itself creates community and political vision. These claims are made based on personal experience creating a digital-story exploring the first memories of having a racialized body constituted by racist slurs and from a discourse that disidentifies one from Canadian citizenship and belonging.

Keywords

Socialist-feminisms; outlawed experience; relational aesthetics; emancipatory moments; digital storytelling; racialization; anti-racism; colonialism

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reflection upon it for personal and collective transformation. Many thanks to the anonymous reviewers and Editor for their comments and suggestions. All errors are my own.

I dream of creating a place where we can dare to be our most authentic, glorious, outrageous selves. It will be a brief vision of a possible future.

- Bonnie Klein[1]

Socialist-feminisms comprise diverse social, economic, cultural and political theories and practices. I imagine them forming a constellation where they co-exist with one another, intersect, and also come into tension with one another.[2] Class remains an important category of analysis to socialist-feminisms, yet socialist feminists recognize that effects of power are not reducible to class (Brenner and Holmstrom 2012, 267). Additional and integral categories have been brought together and intertwined through intersectional analysis with class, including: gender, sexuality, disability, race, and colonization. As well, there is now growing recognition of the role affect emotions have in shaping social relations, self-reflection and respect for difference in socialist-feminist activism (Brenner 2014, 44). The image of a braid may be apt for this diversity and intersectionality [3] within socialist-feminism; the braid provides a sense of the different, divergent trajectories (hair strands that depart from the braid), tensions, and alliances that occur and bind together (sometimes loosely, sometimes tightly) within the larger intellectual space where practices of "socialist-feminism," and debates concerning those practices, take place.[4]

One strand envisions and focuses on the systemic transformation of capitalism and patriarchy considered simultaneously in relation to human needs (Hartmann 1981, 1982; Mitchell 1974, 1984, Wood 1995). Another looks to greater redistribution of resources more evenly throughout society to reduce sharp income and wealth stratification produced by capitalism (Fraser 2012).[5] Yet another looks at gender identities and their respective specific material conditions of discrimination and oppression to examine specific needs of women

[1] Bonnie Klein made this declaration at the 2008 Unruly Salon, an inaugural and groundbreaking gathering of disability culture and scholarship at University of British Columbia (accessed August 2013 at http://www.unrulysalon.com, now no longer available).

[2] Albritton, Bell, and Westra note that socialism is not one thing (Albritton et. al. 2004, 4). Similarly, socialist-feminism is not one thing; socialist-feminisms comprise a multiplicity of approaches and an ongoing discussion and debate of paths forward toward better understanding oppressions and possible emancipations.

[3] For a concise discussion of intersectionality, see Brenner 2014, 33.

[4] There is also ambivalence toward the multiplicity of socialist feminist strategies informed by post-structural thought that emerged in the 1990s as a vision for politics and struggle against capitalism. See Sangster and Luxton (2012), Wood (1995).

[5] Fraser presents a narrative of feminism, specifically second-wave feminism as having been co-opted by neoliberalism. Sangster and Luxton argue Fraser conflates second wave feminism with liberalism at the expense of socialist-feminism, providing historical context and examples (2012).

whose claims-making intersects with race, sexuality, indigenous identities, colonizing experiences (Brenner and Holstrom 2012, 283-284), as well as disability (Rice, et. al. 2016, Erevelles 2011, Oliver and Barnes 2010, Roman 2009b, Russell and Malhotra 2002). This last strand I will refer to as disability and difference from this point onward. Disability and difference recognizes diverse identities and embodiments of class, disability, gender, transgender, race, sexualities, First Nations and Indigenous Peoples, intersexed persons, and those still becoming. By using the phrase "disability and difference," I refer to and beckon identities and embodiments involving multiple and intersecting categories of analysis.[6]

In this article, I build upon this last strand recounting an art creation experience that attends to disability and difference. In the space of art creation, marginalized experiences can be welcomed-in; these are experiences largely rendered invisible, made unwelcome or taboo within public or private spaces. It is these very *outlaw* experiences (Hennessy 2002) that have been under-acknowledged within socialist-feminist theorizing and politics. To give them voice and centre them would go some way toward building a more capacious socialist-feminist practice.[7] Such a space could be called creative socialist-feminist in that it is practiced and explored with the intent of fuller and fullest participation for individuals whose stories of difference have not been (or rarely) told, or heard. It could allow for the vulnerability that emerges when a hidden difference is brought into the open. "Creative" refers to art-creation or art-making that can include a variety of art mediums. In such a creative socialist-feminist space, the emergence of difference can at least begin to disrupt stereotypes produced through oppressive power. Connections among art-makers can develop via relational aesthetics (Bourriaud 2012) that become *cripped* [8] and *socialist-feminized*. Stories, new knowledge, and new imaginings for better worlds emerge *from the participants themselves for themselves and their communities*. It is in these spaces that *new* senses of agency and empowerment appear, although not at the scale of system, such as the overturn of patriarchy or capitalism, but potentially at the individual and community scale. Even so, a creative socialist-feminist space is incomplete and temporary. I use my experience of digital storytelling where I decided to create a film of my childhood memories of being racialized from the outside and adult memories of more nuanced racialization, as an

[6] For discussion of body-becoming theory and body-becoming at the intersections of gender, race, disability, and class that bring into view the complexity of gender identities see Rice (2014).

[7] Ferguson (2014) and Carty (2014) engage with Luxton (2014) on this latter point in *Studies in Political Economy* 94. Coburn advocates participation of working class and dominated people "be taken seriously in socialist struggles" (2014, 23). She explicitly refers to women, disabled persons, racialized, sexual minorities, and minoritized others who are oppressed within capitalism, but not grasped well by socialisms (2014, 22-23). Additionally, she states "we need to actively reach out and find out what is necessary for our conversations and struggles to become relevant and accessible to the whole working class" (2014, 23), including those with disability and non-standard bodies and minds.

[8] The use of crip as a verb is inclusive of, but not exhaustive to, three meanings. To crip is to center disability and queer experiences (McRuer in Chandler 2012), to "open up desire for what disability disrupts" (Fritsch in Chandler 2012) or to enact community that desires or is motivated to dwell with disability (Chandler 2012).

example. My story is an example of an outlaw experience brought into the open that also became part of a cripped and socialist-feminized relational aesthetic. The encouragement of both outlaw experiences and relational aesthetic holds potential for building upon socialist-feminist practices and knowledge.

Digital Stories: Creating Space for Disability and Difference

In Spring 2012, I made my own digital story (https://vimeo.com/120832001) which is a three to four minute self-reflexive film with Project Re•Vision.[9] Project Re•Vision adopted digital storytelling from The Center for Digital Storytelling in East Bay, CA and adapted it for women living with disabilities and differences and healthcare providers.[10] The workshop where I made my digital story was held in Toronto at the YWCA on Elm Street. As a participant, I discerned the highly sensitive and thoughtful efforts made to provide the broadest possible access, including wheelchair access, as well as access to those with disabilities, broadly defined. Nourishing food was sourced from a social enterprise café that employed persons living with disabilities to include physical and mental challenges. The YWCA on Elm St. was designed and built mindful of women's needs for accessibility and affordability. When it opened, the building was thought to offer the largest number of affordable housing units in the city in at least a decade. It was women-centered designed meaning it was designed for women surviving trauma and violence, living on low-incomes or living in poverty, and/or working part-time or shift work (Alphonso 2012). The Christian affiliation of the YWCA, however, would understandably be alienating for non-Christian women.[11] The digital story workshop itself did not reference any religious affiliation; still, it is important to acknowledge the need to address exclusions, multifaceted aspects of Christian dominance, and the organization of creative spaces at the intersection of non-Christian faiths, disability, and difference.

The digital story workshop was a three-day temporary space where I and about fifteen diverse women in and outside the academy would each be making their digital story. It was more than a physical place to make a film. The conditions facilitated a kind of emancipation

[9] Self-reflexive means to reflect critically, in this instance, upon one's lived experience. "Project Re•Vision" is directed by Carla Rice, Canada Research Chair, Gender and Family Studies, also Founder of Project Re•Vision and the Revisioning Differences Mobile Media Lab (REDLAB) at the University of Guelph, ON. The project is funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). Digital story making was done in the first year, and theatre presentation of stories from women living with disabilities and differences occurred in 2014. The members of the research team are located in Law, Nursing, Critical Disability Studies, Gender and Women's Studies, Political Studies, Public Health, and Social Work. The goal of the project is to create greater equity in health for women living with disabilities and differences.

[10] See http://storycenter.org for more information on the history. For guidelines for digital storytelling, see Lambert (2010).

[11] In contrast to Canada, the YWCA in England and Wales in 2011 changed its name to Platform 51 to refer to women comprising 51 per cent of the world population (Doughty 2011).

defined, here, as a reprieve from the disavowal of otherness through the very recognition and exploration of otherness through art. It created an important, yet partial, place of freedom of the kind not experienced outside the space. The creative space itself was intentionally conceived to be accessible to and welcoming of disability and difference. This space allowed for creative imagining in that it accomplished fuller aspects of participation through the temporary suspension of exclusions experienced everyday. These exclusions include but are not exhaustive to physical inaccessibility and absence of accommodations associated with physical and mental disabilities and differences. These included comfort spaces for rest and quiet, or flexibility in scheduling to a person's needs rather than an organization's needs or choices. More than this, it allowed for exploration of personal reflections that are entwined with the social, economic, and political not consistently made welcome or shared in either public or private spheres. This contrasts with most everyday spaces which exclude disabled persons and persons who do not fit normative embodiments (i.e., persons whose embodiments diverge from normative racialization, class, gender, sexuality) from the outset because the conditions for safe and full participation are absent. I acknowledge my privilege in my association with the academy; at the same time, the focus on telling stories of disability and difference allowed for my story of difference to be told in a way that I felt would "unsettle" aspects of academic privilege and open up discussions and debate on such privilege in order to disrupt it.[12]

The workshop became a space of safe sharing for my story of difference. Prior to the workshop, I prepared a draft of my story and discussed it with Carla Rice, Director of Project Re•Vision.[13] On the first day of the workshop, I shakily shared it aloud with participants in what was called a storycircle. After the storycircle, time was given to work on it some more. In the quiet time where revisions were made, I realized I harboured a foundational desire and identity to feel myself fully-belonging Canadian in ways that exceed legal citizenship. During childhood, I had experienced loss and shame from being denied that very identity and belonging. I felt a palpable risk in telling my story: having been denied being Canadian, I feared reliving the shame and loss, and again, being denied. I was uncertain how my story would be received in the workshop especially since, aside from Rice, I had no or very little prior connection with the participants. And, while I had previously met with some individuals in the workshop, I had not shared my story that was personally threatening to my

[12] Bannerji et. al. note the importance of telling stories that rarely get voiced in the academy to be taken seriously in academic debates (1992, 5). Indeed, they point out that the organization of power and knowledge in the university makes it possible not to reflect upon class, gender, race (1992, 7); the conferral of dominant normative power relations within the academy becomes the silent norm. Ng describes the silent and invisibly embedded systems of sexism and racism in the university and how they become brusquely visible in a student complaint while sexism and inequality due to race, class, gender, ability, sexuality reinscribe themselves through university language of "neutrality" (1993, 196-198).

[13] Carla Rice's supportive attention to my story made it a better story. I found the courage to tell it from her enthusiasm and encouragement.

sense of belonging.

I realized that disclosing my story created vulnerability on my part from the threat I experienced in sharing it. Yet, I continued because I wanted to tell this story to better understand my own experience of racialization and racial discrimination and my perceived personal inadequacies I associated with these experiences as a young child. I understood that the workshop had been designed as a safe environment and that motivated me to choose and tell this story. The workshop facilitators *said* they were committed to hearing stories of disability and difference. I decided to *trust*.

Outlawed Experiences

The workshop took seriously outlawed experiences (Hennessy 2002, 85). According to Hennessy, "under capitalism, human affective and sensate capacities have been produced such that some ways of organizing them are consolidated into legitimate "experiences" and social relations while others have been outlawed" (2002, 85). This concept of "outlawed experiences" provides a conceptual opening toward theorizing the experience of digital storytelling in an overarching or broader context of commodification.

Commodification transforms human beings and living entities into exchange values: human beings become objects each with a price tag that makes invisible social costs borne by society and surplus value appropriated by capital.[14] In the conversion of human beings to exchange value outlawed experiences of emotion go unrecognized as having value and indeed become devalued. These include the pain and suffering related to oppressions from poverty, abuse, disability, mental illness, homophobia, racism, etc., and their intersections. These emotions and the experiences from which they arise can become marginalized, delegitimated, and/or abject. In my own case, I have marginalized my own experiences of racialization and racism because there is pressure to keep such experiences private and hidden from view. I have dismissed and delegitimated my own emotions related to racialization in order to maintain a degree of intelligibility I felt necessary for myself in each instance of being excluded from the Canadian body politic. If I was not recognized as belonging Canadian, I pursued other qualifications I perceived legitimate such as through the education system.[15] I came to understand my abjection of my ethnicity and skin colour

[14] Not to mention the exclusion of one's own unique individuality that becomes eliminated through commodification (Marx, 1988 (1844)).

[15] Yet, the recent *Macleans* cover story "Too Asian" (Findlay and Kohler 2010) reveals continued racialization and racism in reference to "Asian" and "Canadian" embodiments, norms and standards around post-secondary education whereby studious high-achieving "Asian" students are putatively having a negative (including killjoy) impact on the university experience for white students. I place "Asian" and "Canadian" in quotations to denote that Findlay and Kohler's deployment of these words are controversial for their racializing and racist effects. For critique of the "Too Asian" controversy that erupted from the *Macleans* article, see Bhandar, Gilmour, Jeer, and Ma (2012).

partially reflected my desire and performance of acceptable embodiments in work and play. Sefa Dei et. al, sum up concisely that the articulation of White hegemonic power denies and silences the experiential realities of bodies of colour (2010, xii). Such experiences are legitimate only as zones of exception[16] in which they should not be spoken, seen or made intelligible lest they bring harm, injure or destabilize the existing order, or "infect" the body politic. Indeed, socialism has been suspect in this disavowal of bodily experience, arguing that women's experiences of racism or homophobia, for instance, are essentially secondary systems of oppression to that of class.[17] Following from Hennessey, these regulative norms fracture our human capacities "as affective, sensuous, social beings" (2002, 85). They exact enormous social costs largely borne privately by individuals.

At the same time, there are many experiences of emotion that are valuable to commodity exchange, legitimated, and considered desirable. These would include emotions of triumph over adversity, perseverance, tenacity, and courage that have culminated in already valued goals that resonate with dreams of the middle class, the corporate elite, or celebrities. One can or can have struggled with class (understood in the mainstream as living with hardships associated with low income or poverty), discrimination (at the intersections of class, race, sexuality, disability, for example), however, present hardships and struggles will be temporary and at a future point, definitively relegated to one's past, not to be repeated; or, if repeated, once again overcome or managed. Oprah continues to grow her brand based on this kind of narrative. Her stated intention is to empower girls and women by celebrating the individual overcoming of class deprivation, racism, homophobia and disability through *personal* perseverance.[18] Roman refers to this kind of overcoming as "productivist notions of productivity." They place responsibility on individuals for their overcoming and success, assuming that individuals are fully empowered at the outset to do so (2009b, 685). This abstracts individuals from their social, cultural, and economic relations of oppression, that in turn, deny the role of collective struggle in bringing about social transformation.[19] Denial can also occur paradoxically through the coercive aspects of compelled self-disclosure, and repetitive disclosure (Roman 2009, 684). Speaking from a context of disability, Roman explains that persons with invisible disabilities are compelled by able-bodied persons to explain their disabilities over and over because they are not readily readable on the body, suggesting that disability needs to be visible, for example, through a wheelchair or

[16] Giorgio Agamben (2005) uses this term for spaces created by the state where persons become deemed legal exceptions and dwell invisibly without claim to rights and law, and under conditions of violence and deprivation.

[17] Coburn discusses the effect that adherence to class as the primary system of oppression has on considerations of lived experience and intersectionality (2014, 4-6)

[18] For discussion on how the Oprah Effect (Oprah's self-belief and success) overcomes adversity see Janice Peck (2013).

[19] See also, Roman 1988, 2004; Ferri 2008; Taylor 2004; Ware 2002.

non-normative embodiment such as asymmetric embodiments, for and answerable to able-bodied society and repeatedly for the able-bodied (2009b, 684-686).

Hennessy does not discuss these kinds of experiences, however, she notes that labour power as something "owned" by a person emerges only when her human potential is severed from her very being. Her human potential for work to become the fullest person possible must be suppressed to become exchange labour. It is only in this way that she can commodify her capacities and even her personality into a thing that she can sell (2002, 85). Alienated human potential under conditions of exchange labour cannot be expressed imaginatively in the fullest sense possible where human fulfillment is the goal. For women, their respective needs largely become subsumed, silenced, and subordinated to the commodification process that is premised upon a history of masculine, patriarchal, racialized, sexualized, class, able-bodied, and gender norms and practices manifest in myriad and complex ways.

One way to bring to light the depth of these (un)acknowledged experiences is to create spaces to encourage their expression in ways conceived more creatively and more broadly. Commodified labour renders valueless what it would consider unproductive sensate experiences; in doing so, individual expression becomes repressed and unacknowledged from the full potential of human capacities. A socialist-feminist ethos that encourages and allows these to come forth presents an opportunity to explore the knowledge in the sensate's initial release *as an end in itself*, understanding this sensate experience itself as integral to what it means to be fully human, to be further explored alongside or within socialist-feminist goals. This is different from an approach that views or assumes emotions useful only insofar as they *serve the assumed ends* of socialist-feminist goals for socialist transformation. But, as noted above, this excludes too many.

My Outlawed Experience

My own outlawed experience involves coming to awareness of my racialized embodiment and certain experiences of racism.[20] I had begun to realize at the beginning of Project Re•Vision that powerful emotions were surfacing more regularly in discussions of difference relating to specific childhood experiences. I was becoming more aware of their reverberations in adulthood. I anticipated that putting my reflections into the digital story might be beneficial for my own emotional health, self-acceptance, and strengthening of my capacities in my own communities. I was optimistic that working through the experience of difference relating to my racialized embodiment, I might also experience new possibilities for agency. It was a process of both self-development in terms of personal exploration, and becoming more aware of human affective and sensate capacities in Hennessey's words.

[20] During the making of my digital story, I came to awareness that this was not my only outlaw experience. The making of this digital story is (en)couraging me to theorize the intersection of disability and difference in ways I do not yet fully understand.

Powerful and threatening emotions arose when I started to describe in words my childhood memory. They were powerful in that I felt thundering tremors coursing through my body; I nervously jumped and cowered *inside* responding to the thunder as if it were booming directly over me. The memory of racist slurs were verbal shots fired at me by an assault weapon and I braced my body in preparation for their contact. They lodged into my flesh at all points with my insides exploding in vulnerability and pain. The emotions felt threatening because I remembered the desolate isolation and stopped-in-my tracks confusion of not knowing what to do, whom to tell, or what to say, and seeing the destruction of my identity as Canadian and friendships. I remember simply falling apart inside, trying to maintain an air of indifference on the outside, or saying something mean in retort which only invited more of the same racial slurs. In preparing my story, I felt I was re-living my childhood experiences.

I had not shared previously that I hated my body as a child. I accepted the racial slurs; I thought my body was abnormal and deeply shameful in appearance in comparison to the silent and desired body of whiteness. I neither belonged nor was I Canadian because I had the wrong body. I felt very vulnerable at this realization; I found myself powerfully feeling the shame and self-hatred as if it were happening all over again in the present.

I also remembered the source of the remarks. They came from childhood girlfriends with whom I had come to feel a sense of togetherness that was cozy and secure. The feeling of friendship was of us wrapped in a warm secure blanket. Then, the taunts aggressively ripped the covers off.

"Yellow skin." "Slanty eyes." "Flat nose." "Chink." Taunting sounds mimicking an imagined Chinese dialect. Repeat loudly and louder in what would feel like endless time.

Suddenly, with these sharp words and sounds directed at me, I felt a blunt knife severing me from the feeling of togetherness and belonging. Unfamiliar bodily differences I had not heard prior ("yellow skin," "slanty eyes," "flat nose," "chink") differentiated from the implicit white body was imposed on me in a way that I had no control over and did not fully understand, by my closest friends, no less. I felt my difference was of my own doing, something innate, because it was my body they were verbally shaming and severing.

I blamed myself for not having the right body; I did not understand I was being marked different by those who did not need to mark themselves. In those tense and anguished moments, they spoke from a position of power. But I was eight years old at the time and what did I know, except what I was feeling? Yet, my feelings, too, were outlawed by my own censorship because of the need I felt to be problem-free and impervious to the racial slurs and taunts for my parents and teachers. The loss I felt most acutely was of a happy, joyful, flowing mind-body movement of existence where mind and body were not separate: *mindbody* flowed as one. I did not question or see my body as a racialized body until it was declared from the outside as a raced body, as the foreigner, the other, the one who did not belong, the visible

abject.

As a child, I was also routinely asked "the question" of origin, "*Where are you from?*" with the refusal to acknowledge or accept that I was from "*here.*" Additionally, the way in which the question was asked had a tone of policing and judging, and convicting all at once. During those moments, I would grip my insides so tight, hoping, praying, willing as hard as I could for the questioning and *conviction* of not belonging, of not being from *here*, to end. And yet, when it did end, I felt disoriented. My sense of who I was, my citizenship and nationality were unsettled and confused; I felt dislocated from the outside. I *was* born *here*. "*But, (even if you were born, here) your parents weren't!*" This signaled my not *truly* belonging, not *truly* Canadian-ness in ways identified by Himani Bannerji (2007). My immigrant parents were also racialized and identified as outsiders (even though they were well on their way to citizenship) and their identity as outsiders trumped my birthplace. My hopeful reply of "but, …", with explanations of the process of parents' permanent residency and their being on the path to citizenship as my evidence of belonging were met with dismissive intoned and intended exclusion. This dismissal of my evidence confirmed for me the sense of not belonging, of not being Canadian completely or properly enough.

I came away from these "dis-identification sessions" feeling cast-out by my closest friends, my then peer-group. I kept these experiences from my newcomer parents for fear that I was responsible for this treatment. The feeling and fear of not-belonging is one of the emotions that reverberated throughout my childhood and into adulthood. My sense of belonging in Canada as a *true* citizen would be rendered fragile by the repeated question: "where are you from?" followed by, "no, where are you *really* from?" to my answer of "*Sarnia*, Ontario." The question "*where are you from?*" was a discourse of exclusion and othering; there was an expectation for an answer of birthplace outside Canada in tacit comparison to the questioner's own claim of inclusion and belonging as Canadian. And, when the answer of homeplace was within Canada, a place outside of Canada was found for me by substituting my newcomer parents' birth country.[21]

There was at work in this angle of questioning a sharp dis-identifying process of the subject from my own self-understanding in terms of legal status, and social and cultural standing as citizen within my locality and nation. The question "where are you from," continues as an adult. I now sometimes reply with the question whether they are asking after my ethnicity and/or the ethnicities of my parents, and after answering, I ask "and how about you?" I sometimes edit the question depending on the circumstances to ask: "Where is your hometown or homeplace?" "What is your ethnicity?" "What generation are you," with the always implicit phrase, "in *our* country Canada, also a white settler nation."

In addition to these memories and emotions that arose during the workshop, I also found myself managing the memories and strong feelings of being made an outsider and felt fearful of rejection by the peer group at hand who were also making their own digital stories.

[21] My parents' birth country was South Africa. They left South Africa to leave apartheid.

I knew I was in a supportive environment, yet still, I was acutely aware I was the only one in the workshop making a film about racialized embodiment and I felt it was risky to share the point in my life where I realized this difference was marked from the outside. I felt internal shaking and anxiety over the response to my story, particularly non-acceptance, or worse, indifference.

Finally, I felt shame of my own shame. Larocque's (2010) account of First Nations' lived experience refers to this double shaming. She writes that Indigenous peoples experience living "shrouded in shame twice over: racial shame and, to the extent we may be conscious, shame about feeling ashamed" (2010, 121). She notes the internalization of the colonizer's images of the "grotesque, ignoble savage is perhaps the most damaging" (2010, 121). In my own case, I realize that one part of my lived experience was constituted by the injunction of my racialized otherness made concrete through the slanty-eyed, flat nose, yellow-skinned, chink stereotype. When combined with economic privilege and knowledge available through critical race studies and feminism, as well as my experience in community advocacy as a leader of a Community Race Relations Committee, I also wondered "shouldn't *I be over* this vulnerability, shame, feeling of abjection, and uncertainty of belonging?" While some might answer, "yes," Larocque draws on Puxley to say that "a lengthy colonial experience deprives people of their right to define their experience authentically, but even deprives them of consciousness of such a right" (2010, 121). This colonial experience resonates: I had been internalizing the shame and its outlaw dimension helped keep it intact.

One of my fears in making my digital story was that I should have been able to be strong enough at some point between these childhood experiences and the making of the film to have come to an adequate understanding of what happened to me with an accompanying theorization. Larocque's concept of "shame twice over" offers how this expectation is unrealistic yet understandable. It was within the reassurances of a safe space of the workshop that I decided to tell my story in the presence of fear and the secret shame over having a racialized body, of having been excluded because of it, for not knowing how to stand up for myself, for not knowing how to respond to the explicit racial slurs of childhood and more subtle othering as an adult. There were many points during the making of my film where I just wanted to bury my head in the sand and disappear from the world. The difference was that people in the workshop wanted to hear my story and were able to witness its telling in a way I had not previously experienced. What was new was an acknowledgement that what I had experienced was very real to me and that the experience was something that happened which would not occur in another world where anti-racism would be valued and practiced.[22] In

[22] The ongoing critical reflection and practice of anti-racism, compared to the elimination of racism is an important distinction. George J Sefa Dei et. al., discuss how it is that anti-racism is an ongoing project. Victories against racism can be regulated, "re-tooled" or "re-focused" by racism in ways that blunt the apparent gains (Sefa Dei, et. al. 2007, 5). Sefa Dei et. al. suggest that it is in providing tools and perspectives for the oppressed to write and re-write their constitution within oppressive and interlocking frameworks of racism, sexism, heteronormativity, and so on that new possibilities for resistance, insurgency, and social change may be

retrospect, I felt safe enough within the creative space to be vulnerable among my fellow participants.

Feminist anthropologist Ruth Behar (1996) speaks of the value of this experience. For Behar, new and important knowledge emerges when researchers make themselves vulnerable with an openness and honesty for critical purpose (1996, 14).[23] Following this line of thinking, when a person allows herself to become vulnerable with others an interruption of norms can occur, provoking personal and collective transformation (Rice 2015, Rice et. al., 2016). A fellow participant working in education approached me and shared that my story was still highly relevant because children continue to perpetrate and be the objects of racist slurs. She shared that my story would likely have meaning for children and educators.[24] The response to and support for my story in the workshop, gave me the courage to theorize my story as an outlawed experience.

Relational Aesthetics: Political Possibility from the Ground of Vulnerability

Each storyteller shared their story of disability and/or difference. In hearing the stories, what confronted me especially were the stereotypes and misrepresentations circulating within society of those living with disabilities and differences. These stereotypes did not fit with the women's stories being told; I was challenged by the "gaps" between the stereotypes and the diverse and rich realities of lived experiences of those living with disabilities and difference. For example, there was the image of a beautiful young woman exuding self-confidence in photos bespeaking the 1960s who the workshop audience learns is violently abused by her husband, institutionalized, released, and eventually dies on the streets, homeless, estranged from her family. The storyteller is the grand-daughter seeking to make sense of what happened amidst the silence within her family. In another story, a young woman with a nonstandard body defies medicalization of her body, invites, indeed *dares*, her viewer to continue to fix their gaze on her naked body and see *all* of her while different images of her naked body flow across the screen, giving her viewers entrance into her rich, artful world while at the same time resisting the medicalization of her physical appearance by remaining silent about it. The stories and the films themselves had the effect of disintegrating certain stereotypes and misrepresentations in a way different from scholarship in that the outlawed experiences brought to light created a relational aesthetics that I will discuss next.

Relational aesthetics that becomes *cripped* and *socialist-feminized* involves

possible, in contrast to providing answers to the end of racism or any oppressive system (2007, 10).

[23] Behar makes clear that a person's vulnerability even when expressed in the description of emotion and/or emotional needs *must* become subject for discussion in service of a critical purpose or direction, otherwise, it becomes focused on that person's suffering and brings critical thought to a halt.

[24] For elementary school interventions in anti-racism see Roman and Stanley (1997); Roman and Eyre (1997). Reframe Peterborough International Film Festival announced in 2015 its plans to screen my film in its Reel Kids school program in 2016.

co-creating meaning within a creative space where there is awareness of multiple and intersecting oppressions and support, empathy, compassion, an openness to vulnerability, group discussion and spontaneous conversations among participants. Relational aesthetics comes from Nicolas Bourriaud who resisted the view that art of the 1990s was surface consumerist art and depoliticized. Bourriaud argues that relational aesthetics arises from art itself being a social space where the possibility of intersubjective encounters occur over meaning, not only about the art, but also the referents those encountering the art together bring to light collectively with one another (2002, 16-17). For Bourriaud, "relational aesthetics" arises from art itself because art "creates free area and time spans whose rhythm contrasts with those structuring everyday life" (2002, 16). When cripped and socialist-feminized, these free areas and time spans provide a release from the oppression of capitalist time, welcoming-in experiences kept hidden and suppressed in a new time-space that strives to be open to the lived experiences of disability and difference. Encounters between persons occur through art that would not occur otherwise because our communication and interactions with one another are so highly regulated.

I assumed prior to the workshop that the experience of making the digital story would be largely an individual and private one. Yes, I was going to be making art within a group of women and I anticipated the journey would be an emotional one given the subject matter and experiences. However, the co-creation of knowledge was something I did not anticipate to the degree experienced. The depth of lived experience and the accompanying emotional journey transmitted by each story was enormous. Outlawed experiences and emotions within the daily existence of commodification had been allowed to surface, indeed encouraged, to be told, and shared. The conditions of the workshop created a safespace for participants to be vulnerable with each other. At the same time, the participants actively created a supportive, cooperative place where we could learn together. In so doing, new encounters occurred with a sense of deeper understanding of the very wide range of experiences living with disability and difference brought to the space. This was enlivening because stereotypes of disability and difference became clearer, and the conversations that occurred around the stories and films opened up new ways of thinking and acting outside the scripts that follow or assume the stereotypes.

Bourriaud likens the encounters with art to the back and forth in a game of tennis: there is a serve and a return, implying continued exchange with a willing partner. Bourriaud implies a transformation from competition to collaborative and cooperative communication and I observed it can become a cripped and socialist-feminized space of relational aesthetic. In the workshop, I discovered meaning was created in encounters during the making of my digital story. I shared my deliberations over visuals that would convey the feeling and experience of being "outsider" in Canada; symbols and objects came up independently and simultaneously. With one storyteller, there was a shared recognition in the form of laughter in acknowledgement of the Queen of England and the Canadian National Anthem that I would eventually use in my film as emblematic of official Canadian identity and sense of

belonging.

I was also able to discuss with some storytellers at a much greater level of detail the racialized meaning of a portrait given to me as an adult by a young girl where my skin was represented with bright yellow and described by the girl's parent as physically accurate of my skin tone. I recall physically cringing, feeling pain, and unable to say anything that addressed the remark upon hearing it. There was discussion following this that explored the meaning of skin tones as markers of race and ethnicity and how skin tones can still connect to racial slurs and stereotypes. Initially, some fellow participants thought the portrait sweet and a very kind gesture. When I offered that the portrait was also a form of racialization and reinforcement of the stereotyped Chinese yellow skin colour and slanty eyes, there was recognition and acknowledgement of the complex role of racial-cultural stereotypes and their normalization.[25]

For me, this was a "tiny revolution" where there was some greater clarity about the racialization of representations of Chinese ethnicity. I felt a different future might be possible where stereotyped representations of skin colour, slanty eyes, and otherness were concerned, "pointing to a desired world, which the beholder thus becomes capable of discussing, and based on which his [her] own desire can rebound" (Bourriaud 2002, 23). At the very least, I felt that within the community of storytellers, something additional had been created: the realization that the deep appreciation of a child for an adult in a portrait can also carry complex histories of racial stereotypes that remain naturalized, if not addressed. It was within this space of the workshop that exchange over my digital story created a relational aesthetics with emancipatory capacity in that the space also became a forum for discussion beyond the object produced (Bourriaud 2006, 20).

The social change I *imagined f*rom the experience was important, even if it was an imagined reality that I was glimpsing in my exchanges with the women in the workshop. Bourriaud anticipates the emergence of a horizon, "a desired future or world which the exchange will reveal in discussion" (2002, 23). Indeed, I imagined the possible interventions that would potentially have made a difference for myself. For example, feeling safe to approach parents, a friend, or teacher at school to alert when racial slurs occur; to express how racial slurs are hurtful; feeling confident that racial slurs are clearly unacceptable; having confidence teachers will make effective anti-racist interventions, something not yet assured.

More broadly, utterances were made in the workshop, imagining a world where the pain, suffering, indignities, discrimination, marginalization, criminalization, exclusion, and violence arising from the universalization and dominance of abled-bodied norms, norms of whiteness, heteronormativity, and patriarchy would be chastened and yielded. What was absent from the everyday was brought into focus. For example, racialized and non-normative bodies are socially made or constituted and marginalized through norms of whiteness and able-bodiedness (Davis 2013, Erevelles 2011, Colin and Barnes 2010, Bannerji 2007, Russell

[25] For discussion on normalization of stereotypes as common sense, see Ng (1993, 193-196).

and Molhotra 2002). That this could become central for consideration, even if only ephemerally, was itself emancipatory in that such a collective consideration is outlawed from daily experience.

One critical observation made of relational aesthetics by Claire Bishop is an anxiety that it can "collapse into compensatory (and self-congratulatory) entertainment" (2010, 79), and I will add within a feel-good frame, perhaps even a self-satisfactory "look-at-me, I'm so great" moment. However, when embodiments have been marginalized, abjected, or minimized through colonization, ableism, heteronormativity, and so on, the emergence of new representations need to be given time and space to allow their disruptive effects as resistance to unfold and take hold. This could be understood as an inverse contrapuntal reading, following Larocque's position to "foreground Native responses to centuries of misrepresentation" (2010, 12) rather than criticize them according to traditions of western criticism that she notes can be aggressive and ruthless. Larocque notes that both the creation of Aboriginal material and literary criticism of it represent new bodies of knowledge that distinguish themselves from western literary traditions. Extending Larocque, creations of art and knowledge from the margins and abject deserve time and space to live in recognition of the work as resistance and the struggle for the work to come to representation. When thought of as newly emerging, new representations from the margins deserve consideration from whence they came. New representations would become weakened, if their purpose exclusively remains to be affirmed. When the work is animated by desire for social justice, the goals of the work aim at self-reflexivity in ways that include awareness of new stereotypes or reinforcement of familiar ones.

A sense of achievement in creating and learning something new about oneself was an ephemeral moment in the making of my digital story. Yes, there was a sense of a job done *well-enough* with accompanying "I would have done that differently," having learned and created something new, being opened up to new experiences, including the dark knowledge of those living at the margins whose lives ended because they were not considered worthy of life. However, any trace of accomplishment approaching self-congratulation became quickly revised by the ephemerality of the space as well as the density and magnitude of system change and intersubjective change required for the otherness recounted in the digital-stories to be meaningfully addressed, let alone the accompanying economic transformation required. Among the dreams and goals of disabled persons is to earn a living wage in meaningful employment and to participate fully and be recognized as fully participating in society (Wendell 2013, Shier et. al. 2009, Wilson-Kovacs 2008). The creative socialist-feminist space of the workshop was recognized as one part of a broader strategy to facilitate change in meaning and structure of employment: not simply inclusion into the capitalist labour market on its on terms, but a working place or space where all human beings, including those non-normatively different and disabled, experience life as full/er self-expression rather than alienation. Seeds were planted to imagine work and play spaces accessible for different, non-standard, non-normative bodies in ways similar to the

storytelling workshop. As well, there were imagined transformations of work and play spaces into places of human sharing rather than places where surplus value and profit are created and appropriated by the capitalist. The digital story filmmaking provided a space where imagined change became clearer from women's experiences themselves and how these experiences need to be translated to employment for persons living with disability and difference – and ultimately, into very different ideas about human labour, with human labour that would no longer be commodified at the horizon.

The relational aesthetics within the space came to an end after three days and with it so did the safe haven where otherness and outlawed emotion were welcomed-in. At the end, reality flooded into the space and we all had to leave. Along with my fellow digital-story filmmakers, I felt roughly grabbed back with jolts disrupting a comfortable rhythm established over the three days into my own current of activity. I felt so much was on the cusp of changing in my own self-understanding; my past had shifted and in having my story shown and having seen others' digital-stories, I felt a sense of empathetic acceptance with the desire and capacity to embrace others who shared this journey. I was ready, too, for a different dialogue over the experiences of marginalization, violence, trauma, and abjection intertwined with disability and difference: not one exclusively of consciousness-raising, but one also of making clear where experiences under discussion do not "mesh-up" into and resist a totalizing logic of oppression and singular solution. The diversity of experiences, instead, created ripped edges of understanding that did not resolve into a unity or coherence of sorts, but instead coaxed a capacity for acknowledgement of the complexity of multiple and intersecting oppressions involving gender, class, race, sexualities, abilities, and colonialism.

As a temporary community that came into connection intimately for three days, the memory of the relational aesthetics, of artful relating and relating artfully, continues to be a powerful memory and inspiration for further action. The relations within the workshop enacted democratic principles of consensus, intense listening, support, agency, and arguably an emerging principle of vulnerability, however, they were immanent to the space of the workshop. There was no debate or dialogue over specific political, social or economic program for change and how the group would be part of that transformation. Nonetheless, one knew that the stories and films would be shared in future spaces specific to each participant's communities.[26]

As well, there were socialist-feminist visions of full access to participation and individual economic and social needs being fully met according to one's abilities. These conditions were not put into words or a program-of-action, rather, it came into tangible existence as a present-absence from the stories themselves. The future was felt in the negative spaces, in the interstices, created by the stories that showed implicitly what should not and

[26] Each digital storyteller owns their film to do with as they choose. Project Re•Vision provided each storyteller options whether their film would or would not be screened publicly for research purposes. My film was accepted and screened at the 2015 Reframe Peterborough International Film Festival.

need not have happened in terms of the range of marginalization, indignities, exclusions, and violence storytellers experienced. For myself, the racialization of the body rendered other and not belonging was an act, an incident from which to learn the complexities of otherness and belonging for their acceptance and allow for diverse visions of belonging and anti-racism. At the end of the workshop, there was an ongoing anger and frustration toward the relations of power that create and maintain multiple and intersecting oppressions, as well as a loss for what the workshop provided: the resources of space and time to reflect upon these power relations and connection with others.[27] There was also recognition that transformation at the local is an ongoing process and that the workshop could be viewed as part of an iterative process.

Creative Socialist-Feminist Spaces: Diverse Socialist-Feminist Strategy

To conclude, I have presented some of my experiences as participant in the creation of a recently developed arts medium, the digital story. In the space of creation sensitive to and welcoming of disability and difference, that is, a space that is *cripped* and *socialist-feminized*, I found the following are encouraged and facilitated: sensate experiences and needs outlawed by commodification are allowed to surface and dwell more openly for a temporary period in a safe and comfortable environment with fellow travelers going through the same experience. A relational aesthetic emerges where meaning is co-created through intersubjective exploration; and future trajectories become imagined where women who have made digital stories can continue to screen their films and disseminate knowledge from the project.

The creative socialist-feminist space I experienced, offered opportunity for both dis-identification from stereotypes and new possibilities of identity-formation and agency. Importantly, this space welcomed-in emotion inseparable from outlawed experiences, and emotions were given words and acknowledged. In contrast, these emotions and outlawed experiences are largely unwelcome and disallowed within commodity capitalism because a person must commodify herself as labour power and suppress her experience as a fully sensing and emotional human being. For me, the powerful emotions in response to racism and othering of my body from Canadian belonging and social citizenship were given words in a space that welcomed them for the first time. From my experience, I suggest that a creative socialist-feminist space has the potential for persons to share, make visible and individually and cooperatively explore and make meaning of outlawed experiences relating to gender, class, race, disability, colonialism, and sexuality even if only temporarily. Given the vulnerability involved in bringing these outlawed experiences into the open,

[27] Perhaps the need to mark the end of emancipatory timespaces is important. Anderson asked the question of the need to eulogize the end of The Unruly Salon series, inaugural performance spaces for disability artists held at the University of British Columbia in 2008 (Roman 2009, 672). While there was celebration and pride for these important salons, there was also grief and a sense of finality to their ending, as well as knowing the importance of continued work in creating spaces and opportunities for disability artists.

socialist-feminist principles are vital in these creative spaces. These principles importantly relate to material comfort, allowing for safe spaces of intense expression, negotiation, listening, respect, vulnerability, accessibility and inclusion in ways not experienced outside the space. As well, the limitations of this space are several: the space was temporary; while the project aimed for the greatest diversity possible of participants in the workshop I found that in the workshop I attended, I was the one visible Asian woman, yet also privileged in class, sexuality, and appearance of the able "mind and body.[28] I centered racialized difference in my digital story film. In being able to reflect upon and express experiences relating to racialization, I began to recognize more profoundly the stakes of maintaining and making clear the distinction between racialized embodiment and the standard able mind-body. Even while my body was pointedly excluded from Canadian-ness as a child, and subtley so as an adult that continues now, my keeping my outlawed experience under wraps gave me the illusion that if I did not refer to these instances of exclusion, I could rely on, feature, present, or perform the parts of me that were acceptable and fit into the mind-body exigencies of any given ablebodied-demanding location. Recognizing these stakes may lead me to another film or art-making having to do with outlaw experience at the intersection of racialization and normative able-bodiedness.

The intertwined processes of self-reflection and art-making inadvertently also became the facilitation and encouragement of a space for a relational aesthetics. This kind of space supported honest exploration amid vulnerability in bringing forth new knowledge created collectively through spontaneous discussion, not in a systematized or systematizing way. The knowledge created was highly valued in the context of building equity because the lived experience and needs of women living with disabilities and differences is extraordinarily devalued within a society that privileges abled-bodiedness and disavows physical, mental, racialized, colonialized differences, reducing them to inferiority or rendering them invisible, unintelligible, or abject. The knowledge also has a fragile quality in that a person who decides to bring to light what has been shamed and deemed worthy of only being hidden makes themselves extremely vulnerable in terms of their own self-identity and sense of worth as a person in relation to dominant norms. I also discerned strength for having brought forth these buried experiences for their dissembling effect of racist stereotypes in my own case as well as a reassembling from the political insights brought to light. A relational aesthetic within a creative space appears to create possibilities of agency, connection and interventions that carry forward beyond the space itself. Politically, these creative spaces strike me as important for socialist-feminisms to consider as part of a broader and diverse socialist-feminist strategy.

[28] There are challenges regarding the recruitment of women of color and Aboriginal women and their intersections with class. See Castledon and Garvin 2008; Meadows et. al. 2003, 4-7.

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Article

LEFT BEHIND BY THE ALTER: WHY QUEERS AND SOCIOLOGISTS NEED MATERIALIST FEMINISM

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Biographical Note

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Abstract

The United States marriage rights movement just culminated in July 2015 with the Supreme Court declaring same-sex marriage constitutional. The mainstream – the mainstream media and the mainstream LGBT rights movement – all applaud this trajectory, with no attention to those who get left behind in marriage politics. In this paper, I will argue that same-sex marriage is in need of a materialist feminist analysis. I will critique my discipline – Sociology – for failing to adequately theorize same-sex marriage as a key component of the 21st Century landscape of the capitalist mode of production. I will also critique the mainstream LGBT rights movement and the media attention given same-sex marriage for their lack of attention to the classed relations embedded in marriage rights. A materialist feminist analysis will allow us to see that there's still a need for a larger, more emancipatory sexual politics.

Keywords

LGBT rights, materialist feminism, queer theory, same-sex marriage

Introduction

On June 26, 2015 the United States Supreme Court federalized same-sex marriage. For most in the LGBT community, this success feels like the just end of a long fight for equality. And while this does feel like a big success — and it is, as there was lots of activism that went into the process — I am left wondering if it's really just, and equal. And more importantly, I'm left feeling concerned that it's an ending, especially given the centrality of

marriage to the movement (Bernstein and Taylor 2013), and given scholars' arguments of being "beyond the closet" (Seidman 2002) and "post-gay" (Ghaziani 2011). We've seen this trajectory before, as the Civil Rights era has led us to the color-blind, post-racial era (Gallagher 2003), as well as to the "post-feminist" (McRobbie 2004). The problem with this end is that marriage rights are not emancipatory, in that while queer politics in general and marriage rights in particular are understood to be important culturally (Butler 1997), when considered in relation to economics and the means of production, marriage reflects the social positions of middle class, white members of the LGBT community and in ways that will function to further marginalize those queers who are already the most marginalized—the poor, people of color, transgender people, homeless queer youth (Bernstein and Taylor 2013, Duggan 2002). If we are shifting into the "post-gay" era as Ghaziani (2011) argues, then we risk being left with marriage and no further activism or politicking.

Marriage, as represented in mainstream media accounts of this political process, is framed as the logical desire of loving couples rather than as an economic arrangement that benefits the middle and upper classes. Poor queers are being left behind by the alter. Rosemarry Hennessy wrote that "the relationship between sexual identities and capitalism remains for the most part an unexplored — even unspeakable — area of inquiry" (2000, 4). I would argue that the same is true of the current moment: same-sex marriage needs a material analysis! Specifically, the LGBT rights movement and sociological scholarship on same-sex marriage need a materialist framework lest we find ourselves facing another "stalled revolution" (Hochschild 1989).

For the purposes of this paper, materialist feminism will be deployed as the lens through which same-sex marriage will be analyzed, and the marriage rights movement and sociological scholarship on the movement will be critiqued. Materialist feminism is also often referred to as socialist feminism or Marxist feminism, and there are lots of different trajectories of thought within these frameworks (Hennessy and Ingraham 1997), so it is important to clarify what it means in the context of this paper. As a sociologist, my relationship to materialist feminism is grounded in my discipline, and has its roots in Marx's concept of historical materialism, where the real conditions of life are understood through the lens of historical structural forces. For me this has often meant that activism alone is never enough to instigate social change; the social conditions for change must exist in order for activism to be successful. Rendering a materialist approach feminist means understanding that/how gender and sexuality intersect in the social world with capitalism, and that as such institutionalized heterosexuality must be connected "with the gender division of labour and the patriarchal relations of production" (Ingraham 1997, 276). As a result, in order to interrogate same-sex marriage through the lens of materialist feminism, it must be understood historically, in relation to larger social forces (as well as micro level activism) and as emerging from capitalist modes of production, the nuclear family, and heteronormativity.

Why Same-Sex Marriage?

Queer politics in the twentieth century has gone through many transformations, attending to a multitude of issues from decriminalization and the removal of homosexuality from the DSM to HIV/AIDS and coming out politics. According to Bernstein and Taylor (2013), "the first time that the lesbian and gay movement publicly put marriage on its agenda was in 1987 at the third national March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights" (3). Since then, the mainstream movement has been centered on securing marriage rights (Duggan 2006, Kandaswamy (2008). In the early 1990's Hawaii brought the legal fight over same sex marriage to the forefront of American attention. This attempt at legalization had a positive impact on queer political mobilization, sending marriage rights to the center of the movement's attention, despite the fact that there was significant disagreement within the community over the importance of marriage; while many argued that it was important symbolically or necessary for legal rights, such as in raising children, others argued that it was "homonormative" and could result in the loss of a specifically queer identity and culture (Bernstein and Taylor 2013, Ghaziani)

Hawaii instigated a significant backlash, including the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996 and this backlash fired up the LGBT movement. Since then--from Vermont in 1999 to Massachusetts in 2003 to California in 2004 and 2008--marriage has monopolized queer politics, to the benefit of a few, and with a silencing impact on a range of material issues impacting the LGBT community that marriage rights won't solve. Instead, marriage rights are presented as the route to health care access and economic stability (Kandaswamy 2010). As Chrys Ingraham argues, an "imaginary" creates ways of thinking that render invisible the real conditions of life, that "mask the historical and material conditions" that exist in the real world (2008, 23). It seems the imaginary at work in mainstream attention to same-sex marriage renders queers one marriage away from middle class comforts, full employment, health insurance, and romantic bliss. The reality behind this imaginary is a context in which we "trade the commodification of our lives for limited social rights" (Attwood 2006, 15) that function to benefit a few, while silencing the many.

A Sociological Marriage?: A Brief Review

Sociology is a particularly useful discipline for making sense of how sexuality is organized, thus rendering it important for making sense of how same-sex marriage will operate in the social world and in people's lives. Sociological theories — from symbolic interactionism to social construction theory — have been central to constructing arguments against essentialized understandings of sexuality, especially those arguments that denaturalize heterosexuality and thus opening up the space for successful LGBT activism (Katz 2007). Despite this, it is clear to me that my discipline hasn't adequately addressed the relationship between same-sex marriage and income inequality, or connected queer

marriage to a larger materialist understanding of the institution of marriage.

A quick review of the sociological literature reveals discussions on attitudes towards same-sex marriage (Baunach 2012), research on gay marriage bans (McVeigh and Diaz 2009, Soule 2004), the intersection of religion and (opposition to) gay marriage (Langbein and Yost 2009, Sherkat et. al 2010), and the symbolism of same-sex weddings (Kimport 2013). Kimport, for example, argues that lesbian wedding photography, as taken during the wedding protests of 2004 in San Francisco, challenges heteronormativity because of the presence of gender nonnormativity in the images that serve to dispute "the assumed association between sex and gender" (294). For Kimport heteronormativity isn't an organizing structure of society that shapes relations to production, reproduction and consumption in a capitalist society; rather, for Kimport heteronormativity is about normative gender display and heterosexual practice. Arlene Stein (2013) importantly connects same sex marriage to the privileged classes in a capitalist society and argues that "if marriage offers economic benefits, it does so mainly for those who possess considerable economic resources" (56), though she does not explore precisely how or why capitalism produces a version of heteronormativity that includes same-sex marriage.

A lot of the sociological scholarship on same-sex marriage is grounded in social movement theory rather than Marxist, materialist or economic theory. Soule's (2004) research on state bans is grounded in social movement theory and questions the impact of social movement action on policy. She explored the extent to which elite allies, electoral competition and state law impact the movement and policy changes, and finds that, "movements do matter" in impacting same-sex marriage policy changes, especially "interest organizations" (471). Jeffrey Kosbie's (2013) work explores how dissent within the movement in Massachusetts functioned and with what consequence. Given that "queer activists criticized the focus on marriage as displaced" but still participated in the movement, Kosbie examined how debates within the movement were managed, arguing that "mobilizing this discursive community depended on strategic framing and de-emphasis of identity differences" (111).

This, along with the argument that the LGBT community's desire for marriage is "homonormative," that is, it mimics rather than challenges heterosexuality is what causes Ghaziani (2011) to question, "if identity requires difference, then how is it constructed during moments when such differences are de-emphasized, that is, when gay activists assert their similarities to, rather than differences from, heterosexuals" (100). This is all interesting and important work, just as same-sex marriage is important in addressing "injustices of recognition" (Fraser 1997, 280), yet it fails to situate these arguments (including the queer arguments) within the larger context of exploitation and capitalist labour relations. Hennessy and Ingraham argued that "if feminism is to maintain its viability as a political movement aimed at redressing women's oppression and exploitation worldwide, the theory that underlies feminist practice cannot eclipse the material realities that bind race, gender, sexuality and nationality to labour" (1997, 2); the same goes for LGBT activists and theory in

the 21st century.

While this is obviously not an exhaustive representation of the sociological literature it does help to illuminate the absence of a materialist approach to the issue. While sociologists have addressed the debates and schisms within the LGBT community over marriage politics (Kosbie 2013) and media representations of those debates and schisms (Bernstein and Burke 2013), limited attention has been paid to the material conditions that shape couples' relationship to the institution of marriage. Scholars have addressed the intersection of economics and marriage outside of the context of queer marriage rights, illuminating why poor couples don't marry despite valuing marriage very highly (Edin and Kafalas' 2005). Daniel Schnieder, reports that "recent research suggests that wealth may be an important economic prerequisite of marriage and may help to explain the disparity in marriage by race and education" (2011, 633). While this work is important, it doesn't insert marriage itself as central to the (re)production of class inequalities.

Sociological scholarship that situates (hetero)sexuality within the capitalist mode of production is also minimal. Chrys Ingraham's (1999, 2008) work is a clear exception to this, as her work explores the wedding ritual from materialist perspective, importantly arguing that weddings and marriage reproduce inequalities of race, class, gender and sexuality. Other sociologists have connected the beginnings of the gay social context to the anonymity that urban life provides in the context of capitalism and wage labour (D'Emlio 1997, Valocchi 1999). Meanwhile, others argue that the commodification of gay life has negatively impacted both queer communities and activism (Kelly 2014, Sears 2005). These examples represent important work but don't represent the current moment. The discipline of sociology needs to be invigorated and elabourated to incorporate recent changes in marriage policy into a materialist analysis of sexuality.

Sociological scholarship has (in my reading) spent the past few decades in the rabbit hole of identity and identity construction. The consequence of this, is the conflation of sexuality with sexual identities, and the erasure of (hetero)sexuality as an organizing principle of social life not actually contingent upon bodies or identities, but built into social structures. For example, Gillian Dunne (2000) argues that "lesbian motherhood undermines a core signifier of heterosexuality and challenges heterosexual monopoly of norms for parenting" (16). She also argues that her study of lesbians who opt into motherhood via donor insemination present the "possibility of showing what can be achieved when gender difference as a fundamental structuring principle in interpersonal relationships is minimized" (13). Without delving into her findings and analysis, I take issue with the assumptions built into these quoted arguments, as they center gender and sexuality as components of the bodies present in relationships, rather than as larger structural dynamics shaping all people's relationships regardless of identity. That is, heterosexuality for Dunne is dependent upon the presence of one man and one woman; gender structures don't exist in the presence of two women. Identity work tends to hide the larger structural arrangements, and the queer theoretical response largely perpetuated the same problem the

work attempted to address in that "in most of [queer theory] capitalism remains completely invisible" (Hennessy 2000, 53).

We Are Our History – Materialist Feminist Understandings of Same-Sex Marriage Rights

Homosexuality has always existed to bolster the economic sexual order of the industrial West. As such, using a materialist frame reminds activists and scholars alike that same sex marriage is an inevitable outcome of history, rather than a liberatory politics. Rosemary Hennessy and Chrys Ingraham (1997) write that

> emancipatory change that aims to eliminate exploitation and oppression within a social system cannot take place by eradicating inequities only in one sphere of social life--whether it be the economy, state, or culture. For change to be truly emancipatory, it must include civil rights and cultural reforms and extend to the social structures that allow wealth for the few to be accumulated at the expense of the many (4).

Hennessy and Ingraham remind us that not all politics are truly emancipatory. This is the position the LGBT rights movement in the U.S. is in, by allowing marriage without illuminating or critiquing the class-inflected nature of marriage. By disconnecting marriage from the larger economic structure of society, as organized also by the state, the movement fails to be emancipatory as Hennessy and Ingraham suggest. A materialist approach also reminds us that change doesn't just happen because of the hard work of activists--though activism is crucial to speed up the process — but as a result of larger historical forces.

In the context of the successes of the post-Stonewall, post-HIV/AIDS LGBT rights movement, an often overlooked but significant impact on the successes of this movement have been social and medical changes in reproduction, along with the deinstitutionalization of marriage and the emergence of the post-modern, post-industrial pure relationship (Cherlin 2004). It is within this context, and in relation to the capitalist mode of production, that the ground shifted towards same sex marriage. Homosexuality has always functioned in society to organize and normalize, marriage, reproduction, and heterosexuality; same sex marriage does not change that.

Heterosexuality and homosexuality have not always been the social categories that function to organize sexuality socially. In fact, prior to the 19th century, the terms didn't even exist in the vernacular (Katz 2007). The reproductive imperative is what drove all structural, cultural, and individual understanding of bodies. All that changed along with the economic transformations of the Industrial Revolution, when the new "science" of sexuality, and the culture at large, deployed heterosexuality and homosexuality as social mechanisms to facilitate re-organizion of the new economy. As D'Emilio writes

> gay men and lesbians have not always existed. Instead, they are a product of history, and have come into existence in a specific historical era. Their emergence is associated with the relations of capitalism; it has been the historical development of capitalism--more specifically, its free labour system – that has allowed large numbers of men and women in the late twentieth century to call themselves gay, to see themselves as part of a community of similar men and women, and to organize politically on the basis of that identity (1993, 468).

The transformation from a subsistence agricultural economy to an industrial capitalist economy created the context for wage labour and urbanization, which D'Emilio argues created the space for individuals to construct anonymous space for living gay lives. This transformation also instigates changes in regards to the reproduction of the labour force, and thus changed the context of sexual socialization and policing. As such, as homosexuality emergences so too does homophobia and heterosexism. The homosexual "other" and the social stigmatization experienced by these "others" helped to organize the majority ensuring heteronormativity. A devalued homosexuality serves to push heterosexuality into more valued space and the state (via marriage, labour laws, decency laws, and gendered norms) pushes homosexuality into the closet (Seidman 2002).

Further, heterosexuality as a social sexual idea is a key player in the transformation of understanding our bodies as sources of (re)production to sources of pleasure. Making sense of the body as a source of pleasure not only serves to facilitate a transition to an industrially appropriate hetero-ethic, it also opens up the necessary relationship between pleasure and consumption, an impact of capitalism on the sexual world. Purchasing out of want rather than need requires organizing the social and the self around pleasure pursuits. Birth control, especially the development of the pill and the legalization thereof, solidifies the shift towards a sexual pleasure ethic that begins to blur the boundaries of sexual morality and regulation.

Further, according to Katz, "the decreasing value of procreation, and increasing value of pleasure sex, make heterosexual and homosexual seem even more similar. This undermines, as we'll see, old rationales for unequal treatment, and, finally, the very basis of the heterosexual/homosexual distinction" (2007, 86). This marks the transformation from an industrial production oriented society to a post-industrial consumer oriented one, and as Katz argues, begins to destabilize the heterosexism of the industrial era. At the root of heterosexism, however, is the organization of socially necessary labour. What we are seeing in the late 20th and early 21st century is most certainly a moment of increasing space for LGBT lives, as evidenced by the emergence of same-sex marriage. At the same time, however, the undermining of heterosexism does not automatically result in the reorganization of labour relations that heterosexuality has historically organized.

Queering Labour Relations? A Materialist Analysis of the Household Division of Labour

As materialist feminist scholars have been arguing for decades, "as an economic unit, the nuclear family is a valuable stabilizing force in a capitalist society" (Benston 1997, 21). The nuclear family's reliance on a breadwinner secures the capitalist economy wage labourers, and at the same time, the nuclear family's dependence on a homemaker secures capitalism's need for consumption and a well cared for (future) labour force. The nuclear family in the context of state regulated marriage, wage laws, and limited welfare ensures the privatization of care work.

Further, privately organizing reproductive labour frees the state, and thus society, from said responsibility. As the state regulated the nuclear family through marriage policy as a heterosexual unit, and organizing the private and public labour as separate gendered spheres subsequently keeps men and in particular, women, dependent upon each other, and on the institution of marriage that organizes this relationship. This dependency—women's dependency on men, men and women's dependency on civil marriage—is productive for the capitalist economy. Again, as Benston points out, "...the amount of unpaid labour performed by women is very large and very profitable to those who own the means of production" (1997, 22), as is a breadwinner who reports to work every day, unlikely to ask questions about his labour conditions, so as to support his wife and children. Same-sex marriage will support, not alter these dynamics. All bodies are organized by these mechanisms of labour relations, not just heterosexually identified people in "opposite sexed" relations. As stated previously, (hetero)sexuality is a mechanism by which labour is organized; it is not an essential property of individuals.

Ingraham and Hennessy write that "women's labour continues to be a primary source of capital accumulation. Feeding and caring for children, attending to the sick and the elderly, and providing one of the main sources of cheap labour in waged work have been women's longstanding contributions to capital accumulation across the globe" (1997, 1-2). This argument is key to a materialist analysis of marriage, gender, and sexuality. Mainstream social science seems to have ignored this theoretical trajectory, particularly in relation to same-sex marriage. For example, Green (2010) states that a "traditional" marriage is one that is monogamous, reproductive, and organized around a gendered division of labour (402), and thus argues that same sex marriages "queer" this tradition simply by dismantling the gendered division of labour. Absent here is any discussion of labour from the perspective of capital accumulation. Even if the couple is same-gendered, someone is still doing all the labour and thus, exploitation is still at the center of the same-sex household. In fact, according to Green,

> ...the negotiated quality of the domestic division of labour and authority across same-sex married couples does not align with the critical

> feminist/queer prediction that marriage will assimilate lesbian and gay spouses into role-differentiated marriages that reproduce power inequities found in traditional heterosexual marriages (424-5).

The power inequities that he is referring to are gendered dyanmics – the male dominated breadwinner-homemaker structure of the "past." What materialist scholars must tend to here, however, is the extent to which gendered power dynamics are central to 21st century marriage from the perspective of capital. Just because these couples don't have "traditional" gender roles embedded in their daily lives, doesn't mean that their lives don't "reproduce power inequities." The issue here is in part operational definitions. If we confine our understanding of marital power to patriarchy, and of power being essentially tied to particular types of bodies then we will miss the larger economic function of the privatized institution of marriage. Marriage doesn't just exist to serve patriarchal functions, but to serve capitalistic functions, of which patriarchy has been (re)organized to serve.

There is a reciprocal relationship between capitalism and same-sex marriage; capitalism has encroached into this aspect of queer lives and politics. As an example, one of Green's (2010) participants, a 33 year-old male made clear that the affordability of day care versus hiring a nanny was going to shape him and his partners decision making regarding family size. This means that while he and his partner may challenge the heteronormativity of the patriarchal structure it is clear that via hiring a nanny or using a day care provider they will still be relying on the labour of women – likely poor transnational women of color – to facilitate their paid labour. That is, their household does not live outside of the globalized capitalist mode of production. As such power inequities are maintained by these same sex households; but as white middle class men and women who can afford either a day care or a nanny, they don't see or feel the inequities as they largely impact other families homes.

Dunne's (2000) piece offers similar analytic issues. For example, a lesbian couple who opted into motherhood via insemination are described as such:

> The experiences of Thelma and Louise are not atypical of mothers in this situation. They have been living together for seven years in an apartment they own in inner-city Manchester. They have two daughters, Polly, age four, and Stef, age two. Thelma works in desktop publishing, and Louise is a teacher. Like many in the sample, Thelma and Louise operationalize shared parenting by reducing their paid employment to half-time (21).

The ensuing analysis of this couple focused on how they are redefining parenting in queer ways. No attention was ever paid to their professions, their home ownership, their ability to afford half-time employment, nor is there a discussion of the realties that one egalitarian household does not restructure macro level dynamics of ownership and capital that produce social (in)equities in society and in households.

Clearly, what these sociologists are missing is a materialist frame. As Hennessy writes, "capitalism does not structurally require patriarchal gender asymmetry, but historically, it has made use of the institution of marriage and the heterosexual norms it regulates to reproduce gendered divisions of labour both in and outside the family" (2000, 65). As Hennessy makes clear in this comment, while heteronormative gender relations are not necessary, they have been useful. What's crucial here, however, is that "patriarchal gender asymmetry" is not a functional requirement of capitalism; so long as there are people willing to exploit themselves in the labour market and child care and other forms of care work are privately funded through (shrinking) wages, the capitalist organization of labour in society remains functional.

Sociologists regularly argue that gender and sexuality are socially constructed social institutions, and yet, when they situate those same dynamics within bodies, they fail to deploy their own disciplinary perspective. Heteronormative gender relations have always been about securing a passive wage labour pool and a privatized system of care work. What studies like Green (2010) and Dunne (2001) actually make clear is that gay men and lesbians do not organize their households in ways that challenge these underlying functions. As stated earlier, homosexuality has always functioned to the benefit of heteronormativity, and heteronormativity has always functioned to the benefit of capital. Same-sex marriage reorganizes this process while keeping historical capitalist labour relations firmly in tact. In fact, in the 21st century, these labour relations are so hegemonic, we are seeing a weakening of heteronormative gender relations — in both "same" sex and "opposite" sex households — without the equivalent weakening of the structure of capitalist labour relations.

Love Has Everything to Do With It – Media Framing of the Marriage Movement

Since the 1990's era of Ellen DeGeneres' televised coming out, followed by Will and Grace, the LGBT community has become increasingly visible, largely relying on the culture industry (Adorno 2001) to shape this visibility. As a result, and as Sears has noted (2005), consumerism (by queers) and profit (for the industry) have dominated. This visual representation has had a significant, and positive, impact on the LGBT community in relation to coming out, identity construction, and cross-sexual interactions with friends and family (Edwards 2009). At the same time, these images have the potential to hurt the community, to lure us into a false sense of (economic) security.

Since the early 21st century, media scholars have been pointing out that the media has "stereotyped" the LGBT community as "affluent" despite plenty of documentation to disprove this belief (Ragusa 2005, 656). Of course, these visual representations obscure the reality of life in the LGBT community, rendering invisible the homelessness, poverty, and violence that many members of our community experience. As reported by The Gay and Lesbian Task Force, transgender people are more likely to live in poverty: "our sample was nearly four times more likely to have a household income of less than $10,000/year

compared to the general population" (Grant et. al. 2011:2). The queer representation that emerges from the mainstream media does not shed light on these very relevant concerns, while it is important in framing our understanding of the world. As Bernstein and Burke (2013) point out, "scholars find that newspapers are highly influential in shaping public opinion about important issues" and that "media coverage [is an] indicator of value change" (322-333). Given the extent to which queer media visibility shapes queer politics, it is no surprise that same sex marriage, a middle-upper class issue, has come to dominate the mainstream movement's attention in the 21st century.

Margaret Bentson (1997) writes that,

> One function of the family, the one taught to us in school and the one which is popularly suggested, is the satisfaction of emotional needs: the needs for closeness, community and warm, secure relationships. …This function of the family is important in stabilizing it so that it can fulfill the second, purely economic function (20).

We can see the function of emotional needs in media reports of fights over marriage rights. That is, the emotional-romance ideology that emerges from the same sex rights movement is that marriage is the place to secure love relationships. In this sense, the economics of marriage are excluded from the narrative and romantic love becomes the "imaginary" (Ingraham 2008). For example, the *Dallas Morning News* (2014), in a report on pending cases to challenge the same sex marriage ban, quoted one member of a suing couple as arguing that, "'we love each other and, like most straight couples who love each other, we want to get married" (1). This argument situates marriage in relation to romantic love rather than in relation to property rights; it is also a culturally powerful argument. Now that reproduction no longer requires (hetero)sexuality, love becomes the ideological force that maintains the institution of marriage.

As a scholar, it seems to me that these normative frames make very clear the reality that same-sex marriage is a limited version of "equality," in that it functions to the benefit of heteronormative structuring of labour relations, securing docile wage labourers and performers of reproductive labour as "labours of love." There's no real social transformation going on; rather, it a state-sanctioned restructuring of who's involved in the status quo. As one woman from South Carolina is reported as saying, "you think about your heterosexual life and we do the exact same thing you know I go to work all day come home and we watch TV and go to bed. It's a normal married life"' (Mishkin 2014).

Class relations are silenced in these narrative, even as they are still present. The Texas couple was reported by the *Dallas Morning News* as a physician's assistant and a lawyer by profession. In addition, the article reports that "both couples in the suit have connections" with the law firm representing them in the case. This information clearly situates the parties in this case in economic terms, making it easy to imagine how these couples will benefit from

being able to access the economic benefits of marriage. Further, as Schneider (2011) argues, wealth is often a pre-requisite for marriage, whereby one's access to resources shapes perceptions of marital desireability. As a result, access to resources both preceeds and emerges from marriage. Despite these classed relations, marriage rights are framed in terms of access to marriage and democratic citizenship rights, where the institution is the rightful home for love relationships.

Similarly, *The New York Times* reports on a few of the couples who were challenging the marriage bans in Virginia. One couple is reported to be "an English professor" and a "real estate agent" who "wants to be married like everyone else" (Eckholm 2014). As Gregory Mantsios writes, "for the most part, the news media ignores the poor" (1998, 1) and that by "by ignoring the poor and blurring the lines between the working people and the upper class, the news media creates a universal middle class" (3). This is clearly what *The New York Times* is accomplishing with quoting this real estate agent, who declares that everyone wants to get married, erasing the economic realities of multitudes of working poor partnerships opting-out of marriage for economic survival. The other couple reported in this article are declared to be an "expert in special education" and an "education professor" (Eckholm 2014). All of these jobs are reported as mundane and class-less, though they are all clearly professions that situate these individuals within classed positions, ready for the property rights marriage will deliver.

Again in *The New York Times*, marriage is framed as a positive, universal "victory" all while the class relations are silently lurking—present but unremarked upon. According to the article, "Erin E. Miller and her wife may have to pay more income tax this year, but they aren't about to protest. Quite the opposite. They are delighted" (Delafuente 2014). The article continues: "'I don't care,' said Ms. Miller, a software engineer who lives in Beverly, Mass. 'I'm thrilled that DOMA was struck down, regardless of my own personal situation'" (Delafuente 2014). Here, her situation — having to pay more taxes — is framed as a difficult "personal situation," rather than the clear classed position that it really is. As a software engineer, it's clear she can afford not to care; and the article frames this as normal and just, as if "we [the universal middle class] all share the same concerns" (Manstsios 1998, 3). This normalization is powerful.

As reported in *Milwaukee-Wisconsin Journal Sentinel* in 2014, same sex marriage is about "one thing: basic fairness" (Editorial Board). The outcome of an argument like this, however, is problematic, as it sets up marriage rights as the only impediment to "simple justice" (Editorial Board). Rather than discuss the continued inequities of wages, unemployment, lack of access to affordable health care, the growing wealth gap, or the impacts of the housing crisis, marriage is framed the solution, as the last bastion of unequal social relations. The article even deploys a color-blind frame by comparing the abolition of same sex marriage bans to the abolition of interracial marriage bans, all while

perpetuating the notion that these legal changes will solve the underlying social inequalities that they organized during their reign. Instead of reports on the realties of class inequality and how marriage functions to perpetuate that inequality, we get the "heterosexual imaginary" (Ingraham) and visions of love and equality: "this lawsuit, at its core, is about family. It's about loving committed couples… This is about dignity and equality for all… families" (Johnson 2014).

Of course this analysis reflects the time period in between the United States vs. Windsor (2013) and Obergefell vs. Hodges (2015); the period where DOMA was struck down but the marriage bans in upwards of 30 states were still legal. What these snippets of media attention make clear, however, is the inevitable trajectory towards legalization. In the larger cultural context as outlined here, it is culturally difficult to argue against love, as love is central to 21st century heteronormativity. It is no surprise, then that in response to Obergefell vs. Hodges the Human Rights Campaign website declared "love wins" and CNN quoted a physican who said: "the main reason there is a benefit to being in a legally recognized marriage is that it introduces a level of stability into a relationship. This is going to help change the social climate. Hearing the Supreme Court say this is OK will help couples feel like they're part of regular society" (Smart 2015, 3). Despite the reality that there are still plenty of dissenters (including four members of the Supreme Court), there is a clear normalizing effect at play in the mainstream media. Being gay or lesbian and married, thus a part of "regular society," means having "resources of economic and social class" as well as racial privilege "to achieve the ordinariness they desire" (Stein 2013, 48). As such this normalizing media frame participates in the larger project of "simply expanding current conceptions of what is normal and acceptable to include same-sex married couples" and will do nothing to "support people with nonnormative family structures" whether queer or heterosexual (Bernstein and Burke 2013, 319).

Conclusion: We Got Married, But The Rest are Poor

It is important to recognize what marriage doesn't accomplish towards equality. According to Gary Gates and Gallup (2014), the LGBT community doesn't fare as well in regards to well-being when compared to their heterosexual peers. According to the poll, this is even more pronounced for women in the LGBT community (Gates 2014). Given the historical relationship between women's oppression and the institution of marriage, it is difficult to argue that marriage equality will be what changes LGBT women's lives and sense of their own well-being.

Further, given the economic contours of marriage we know that marriage benefits and privileges white and higher income couples at the direct expense of people of color and the working class and poor, via normalization and welfare policy (Kandaswamy 2008). As Kandaswamy points out, "same sex marriage emerges as a possible avenue towards rights and

inclusion only against a historically specific landscape in which the institution of marriage has been instrumental in defining citizenship rights in racially stratified ways" (708). In addition, nowhere in the mainstream movement do you hear attention to the difficulties that poor couples have in balancing their desire to be married, for example, with their economic need for child care subsidy eligibility. Instead, organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign frame their argument to read that the denial of the 1000+ benefits (including social security, tax, immigration law, employee benefits, COBRA insurance) of marriage affects us all the same. Marriage discourses are used to silence attention to the problems of economic inequality (Kandaswamy) to the point where it seems forgotten that marriage is an economic arrangement.

This can have a significant — and negative — impact on the LGBT community. Barrett and Pollack (2005) discuss the class bias of the LGBT community by illuminating how middle and upper class gay men, as a result of material as well as symbolic resources are more able to move into and operate visibly within the queer community. As a result, the needs of the community come to be defined by those who are able to participate. This is how marriage, an institution that only benefits the middle-upper class few, comes to be the final frontier of LGBT rights. All the while, as the Gallup poll (2014) reports, finances is the area where the LGBT community lags the most in comparison to straights, and that the findings are "consistent with research from UCLA's Williams Institute, which shows that the LGBT population is at a disproportionate risk for poverty and food insecurity" (2).

Given this economic insecurity, marriage will not likely be the trajectory that leads to improved material conditions for these folks, in the same way that marriage doesn't alleviate heterosexual families poverty (Edin and Kefalas 2005). In fact, marriage rights could make matters worse for poor queers by maintaining the connections between citizenship rights and property relations as private matters to share only among the married, rather than addressing resource distribution as a public good regardless of relationship status. These connections organize inequality; they don't dismantle it. As Kandaswany puts it, "in seeking greater access to the top two tiers of the welfare state through marriage recognition rather than making more universal claims, same-sex marriage advocates rely upon and reproduce the already existing structure of stratified social rights (2008, 718).

For example, despite the on-going political debate about the Affordable Care Act, mainstream queer politics has been markedly silent on the impact this policy might have on the LGBT community, such as access to needed health care and child care costs. The Human Rights Campaign's website has this to say under the "health and aging" link"

> Fear of discrimination causes many LGBT people to avoid seeking care and, when they do get treatment, studies have shown that LGBT people are often not treated with the respect that all patients deserve. Through pioneering efforts such as the Healthcare Equality Index, the Human Rights Campaign is dedicated to improving healthcare for LGBT people and their families

(retrieved on September 24, 2013).

No attention is given to the Affordable Care Act as it pertains to the LGBT community, or anything else about access to health care, the rising costs of insurance, employment instability, denial of coverage of certain "elective" procedures, or the impact of poverty on health and overall quality of life. These issues are of specific importance to the LGBT community, as more and more same sex partners become parents, as the trans-community continues to be denied access to medical procedures important to those who wish to use such procedures, and as all of us continue to face a changing policy and economic context that will shape our access to health care.

For example, "Bassinger and his partner are both HIV positive and on disability funding. If they were to get married they would lose their SSI and SSDI benefits. And his situation is not uncommon" (Dettmer 36). Dettmer continues on, raising the important issue of the symbolic importance of marriage, as many people argue that even if marriage won't benefit an individual or a couple materially, symbolically it's an important marker of acceptance:

> But as Joseph DeFilippis, former executive director of Queers for Economic Justice points out, "When homophobia is your only target, its removal will only benefit people for whom it was the sole issue. If you're homeless and a person of color, or a person of color who is an immigrant and queer, getting rid of homophobia doesn't change the immigration battles you face, or the racism you have to contend with, or your struggle to pay for your apartment! (37).

Clearly the idea of a blanket homophobia that impacts the queer community universally is hiding the every day material realities of many queers. When half of the homeless youth are queer youth (Dettmer 2010, Reck 2009), it is clear that minimizing homophobia symbolically won't directly impact the material realities of their homelessness. According to Reck (2009), participants report the import of the Castro, while also stating that the "MUNI station… is the only public space in the Castro where kids can sit down without spending money" (232). Even cities that are historically known for being queer friendly are seeing the impact of these larger social and economic transformations, as there are very few public spaces left that haven't been commodified.

Though lesbians and gays can now marry with Federal protection in the United States, I can't help but wonder, will we have health insurance to share? Will we have retirement benefits to share? Will we be able to keep our child care subsidies if we do get married? As Dettmer points out, "…the majority of LGBT people actually consider economic discrimination to be the No. 1 issue in their lives, ...[and] that queer white men are the most likely to be coupled where as black lesbians are the least likely to be coupled, thus

demonstrating that marriage will benefit gay white men more than queer women of color" (2010:34). Clearly, both scholars and activists alike need to take a minute to reconsider the impact and import of same-sex marriage policies and the silencing (silenced by scholarship, by media framing, by mainstream politicking) impact this movement has had on material conditions. Same sex marriage must be understood through the lens of material analysis so as to keep scholars and the movement focused on the real conditions of the lives of members of the LGBT community. There is a lot left to fight for.

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Article

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND ALTERNATIVE FOOD: ALIENATION, DIVISION OF LABOUR, AND THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMPTION

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Abstract

This article takes food issues in both the advanced capitalist and developing worlds, as well as discourses and struggles that have developed in response to them, as a point of departure. The exposition begins with a description of food sovereignty movements and their successful struggles. Third-world campaigns for food security are inspiring cases of resistance, of struggle for disalienation. The focus then shifts to the problems with the contemporary North American diet, and the 'foodie' response to the epidemic of poor eating and resulting poor health. Foodie culture as it has developed in the advanced capitalist world has severe limitations, particularly in regards to its treatment of gender and class. Yet it also contains important messages about meaningful human interaction with nature in the form of food procurement and preparation. The analysis developed here strives to go further than a critique of the distribution and availability of foodstuffs in the contemporary capitalist economy. The aim is to understand contestations over both the production and consumption of food in terms of some key categories of Marxist philosophy. It is argued that using the concepts of alienation, division of labour, and *production of consumption* can strengthen the case for food sovereignty while also mounting a critique of foodie culture that nonetheless preserves its constructive insights. More specifically, this means that an exploration of the relationship between the division of labour and alienation can demonstrate the negative consequences of industrially produced foods, while affirming the necessity of alternative forms of food production and consumption. Everywhere and in different ways, capitalism alienates humans from their *species-being*. This article argues that this fact is particularly evident with regards to the industrial food system. However, just as food can be a site of oppression, so too can it be a locus of struggle against capital.

Keywords

Food sovereignty; foodie culture; alienation; division of labour; production; consumption; socialism; food systems

Introduction

In advanced capitalist countries, an abundance of cheap calories has led to epidemics of obesity, heart disease, and other degenerative conditions. In the developing world, the number of malnourished and underfed continues to rise, a process driven by capital accumulation and dispossession. These trends are internally related (Albritton 2009; Patel 2007). In recent years critical scholars have increasingly focused on food production as a site of struggle, especially in the global south. There are good reasons to believe that such struggles can be fruitful, as evidenced by the appreciable gains made by various movements for 'food sovereignty' (Bello 2009; Desmarais 2009; Sumner 2012). Meanwhile, in the advanced capitalist world attention to food issues tends to centre on the sphere of consumption: both the quality and quantity of available foodstuffs. There is a good deal of popular literature on such issues, overwhelmingly advocating healthy and sustainable eating: buying locally produced food, preparing meals from scratch -- broadly, this can be referred to as 'foodie' culture.

The present argument takes food issues in both the advanced capitalist and developing worlds, as well as discourses and struggles that have developed in response to them, as a point of departure. The exposition begins with a description of food sovereignty movements and their successful struggles. Third-world campaigns for food security are inspiring cases of resistance, of struggle for disalienation. The focus then shifts to the problems with the contemporary North American diet, and the 'foodie' response to the epidemic of poor eating and resulting poor health. Foodie culture as it has developed in the advanced capitalist world has severe limitations, particularly in regards to its treatment of gender and class. Yet it also contains important messages about meaningful human interaction with nature in the form of food procurement and preparation. The analysis developed here strives to go further than a critique of the distribution and availability of foodstuffs in the contemporary capitalist economy. The aim is to understand contestations over both the production and consumption of food in terms of some key categories of Marxist philosophy. It is argued that using the concepts of alienation, division of labour, and *production of consumption* can strengthen the case for food sovereignty while also mounting a critique of foodie culture that nonetheless preserves its constructive insights. More specifically, this means that an exploration of the relationship between the division of labour and alienation can demonstrate the negative consequences of industrially produced foods, while affirming the necessity of alternative forms of food production and consumption. Everywhere and in different ways, capitalism alienates humans from their *species-being*. This article argues that this fact is particularly evident with regard to the industrial food system. However, just as food can be a site of oppression, so too can it be a locus of struggle against capital.

Preliminary Theoretical Considerations

While Marxist analyses of alienation typically focus on the sphere of production, this article broadens the focus to include the problem of alienated consumption. It is important to distinguish from the outset two senses of the term 'consumption' that are used here. The first sense is simply consumption in its uncomplicated meaning as direct, physical consumption. Consuming calories and nutrients in the form of food items is necessary for humans to survive, although it is here argued that the source and quality of those food items determines to a great extent the life-sustaining qualities that they possess. The second sense includes the first, but is broader insofar as it includes the activities that surround consumption. It is a reference to the way individuals produce the food that they immediately consume. This sense might be termed the 'production of consumption,' and brings Marxist theory to bear on the act of consuming food (see also Albritton 2009, 9-10). The activities of production and consumption are closely intertwined. Indeed, in his *Grundrisse* Marx insists upon the interrelation between the two processes and uses the specific example of food to illustrate this point: "It is clear that in taking in food… which is a form of consumption, the human being produces his own body" (Marx 1978, 228). However, Marx distinguishes between an immediate unity of consumption and production (productive consumption), on the one hand, and "production proper" on the other (Marx 1978, 229). In other words, productive consumption, of which the preparation of food is an example, is different from production in the more general sense, in which the producer's relation to the product is external (Marx 1978, 232). That is, the product of the direct producer is the property of the capitalist employer — it is alienated. Thus, productive consumption, or the *production of consumption*, differs from both *production* and *consumption* insofar as it is an immediate unity of the two sides. The analysis developed here pivots on this distinction.

It will be argued that socialist theory and politics should be interested in the issue of food for two principal reasons. First, the *production of the consumption* of food is a potential site of struggle against capital. Here, it is useful to mark the distinction between the sphere of labour that is productive for capital, on the one hand, and the sphere of reproductive labour, wherein human life is reproduced as an end in itself, on the other. Marxist theorizing has paid a great deal of attention to the immiseration of the worker (*qua* worker) in the former realm, while generally neglecting this phenomenon in the latter. A notable exception, Michael Lebowitz has stressed the demystification of "the process of struggle by which workers produce themselves as subjects capable of altering their world" (Lebowitz 2003, xi). Lebowitz holds that in striving to satisfy their needs, workers struggle against capital. He writes, "the struggles of workers to satisfy their

many-sided needs… are struggles against capital as mediator within society. […] Rather than directed only against particular capitals, they are struggles against the power of capital as a whole and against the ruling principle of valorization (M-C-M')" (Lebowitz 2003, 186). The present analysis argues that the consumption of food is precisely one such need that can be understood as a site of struggle against capital. However, the potential for struggle at this site is not fully developed because of the limited nature of food options available to the worker and consumer as an output of capitalist production.

The second reason, not distinct from the first, concerns the transformation of the human relationship with nature in a post-capitalist future. If contemporary socialist politics is at all concerned with providing a *non-alienating* alternative to capitalism, a non-industrial, or post-industrial, model of food production and consumption could indeed be an important part of the socialist agenda. Furthermore, any progressive politics today must come to terms with the looming ecological catastrophe that is neoliberal capitalism. Capitalist forms of agriculture and food production have been devastating ecologically (Weis 2012; Albritton 2009, 146-64). By contrast, organically and bio-dynamically produced food is much better for human health (see, for example Maciel et al. 2011; Heimler et al. 2009; Carbonaro and Mattera 2001; Chassey et al. 2006; Mitchell et al. 2003). As well, alternative forms of agriculture, especially small farms, could be instrumental in the transition to a more ecologically sustainable society, and provide adequate food at the same time (Bello 2009, 139-144). Such a transition has the potential to overcome what has been called the 'metabolic rift' of capitalist production (Foster et al. 2010; Clow and McLaughlin 2008).

Food Sovereignty and Anti-Capitalist Struggle

The influx of capital into agriculture has had disastrous effects for food security. Where once food systems were locally controlled, they are now overwhelmingly integrated into the global capitalist food system. Peasant agriculture has been replaced by capitalist agriculture (Bello 2009, 19-38). Small-scale farmers throughout the world have lost control of their own production, and with it the security of being able to produce their own food. An adequate history of this political economic transformation is outside of the scope of this article. The key point is that this has severely limited the security of access to food for many people in the world today, the result of which has been unprecedented global hunger (Bello 2009, 1-18).

And yet there is great cause for optimism. In many parts of the globe mass movements have assembled with the aim of restoring food sovereignty. Using the platform of *La Vía Campesina* (The Peasant Way), one of the largest and most successful peasant organizations, Walden Bello describes several of the central elements of the food sovereignty paradigm. Food sovereignty encourages a return to non-capitalist, indigenous

and peasant forms of knowledge and production. First and foremost, it suggests that the aim of agricultural policy should be food self-sufficiency. This means that in any given region, the farmers from that region should produce the majority of the food consumed there. Rather than being subjected to the demands of the global market, people should have the right to decide how and what they will produce and consume, and this should occur in a way that benefits the direct producers rather than the owners of capital. Food sovereignty movements also emphasize producing 'real' and healthy food, which means growing a diversity of crops instead of monoculture. This likewise means rejecting genetically engineered food as much as possible, as well as chemically intensive (and environmentally damaging) agricultural techniques. Finally, this approach to food production and consumption aims to find a new balance between agriculture and industry, as well as between town (city) and country (rural), with the goal of the mutual improvement of both (Bello 2009, 135-137).

As noted above, *La Vía Campesina* has become a remarkably successful food sovereignty movement (see Desmarais 2009). Founded in 1993, it has now grown to include member organizations in 69 different countries, which represent up to 100 million people worldwide. A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi claims it is the largest social movement in the contemporary world (Akram-Lodhi 2013, 150-151). One of *La Vía Campesina's* member organizations, the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST or Landless Workers' Movement) is described by Bello as "probably the most dynamic agrarian mass movement in any country in the world today" (Bello 2009, 129). It has become a serious political force in Brazil and made tangible gains, such as advancing literacy and education for landless workers (Bello 2009, 129-131). In France, the *Conféderation Paysanne* (Peasant Confederation) represents 45,000 people and has been at the forefront of many food struggles, including against McDonald's (Bello 2009, 127-128). The list of food sovereignty organizations could go on, along with an inventory of successful struggles. As it concerns the present analysis, the movements for food sovereignty are of central importance because they can challenge the very logic of capital itself (Suschnigg 2012, 236). As Akram-Lodhi notes, they are advocating improved local control over *production* and *consumption* (Akram-Lodhi 2013, 25). But it is more than this: these movements are fighting for better control over the *production of consumption*. Peasants throughout the world are struggling to reclaim a sphere of production that is beneficial for the reproduction of human life as an end in itself, rather than for capital. They understand that what is at stake is not just more or better food on their plates; it is the ability to have genuine control and autonomy over their very means of physical sustenance and reproduction. The importance of Marxist theory for this type of struggle will be articulated below. First, the analysis turns to 'foodie' culture.

Eating Today: Health, Industrial Food, and the Rise of 'Foodie' Culture

It is certainly no understatement to say that North Americans have become a remarkably unhealthy population. Paradoxically, while living longer than ever, they are beset with a myriad of illnesses and health complaints. For example, rates of obesity are on the rise (see Sturm 2003; Hedley et al. 2004; Taubes 2014) and the number of Americans with diabetes has been predicted to increase 165% from 2000 to 2050 (Boyle et al. 2001). Modern medicine is developing increasingly sophisticated ways of managing and treating these ailments, mostly in the form of pharmaceutical drugs, and yet it has had little success identifying root causes (Taubes 2014). Furthermore, many of the medical community's lifestyle assertions — for example, concerning the negative effects of dietary fat — are increasingly being brought into question (Enig 2000; Taubes 2007 and 2001). One thing is quite obvious, however: the industrial diet is incredibly unhealthy. While the consumption of processed foods has steadily increased, so have rates of heart disease and obesity (Taubes 1998; Hennekens 1998). Nutritional science confirms that what are here called 'abstract foods,' a term that will be explained below, have considerable negative health consequences. High-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) in sodas, refined flours in wonder bread, and even the texturized soy protein in an ostensibly healthy veggie burger are all so-called 'foods' that the human body is not equipped to process and which in the long term are likely to make it sick (Bray et. al 2004; Monteiro et al. 2010).

Overwhelmingly, the contemporary popular 'foodie' writers tend to analyse the food system as an undifferentiated whole, and the effects of industrial food on individuals abstracted from their concrete and diverse conditions of existence. While this approach has limits, it is not without some merit. For example, Michael Pollan, in *The Omnivore's Dilemma*, offers a straightforward political economy of corn in the United States. He shows that massive federal subsidies have meant that corn-derived products (especially HFCS, dextrose, and other by-products) are in almost every food item at the grocery store and corn has even replaced grass in animal feed, drastically reducing the nutritional quality of industrially-produced meat (see also Hahn Niman 2014, 194-201). Meanwhile, the farmers themselves are left with crippling debt.[1] The essence of Pollan's exposition is that industrial food is bad for the soil, bad for farmers, bad for the environment, and terrible for those who consume it. His alternative has become the mantra of the foodie movement: 'eat food, mostly plants, not too much' (Pollan 2008, 146). It is perhaps the

[1] Pollan's critique of corn subsidies offer a useful starting point, although the picture is in fact much more complicated. In her *Weighing In: Obesity, Food Justice and the Limits of Capitalism*, Julie Guthman offers a much more rigorous explanation of farm policy (Guthman 2011, 116-39, 173). Additionally, Robert Albritton provides an analysis of corn production in the United States that focusses on its specifically capitalist origins (Albritton 2012, 96-100).

first part of this imperative that warrants the most explanation. By 'food,' Pollan means 'real food.' Essentially, this refers to items that, in his words, a person's grandmother (or great-grandmother) would recognize as food (Pollan 2008, 148). Broccoli and carrots are food; the mono- and diglycerides, sucrose/fructose, monosodium glutamate, and partially hydrogenated palm oil that are in packaged and prepared products are not. The negative emphasis on prepared products is also important. Foodie culture encourages us to make our own meals from real ingredients. Organic is good, but locally-sourced vegetables and meats from a farmers' market are better (Barber 2014; Kingsolver 2008; Smith and MacKinnon 2007).

This is all fine advice, but it misses crucial points about the intersection of eating patterns and social categories. Social class undeniably plays a role in contemporary eating habits and ideas about food (see Beagan and Chapman 2012, 146-47). Unprocessed foods cost more than processed and refined foods (Hill and Peters 1998), meaning that those who are economically disadvantaged simply cannot afford to eat well. An often-cited example concerns what have been called 'food deserts' in the cores of urban centres; these are vast areas in which the only nourishment to be purchased is convenience store 'junk food.' Making a trip to a supermarket is not economically feasible for residents of these areas (Patel 2007; Hendrickson et. al. 2006; Inagami et. al. 2006; Caraher et. al. 1998). As a consequence, it is the socio-economically advantaged who have the time and financial means to eat properly. Julie Guthman makes a strong case that it is not merely the differing features of various built environments (food deserts vs. parks and farmers' markets) that determine health. That is, it is more complicated than the argument that poor access to fresh fruit and vegetable causes some to be obese, while access to green-space causes others to be thin. Those built environments are themselves products of a classed system (Guthman 2011, 87-90). Moving beyond the issue of access, one British study showed that members of lower income groups are generally less concerned with healthy eating than their higher class counterparts. Those in lower classes were perfectly aware of the importance of proper eating, but were not able to make it a priority (Caraher et al. 1998, 193). Declines in basic cooking skills and food literacy act as another barrier to healthy eating. Caraher and Lang write, "If homes lack the opportunity to experiment with, and diversify, their diet in more healthy directions, their occupants are locked into a less healthy way of life" (Caraher and Lang 1999, 94). Essential to such experimentation and diversity are cooking skills and confidence, which Caraher and Lang show are correlated to social class. Furthermore, this lack of skills may serve to reinforce a sense of social exclusion (Caraher and Lang 1999, 93-97). In the end it is undeniable that members of socio-economically disadvantaged classes are left to consume nutritionally void packaged and prepared meals, which, like capitalist labour, degrade their bodies (Winson 2013, 285-293; Albritton 2009, 91-95).

A distinctly conservative current that runs through foodie culture can be detected in its constant invocation of past ways of producing and consuming food. Pollan's advice

to eat as our grandparents did is a prime example. Relating to the preparation of food within the household, there are concrete gender dynamics that require attention. Several popular foodie writers have tackled gender directly, but in a way that is woefully inadequate. For instance, Pollan argues that more time needs to be spent making healthy meals at home, but he has trouble reconciling this with the fact that transcending the immanence of the private sphere was one of the hard-won accomplishments of feminism in the twentieth century (Matchar 2013). Of course, the labour required to sustain households is still predominantly performed by unpaid women, even after their integration into the sphere of capitalist labour (Luxton 2006, 33). At one point, Pollan points his finger at feminism, blaming the movement for the decline of home-prepared meals (Pollan 2009). He does, however, adopt a more nuanced gender analysis in his latest book (Pollan 2013, 10-11). Barbara Kingsolver, in her *Animal, Vegetable, Miracle* (another key book in the foodie movement) calls feminism "the great hoodwink of my generation" for removing women from the home (Kingsolver 2008, 127). Bearing the burden of the social reproduction of the household and confinement to the private sphere has been a key aspect of the oppression of women. Although this arrangement is often represented and understood as natural, feminist analysis has clearly shown otherwise (see Federici 1975; Luxton and Rosenberg 1986, 9-13). As Caraher and Lang succinctly remark: "It is important not to advocate a return to an oppressive past, where individuals (women) slave over hot stoves preparing meals from basics" (Caraher and Lang 1999, 90).

While popular foodie writers have at best dealt with gender in a dubious manner, those who have put the foodie ethos to work in their own kitchens seem to have fared only slightly better. In an insightful study on foodie culture, Cairns et. al. begin from the well-established observation that "social and cultural meanings attached to food serve to perpetuate unequal gender relations" (Cairns et. al. 2010, 592). Women continue to do the majority of unpaid food work and this ties them to the necessity of the private sphere (see also Brady et. al. 2012, 126-132). Men's relationship to food, on the other hand, has been predominantly as a hobby, or as professional chefs (Cairns et. al. 2010, 593). Cairns et. al. carried out a qualitative study that investigated gendered relationships to food amongst self-described foodies in terms of three main themes: pleasure, care work, and knowledge and expertise. It is only the first theme, pleasure, at which a gender parity was observed; both men and women described their relationship to food as one that is animated by the pleasure of preparing and consuming food (Cairns et. al. 2010, 598-599). Cairns et. al. emphasize the historical importance of this: "Because femininity has historically been associated with restraint of, or a pathological relationship to, food's pleasures, it is noteworthy that the women in our study actively embraced the pleasurable aspects of eating" (Cairns et .al. 2010, 599; c.f. Donner 2008). However, they are also careful to note that the type of 'selective' food consumption that enables such pleasure is made possible by class privilege. Therefore, this achievement of gender parity may

reinforce class divisions (Cairns et. al. 2010, 599). On the theme of care work, the women respondents overwhelmingly identified a sense of feminine responsibility related to nourishing the family and cooking for others (see also Caraher and Lang 1999, 90). Men also described enjoying cooking for others, but from a standpoint of leisure rather than responsibility (Cairns et. al. 2010, 600-605). Finally, the knowledge and expertise about food that is a defining characteristic of foodie culture also seems to have a strong gendered dimension. Simply put:

> It was more often the men we interviewed who drew heavily upon ideals of knowledge and expertise to articulate their personal relationship to food. For these men, continually refining their food knowledge, seeking out new sources of information, and sharing their expertise with others constituted the defining features of their foodie identity (Cairns et. al. 2010, 606).

Women, conversely, did not share this relationship to food. In the end, the practitioners of foodie culture may challenge gender binaries in a few select ways. However, there seem to be many more levels on which prevailing norms are actually being reinforced, and there is good evidence for the reversal of important feminist achievements.

Foodie culture's questionable record on gender roles may in part stem from its lack of a strong and coherent gender analysis and critique of patriarchy. This an area in which foodie culture can learn from food sovereignty movements. As Desmarais et. al. have remarked, many food sovereignty organizations have dealt directly with the issue of gender (Desmarais et. al. 2011, 59). Again, *La Vía Campesina* provides a striking example. It has made women's struggles, including but not limited to those related to food production, one of its key areas of focus. In addition, it has worked to achieve gender parity on its governing body (Bello 2009, 133). Whereas the main foodie culture voices have been conspicuously silent on it, food sovereignty movements have explicitly adopted positions on gender equality. Food is a locus of both oppression and resistance, and, as Brady et. al. note, this is especially true for women (Brady et. al. 2012, 132). The coalition of food sovereignty struggles and the fight for gender equality, then, is to the benefit of both.

Returning to foodie culture, a final point of criticism concerns its frequent appraisal of farming traditions that are romanticized and parochial. For example, Pollan has been been an advocate of the practices of bio-dynamic farmer Joel Salatin of Virginia. Salatin's approach, often called 'beyond organic,' has been touted by environmentalists. He turned 550 acres of badly degraded farmland into a sustainable and productive operation in a generation (Pollan 2006, 205-209). According to Pollan, by carefully managing when and how his animals graze, and using technology such as a mobile chicken coop to distribute evenly the nitrogen rich droppings, Salatin guarantees that nutrients will stay in the soil and his farm will have very few negative ecological effects

(Pollan 2006, 192-199). However, Salatin's work is motivated by a deep religious fundamentalism. He advocates a strict gendered division of labour, and women are not invited to work on his farm, a fact that Pollan conveniently forgets in his celebration of Salatin's eco-friendly practices. Furthermore, Salatin has uttered some decidedly unsavoury comments about immigrants in the United Sates (Salatin 2008). None of this should be taken as a total condemnation of agricultural practices undertaken by Salatin and others like him. However, it does highlight the importance of separating the good from the bad. Salatin's politics are clearly sexist, xenophobic and reactionary. However, his food production techniques are sustainable and worthy of serious consideration. Pollan is likely correct that Salatin's chickens, eggs and pork taste better, and are better for the environment and soil than their industrially produced counterparts. However, rather than Salatin's religious conservatism, or Pollan's foodie-ism, I argue that the case against the industrial food system is stronger when grounded in a historical materialist framework.

Foodie-ism to Marxism: Towards a Materialist Analysis of Industrial Food

As a point of entry into Marxist theory, it is useful to consider industrially produced food items as commodities. The composition of capital that inheres in food items in neoliberal capitalism is much like so many other commodities. The labour contained in practically any item on the grocery store shelves is exceedingly dead and abstract. A loaf of wonder bread, a box of packaged cookies, or a container of margarine are all 'real' food insofar as they are material items and have a concrete existence. As Anthony Winson writes, though, they are better described as '"edible commodities" than as food (Winson 2013, 1). It is virtually impossible for any person — producer or consumer — to confront these products and see the actualization of any form of unique labour. The food items themselves are the results of extremely technologically mediated chains of production. As a result they are stripped of all uniqueness and particularity. The labour of thousands of workers might inhere in a single slice of refined bread. The meat from hundreds of different cows can be contained in a single frozen beef patty. From the point of view of the producer, these products are abstract equivalents from the beginning, useful only as bearers of value in the process of capital's self-valorization. From the consumer's view, they also represent the real, material sustenance on the basis of which life is reproduced. In the industrial capitalist system of food production, however, the products are so processed and refined that they appear to the consumer more as abstract equivalents than concrete, particular, use values. There is nothing unique or particular to be said about any given industrial food item. Industrially-produced foods, like other commodities, are 'abstract.'

The value of food items may be reduced through the rising organic composition of capital, but this comes at the expense of the uniqueness of the products. While an insistence on there being something unique about every individual product may be open to the criticism of romanticism, a demand for healthy, nourishing food seems less so. Here, the analysis of food in particular brings to light another hidden cost of the extreme division of labour. In short, the technologically intensive chains of production that deliver food items to consumers seriously deplete the nutritional value of the food, that is, its use value. Advertisements are often successful in convincing consumers that processed foods, especially those which have been 'fortified' to replace nutrients lost in the production process, are part of a perfectly healthy diet. But the human body knows differently, and increasingly, so too does nutritional science. The human body, in short, is not adapted for this type of diet (Winson 2013, 76-92, 167-183).

One of Marx's exhortations, in *Capital*, is to look differently at commodities, to try to see them as something unusual, as things that are not natural or normal. In the present analysis, this appeal comes together with the foodie encouragement to eat 'real food' and to be skeptical about whether hyper-refined 'edible commodities' actually are food. However, a further injection of Marxist theory can deepen the investigation. The argument comes to pivot on the contrast between food as a use value (which is necessary for the sustenance of human life and a locus for the expression of creativity) and food as a mere exchange value (where it is reduced to a commodity, which has been referred to as 'abstract food'). When the essential use value that is food is reduced to exchange value (at the levels of production, distribution and consumption), a fundamental facet of the human being-in-the-world is alienated. To articulate this point, the analysis must go beyond a conception of food simply as direct physical *consumption*, to understand it as the *production of consumption*. The nutritional inadequacies of 'abstract' foods, while clearly a matter of concern, are simply the marker of a deeper pathology of capitalist production and consumption: alienation. As the production of consumption, food can be experienced as a satisfying unity; both the process and products of the creative manipulation of nature can be experienced together with other individuals as un-alienated social labour. Under the capitalist food system, however, the moments are divorced and the individual's relationship to the production processes and products of consumption are experienced as essentially 'other.' Historical materialism, which delves beyond the levels of *consumption* and *production*, reveals the deeper structures and processes of capitalist society, and shows that the *production of the consumption* of food is a key site for understanding alienation, as well as realizing disalienation through struggle.

Basic and Excess Denaturation, Alienation, and the Division of Labour

Incorporating a more complex understanding of food into progressive politics is of clear importance. It is necessary that we re-imagine our relationship with food and begin to see food production and consumption as a site of both struggle and possible non-alienation within alienated social relations. The successes of food sovereignty movements, along with the critique of Pollan, Salatin, and others, shows that what is required is a way of thinking about the human relationship with nature, as well as the characteristics of production and consumption, that opens the path to a more humane alternative to the contemporary capitalist model, while avoiding romanticizing past ways of life.

With respect to the latter, it is of critical importance to avoid fallacious appeals to outdated and backwards social relations (such as those upheld by Salatin) and modes of production. In this regard it is useful to begin with the distinction between basic and surplus denaturation. This theoretical apparatus has its origins in Rousseau, is taken up by Freud, and is further elaborated by Herbert Marcuse (Biro 2005, 160). The concept of basic alienation, or of necessary denaturation, suggests that there is a separation from nature that is simply existential to human being. Indeed, it is this quality that makes history and sociality possible and sets humans apart from other animals. Conversely, the concept of excess denaturation, or surplus repression, implies that alienation can vary in quality and quantity depending on the particular socio-economic formation. The reality of a basic level of denaturation forecloses romantic appeals to *completely* 'natural' ways of being. According to Biro, the formula as it is expressed in Marcuse's Freudian study, *Eros and Civilization*, can be applied directly to analyses of the human relationship with nature. Biro writes, "We can thus extend Marcuse's distinction between basic and surplus repression to include a distinction between alienation from nature that is biologically necessary for human life, and alienation from nature that is only made necessary by particular forms of social organization" (Biro 2005, 168; see also Marcuse 1966, 35). As it concerns the critique of the reactionary current that runs in some foodie literature, the notion of basic denaturation should encourage caution and skepticism about appeals to 'perfectly' or 'completely' natural ways of producing and consuming food. Human activity in the world is a complex interpenetration of the natural and the social, and therefore what we eat will always be in some way the product of social labour.

On the other hand, though, the consumption of foods that are so processed and refined, that are mediated through so many layers of technology that their nutritional value is essentially erased, indicates the commodification of vital life processes and represents a particularly deleterious form of surplus alienation. In the search for ways to reduce this excessive alienation, there is a rational kernel to be found within the ideology of the foodie movement. Procuring, or even growing, real ingredients and preparing

wholesome meals, if undertaken freely and deliberately, are activities that are far less alienating than capitalist labour: people can actually see themselves in what they produce and create. To be sure, within capitalism, many of the commodity chains that furnish the raw products to the person making the meal from scratch still embody vast quantities of exploited labour. Nonetheless, a less alienating approach to food is better for the environment, much healthier for those who consume this food, and can serve as an important consciousness-raising activity, encouraging people to think about where their food comes from and to develop a critical understanding of capitalist production and one's relationship with the natural environment. The growing popularity of food sovereignty movements, farmer's markets, organic and biodynamic foods, and foodie culture suggest that alternatives to industrial food are possible (see Suschnigg 2012, 235; Winson 2013, 252-280; Sumner 2012). Socialists ought to pay attention to these alternatives. To be sure, they should not accept uncritically these agendas, which have substantial theoretical and practical shortcomings. For example, current levels of ecological degradation mean that universal food sovereignty would be impossible in the near future. Shopping at farmers' markets may be a good personal choice, but in the absence of widespread economic transformation, is a luxury available only to the affluent. Nonetheless, these movements deserve further consideration because they challenge the capitalist degradation of food and contribute to important discussions about alternative approaches to this essential life activity.

Marcuse's theory of basic and excess denaturation is a useful point of departure in the critique of industrial food and the search for alternatives. However, to push the analysis to a deeper level, it is necessary to turn to Marx and his exposition of alienation and the division of labour. In his *1844 Manuscripts* Marx specifies four types of alienation caused by capitalist production: alienation from the product of labour, from the process of labour, from other human beings, as well as alienation from the human *species-being*, or the essence of human being (Marx 1992, 327-330). Taking control of the *production of consumption* of food offers one way to overcome these forms of alienation. In what follows it will be argued that the socially shared unity of the production and consumption of food can overcome estrangement from the products and processes of labour. Furthermore, this renewed relationship to food represents a liberating transformation of the material dialectic between humans and nature, which can become a locus of the expression of the essence of human being: the capacity to transform nature freely, deliberately and creatively.

To begin, it will be demonstrated that the *logic* of disalienation is consistent with a transformation of not only the *social*, but also the *technical* division of labour. Marx asserts that the division of labour occurs at several levels, most importantly at the levels of society and production. In *Capital* he describes the former as the "restriction of individuals to particular vocations or callings…" (Marx 1990, 471). On the other hand,

the latter form is characterized by "The fact that the specialized worker produces no commodities. It is only the common product of all the specialized workers that becomes a commodity" (Marx 1990, 475). The societal division of labour is a feature of many economic formations, while the division within a singular production process, thought Marx, is unique to capitalism, (Marx 1990, 480). "Some crippling of the mind and body" results from the societal partitioning of labour, he writes, but when the division extends to manufacture it "attacks the individual at the very roots of his life…" (Marx 1990, 484). This is important: Marx is here explicitly critical of an intense *technical* division of labour, and furthermore sees it as interconnected with alienation. Much like in his early writings, in *Capital* Marx describes industrial labour as something that divides the worker herself and confronts her as something externally imposed (Marx 1990, 482-482). For example, Marx holds, "It is a result of the division of labour in manufacture that the worker is brought face to face with the intellectual potentialities [*geistige Potenzen*] of the material process of production as the property of another and as a power which rules over him" (Marx 1990, 482). The word 'alienation' is absent from this passage, but its meaning is unmistakably present. Furthermore, Marx declares unambiguously that the worker confronts manufacture as an alien force partly because it is divided.

Marx's concept of *species-being* helps bring into focus why divided and alienated labour is a phenomenon to be transcended. Alienation from human *species-being* is different from — and yet interconnected with — alienation from the product of labour and *self-estrangement*. Adding substantially to the notions of free human subjectivity developed by Rousseau and Hegel, Marx describes the essence of human existence. In contrast to other animals, Marx holds, humans produce freely and self-consciously. He writes, "The whole character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man" (Marx 1992, 328). In other words, humans are able to choose freely how they interact with nature, and therefore, how they produce and reproduce themselves. Immediately it is obvious that the forced nature of labour in capitalism is a violation of this human essence (Marx 1992, 329). Furthermore, a result of the capacity for self-conscious activity is that humans produce universally, rather than one-sidedly. Thus, "Animals produce only according to the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man is capable of producing according to the standards of every species…" (Marx 1992, 329). Humans are rich, complicated beings, and their relationship with nature is governed by a complex interpenetration of freedom and necessity. However, capitalist social relations alienate humans from their real essence. This occurs in two ways: first, by imposing too much necessity on how humans make themselves and, second, by forcing them to produce in ways that are one-sided and particular. Another important facet of the capacity to labour freely is that it permits what Rousseau calls 'perfectibility,' or the potential for self-change (Rousseau 1987, 45). But Marx makes it clear that divided labour

suppresses this potentiality. He writes, "The simplification of machinery and of labour is used to make workers out of human beings who are still growing, who are completely immature, out of *children*, while the worker himself becomes a neglected child" (Marx 1992, 360). This represents another manner in which alienated and divided labour estranges humans from their essence: it constrains their capacity for free self-development.

The argument presented here is premised on the notion that re-imagining the consumptive act of food production and preparation represents an important step towards disalienation, because it permits an alternative — if only in one sphere of life — to divided capitalist labour. By understanding the *production of the consumption* of food as a form of production, Marx's analysis of production processes can be brought to bear on the production of food and the preparation of meals. In this way food, as a site of production, can also be considered a site of struggle. Of course, Marx's writings focus primarily on the nature of alienation and division of labour in capitalist *manufacture*. However, the key theoretical observation — that to be free and fully developed humans must see their own creativity manifested in the products of their labour — is easily applicable to the much smaller scale in which the *production of consumption* of food occurs.

Marx's critique of the forms that labour takes in capitalism is seldom applied to the production and consumption of food and meals. The foregoing has shown, however, that Marx is deeply concerned with the processes through which humans produce and reproduce themselves. It is by means of these activities of production and reproduction that humans ultimately make themselves free or unfree, fulfilled or stultified. Food is merely one window into this complex problem. The present analysis has demonstrated that in the abstract foods dispensed by technologically intensive production chains there exists little possibility for individuals to realize themselves or their own creativity. This engenders adverse effects for both the physical and spiritual being of those who produce and consume this 'food.' Conversely, in the real and far less mediated relationships with those who produce food, as well as in the activity of infusing one's own labour into the preparation of meals, there exists the potential of unalienated and satisfying creativity. This is the case because producing real food and making real meals are far less divided forms of labour. They involve a vast series of techniques, with countless possible inputs and outputs. Although Marx argues that in the domain of paid labour, work is exceptionally divided and one-sided, this does not need to be the case in all spheres of life.

As a site of capitalist production, and therefore of alienated and divided labour, food becomes *ipso facto* a site of struggle. There are two sides to this, one negative, the other positive. When it confronts the labourer/consumer as excessively divided (in the form of heavily refined products, or as severe alienation in the relations of production) food contributes to their degradation. As another form of one-sided labour —

pre-prepared meals, for example, require no creativity or complicated input — refined food products make the individual one-sided and abstract in the same way that capitalist labour does. In other words, refined food and its preparation and consumption is alienated, and reproduces the alienated processes of production. However, most individuals in neoliberal capitalism have at least some agency to take control of the production of the food they consume. This is an unalienated and undivided form of labour that can serve as a counter-hegemonic activity. Real food and its preparation is a possible and potent school for socialism that offers the worker an example of what proper unalienated living (and working) is like. Workers can begin to use this model to demand the same involvement and satisfaction at work. Preparing meals from real ingredients at home will not bring about revolution. Nonetheless it does challenge capitalist hegemony in one sphere of life and encourages such challenges in other spheres.

Conclusion

The analysis developed here insists that as both *production* and *consumption*, food is part of the challenge that socialists face today. The industrial apparatus that, through exploitation, produces refined edible commodities and delivers them to the majority of the world is obviously pathological. The transformation of peasant into capitalist agriculture has created widespread food insecurity and hunger. Industrially produced, abstract foods play a direct role in the pacification of the groups whose resistance to capitalism is necessary for successful socialist struggle; in other words, oppressed classes are disproportionately affected by the negative consequences of the capitalist food system. In a variety of ways, this burden prevents their participation in anti-capitalist struggle. Additionally, entrenched gender norms mean that in many cases women experience their relationship to food as one of repressive necessity rather than creative freedom. Nonetheless, just as it is locus of oppression, so too can it be a site of resistance against capital and patriarchy. Above all, the present argument is an exhortation to remember that the socialist alternative is not merely the inheritance of the capitalist project — it is a qualitatively different organization of society and a qualitatively different way of interacting with nature. If it is to be true to its humanist goals, this alternative will require new and different ways of producing, distributing and consuming food. It has been argued here that taking control of the *production of consumption* of food, and thereby transforming the prevailing division of labour, presents of the possibility of disalienation. Food sovereignty movements understand this imperative and have been working toward it for some time. The popular 'foodie' writers discussed in this article have serious theoretical shortcomings: they have failed to address class and gender divisions in any meaningful way. Yet, like their food sovereignty counterparts, their analysis points toward a deep truth about the expression of the human *species-being*. The foregoing

exposition of Marxist philosophy validates the notion that becoming directly involved in the social and material processes through which humans physically sustain themselves offers the possibility for individuals to participate in non-alienating activity and to reclaim the part of their being that is genuinely human.

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Article

QUARTERMASTERS OF STADIUMS AND CEMETERIES: NORMATIVE INSURRECTIONISM AND THE UNDER-THEORIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

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Abstract

In this article, I examine the problematic of revolutionary strategy and how it is under-theorized at the centres of global capitalism, often confused with the theory of organization. Arguing that the theory of insurrection is uncritically accepted as normative, I discuss the necessity of returning to a critical engagement with the theory of strategy in the context of a modern capitalist military. By examining Karl Liebknecht's discussion of militarism, the a priori acceptance of the theory of insurrection by contemporary theorists in both the communist and anarchist traditions (i.e. Jodi Dean and the Invisible Committee), and the counter-tradition of protracted people's war, I demonstrate that the theory of insurrection is philosophically deficient, unable to account for the problems produced by capitalist militarism and pacification.

Keywords

Strategy, militarism, pacification, insurrection, theory

In *Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy* T. Derbent, a Belgian theorist of revolutionary strategy, writes:

> Every social revolutionary project must think ahead to the question of armed confrontation with the forces of power and reaction. To put off making such a study because 'the time is not right yet' for armed confrontation, amounts to making choices… which risk, at that point when 'the time will be right' for armed confrontation, leaving the revolutionary forces powerless, vulnerable, with characteristics that will be totally inadequate. Choices which risk leaving them open to defeat. […] Organizations that claim to be revolutionary but

> which refuse to develop a military policy *before the question of confrontation becomes a practical reality*, disqualify themselves as revolutionary forces. They are already acting as gravediggers of revolution, the quartermasters of stadiums and cemeteries. (Derbent 2013, 1-2)[1]

The significance of this statement is in its implied judgment about normative anti-capitalist practices at the centres of global capitalism. That is, despite occasional claims to the contrary, "in the advanced capitalist countries the question of… the strategic line of the revolution has become the most underdeveloped area… [the] least creative zone, the least productive." (Action Socialiste 2000) If the question of strategy is under-theorized in "advanced capitalist countries," as I shall argue in this paper, then it might be the case that we have indeed disqualified ourselves "as revolutionary forces."

The main contention of this essay is that revolutionary strategy is under-theorized at the centres of global capitalism due to an either uncritical or unconscious adoption of the strategy of *insurrection* inherited from the October Revolution in Russia. Furthermore, I argue that the question of strategy, though frequently named, is often confused with the related questions of organizational form and tactics rather than the problematic of strategy itself. Although these related questions are indeed important, they tend to accept the strategy of insurrection as a priori; in many cases, these examinations of strategy do not appear to be aware that their assessments of organization and tactics presuppose the theory of insurrection. My overall position is that we need to critically engage with the problematic of revolutionary strategy rather than delaying this problem until a future-perfect scenario when "the time will be right."

The first section of my paper will examine the necessity for a theory of revolutionary strategy: in the context of a modern militarized state designed to pacify unruly populations, we cannot simply assume that the problem of armed confrontation between the state and anti-capitalists will spontaneously solve itself; nor should we be unreflective about the strategic theory we have inherited from a revolution where the state forces did not resemble the modern capitalist military. The second section will examine the theory of insurrection that we have uncritically inherited from the Russian Revolution––a protracted legal struggle that will lead to a large-scale uprising where, perhaps after a civil war, the state is overthrown––and argue that it has become the normative theory of strategy, though often unconsciously accepted, by the majority of left-wing academics and activists at the centres of capitalism. The third section will examine in detail two paradigm-examples of this normative acceptance of the insurrectionary strategy. The final section will discuss the

[1] Derbent's work on revolutionary warfare and military theory is better known in French-speaking contexts due to the fact that only the above cited treatise is translated into English. His two significant books are *Clausewitz et la Guerre Populaire* (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2004) and *Giap et Clausewitz* (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2006), which are currently only available in French.

possibility of an alternative to the theory of insurrection and what it might mean to return to critically theorizing strategy in the context of modern militarization and pacification.

1

In *Militarism*, Karl Liebknecht argued that a general theory of strategy was "almost lacking in the case of proletarian revolution." (Liebknecht 1917, 15) Having examined the emergence of a capitalist military, and the strength of the military and police in the pacification of unruly populations, Liebknecht claimed:

> the superiority of the army to the unarmed people, the proletariat, is far greater today than it was ever before on account of the highly developed military arts and strategy, the enormous size of the armies, the unfavorable local distribution of the various classes and the relative economic strength of proletariat and bourgeoisie which shows the proletariat in a particularly disadvantageous position, wherefore alone a future proletarian revolution will be far more difficult than any revolution that has taken place hitherto. (Ibid., 177-178)

More than fifty years prior to Liebknecht's *Militarism*, Engels had written: "[t]he emancipation of the proletariat, too, will have its particular military expression, it will give rise to a specific, new method of warfare." (Engels 1978, 553) Whereas Engels concluded this passage by claiming "[i]t is even possible to determine the kind of material basis this new warfare will have," (Ibid.) Liebknecht claims that such a determination does not yet exist – a particular problem due to the "superiority" of bourgeois military might.

We should understand this "superiority", or "the highly developed military arts and strategy" of the capitalist state, in the sense indicated by the concept of *pacification* discussed in a past issue of *The Journal for the Society of Socialist Studies*. That is, the might of capitalist militarism is not dependent simply on its 'purely' military aspect but also in "psychological action, propaganda, political and operational intelligence, police measures, personal contacts with the population, and a host of social and economic programs" (Neocleous, *et al.* 2013, 1). Hence, there is a need for a general (or, to use a more theoretical term, a *universally* applicable) theory of revolutionary strategy that can account for this reality. In any case, due to the military strength (in the broad sense, implied both by Liebknecht and the notion of "pacification") of modern capitalism, a theory of strategy capable of engaging with this reality becomes necessary.

Although *Militarism* is not a well-known text, perhaps because Liebknecht's theoretical output was overshadowed by the work of Rosa Luxemburg, it is significant in its prescience. Arguing that capitalism necessarily needs an army and a police in order to

protect its existence, Liebknecht understood that such a need was balanced by the fact that capitalism was forced to draw the members of its military from the ranks of the people it sought to police. Hence capitalism faced several significant problems in the maintenance of such an army: i) a standing army consisting of required military service would result in an armed and trained working-class population; ii) drafts for imperialist wars would disaffect the population capitalism sought to rule; iii) constant and outright coercion of populations would be unproductive for the day-to-day business of capital. Capitalism thus required an ideology of militarism that would allow the working-class and possible members of the army to consent to class rule, an ideology that would be expressed at every societal level: "a *system of saturating the whole private and public life of our people with the military spirit* for which purpose the church, the schools, and a certain venal art, as well as the press, a despicable literary crowd and the social prestige, with which our 'splendid war army' is ever being surrounded as by a *halo*, cooperate in a tenacious and cunning fashion." (Liebknecht 1917, 90-91)

Aside from this important insight about the nature of capitalist militarism––an insight that prefigures Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony and Michel Foucault's concept of governance––the significance of *Militarism*, for the purpose of this essay, is the concern Liebknecht expressed above: the possibilities of revolutionary strategy in the face of an immanent and powerful militarization. Motivated by the aim of overthrowing the society upon which this militarism depended, Liebknecht wondered at the lack of a strategic theory that was capable of taking the organized might of capitalist coercion, as well as its ideological hegemony, into account. Since this book was written around a decade before the October Revolution, though, it is worth wondering whether the theory derived from this experience, the general theory of insurrection (also called "the October Road"), satisfied the theoretical lacuna indicated by Liebknecht. After all, the lack of theorizing described by Liebknecht may have been satisfied by the emergence of a theory of how to make revolution, supposedly proven by the revolution in Russia.

As I will discuss in the following pages, the theory of insurrection fails to satisfy the requirements implied by Liebknecht's analysis; a proper strategy of making revolution is still, at least at the centres of global capitalism, underdeveloped. Moreover, it is also significant that Liebknecht, writing eleven years before the Bolshevik insurrection and civil war, saw that the solution to his problem might be found in "[t]he tactics of the urban guerrilla method, splendidly developed in Moscow [in 1905]," and that such a development would be "epochal." (Ibid., 15) Here we find the possibility of a process, obscured by the theory of insurrection, that begins in 1905 and concludes in 1917: it may be possible, as I will discuss in the final section of this paper, to imagine a general theory of revolutionary strategy gleaned from this process rather than from a single moment that was mistaken for the general theory.

If anything, the military forces and technologies of contemporary capitalism are even more extensive than when Liebknecht wrote *Militarism*. To imagine that we can solve this

problem of strategy in the same way it was solved in Russia in 1917, where the enemy's military strength was already in shambles and its army possessed semi-feudal characteristics, is the result of lazy thinking. Unfortunately, as I shall hopefully make clear, this lazy thinking has become normative at the centres of global capitalism.

2

The theory of insurrection, "[f]irst implemented in October 1917 and meticulously theorized thereafter,"(Derbent 2013, 18) can be summarized according to the following points: i) revolutionaries embark on a period of legal agitation amongst the people that will produce disaffection with the system and a heightened anti-capitalist consciousness; ii) this disaffection leads to rebellions wherein further agitation can produce a stronger revolutionary consciousness; iii) these rebellions produce a large-scale insurrection in which the people can be organized, by whatever means, into a force capable of overthrowing capitalism, possibly through a civil war.

The reason I have chosen to begin this section with a general summary of the theory of insurrection, rather than the particular Marxist-Leninist variant that is arguably its point of origin, is because I contend that the theory's normative status is such that one does not have to be a Leninist to accept its veracity. Indeed, the Invisible Committee's book *The Coming Insurrection*, once a popular radical text for the anti-Leninist left, is premised on the theory of insurrection. Moreover, although there are those who reject revolutionary strategy altogether, in this paper I am interested only in the "anti-capitalist left" (whether they define themselves as anarchists, communists, socialists, etc.) that begins by assuming that capitalism cannot be reformed, and that the entire system ought to be replaced with something more humane.

Having reached a certain level of normativity at the centres of global capitalism amongst the aforementioned anti-capitalists, the insurrectionary strategy is rarely examined in a critical sense, except when the problem of organization is considered. Often an insurrectionary destiny is treated as a priori, reified behind discussions and debates of the proper organizational form. Thus, when *Socialist Register* produced an issue devoted to "the question of strategy," not a single article focused on the theory of strategy itself; rather, it examined particular tactics (i.e. the "Occupy" movement, the role of the democratic process, unions, reformist movements) and by what organizational means revolutionary strategy could be implemented. (Panitch, *et al.* 2013) Even recent academic treatments of revolutionary strategy that do not confuse strategy with organization begin by accepting the feasibility of insurrection, focusing mainly on tactical concerns. Daniel Egan's "Rethinking War of Maneuver / War of Position", for example, argues that Gramsci's understanding of Clausewitz was inferior to Trotsky's, but this inferiority is deduced by the a priori assumption that the theory of insurrection is the only way to make revolution in advanced capitalist

contexts since its paradigm model for revolutionary warfare is the October Revolution. (Egan 2014)

Although discussions of the place of particular tactics in a revolutionary movement, and the viability or antiquated nature of a Leninist-style party, are indeed important, the problem is that these often rest on a fidelity to insurrectionary strategy. For example, while Stephen D'arcy's article "Strategy, Meta-strategy and Anti-capitalist Activism" (D'arcy 2009) is notable in that it does grasp that strategy is not a synonym with organizational form, his essay that is ostensibly about strategy is still primarily about the viability of the Leninist form of organization.[2]

Of course, if we attach this theory to its organizational point of origin, the Leninist "party of the avant garde", then we can understand a particular variant of the theory that is purely Leninist. The orthodox Leninist party is an organizational form that leads precisely to a revolutionary strategy lifted from the October Revolution.[3] There is a logical destiny of the purely Leninist party; it follows directly from the assumption that the revolutionary party is a "general staff" of elite managers who are the perfect stand-in of the proletariat. The perfect Leninist party makes revolution in a rather straight-forward manner: circulate amongst the masses and involve oneself in a protracted legal struggle designed to push traditional workers organizations (i.e. trade unions) towards the moment of general strike; use every possible economic struggle, every strike, in a way that teaches those with "trade-union consciousness" to move towards "revolutionary consciousness"; eventually, if the protracted legal struggle is successful, when the moment of the general strike arrives the party cadre can affect a massive break from trade-union consciousness, forcing a civil war; the army and police will be split, the party that was most disciplined and aware will grow exponentially so as to lead the masses in insurrection. (Neuberg 1970) Here, the fundamental theory of organization, the party formation, receives its ultimate meaning in the crucible of

[2] That is, D'arcy makes a distinction between strategies of "overthrow" and "attrition"––thus claiming, pace Derbent and somewhat oddly––that a revolutionary strategy is not necessarily about the overthrow of the capitalist state and that we should instead adopt what, to my mind, is a *non*-strategy of "attrition" dedicated to harrying capitalism and rebuilding the left. (D'arcy 2009, 76-77) Strategies of "overthrow" (the very definition of revolutionary strategy) are treated as synonymous with the concept of the Leninist party; D'arcy's discussion of "attrition" is primarily a critique of Leninism, and thus the need to build new organizations, that he brands *strategic*. Hence, by defining his theory of strategy as "a guide for conducting political action today with a view to laying the foundation for a revolutionary transformation in the future," (Ibid., 77), D'arcy is ultimately discussing organization rather than strategy.

[3] Although we can argue that the theory of insurrection could have been theorized earlier by Auguste Blanqui, this version was less clear and closer to (though not the same as) the strategy of a *coup*. This is not to say that the theorization that emerged after 1917 was not influenced by the event of the Paris Commune––or that we cannot understand the Paris Commune by retroactively applying the post-1917 theory of insurrection––only that the theory Blanqui calls "insurrection" is somewhat alienated from the way we understand it now. Hence, we should treat the theory of insurrection gleaned from the October Revolution as being the first clear expression of insurrectionary strategy.

insurrection.

As noted above, the general theory of insurrection does not have to be Leninist. Those who adopt some form of "movementist" ideology (that is, a social movementism, whether it be anarchist or autonomist, that relies on the spontaneity of the people and rejects, to whatever degree, the need for a revolutionary party) also treat this strategy as a priori, but without "providing a schema for what an insurrection should be." (The Invisible Committee 2009, 19) Here the argument is that we do not need a single organization to act as a "general staff" of the people, or that we even need to think about organizing only the working-class since there may be other sites of oppression that require our attention. Rather, the insurrection is treated as an event that, though encouraged by difficult consciousness-raising, and working with a variety of organizations and individuals, will emerge spontaneously. In their self-organization the people will launch an insurrection that will topple capitalism. Although I may be homogenizing various tendencies in the category of movementism,[4] I am doing so simply to describe the normative prevalence of the theory of insurrection. This normativity is expressed whenever there is an uprising: in the anti-globalization movement, in *Occupy*, in some of the assessments made about the Arab Spring, we can find a reified theory of insurrection.

In contradistinction to the Leninist articulation, then, the movementist variant of insurrectionary strategy argues that "[t]he *militarization* of civil war is the defeat of insurrection. The Reds had their victory in 1921, but the Revolution was already lost." (Ibid., 129) This particular non-Leninist normalization of the strategy celebrates the moment of historical insurrection itself (that is, 1917) as the site of revolution rather than the military activity, produced and galvanized by this insurrection, that led to the defeat of the White Army. However we may choose to interpret this difference, though interesting, is tangential to the fact that an unquestioned fidelity to insurrection is prevalent amongst those sections of the left that reject reformism.

A theory's prevalence, however, does not make it correct. Rather, it is my contention that this acceptance of the theory of insurrection is usually treated as an article of faith. There is no reason to accept this theory as universally applicable; aside from the October Revolution, it has never been successful. For nearly a century, those anti-capitalist organizations pursuing this strategy––either directly or vaguely––have nothing to show for their attempts, especially since "[t]his strategy met with major failures in Germany (1923), China (1927), Austria (1934), Brazil (1935), and elsewhere."(Derbent 2013, 19) In fact, the only post-1917 instances where insurrections have been somewhat successful are in situations where many popular forces have been organized by reactionaries (i.e. as in the case of the 2014 Ukraine rebellions), which is significant: these reactionary-led rebellions tend to find allies amongst the ruling classes, or receive the military backing of imperialist powers,

[4] In my book *The Communist Necessity* (Montreal: Kersplebedeb, 2014) I provide a more sustained critique of movementism.

and are thus closer to coups than insurrections regardless of how they may appear.

3

"Amongst true-believers in 'insurrection theology,'" writes Derbent, "[the insurrection] is somewhat like a horizon: the more they move towards it, the further it moves away." (Derbent 2013, 25) Hence, it may be significant that some of the popular texts that are supposedly about revolutionary strategy do indeed conceptualize the revolutionary moment as a distant horizon in a quasi-eschatological sense.

Take, for example, Jodi Dean's *The Communist Horizon* where the theory of insurrection is indeed reified so that the insurrectionary event lurks at distant and under-theorized point. Although Dean does not really address the strategic concerns of making revolution, she does not have to because insurrection is an assumption of her "horizon". Revolutionary strategy becomes conflated with the problem of organization and the resolution of the latter is presumed to predestine the former.

In examining the failed *Occupy* uprising in the US, Dean is most concerned with figuring out how this movement demonstrates a possibility of communism that can become *actual* once the problem of organization is solved. (Dean 2012, 207-250) She exhorts us to return, though in a critical manner, to Lenin and argues that the Occupy movement already possesses (or, rather, *possessed*) the kernel of a quasi-Leninist party. (Ibid., 233) In this context, Dean understands the strategic problem as how best to actualize this nascent Leninism. (Ibid., 240-241) Occupy, however, was a mass movement that emerged to confront the state directly, albeit incoherently; the meaning of its event was insurrectionist since it sought, in the manner of a general strike, to force a direct confrontation between the *99%* and the *1%*, often hoping to split the ranks of the police that defended the existence of the latter. "You are part of the 99%," was a common slogan, during the days of the failed Occupy movement, levelled at the armed women and men who assembled to defend the state in the hope that these guardians of capitalism would align their interests with the occupiers.

The fact that Dean believes that such movements can produce a neo-Leninist organization capable of making communism an actuality, and is disinterested in thinking through the strategic problems inherent in such a practice, demonstrates an uncritical acceptance of the theory of insurrection. Her problem with the movement was not the strategic aspect of its practice but only the absence of a superior principle of organization. Indeed, she is quite clear that we do not need to reconceptualize a theory of strategy, or that such a theory is even necessary, since revolutions "are results, conditions, and effects of politics wherein states are overthrown, dismantled, distributed, reconfigured, redirected." (Ibid., 240) Despite implying that a strategy of making revolution will emerge spontaneously when it is necessary, and thus conflating organization with strategy, Dean is also endorsing a vague insurrectionism due to her preferred example: "Occupy arranges the

physical presence of large groups of people outside, in visible, urban spaces, in political actions authorized by neither capital nor the state but by the people's collective will." (Ibid., 233) What she is describing is an insurrectionary event, the moment when the people openly manifest so as to directly challenge the state.

Here, it is worth asking whether or not the 'Leninization' of Occupy would have brought us closer to the actualization of communism, as Dean seems to imply. That is, if the occupiers all happened to be Leninists when they emerged to "occupy Wallstreet" (and other places), would they have been able to defeat capitalism? While they might have been better organized theoretically, unified as a party with some manner of class consciousness, the state would still be better prepared to win the confrontation. Simply possessing a different level of theoretical unity, and a proper understanding of class conflict, would not have made any of the occupiers proficient military strategists or tacticians; they would still lack the concrete means to defeat capitalism's military might.

Indeed, the very fact that Dean treats the Occupy movement as a space that could become revolutionary if it was organized according to a specific understanding of Leninism demonstrates an unquestioned fidelity to the theory of insurrection. For Dean, Occupy was potentially revolutionary because it emerged to directly confront capitalism in the manner of an insurrection, and it failed because it lacked Leninist unity. Although it might be the case that Dean is correct about the problem of organization, the fact that she simply ignores the questions of strategy that the Occupy movement could not answer demonstrates a lacuna in thought. We know that Occupy failed because the state was successful in keeping it contained. To assume that this movement could have breached its containment by possessing a higher level of unity is to assume that the theory of insurrection is correct: that a coherent revolutionary movement that arms itself in the moment of insurrection in order to end capitalism, despite its lack of training, will succeed because of its organizational coherence. Such an assumption flies in the face of history.

A similar faith in insurrection, as aforementioned, can be found in the Invisible Committee's *The Coming Insurrection*, a paradigm-example of an anti-capitalism that rejects Leninism. Unlike Dean, whose endorsement of the theory of insurrection is implicit, the Invisible Committee actually ends its seminal text with an explicit summary of this theory. Although there is nothing unusual in this summary, it is notable in the problems resulting from its devotion to insurrection. For example, the Invisible Committee argues for the necessity of taking up arms at the insurrectionary moment, but only insofar as it is tactically important: "the question of pacifism is serious only for those who have the ability to open fire. In this case pacifism becomes a sign of power, because it is only in an extreme position of strength [i.e. in the spectre of being an armed insurrectionary force] that we are freed from the need to fire." (The Invisible Committee 2009, 129)

Furthermore, although the Invisible Committee recognizes that military confrontation between armed insurrectionists and the militarized state "would require that the state be committed to a bloodbath," it dismisses this situation as "no more than a threat,

a bit like using nuclear weapons for the last fifty years." (Ibid., 130) From this dogmatic assumption––dogmatic because it assumes a priori, without any evidence beyond a moralistic assumption, that the state is not committed to putting down an insurrection with or without a "bloodbath"––the authors of *The Coming Insurrection* assume that the doctrine of splitting the police and military's ranks is correct: "[a] massive crowd would be needed to challenge the army, invading its ranks and fraternizing with the soldiers. […] An insurrection triumphs as a political force. It is not impossible to defeat an army politically." (Ibid.) Just why it is assumed that the defeat of the capitalist military is "not impossible" is never explained; it is a presupposition inherited from the normative status of insurrectionary strategy. Liebknecht's analysis of militarism, however, should lead us to another conclusion: we should demand an analysis, on the part of the Invisible Committee, of those state forces that can supposedly be defeated politically and how such a defeat is even possible. Unfortunately, the authors provide no reason for this claim aside from their statement of fact.

What is interesting about the Invisible Committee's reliance on the theory of insurrection, though, is that, right at the moment they presuppose the doctrine of insurrection, they also claim that "[f]rom a strategic point of view, indirect, asymmetrical action seems the most effective kind, the one best suited to our time: you don't attack an occupying army frontally." (Ibid., 129) Here we find the germ of a strategic theory that is counter to the theory of insurrection in that it advocates a different revolutionary policy, but one that the Invisible Committee quickly abandons because it threatens their devotion to what is normative: "the prospect of Iraq-style guerrilla warfare, dragging on with no possibility of taking offensive, is more to be feared than desired." (Ibid.) The reason for this fear is not simply due to the protracted nature of such a strategy but because, due to the Invisible Committee's overall theoretical commitment, it is a form of *militarization* and thus what they have already rejected in their de-Leninization of insurrection. Hence, despite recognizing the significance of an alternative to the insurrectionary strategy, the normative theoretical constraints constrict to smother this insight––an insight that unconsciously echoes Liebknecht's claim about the significance of the guerrilla tactics of 1905.

Although both Dean and the Invisible Committee differ on the theory of organization, they are united in their "insurrection theology." Whereas the former makes the common mistake of substituting the problem of strategy for the problem of organization, the latter refuses to take the problem seriously in its very description of the theory of insurrection.

The military machinery of the capitalist state, described before its full emergence by Liebknecht, is the primary obstacle for a general strategy of insurrection. Premised on the assumption that capitalism can be overthrown primarily through the insurrectionary moment and/or a subsequent civil war, the theory belongs to social circumstances in which the fact of the modern military is unknown. Not only are modern armies and police trained to put down popular rebellions, the majority of people involved in a large-scale rebellion do

not possess, as a whole, the same training and equipment. Liebknecht himself, thirteen years after writing *Militarism*, would experience the failure of the insurrectionary strategy when the Spartacist Rebellion was swiftly crushed––the state does not abhor, as the Invisible Committee assumes, a bloodbath. Since that time, through the experience of innumerable wars, the capitalist and imperialist war machine has become an apparatus capable of pacifying rebellious populations of untrained and poorly armed insurrectionists (as Derbent's list of failed insurrections above attests) or even prevent them from happening altogether. At best, to hope that an insurrection will complete its aims in the face of this reality is wishful thinking; at worst, if the possibility of a massacre is immanent, it is irresponsible.

Moreover, the military's ideological training is such that the majority of the armed forces, soldiers and police, are socialized into accepting their role as guardians of imperialism and capitalism who most probably will not be 'defeated politically.' While we should recognize the existence of war-resisting dissidents and disaffected veterans, to assume that a large population of soldiers and police will, in the moment of insurrection, add their experience and weapons to the revolution is a leap of faith. It is perhaps this strange faith in the revolutionary potential of sections of the military that caused some activists and anti-capitalist organizations to declare that the military intervention in the Egyptian uprisings was a good thing––at least one organization initially claimed that to call this intervention a "coup" was "lying propaganda" because it was part of the broader Egyptian Revolution. (Woods 2013) We now know the result of the military's intervention in that potential insurrection: a state of emergency, a crackdown on radicals, and a return to power of the class that had been temporarily overthrown.

4

Despite the fact that the theory of insurrection has achieved a level of normativity amongst anti-capitalist scholars and organizers at the centres of capitalism, it is not the only strategic theory. After the Russian Revolution there was the Chinese Revolution: whereas the former produced the strategy of insurrection, the latter produced the strategy of protracted people's war (PPW). Although we might argue that the Chinese Revolution was ultimately a failure, this should not prevent us from examining the veracity of its theory of strategy. As noted in the previous section, one does not have to be a Leninist to accept the theory of insurrection; similarly, one does not have to be a Maoist to take the theory of PPW seriously.

If there was indeed a process between 1905 and 1917, obscured by the assumption that the strategy of making revolution *begins* with 1917, then a theory of strategy that takes this guerrilla process into account may in fact be a theory that possesses universal application. PPW is one such theory of strategic process, though its potential universality is confused by its particular application in China. Here, then, is an intriguing proposition:

could the strategic line codified after the Russian Revolution be a particularity misunderstood as a universality whereas, inversely, the strategic line theorized after the Chinese Revolution was a universality misunderstood as a particularity? More precisely, could it be that the revolution in Russia was actually the result of a vague protracted revolutionary process culminating in the insurrection of 1917?[5] Although we should not make the mistake of defining the October Revolution as an example of PPW, and thus claim that Lenin did not conceptualize strategy according to the theory of insurrection, these questions are salient in light of Liebknecht's claim about the events of 1905 and could help us think through a strategy capable of undermining capitalist militarism. Furthermore, although PPW has been proposed as a universal theory of revolutionary strategy, it may also be the case that revolutionary strategy lacks universality. By examining PPW in this concluding section, then, I am more interested in demonstrating how it may tell us something about universal aspects of strategic theory that the theory of insurrection cannot answer rather than proving the universality of this counter-theory.[6]

The reason we should take the strategy of PPW seriously is because there have been various examples of its implementation, in the past few decades, that have demonstrated a larger level of success than insurrection. The people's war in Peru nearly overthrew state power but was eventually undermined by the arrest of the Communist Party of Peru's (PCP) leadership. The people's war in Nepal led to UN intervention that enshrined the party initially leading this revolution. The current people's war in India has produced a state of emergency. Whether or not we agree with the ideology of the organizations leading these revolutions is beside the point; the rejection of the Bolsheviks' ideology has not prevented anti-Leninists from accepting the theory of insurrection as normative. What matters, here, is whether or not the strategy in itself is more successful and applicable than insurrection. We may indeed argue that the PCP was an over-militarized organization guilty of grave errors; we may point out that the Maoists in Nepal betrayed their own revolution; we may argue that the Naxal revolutionaries in India offer nothing significant to the Indian people… But in this paper I am interested in whether or not the strategic line gleaned from these contemporary revolutions can teach us more about how to make revolution than the theory of insurrection. As noted earlier, the question of organization is a theoretical problem that is distinct from, though connected to, strategy. If we can separate these problems when it comes to the theory of insurrection––as we have––then we can do the same with the theory of PPW.

Beyond moralistic and political assessments of the aforementioned instances of

[5] As T. Derbent indicates, the New Communist Party of Italy (nPCI) argues that this is the case.

[6] Canada's Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR-RCP) is one organization, following the organizations associated with the now defunct Revolutionary International Movement (RIM) that argues for the universal applicability of PPW. A good summation of their argument, which I will not replicate here, can be found in their article *More on the Question of Waging Revolutionary War in the Imperialist Countries* (http://www.pcr-rcp.ca/en/archives/1164).

PPW, however, is the long-standing assumption that this strategic theory applies only to the global peripheries that produces a theoretical scission: PPW is a strategy of making revolution in the peripheries, whereas insurrection applies to the modern, militarized capitalist states. Such an argument claims that the former strategy does not apply to the centres of capitalism since it concerns peasant armies that will surround the cities from the countryside––the failure of the insurrectionary theory is thus left unquestioned because its alternative has been dismissed as a strategy of peasant guerilla warfare. Indeed, the theory of PPW is often defined as applicable only to contexts where there is the possibility of popular, peasant armies and the ability to build red bases in economically underdeveloped regions. I want to suggest, however, that this articulation of PPW confuses the specific application of the strategy with its general theorization. My aim in the paragraphs below is not to provide a thorough articulation of the general theory of PPW, or prove its universal applicability, only to provide the broad brushstrokes of an alternative to the theory of insurrection that, at the very least, might teach us something about the fact of modern militarization.

According to Mao Zedong, the military aspect of PPW breaks down to three overlapping but distinct stages: "[t]he first stage is one of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage is one of the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for counter-offensive. The third stage is one of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat." (Mao 1967, 136-137) Since Mao first theorized this strategy, these three stages have been simplified as: i) strategic defensive; ii) strategic equilibrium; iii) strategic offensive. (Derbent 2013, 19) The first stage is when the people's war is launched and, due to the power of the state, it must engage in creative guerrilla deployment; the second stage is when the revolutionary movement has achieved dual power; the third stage is when the revolutionary movement is in a position of strength to take state power. There are often shifts back and forth between these stages, based on the composition of forces, and a people's war never develops in a straight line. The reality of a revolutionary war, and the fact that the state controls a military that is trained in pacifying entire populations, means that it might be the case that a revolution will temporarily gain strategic equilibrium only to be thrust back into strategic defensive, or just begin strategic offensive only to retreat into preparation. Mao referred to this characteristic of people's war as a "'jigsaw' pattern."(Mao 1967, 145)

Moreover, these stages should not be treated as purely military because they are intended to also function, together and as we shall see before, as an expression of politics through war. In this sense war takes on both a military and non-military dimension. Similarly to how capitalist functions to pacify its subjects in every aspect of life, PPW is intended to produce an *un*pacification by confronting capitalism in every area of life. In some ways this intersects with Stephen D'arcy's concept, mentioned earlier, of "strategies of attrition" but connects the protracted process of tradition with politicization and a "strategy of overthrow"––the latter of which D'arcy believes to be outdated due to his conflation with

"overthrow" and the Leninist style of organization. (D'arcy 2009, 66) PPW theorists have typically conceptualized D'arcy's notion of "attrition" as the accumulation of forces that only makes sense when directed at the strategic end of capitalism.

In every context where a revolutionary movement has initiated a people's war, the state has always been far more powerful than the revolutionaries. Hence the "protracted" nature of the strategy that begins in "strategic defensive" where those launching such a war use guerrilla tactics, accumulating weapons and forces based on the tactics they employ, growing and consolidating slowly. Due to the fact of modern militarization, and the ability of this military to keep its populations divided and pacified, one cannot hope that a protracted legal struggle, without the experience and training that comes through a protracted military struggle, will lead to an armed insurrection capable of toppling better armed and better trained state forces in a frontal confrontation. The "jig-saw" nature of this strategic theory allows for a creative deployment, training, experience, and accumulation so that, if those moments of open clashes (which may in fact include insurrections) are ever defeated, there is still a possibility of retreat and resumption of the people's war rather than a thorough defeat. One only needs to look at the decades long people's war in the Philippines to recognize that this is the case: despite having suffered serious setbacks, where the US and its allies have intervened on the side of the state, the Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People's Army have continued to survive and retain "red bases" and "liberated zones" throughout the nation.

The concept of "red bases" and "liberated zones", where a people's army can move freely and establish the seeds of a counter-authority to the state, also needs to be separated from the particular nature of people's wars in peripheral contexts. Rather than treat these base areas as liberated zones in an underdeveloped countryside, the point is to think of areas of operation that can exist within the cracks of society amongst people who are won over to the movement's line so that the latter may establish its counter-hegemony. At the height of the "Troubles" in Belfast, for example, there were entire neighbourhoods that were under community rule; the police and the military, despite the militarization of the modern state, would not enter unless it was absolutely necessary. Although such no-go zones are not necessarily revolutionary, their existence proves that revolutionary base areas are possible for the same reason these no-go areas were possible.

What is more important than the military aspect of this theory, as discussed above, is its political aspect. Preceding the people's war and during the people's war, the revolution must also succeed in "accumulating forces" so as to embed itself in the masses and saturate society as a whole. Here is where this strategy is not just an explanation of guerrilla tactics but a strategy of mass mobilization: "[t]he mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war." (Ibid., 154) Such a mobilization is a political mobilization where people are pulled into the orbit of the revolutionary movement because

this movement is also involved, and has been involved before launching its war, in politicizing people. The revolutionary army becomes the people itself, because the people will want the movement to succeed, and the state will thus be unable to immediately recognize the fronts and bases of the movement.

To accumulate conscious and politicized forces is to slowly expand a sphere of counter-hegemony where the revolution that seeks to become hegemonic attempts, through a protracted process, to define itself as a legitimate alternate authority––to win the consent of the people. We can analyze the strategy of PPW according to Gramsci's concept of "war of position" where "the superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare." (Gramsci 1971, 235) As discussed, the modern, capitalist state already understands that pacification must also be accomplished through a "war of position"––an ideological and cultural battle to maintain hegemony––as well as its cruder and more visceral methods of coercion. The strategy of people's war, due to its protracted nature, is also a strategy that, intended to be deployed in every terrain and level of a given society, has the same understanding of warfare.[7] I am not arguing, here, that Gramsci was a theorist of PPW, or even anticipates PPW, only that this strategic approach takes his conception of hegemony into account.

In a qualified sense, we can also think of the strategy of PPW according to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the *rhizome* that "may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines." (Deleuze and Guattari 1998, 9) Although there are significant limitations in using this concept, the comparison it permits between different forms of warfare is clear in the following analogy of chess and Go, an older strategy boardgame:

> Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is a war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is semiology. Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual. (Ibid., 353)

This analogy is useful in explaining the differences between insurrection and PPW.

[7] The nPCI, it is worth noting, has explicitly linked Gramsci's concept of "war of position" with the strategy of PPW in a document entitled *Gramsci and the Protracted Revolutionary People's War* (http://www.nuovopci.it/eile/en/gramsci_prpw.html).

Whereas the former is defined by a coded and linear system where the state is eventually confronted as a front, the latter is defined by moving across the entire social space with a "minimum number of forces" so as to slowly accumulate and consolidate at every point in multiple chains of resistance. Although this appeal to the concept of the rhizome is not entirely perfect, the analogy of chess and Go might be metaphorically useful in explaining the significant difference between the two theories of strategy.

The overall point is that the theory of PPW possesses less rigidity than the theory of insurrection: it is not about gambling everything on a single uprising, hoping that the state will disarm itself in the face of the defiant masses, but about a tortured process of slowly building and training a mass movement in the cracks that exist in all societies, no matter how militarized, and continuing to accumulate forces and saturate every social space and structure. The crushing of an insurrection crushes the movement itself since the insurrection is the moment upon which the movement as a whole gambles. As aforementioned, we only need to look at the failed insurrections post-1917 to recognize that this has been the case. On the other hand, it is difficult to crush a strategic deployment of revolutionary forces that spreads throughout the entire social terrain; a people's war cannot easily be beheaded due to its immanence. The beheading of such a movement will come from elsewhere, such as the defeat of the people's war in Peru due to the capture of its leadership and the movement's inability to deal with the contradictions produced by this leadership's supposed denunciation of the war.[8]

We should know from experience that urban guerrilla movements at the centres of capitalism, despite their obvious historical problems, have caused more problems for capitalism than those failed or imagined insurrections. The Red Army Faction, for example, persisted until the late 1990s when it voluntarily chose to disband, despite all attempts of the German state to exterminate its members. The failure of these guerrilla movements was not in their guerrilla tactics but in their strategic line: they failed to accomplish any revolutionary aims because the telos of their ideology was *still* insurrection––the Guevera-influenced *focoism* they expressed was intended to spark "an insurrectionary general strike." (Derbent 2013, 21) The fact that guerrilla movements can survive at the centres of capitalism should tell us something about the inability of the state to easily weed out and crush urban guerrilla tactics. (Conversely, in the frontal confrontation necessitated by a general insurrection, where the state is presented directly with an armed population that has not developed into a fighting force through a protracted process, the capitalist military's ability to crush a potential revolution is easier.) If PPW advocates a process of embedding potential guerrilla movements across broad populations, and thus gaining popular sympathy, then it is more promising than these disconnected guerrilla experiences that still survived for decades

[8] For more information, see the various articles about this period in the Peruvian people's war in the 1996 issue of *A World To Win* (http://www.aworldtowin.org/back_issues/1996-22/index.htm).

despite being unable to produce a larger revolutionary movement.[9]

In November 2000 Action Socialiste, a now defunct socialist organization from Quebec, wrote:

> The fact is that 150 years of [Marxist theory]… should have been oriented in an almost singular direction: solving the question of the proletarian revolution. Especially since, in 1848, Marx and Engels concluded their founding manifesto by openly admitting this very fact: "[communists] openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." Thus, the question of proletarian revolution is not a purely decorative aspect, nor a subsidiary question that we leave to randomness and improvisation. (Action Socialiste 2000)[10]

Since the *Manifesto* was written, capitalist militarization has developed into a powerful system of pacification that is able to enforce ruling class power in a manner anticipated by Liebknecht in 1906. The question raised, first by Engels and then by Liebknecht, regarding the necessity of revolutionary strategy capable of responding to this militarism still needs to be answered. Indeed, the questions of strategic theory should be intrinsic to any socialist project interested in transgressing the limits of capitalism; they cannot be substituted by those related questions of organization and tactics. Although the theory of protracted people's war might provide us with a clue of how we might respond to this necessity, we cannot adopt it merely as a formula to be applied unthinkingly in every context. After all, the theory of insurrection has become the normative conceptualization of revolutionary strategy––often unquestioned or reified––due to a similar uncritical mindset that would have us ignore the problematic of revolutionary strategy by pretending that it is already solved. We need to begin thinking through this problematic now, alongside the problematic of organization, so that it does not remain under-theorized by the time it is too late.

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[9] For more information on the survival of these movements that were successful in their partial resemblance to the strategy of PPW, the multi-volume *The Red Army Faction: A Documentary History* (J. Smith and Andre Moncourt) and *Strike One to Educate One Hundred: the Rise of the Red Brigades in Italy* (Chris Aronson Beck, Reggie Emilia, Lee Morris, and Ollie Patterson) are particularly illuminating.

[10] The awkwardness of this quotation is due to its translation from the French.

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Article

GLOBAL CAPITAL, BUSINESS GROUPS AND STATE COORDINATION: THE CHANGING PROFILE OF CHAEBOL-STATE RELATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA

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Abstract

This article examines the effects of global capitalism and state coordination on the financial behaviour of *chaebol* (business conglomerates) in South Korea. This study focuses on the evolution from controller to coordinator in the post-developmental South Korean state. In recent times, the Korean government has been studied as the exemplar of the Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs) based on its ability to *control* economic development. As civil society pressures outgrew government control in the 1990s, the government's mission shifted from control to *coordination* – the state sought to accommodate newly emerging or enlarged bargaining domains of key political-economic actors. However, the emergent post-developmental state is buffeted by the growing strength of the private sector, domestically and transnationally. While civil society strived to mobilize mass movements to further social democracy, the neoliberal evolution of capitalist class interests generated institutional configurations favouring the hegemony of finance capital.

Keywords

Global capitalism, finance hegemony, state coordination, post-developmental state, *chaebol*

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While East Asian business groups are well studied, the focus has been on the economic success produced by particular industrial relationships *within* the developmental state (DS). Now confronted by expanding global capitalism, the state in the post-developmental era is greatly affected by transnational stimuli and strives to regain

legitimacy over both the private sector and civil society. Hintze's (1975) classic concept of the state as an actor constrained by historically changing transnational contexts finds its modern echo in the conceptualization of the post-developmental state (PDS) in South Korea.

The 1997 East Asian economic crisis prompted Asian governments to adopt neo-liberal reforms that overwrote traditional developmental strategies. The roots of structural change in business entities arose from two related processes of global expansion in the previous decade. First came the state-mediated effect on their governing arrangements amid the waning control of the DS and the waxing finance capital; and the direct effect of global capitalism altered the financial structure of various business entities.[1] The transnational market order reaffirms the classical Marxist view of the hierarchical relationship between global financial institutions – mostly housed in western countries – and the countries and the enterprises that are rated by those institutions.

This study focuses on the leverage that transnational capital obtains as the local business groups in the DS outgrow the financial resources of their home country.[2] Then it addresses how global capitalism affects subsets of social formation, particularly business-state relations in South Korea (henceforth Korea).[3] The financial profile of the Korean economy emphasizes *chaebol*-centered capitalism. The financial behavior of *chaebol* in Korea reveals the external influence of global capitalism on domestic actors and the internal changes of the state from a controller to a coordinator. In mediating the impact of transnational capitalist expansion, the state also had to reconcile disputes of labour-management relations. Despite the political oppression by the DS, the economic success of the DS ultimately strengthened civil society. The PDS, unlike the historical DS, is neither able nor willing to stifle industrial relations but instead attempts to coordinate these competing interests among industry and civil society.

The Grand Processes of Global Capitalism: State Guidance to Global Standards

A corporate group is a preferred form in emerging economies because a strong state encourages this particular form of economic organization. Since Johnson (1982) first

[1] Robinson and Harris (2000) argue that a new global hegemonic bloc emerged in a ruling body of global governance under world capitalism. This new historic bloc includes transnational corporations and financial institutions that behave as a class, affecting global circuits of accumulation beyond locality and domestic polity.

[2] *Transnational* refers to cross-border practices that transcend national boundaries; g*lobal* to the complete denationalization of corporate procedures and activities; and *international* to relationships mediated by the nation-state system (Sklair 2001).

[3] I use the term subsets of social formation to refer to the dyadic relations of state-capitalist, labour-capital and state-labour relationships. The present study focuses attention on state-capitalist relations.

coined the term, *developmental* state versus *regulatory* state, comparative studies have mostly focused on state intervention in producing economic success.[4] Such propensity dominated both academicians' theorizing state configuration and policy-makers' administrative effort to attain it. Ironically, both theoreticians and policy-makers tend to underestimate the aggressive expansion of capitalism, domestically and transnationally.

The DS apparatus includes a bureaucracy ideologically buttressed by Weber's legitimate monopoly of coercion (Camic, Gorski, and Trubek 2005) and practically equipped with a rigid top-down ordered bureaucracy. Such a bureaucracy is simultaneously a tool for monitoring people and a vehicle for implementing economic policy. The ties between the bureaucracy and the large corporations control the upward mobility of new players outside exclusive political economy networks. This structure developed in most successful instances of DS. Among its most important features is governmental supervision of financial institutions that provides otherwise unavailable funds to leading companies.[5] State intervention is a key component for establishing a rule-following culture within the business community; developing inter-firm cohesiveness in key sectors (Evans 1995); orchestrating the coordination of several sectors to achieve international competitiveness (Wade 1990); and emphasizing macro-economic policies at the expense of labour rights (Deyo 1989). Besides price controls, tax exemption for major industries, and the construction of infrastructure, the state monitoring of capital most significantly included control over the financial system.

Business groups in DS like the Korean *chaebols*—with a long history of centrality to the economy and organic ties to the political elite—were designated as leading partners for industrialization. Corporate leaders complied with state policy, making key business decisions based on state policy, even when such decisions were inconsistent with short-term economic efficiency or profitability. This embeddedness was rephrased as *governed interdependence* (Weiss and Hobson 1995, 169), or as *crony capitalism* (Krugman 1994, Kang 2002) — control over corporate assets based on social ties between economic and political elites. For example, the Suharto regime in Indonesia provided Astra with a protective environment and inside information crucial to the company's operations. Thailand's government sponsored Charoen Pokphand's entry into agribusiness, its diversification into telecommunications, and its expansion to China. The Malaysian government's New Economic Policy allowed the Robert Kuok Group to obtain a monopoly in the sugar industry. The Thai, Philippine, and Indonesian states encouraged the development of large, vertically integrated textile companies (Brown 2000).

[4] For the best accounts of the role of the state in the economic development, see Akyuz and Gore (1996); Amsden (1989), Tun-jen Cheng (1987), Evans (1995), Haggard (1990); see David Kang (2002), Duck-Jin Chang (1999) Sea-Jin Chang (2003), Eun-Mee Kim (1997) and Yeon-Ho Lee (1997) for Korea; Johnson (1982) for Japan; Wade (1990) for Taiwan; Campos and Root (1996), Koh (1995), and Quah (1982) for Singapore; Root (1996) for Hong Kong.

[5] See Eun-Mee Kim (1997); Woo-Cumings (1999); Chibber (2002) and (2003).

Business entities nurtured by the DS were under normative pressure in tandem with the obvious coercion exercised by the strong state.[6] Not only finance capital but also most professional expertise was controlled by the state through its structural ties to key scholars and scholarly associations. Businesses were guided by direct negotiation of investment agreements and the homogeneous advice offered by state-affiliated experts. This coercive and normative pressure made this form of business group dominant in the economy, reflecting a state preference for large entities. The state demanded political funding in exchange for information about governmental investment plans and subsidies. Additionally, the military-like corporate culture was supported by the authoritarian capitalist DS. Those "mutual hostages" (Kang 2002) led to similar outcomes in the financial behavior of business groups which included high debt ratios and circumscribed diversification in size expansion.[7]

Embedded autonomy theoretically bridges the self-sufficiency of the state apparatus and its coherent administration over the private sector (Evans 1995). Only when internal bureaucratic coherence is maintained, the state utilizes external networks without compromising its autonomy. The connectedness then represents a high level of state competence. The embedded autonomy depends on both a rule-following culture and an effective bureaucracy; as well as the historically determined character of the state apparatus (Evans 1995, 50). Korean and Taiwanese bureaucratic organizations comparatively showed that state autonomy may or may not succeed if the bureaucracy does not follow the rule but relies economically upon the private sector whom "the state shares a joint project of transformation" (Evans 1995, 59). However, the same degree of rule-following culture generated opposite outcomes, depending on the interagency relations within the government. Korean DS produced economic growth through the successful coordination among state agencies while India failed because the various state agencies were closely tied to the corporate sectors that they were supposed to regulate (Chibber 2002) .

These theories characterize a strong DS like Korea as a *controller,* the planner and sustainer of state capitalism leading to economic growth. Simultaneously, it coordinated interagency relations and controlled the relationships of each agency to the private sector. This unusual emphasis on the state apparatus tends to treat DS as the only dynamic force, with other social actors as mere expressions of state planning. The changing relationships of government with civil society and with the capitalist class are critical in determining economic trajectories. The potential for bottom-up effects from civil society are

[6] For more detailed conceptualization of normative, coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures, see Powell and DiMaggio (1991).

[7] Size expansion behavior temporarily waned at the economic crisis in 1997. Soon after the economy recovered, however, chaebols continued to expand the number of subsidiaries. The top four chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai, SK and LG) had a 30% increase in the number of subsidiaries as of 2007 after the crisis (www.saesayon.org).

underestimated, as are the independent actions of businesses, either as a class or in smaller factions. Song (2011) critiques both DS theorists (e.g., Johnson, Amsden, Wade) and institutionalists (e.g., Chibber and Evans) for their common lack of criticism of dictatorial statism and their heavy focus on the linkage of state and private sectors for development. Despite Song's misreading on developmental state theory as if it takes authoritarianism for granted for the economic growth,[8] she addresses theorizing DS beyond a national level as essential. To reconsider the state's class interests while relocating the DS within the hierarchical world-system would create more room to identify the transformation of DS into PDS in a global context.

Alternative analysis has to place both the dynamics of global capitalism in the private sector and the state-business relationship at the center. Left unanalyzed is the impact of global capitalism on the nationally embedded structure. Bureaucratic coherence becomes harder to maintain once the state and its economic partners are integrated into transnational scenes. While the state apparatus could operate with relative autonomy in the national context, the same autonomy is no longer allowed in the ongoing confrontations between transnational and local capital on the one hand, and between global capitalism and global civil society on the other. Traditional analysis of DS has the least room for these issues.

The private sector's transnational expansion first undermines the legitimate monopoly of *state control* over capital and financial expertise. The state retains the internal cohesiveness that allowed it to guide economic development during the initial expansionary period. As business groups invest in foreign countries and procure capital from foreign capital markets, however, state monopoly declines. Transnational capital flows bolster the influence of foreign lending institutions and the credit-rating system that guides their investment. This undermines state control over finance and its industrial policy becomes contested by the transnational credit-rating institutions. Those external agencies evaluate the sovereign nations and their local firms for international capital based on global standards.

Therefore, the governments of late developers, like Korea of the 1980s and 1990s, responded to these pressures by accepting new *global standards* to work within the global framework. State strategy evolved into a series of ad-hoc remedies designed to accommodate the penetration of global capitalism and declining control over the private sector. This evolution involved a fundamental reconceptualization of the state: from an

[8] For instance, Chalmers Johnson (1999) the creator of DS theory, in the compiled book of state theorists' reviews on DS (Woo-Cumings 1999a) after the East Asian economic crisis, had already defended his original concerns on the pervasive false criticism of DS theory for a possible dangerous justification given to any authoritarian regime for development. It is noteworthy to closely read his distinction between developmental and authoritarian based on cultural context of East Asia, which gives a particular legitimacy to the developmental state.

authoritative/dictatorial organizer of economic policy to a *coordinator* between local needs and the demands of the global political-economy.

Global Standards Under the Hegemony of Finance Capital

Hobsbawm (1979) had posited that the world economy had almost completed the transition from an aggregation of distinct national economies to an integrated and coordinated global division of labour in production and trade. Western-based institutional isomorphism has been pronounced in global financial system.[9] The transformation of DS has occurred amid its integration into the global financial system. Capital dependence generated structural constraints for industrial firms, which in turn delegated conditional power to financial institutions.

While regional economic blocs exist, global convergence towards a set of economic rules for businesses becomes tangible as is observed in global competition rules, specific lending patterns, dependence on global financial institutions, conforming national standards to global standards for rating investment risks and options, and restructuring the domestic financial system.[10] Although the debate continues whether a TCC (transnational capitalist class) exists as a tangible power network in the global economy,[11] such global isomorphic processes continue to drive the corporate action of participants. The power of agreement between multiple parties is not susceptible to control by an individual nation-state. Recent research on transnational policy-planning networks finds that a TCC is forming unevenly regionally, with the North Atlantic ruling class at the center of the class formation process via the global corporate-policy network (Carroll and Sapinski 2010). Additionally, the establishment and enforcement of

[9] I refer *global financial system* to the systematic interplay of financial institutions and regulations that operate both *at* and *beyond* national or regional level. The major participants are global institutions (e.g. IMF and World Bank), nation-state's agencies (e.g. central banks and finance ministries), and private institutions acting on a global level (e.g. transnational banks and hedge funds). These actors are concisely divided into three categories: regulators (e.g. the European Central Bank or the IMF), regulated entities (e.g. international banks and insurance companies) and the lightly or non-regulated bodies (e.g. hedge funds, private equity and bank sponsored entities such as off-balance-sheet vehicles).

[10] For elaborations of the ways in which the world economy homogenizes corporate behavior, see Chase-Dunn (1998). Globalizing aspiration of firms expressed in organizational forms is more pronounce in financial industry. National aspirations to advance financial industry by benchmarking the systems in core countries bred oligopolistic financial groups in countries like Korea, i.e., *Four Major Financial Groups,* including Hana, KB, Woori and Shinhan.

[11] Sklair (2001) interviewed global fortune 500 companies' CEOs to show the existence of TCC while Carroll (2010) tested global interlocks and concluded that the existence of an inner circle of TCC is highly plausible.

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the Group of 20 Leaders (G20) indicates a global convergence of national standards.[12]

In the DS, it was common for high-level state administrative personnel to be assigned by the state to financial institutions, where they monitored financial decisions to insure their consistency with government policy. Such placements, however, faded for two possible reasons. First, domestic banks are less dominant as loci of key lending decisions than in the DS, and foreign direct investors are loosely monitored by government institutions. The dynamics of capital flows started conditioning the role of the state and economic trajectories. Secondly, foreign stockholders have occupied domestic banks as neo-liberal policies are enacted. The domestic banks are no longer the traditional extension of the state apparatus. Thus, the notion of *finance hegemony* has relevance to corporate behavior in the new organizational field of global finance.

The finance hegemony has its origins in Lenin's capitalist imperialism (Lenin 1990[1914]).[13] As banking centralizes, the fluidity and profitability of finance capital tends to promote investment in all aspects of the economy beyond national boundaries. Once investment capital is concentrated in a few oligopolistic financial groups, the groups tend to have similar investment profiles and priorities. In Mintz and Schwartz' (1985) modern version of the theory, corporate activity is constrained to follow the priorities set by finance capitalists because of a combination of institutional connections between the hegemonic financial institutions and other standard setters. These include direct intervention in key industrial firms during periodic business crises, the pressure derived from institutional stockholding, and by the expectation among all firms that future capital needs will be judged according to their conformity to the behavioral and investment profiles that these hegemonic lenders favour. In the long run, however, financial decision-making is paramount, at least in broad strokes, and the intersection of financial and nonfinancial constraint is financial hegemony by financial institutions and other standard setters (Mintz and Schwartz 1985: 107). The dominant lenders like the IMF & WB and Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and other credit rating companies create a set of constraints that constitute isomorphic pressures on the firms operating within the global financial system.

[12] The IFRS is to develop one set of globally accepted financial reporting standards. The IFRS foundation and IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) cooperate with global stakeholders, investors, national standard-setters, regulators/auditors, academics who are interested in developing global standards. All G20 countries have established time lines to converge with the IFRSs. See http://www.ifrs.org/Use+around+the+world/Use+around+the+world.htm

[13] Lenin's argument was based on Hobson's earlier work(1971 [1938]) and later extended by Hilferding (1981[1910]). Zeitlin's work (Zeitlin 1974) revived the interest of scholarship to explain the role of capital flows and financial institutions in determining political economic trajectories in America (Mizruchi 1996, Palmer, Friedland, and Singh 1986, Mizruchi and Sterns 1994, Useem 1996, Glasberg 1989), in European countries (Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott 1985) and in Japan (Gerlach 1992).

Corporate Financial Behaviour in the PDS

Large corporations emulate the best practices of TNCs in the context of hegemonic global standard as addressed above.[14] What specific mechanisms operated in those practices? With the role of external impact considered, the overlapping domains among domestic actors and their global nexus need to be at the center of analysis. The relational domains are the arenas of political competition for hegemonies.

First, let us disentangle the *mediated effects* on financial behavior, a result of the decline of the DS during the period of neo-liberal reform. Transnational capital exerts influence on business practice when banks from Western financial markets deal directly with national business groups, or when these ties are mediated by the indigenous government. One mechanism of state-mediation is the practice of measuring a country's *sovereign rating*. The ratings, while judging the country's business climate, are maintained by key global firms, including S&P, Moody's, Fitch, and IBCA. These institutions compete with nation-states for information that is used to create a country's economic profile; and their opinions often have tangible impact on investment judgments. The sovereign rating is meant to judge the capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, and thus—although the rating is given to the country as a whole—directly affects foreign loans of individual firms (Lee 2003). This combination of national evaluation with firm-level consequences severely leverages the nation-state behavior, since a low rating coerces the government to enact and enforce measures that assure prompt repayment of international obligations, both for itself and for major domestic companies. The sovereign ratings, therefore, exert tremendous pressure on the PDS to adjust its own actions to the standards and demands of transnational entities, undermining the state monopoly of standard in private sector.

Second, the *direct effect* of global capitalism on corporate behaviors, regarding financial and management should be addressed. The hegemonic position of foreign financial institutions appears in corporate boards and/or in the position of a direct investor holding voting stocks. Finance hegemony theory maintains that institutions at the nodes of capital flows exercise definitive leadership over business decision-making within the American economy (Mintz and Schwartz 1985). Global financial institutions exercise a similar hegemony over the TNCs that rise to the global market from emerging economies. As domestic firms expand into the global marketplace and establish production facilities abroad, they seek to enter the already existing TNC community. Such entry involves submitting to the established patterns of this organizational field, while following its established leadership, the multinational financial community. This

[14] For the new global market order re/generated by world best practice and benchmarking across nations aspiring to national competitiveness, see Sklair (2001) chapter 5.

integration of domestic large firms into global networks created an excuse for business groups to request further deregulation from the state. Meanwhile, foreign financial institutions may invade the once self-contained financial networks of the host country and upset the state-centered balance within these networks.

Seen this way, *finance hegemony* of transnational financial institutions is an ongoing reality of the post-developmental era. This hegemony is made visible in two ways. The presence of representatives from global financial institutions on the boards of directors is a signal that transnational capital flows are being effectively monitored. Foreign major stockholders, e.g., non/institutional investors in the domestic financial industry are another.[15] The foreign direct investment (FDI) trend in national economy indicates the direct effect of finance hegemony on corporate financial behavior as well as the changed role of PDS. Though the effects of FDI have been controversial, current practices of finance capital support the capital dependency theory of the Marxian tradition.[16] The past two decades evinced the increasing FDI in emerging economies.[17]

Coordinator, the New Face of the PDS

Leveraged by the transnational finance hegemony, the state voluntarily discards the role of *controller* and becomes a *coordinator* among competing interests. In doing so, the state seeks to preserve national interests and guide them into reinvestment in the local economy. As the state becomes more a flexible coordinator than a protector of exclusive social ties, the state's intact domain becomes marginalized with a notable trend of reducing state-owned enterprises and privatization. Meanwhile, capitalist domain enlarges as business groups go global in orientation. The business groups and the state become rivals while the bargaining between business groups and civil society is dramatically expanded. The controlling power of the DS is transformed by both democratization and globalization.

[15] According to the OECD Benchmark Definition, 10% rule applies to become *direct investment* as holding stocks in the form of voting stock. www.oecd.org

[16] Economic sociologists, e.g., Chase-Dunn (1998 [1989]) and Firebaugh and Beck (1994), continued to test capital dependency theory. The foreign investment appeared to negatively affect both richer and poorer developing countries with stronger effect within the richer. The relationships hold independently of geographical area (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978). Contrary to the Marxists, Firebaugh (1992) found a positive effect of foreign capital on economic growth conditional upon exogenous factors—the differential productivity of foreign versus domestic investment; and the negative externalities from foreign capital penetration. Dixon and Boswell (1996) reappraised Firebaugh and found that less-developed countries dependent on foreign capital show slower economic growth, higher income inequality, and possibly impaired domestic capital formation.

[17] Emerging markets took the largest share of FDIs made by businesses for the years 2012 and 2013. The share of FDI claimed by Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa has almost doubled since 2008. *Wall Street Journal,* January 28, 2014.

Tri-partite bargaining among state, business and civil society, becomes a factor in projecting economic trajectories. The tri-partite domain reflects internal democratic consolidation and external globalization where the state houses the negotiation between civil society and the private sector. The autonomy of civil society is always a crucial factor even in the most authoritarian states and further expands with civilian globalization. The global NGO network and personal contact provide resources and strategies for political action. While the state is actively engaged in international governmental organizations (IGOs), both capitalist class actions and bottom-up social movements substantially increase.[18] People are organized into groups both within and across national borders that limit state sovereignty (Sassen 1998; Sassen 2000; Sklair 2001). Yet, the state is not only constrained by this bottom-up movement, but often actively chooses to yield the position of controller, responding to the realpolitik of globalization. Ironically, this much more democratic PDS is constrained both internally and externally. Symptomatic is the IMF bailout during the East Asian economic crisis: the state that once dominated labour and business groups now strives to coordinate domestic industrial relations, and the bi-lateral agreement between business groups and IGOs and other foreign financial institutions.

The state interacts with the global environment in two distinct ways. One is the direct interaction via intergovernmental networks between the global economy and the nation-state. For instance, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) meetings and forums continuously produce international consensuses around global financial matters.[19] The effects are negotiated through domestic bargaining and produces changes in the behavior of business groups. Trade blocs try to strengthen the economic and political ties among the subsets of nations at the governmental level. Meanwhile, the IMF structural adjustment plan illustrates contemporary relations between the global political economy and domestic actors. Such institution's prescription implies decreased nation-state sovereignty and the increased power of foreign lenders. It also draws attention to the role of TSMOs (transnational social movement organizations) as the counterforce of regional FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) and the global financial system. Although the states formally sign IMF plans, they are in fact agreeing to economic plans imposed externally, plans that often reflect the interests of transnational capital, e.g.

[18] Activists share tactics globally while interacting with the local mass public in socio-cultural space through high tech strategies, e.g. pod-casted news and political music concerts as well as traditional direct action. A study in the 1990s found that the number of NGO and TSMO including the membership size increased both in the global North and the South (Smith, chapter 3 in Smith et. al. 1997, p.49-50). The current civil forums linked to World Social Forum (WSF) first begun in 2001 indicate the highly expected significance of global civil society intervening in social change. Their regional/thematic forums have addressed diverse issues like financial crises, democracy, human rights, war, drug trafficking, etc. (Smith et al. 2007).

[19] The CGFS, a central bank forum monitors and examines issues relating to financial markets and systems. Members are deputy governors, other senior officials of central banks, and the Economic Adviser of the BIS. Member institutions are mostly from G20, see: http://www.bis.org/cgfs.

capital demands to open up a state for foreign direct investment (FDI), are imposed as IMF conditionalities.

Yet, the IMF is opposed by TSMOs, for instance, *Fifty Years is Enough*. In a globalized economic sector, TSMOs can add pressures through the global socio-economic environment**,** which directly challenges state autonomy.[20] In some cases, there is direct confrontation between TNCs and TSMOs, but more typically the outcomes of such conflict are consolidated in the form of specific legal arrangements of a nation-state.[21] In the case of IMF conditionalities, for instance, some may be modified by the state to satisfy conflict between TNCs and TSMOs. The impact of ever-growing direct cooperation between domestic NGOs and INGOs has not been addressed in the state-centered approach. TSMOs tend to reinforce supporting networks of social relations for direct action, providing resources and stimulating one another to attack transnational sources of common problems (Chepurenko 2010, 14-5). These civil society changes have created both tensions and cooperation within and across national boundaries, as INGOs attempt, with more and more success, "to intervene in global political processes once monopolized by states" (Smith, Pagnucco, and Chatfield 1997, 65). The global civil society networks may indicate the degree of political opportunity that civil society enjoys. Consequently, globalization challenges the autonomous decision-making of the nation-state and forces the state to come to the bargaining table with business and civil society. Now the key for social democracy under PDS has more to do with the power game between the civil society and the capitalist class interests, rather than the old frameworks that heavily focused on how to win against the oppressive DS government.

Chaebol, the State and Civil Society in Korea: An Empirical Analysis

At the outset of the "Korean miracle", the state nurtured the *chaebols,* seeing them as a better vehicle for rapid economic growth than relying on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The contradictions of institutional autonomy were avoided by authoritarian politics that were solicitous of already established businesses. The state directed major capital flows toward *chaebols* while allowing the repression of unions that

[20] The first Occupy protest to receive wide coverage was Occupy Wall Street in New York City's Zuccotti Park, which began on September 17, 2011. Over the next twenty days, protests had occurred in over 95 cities across 82 countries, and over 600 of the U.S. communities. Global solidarity around the Anti-FTA movements in emerging countries (www.bilaterals.org) and the synergy of occupy movements across the globe after global financial crisis are noteworthy (www.washingtonpost.com Oct 15, 2011).

[21] Global *sweatshop watch* movement against transnational manufacturing companies like NIKE and Forever21 pushed the governmental legal measure for improving working condition of the factory workers by directly challenging the company. Similarly, "rank-and-file internationalism" focuses on labour-right violations in the Third World. Despite the insufficient world-wide enforcement, there has been noticeable advancement at the practical level.

arose to challenge their labour practices (Chang 1999, 60-67). The export-oriented industrialization was a key locomotive that integrated the Korean economy into the global market. *Chaebols* perfectly suited this purpose, and the Park Jung-Hee regime, born in the military coup of 1961, worked with established *chaebols* throughout the 1960s' East Asian miracle era. The partnership of Park and the *chaebols* remained firm as the country moved steadily toward economic prosperity (Kim 1997, 100).

However, a friction began to develop between the government and the *chaebols* after the second military coup in 1980. The first public sign of this friction was the regulation of the *chaebols* after General Chun became Korean president (Lee 1997, 46-77). From that moment forward, the government oscillated between policies of regulation and deregulation (Harvey 2005). The Chun regime struggled to guide the behavior of the *chaebols*; a dramatic departure from the Park regime, which had maintained seamless relationships based on uncontested government control. To this end, Chun implemented a series of regulatory policies, including the termination of financial support from banks to certain business groups. As a result, one of the *chaebols, Kukche Group* in 1985 went bankrupt, the first such bankruptcy since the economic boom began. The negative control by the state over the *chaebols* increased resistance against government interference. Nevertheless, the Chun regime sought to shore up the *chaebols* by enunciating labour policies aimed at eliminating any possibility that the rapidly developing labour movement would become an active counterforce (Kim 1997, 200-203) to the demands and dictates of industry.

Unlike the Park regime, the Chun (1980-1988) and the Roh (1988-1993) administrations relaxed the exclusive partisanship through new deconcentration policies against *chaebols*. The *chaebols* made every effort to deter the state from executing these policies and ultimately managed to vitiate the policy.[22] Other policies designed to rein in the *chaebols* met similar fates, including the revised Fair Trade Act, which prohibited firms within *chaebols* from giving each other favorable terms of trade. The government acted with its accustomed autonomy, but effective resistance by the *chaebols* narrowed the scope of the amendment and enforcement of the Act (Lee 1997, 77f). During the 1980s, the state took the regulatory posture of limiting the economic independence of chaebols, but experienced commensurate frustrations. The *chaebols* acquired important and diverse holdings in real estate and financial institutions, thus further constraining state action, while accusing the government of failing to provide the information and leadership needed to cushion the crisis that arose in the late 1980s. The state apparatus for economic

[22] Chaebols had a well-structured organization for corporate action through The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the biggest lobby in Korea. The association was launched in 1961 as Businessmen's Association to induce American capital investment and encouraged to be economic partnership of government as KFI in 1968. Later on, it evolved into the primary mechanism for sustaining hegemonic position in bargaining with both the state and labor. FKI pursues free market, free enterprise and free competition as its core ideology. http://www.fki.or.kr/en/

formation had comprised the Economic Planning Board (EPB) (1961-1994) and Ministry of Finance (MoF). The EPB, for more than thirty years of economic development had constrained the private sector and limited its ties to transnational capital. By the 1990s, the state was no longer able to restrict access to transnational capital, demonstrating the decline of the DS in Korea.

In responding to globalization, the civilian president Kim Young-Sam enunciated extensive neo-liberal reforms and justified these changes as necessary adjustments for the national economy to survive in the global competition. The EPB and MoF were merged into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in 1994 for that purpose.[23] The hoped-for consequence was to expand international investment capital, both inflow and outflow. Many *chaebols* invested abroad, consistent with the economic plans of president Kim's policy since 1992. Yet it was not strictly speaking dictated by the logic of the nation's own investment strategies. Rather, like other MNCs, *chaebols* pursued emerging neo-liberal capitalist norms, including a global consumerist ideology. Like other DSs, the Korean state "adapted" to the new global market order in situations where transnational corporations are permitted to dominate the country's relationship to the world economy.

Globalization also allowed private sectors in Korea to develop political economy expertise. Corporate institutes started competing with state-sponsored expertise on the internal market and promoting a global consumerist ideology. By 2005, many of the large firms among the thirty largest *chaebols* in Korea ran their own political economic research institutes.[24] Not only business groups established their own affiliated research institutes, but also non-for-profit NGOs grew in numbers and in influence. In 1994, for example, the activists, scholars and lawyers launched People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), inherited from various democratic movements during the military dictatorship. To promote democratic participation in government policy-making and reforms, PSPD in 1996 established an auxiliary research institute, Institute for Participatory Society (IPS). In 2004, PSPD also obtained a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and started to advocate

[23] In 2008, the MOFE and the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) was again merged into the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) to coordinate fiscal policy and inter-ministerial policy. Meanwhile, the MOFE's authority onver financial market was transferred to the Financial Services Commission (FSC). www.mosf.go.kr

[24] The institutes include Samsung (www.seriworld.org), Daewoo (www.dweri.re.kr), LG (www.lgeri.com), POSCO (www.posri.re.kr), Hyundai (www.hri.co.kr), Kia (www.kiaeri.co.kr), Daishin (www.deri.co.kr) and much more. Their researches are publicly credited and published by their own affiliated publishers, including web journals. *The Korea Economic Daily* publishes the list every year and it includes the measurement of policy influence of the institute. (www.hankyung.com). As of 2012, *The Korea Economic Daily* reported that six corporate research institutes ranked within the top 25 economic policy think tanks. For another indicator of such influence, the SERI (Samsung Economic Research Institute) ranked in the first place in the top 100 of the Korea's think tanks for the four consecutive years, 2008-2011. Chart 1 illustrates the shifts in the makings of economic knowledge for the past three decades.

before various UN bodies including the UN Human Rights Council and the Security Council.[25] Both the corporate affiliated research institutes and NGO-run institutes continued to grow.

In implementing neo-liberal policy, the government opened domestic capital markets, which allowed *chaebols* to borrow from financial institutions domiciled in core Western countries. These externalized lending relationships made the *chaebols* subject to conditions set by the global financial system, thus compromising the hegemony of domestic banks of Korea. The balance of payment crisis in 1997 bankrupted some *chaebols* (including the Hanbo, Jinro, and Kia Groups) and forced others to alter key practices to satisfy WB and IMF conditions. These newly instituted constraints enacted a normative isomorphism[26] in which *chaebols* began emulating the MNCs domiciled in other countries.[27]

Meanwhile, the civil society grew as a strong counter-force to the capitalist class during the 1990s. Social movement organizations, including labour unions have been influential in the domestic political process. The experience of using militant action to oppose the authoritarian state empowered civil society to demand changes in the state bureaucracy and private sector. During the 1980s, the labour movements critiqued the Park, Chun, and Roh regimes for the authoritarian structures that hindered socioeconomic development. In a direct attack on the labour-repressive policies of these regimes, the labour movement targeted both the state and large employers. They enlisted the support of student movements, and thus became a rallying point for civil society. These early protests hardly had immediate success until the Great Workers' Struggle and the June Democratic Protest in 1987. The democratic trade union movement held a nation-wide May Day rally which led to organizing the Korean Trade Union Congress (KTUC, *Chun-no-hyup*). *Chun-no-hyup* mainly consisted of unions in the manufacturing sector and paved the way for a more consolidated democratic union movement in the 1990s. As a result of membership in the ILO (International Labor Organization), major national configurations came together as the Joint Committee for Ratification of ILO Basic Conventions and Labour Law Reform. The Committee mobilized the unions for the "1992 National Workers Rally" and tried building a consolidated national organization. The subsequent efforts led to the formation in June 1993 of the Korean Council of Trade Union Representatives (KCTUR, *Chun-no-dae*), which brought together leaders of the democratic trade unions into a unity. Founded on the preceding struggles of *Chun-no-dae*, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, *Min-ju--noh-chong*) was established in

[25] www.peoplepower21.org

[26] According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), major pressure for normative isomorphism usually comes from from professionalism, an expertise now vested in MNCs and global financial actors like IMF, World Bank.

[27] As for the behavioral pattern of these global actors, see Sklair (2001), chapter 5; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and and Ramirez (1997).

1995 with 862 enterprise unions and a total membership of 418,000. The confederation has emerged as the representative organization of Korean workers and the trade union movements for democratization.[28] However, the union movement solidarity contributed to the growing friction between the state and the *chaebols*. These events were the prelude to dramatic changes in the tripartite relationship that occurred in the PDS era. In addition to labour solidarity, the new middle class emerged as significant actor in transforming social relations from authoritarian to democratic in various organizations in Korea (Chung 2005).[29]

Combined with the substantial pressure emanating from the integration of the economy into the global market, growing civil society brought important changes in the functioning of the Korean state— from a *controller* to a *coordinator.* Since the mid-1990s, Korean scholars (Kim 1994, Choi 2009, Im 1994, Lim 2007) reexamined whether the developmental dictatorship advanced or hindered the economy and disputed the myth that authoritarian structure yields economic growth. The coordinator state differs from its controlling predecessor because it no longer depends on political-economic coercion as the primary vehicle for enforcing state regulatory policies; it must instead negotiate mutually beneficial policies among key actors in domestic politics. Unlike regulatory states that seek to coordinate the diversified interests of domestic capital, this PDS implements global standards that in turn ironically reinforces transnational capitalist hegemony. While remaining as lender of last resort on the national capitalists' behalf, the PDS configures the form of political neutrality by allowing civil society to organize.

State Coordination and Financial Liberalization

The PDS model illustrates that the shifts in the state's political positions reciprocate with its role in the socio-economic relations. In the Korean context, the interrelatedness originates from the dirigiste inclination of *chaebol*-state patron relationship. The evolution from a DS controller to a PDS coordinator was accompanied by a parallel shift from a bureaucratic authoritarian state to a liberal democratic state.[30] The changed role of the state needs to be interpreted in both economic and socio-political terms and it is the financial function of the state that is central to both of these realms.

[28] By 1997, the membership increased to over 526,300 in 1,144 unions and became the successor to a of struggle of Korean workers while committed to advancing workers' empowerment by building industrial unionism and workplace democracy. As of 2012, 143 solidarity organizations from civil society are to KCTU. See www.kctu.org and www.nodong.org.

[29] Chung (2005)'s research analyzed South Korean data from the World Values Survey 1995 which measures the general populations' political cultures and attitudes using a probability sample of 1253 men and women over 16 years of age.

[30] For more discussions on democratic consolidation processes in developing countries including Korea, see Ho-Kee Kim 2000a and 2000b and Sung-Hack Lim (2003).

Unlike most Western capitalist states, the Korean state itself was the leading actor of capital accumulation. This had a strong impact on the *chaebols*' political behavior, since they could not risk tampering with their economic standing by indulging in independent political action. As the state's financial monopoly began to erode, so did the political control that the state could exercise over the private sector. Meanwhile, capitalists had already become more directly influential in the households' economy through their dominant share in the production market and their political leverage in the labour market. Since the early 1980s, when the country was even nicknamed as the "*Chaebol* Republic", rapidly accumulating wealth and denser social networks have facilitated coordinated action among *chaebols*. During the 1990s, the capitalist class matured into a dominant political force.

One indicator of this new coordination appeared in the 1992 National Assembly Election, when the National Unity Party, based in the *Hyundai Group*, ran a strong third despite having been formed only two months before the election. This sudden rise reflected the newly unleashed energy among a disgruntled electorate no longer content to accept the traditional choices offered by the established parties, and therefore willing to support the corporate representatives in the National Unity Party as a possible alternative (Kang 1998). This, however, fails to explain *Hyundai's* willingness to challenge the established parties, when even a strong third place vote would leave it vulnerable to retribution by state managers loyal to the existing major parties. Since state regulation had been dissipating, *Hyundai's* managers (and other *chaebol* leaders) were emboldened; instead of ingratiating themselves with state managers by uncritically accepting government policy, they sought to form state policy congenial to their corporate plans. The Unity Party was one prong of a new activist approach among *chaebols* toward government policy formation.

The economic policy at the turn to PDS under the president Kim Young-Sam was crystalized in financial liberalization and a transparent financial transaction system. The Real Name Financial Transaction Act was legislated by the President's Commission on Finance and Economy Code 16 of 1993 with Congressional approval.[31] The mandatory usage of real names for financial transactions made it possible to track capital sources and flows. This transparency was aimed at discouraging informal/unfair transactions while facilitating sound development of the financial industry. This legal act paved the way for the Korean financial industry to become deeply involved in the global financial system.

Financial liberalization policies, meanwhile, yielded drastic changes, including interest rate liberalization, capital account liberalization, a competitive exchange rate and the

[31] This legal action was further reinforced by being legislated as *The Act on Real Name Financial Transactions and Guarantee of Secrecy* the Legal Act code number 5493 on December 31, 1997. (Korea Ministry of Government Legislation. www.law.go.kr)

liberalization of FDI.[32] Finance capitalism emerged in Korea as the government made vast efforts to increase the financial assets and financial interrelations ratio (FIR) (Table 1). Observing the global expansion of finance capitalism, the government strongly felt the urgency of restructuring and advancing the domestic financial industry. It is not a coincidence that FIR emerged as a crucial economic indicator of nation's cumulative financial assets in the central bank's documents. The FIR was 2.6-2.8% in the 1970s but continued to increase up to 4.92% by the end of 1993. The government in reference to the U.S. (6.55% in 1992), Japan (7.81% in 1992) made an effort to improve the ratio.[33] As a late developer, the government tried to benchmark the advanced capitalist system in reference to the FIR trends. This in turn, deeply integrated the Korean economy into the global financial system while the effort to restructure the financial industry affected corporate financial behaviours domestically. Moreover, as Charts 1 and 2 demonstrate, the Korean States transition from DS to PDS is marked by it withdrawal from the financial sector, particularly in regard to commercial lending.

Table 1. Financial Assets (unit: trillion KRW) and FIR (Total Financial Assets/Nominal GNI)

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Financial Assets Total	27	114	312	770	1852	3592	6199	10298
Financial Companies'* Assets	8	41	92	224	468	893	1474	2376
FIR	2.7	3.0	3.8	4.1	4.7	6.2	7.2	8.8

Source: Bank of Korea and Financial Supervisory Service

*Note: including banks, insurance company, securities company, brokerage and investment bank.

[32] As for the detailed legal measures and historical events in the financial industry of Korea, see www.fsc.go.kr

[33] FIR increases when: 1) the subjects of savings and investment are independent of each other; 2) the external financing of corporate investment increases; 3) the proportion of indirect financing within the external financing increases; 4) stocks and bonds are frequently issued among financial institutions, regenerating multiple transactions out of the issued stocks and bonds. For the calculation method of FIR, see the Bank of Korea (1996) *Economic Indicators*, p.124.

Chart 1. Makings of Economic Knowledge Producing Body*



Source: magazine.hankyung.com

*Note: *The Hankyung Business* conducted a survey research by recruiting 120 respondents from 4 organizational categories, i.e. governmental, corporate, NGO affiliations and research universities; and 6 professional fields, i.e. national security and diplomacy, politics, social welfare and education, economy and industry, women and labour, science and technology, and environment and energy. The survey was done between November 14 and 25, 2008 on behalf of *The Korea Economic Magazine, a* weekly economic professional magazine of Korea. The respondents listed top ten organizations in each field where they work as a profession; then the total frequency counted to come up with top 100 for total. Exceptionally, the organizations in science and technology field were measured by the size of funding for research.

Chart 2. Foreign Loans Arrivals Total (in Million USD)



Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, The Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr)

The shifts away from financial control by the state were embedded in larger processes of political turmoil, including a political impeachment and major economic initiatives, like the Roh Moo-Hyun administration's effort to stimulate "job growth and foreign investment" as part of a larger program designed to turn "Korea into a logistics and financial hub for Northeast Asia."[34] The explicit goal of Roh's program to stimulate foreign investment involved the directing of investment to certain chosen sectors with a minimal attempt to shape the impact of the investment—these choices were left to the global capitalists and to the markets that facilitated the investment process. Importantly, the PDS under the Roh administration also sought to create a peaceful labour environment, creating space for the autonomous associations of civil society. Union negotiations directly with government and business would have been unthinkable only two decades previous.

Direct Effects of Global Capitalism on Corporate Financial Behaviour

Korea's manufacturing industry for the past 60 years has grown from 7.4% (1953) to 30.6% (2010) of GDP (Cho, Park, and Kang 2012). Large firms[35] focusing on manufacturing have been leading companies in the industrial development and economic growth of Korea. During the DS era, *chaebols* had a low BIS capital adequacy ratio and a high debt-to-equity ratio. The major source of debts was the investment banks controlled by the state central bank. The developmental policy encouraged the central bank to lend more money to large firms than SMEs (Small Medium Enterprises).

By the mid-1990s, the profitability of the thirty largest chaebols continued falling (Chang 2003, 14). Many *chaebol* affiliates were inefficient and unable to cover their own financing costs. Their investments abroad, financed by loans from foreign capital, were unprofitable, at least in the short term. To qualify for loan restructuring in the global market, the *chaebols* were forced to undertake reforms in their business strategies.

In the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the proportion of stockholders via direct financing stretched as the large firms improved their capital adequacy ratios. Corporations preferred direct financing to indirect financing. The crisis offered the Korean economy an opening to adopt global standards in finance and to open to a global capital market and foreign direct investment, fully orienting the economy toward the neoliberal economic order. The positive effect expected was the expansion of transparent market transactions, autonomy and

[34] http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2004/05/12/200405120020.asp

[35] The Small Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Korea defines any business entities hire more than 300 employees as large firms, otherwise SMEs (www.law.go.kr) while the Fair Trade Commission considers the total asset over 5,000 million in USD (www.ftc.go.kr)

openness of market. Nevertheless, its final outputs yielded a high unemployment rate and growing inequality.[36]

As the financial industry further liberalized, the international financial market became the preferred source for large borrowers with global reach for two important reasons. One can be found in the relative interest rates for corporate bonds and bank loans in force during the key transition period. Whereas corporate bond rates as of 1992 far exceeded the Korean bank prime rate (18.9% to 11.3%), the two rates converged in 1998, when the rising prime slightly exceeded the falling interest rate of corporate bonds (15.2% to 15.1%).[37] The two remained equal thereafter, meaning that large firms that could qualify for corporate bonds would pay no penalty for using them. Since corporate bonds carried less specific oversight of government institutions, they were far more attractive to both issuers and buyers who participate in the bond market. This option was therefore adopted by the major *chaebols*; and foreigners continued to rush to bond markets. Large foreign investments were attracted to Korean domestic bonds as the fiscal sustainability and low public debt continue.[38] Moreover, the financial independence of the largest *chaebols* trickled down to other Korean enterprises, since the intra-chaebol connections often gave them indirect access to these same global financial resources. These changes in the Korean lending profile demonstrate that the largest *chaebols* had become members of the TCC, with the option of transgressing national boundaries in pursuit of economic self-interest. While such membership also brought the *chaebols* under the discipline of the global financial system, this discipline was (perhaps ironically) much looser than that exercised by the Korean state.[39]

While the Korean economy recovered from the crisis, the proportion of foreign capital in the domestic financial industry increased sharply; the rescue operation created permanent changes in ownership arrangements. As the first evidence, the proportion of foreign stakeholders increased yielding irrevocable changes in the ownership arrangement. By 2004 three of the eight largest commercial banks (*Jeil Bank, Foreign Exchange Bank* and *Hanmi Bank*) became subsidiaries of global financial firms, and FDI held a preponderant proportion of stock in three of the remaining five (*Kookmin Bank* 77.8%, *Shinhan Finance* 64.3%, *Hana Bank* 65.5%)(Park 2004). The same trends operated throughout the upper reaches of the Korean business community: foreign ownership in the banking industry as a whole rose from 6.1% to 27% in a scant five years from 1999 to 2004; while the insurance industry recorded an increase from 4.6% to 15.6%. During the same five year period, foreign ownership among all publicly traded shares on the Korean stock exchange

[36] The structural adjustment after crisis, for instance directly affected the unemployment rate which increased from 2.1% in 1995 to 9.6% in 2010 (Cho et al. 2012, pp. 25f).

[37] www.ecos.bok.or.kr. The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System.

[38] www.iif.com/emr/ap/korea Institute of International Finance.

[39] For a careful distinction between hegemony and control, see Mintz and Schwartz, 1985.

increased from 6.5% to 25.5%.[40] Foreign shareholdings in commercial banking industry have expanded since the post-crisis period: 16.4% in 1997, 50.2% in 2003, 59.7% in 2004 and 57.8% in 2007.[41] According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) report[42], foreign equity funds, often private, had acquired controlling interests in Korean domestic banks after the crisis. The foreign capital in the Korean financial industry and in the stock market has remarkably increased (Chart 3).

Chart 3. Stock Market Shares by Shareholders (%)



Source: Korea Exchange, chart reproduced form Economic Statistics System (ecos.bok.or.kr)

The increases of foreign capital indicate that the integration of the Korean economy into the global financial system had gained irreversible momentum during this post-crisis period. Foreign-owned banks particularly focus on expanding commercial banking or household lending rather than offering a wide range of financial services to other industrial sectors. Secondly, foreign banks emphasized *standardized credit evaluation* over local information and long-term customer relationships. By April 2004 foreign debt among the largest Korean businesses had reached $44.3 billion,[43] and the

[40] The market occupancy ratio for each sector is measured by total assets in 2003 on average for banks; total amounts of stock exchanges during January 2004 to July 2004 for stock market, total incomes from insurance policy sales of life insurance companies during April 2004 to June 2004. Source: Financial Supervisory Service, Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Life Insurance Association.

[41] Percent calculated based on stock market prices in Kyungsoo Kim, Byoung-Ki Kim and Young Kyoung Suh, "Opening Capital Flows and Implications from Korea" Economic Papers Vol. 12 No. 1 published by the Bank of Korea. www.bok.or.kr

[42] http://www.bis.org/pub/cgfs22.htm.

[43] www.fnnews.com reported on April 12, 2004

chaebols faced pressure to conform to global standards of business conduct. This included adjusting to global accounting standards, implying or requiring new approaches to the generation and disposition of profits, and many of these are in stark contrast to longstanding Korean government practices. Similarly, shareholder activism, which originated in the United States, had become a global phenomenon as institutional investors diversified their portfolios internationally.[44] This resulted in direct negotiations over corporate policy between Korean CEOs and highly opinionated representatives of foreign stockholders, and this became another source of friction in which *chaebol* leadership was forced to counter Korean government policies.

The drift of corporate finance outward into global markets for commercial bonds and stocks or international loans, complemented by the Korean banks' migration into security underwriting, created a corporate network within the country largely outside of government control or influence. The banks are no longer the central location attached to state control where the overarching knowledge of the economy was collected, and decision-making over bank loans had once been the moment for state strategizing and implementing plans for economic development. Beyond this, the changes left a power competition among knowledge producers, since no single institution held this central place within the Korean economy. Instead, these changes can be seen as part of a general trend toward disorganized capitalism. Once the power of the domestic bank declined, "the social ties among firms [became] dispersed" and the capacity to coordinate their actions dissipated (Davis and Mizruchi 1999, 236).

Because of the concentration of capital, a few large foreign banks began exerting a different, but nonetheless tangible, form of control over Korea's largest firms, beginning with the balance of payment crisis in 1997 and deepened by the rapid recovery from the crisis. This influence resembled that described by Lenin as the central element in modern imperialism: the banks are able to "*ascertain exactly* the financial position of the various capitalists, then to *control* them, to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating or hindering credits, and finally *entirely determine* their fate (Lenin 1990 [1914], 37)." Though the current forms of financial control, mediated through loosely organized markets (like the increasingly important stock and bond market), are less programmatic than those described by Lenin and less directed than those controlled by the Korean DS, the hegemonic global financial system is nevertheless the key legislative and executive force in the new global economy.[45]

[44] Useem (1996) cited in Chang (Chang 2003, 31)

[45] Chang (2003) offers a persuasive argument for the vision of global capitalism as hegemony while the current practices of the CGFS (Committee on Global Financial System) confirm such argument.

Conclusion

In the 1970s and 1980s the Korean government was the prototypical DS, acting as a *controller* over economic trajectories and authoritarian control over civil society. But by the late 1990s, the state apparatus had been reconfigured as a *coordinator* to accommodate the diverse demands from global financial system, local business groups, and from an increasingly autonomous civil society. This decline in state autonomy also needs to be considered as a consequence of political democratization. The rise of civil society in the 1980s paved the way for contested democratic elections of the 1990s, peaceful regime change, and a growing responsiveness of government institutions to public opinion. Yet, as the PDS became more responsive to both private economic sector and civil society, it faltered in providing economic guidance. Transforming itself from a proactive force for development into a *coordinator* to enforce the structural constraints of global capitalism which ironically led the Korean state to promote global *financial hegemony* over domestic Korean enterprise *and* civil society. The state took the position of neutral third party to find middle ground among contending actors, most notably domestic and transnational capitalists and organized forces of civil society. Ultimately, the leverage of transnational financial institutions is, in most instances, predominant, outweighing even the cumulative force of other actors in the system. Indeed, the recent history of the Korean political economy suggests that the administrative capacity of states in the late developers seem to be focused on facilitating the continued functioning of the global financial system. The state in the post-developmental context is destined for the role of coordinating and striving to leash the finance capital that revives and expands despite the global financial crisis. The process of finance capitalism demands our attention to uncover the mechanism through which the profit of finance capital is privately enjoyed while the cost socialized.

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Research Note

EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNCTIONS OF FACT-INSENSITIVE PRINCIPLES

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Biographical Note

Kyle Johannsen is an instructor in the Department of Philosophy at Trent University. He is primarily interested in social and political philosophy, especially distributive justice, but he also has interests in applied ethics, especially animal ethics. He has published in *AJOB Neuroscience, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review,* and *Social Philosophy Today*

Abstract

In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly note that G.A. Cohen's fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is explanatory. This observation raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative deliberations? The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question. Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen's thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. As a result, the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason. With this interpretation in hand, I then proceed to argue that Lea Ypi's and Robert Jubb's recent criticisms fail to undermine Cohen's thesis, and that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, are especially helpful for purposes of deliberation in circumstances characterized by changing and changeable feasibility constraints.

Keywords

G.A. Cohen; fact-insensitive principles; feasibility; socialism; justice

G.A. Cohen's now seminal article 'Facts and Principles' (2003) defends the radical claim that our most fundamental normative principles are justified independently of

facts.[1] He maintains that without fundamental, 'fact-insensitive' principles, we cannot make sense of the justificatory relationship between factual reasons and context-specific, action-guiding regulatory principles (Cohen 2008, 265-7). Cohen's thesis, in his own words, is that "a principle can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a response to a principle that is not a response to a fact (Cohen 2008, 232)." Understanding what Cohen means by this is a bit tricky, but Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse have aptly suggested that Cohen's thesis is best understood as an explanatory one (Forcehimes and Talisse 2013, 373-4) . On the assumption that some fact F supports some principle P, explaining why F supports P requires invoking a further principle, P*. To use Cohen's own illustrative example, on the assumption that the fact 'keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects' supports the principle 'people ought to keep their promises', some further principle is needed to explain the justificatory relationship, e.g., a principle such as 'people should help others pursue their projects' (Cohen 2008, 234-6).

Recognizing that fact-insensitive principles function to explain the facts justifying our moral commitments is essential to understanding the fact-insensitivity thesis. However, it also raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles function as explanations, then do they have a role in ethical and political decision making? Understanding why one's factual beliefs supports one's principles, and thus the basis upon which one endorses those principles, is perhaps an important kind of self-knowledge, but is that all it is? If fact-insensitive principles are *merely* explanatory, then they can have no practical role to play.

The purpose of the present paper is, in part, to address the above mentioned concern. In the next section, I briefly explain Cohen's thesis and the premises he invokes in support of it. Drawing on David Miller (2008), I indicate that on a charitable understanding of the thesis, a fact-insensitive principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. If the interpretation I advocate is correct, then the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason.

With Miller's interpretation of the fact-insensitivity thesis in hand, I then proceed to defend Cohen's thesis against two criticisms, one of which challenges it on explanatory grounds and the other on justificatory grounds. The first of these criticisms, authored by Lea Ypi (2012), attempts to convict Cohen of an infinite regress. In reply, I argue that once the logical character of Cohen's thesis is fully appreciated, it is apparent that the

Some of the material comprising this paper was previously presented at Queen's University's Philosophy Colloquium Series. I thank the members of my audience for their comments. I would also like to thank the members of my supervisory committee - Will Kymlicka, Alistair Macleod, and Christine Sypnowich – for written comments, as well as two anonymous reviewers for *Socialist Studies*. Finally, I acknowledge funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

[1] For a revised version of his 2003 paper, see Cohen 2008, chapter 6.

assumptions he works with do not commit him to claiming that the force of an explanation always presupposes a further explanation. The second of these criticisms, authored by Robert Jubb (2009), challenges Cohen on the grounds that his thesis pertains to the logical but not the epistemic sense of 'grounding'. An explanatory principle (one that explains why a fact is a justificatory reason for the agent who believes it), though needed to generate a valid argument, does not succeed in epistemically grounding a fact-sensitive principles unless it, i.e., the explanatory principle, and the factual premise or premises it serves alongside, are justified. In reply, I argue that Jubb's critique succeeds in showing that explanatory principles are not sufficient for the justification of fact-sensitive principles, but it does not succeed in undermining their status as necessary conditions for justification. An explanatory principle is required for there to be any sort of inferential relationship between a factual premise and the principle it supports, and thus an explanatory principle is needed to produce a sound argument.

After addressing the above criticisms, I proceed to argue that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, can be productively extracted from their explanatory setting and employed for purposes of deliberation. Following Pablo Gilabert (2011), I acknowledge that their insensitivity to facts that constitute *soft* (changeable) feasibility constraints makes them suitable for guiding political transition. What is more, I suggest that our limited epistemic abilities make insensitivity to facts that constitute putatively *hard* (unchangeable) constraints useful too. Facts we originally took to be permanent sometime change unexpectedly, and when they do, fact-insensitive principles are important for political reform. As we'll see, these observations are of special interest to both socialists and liberal egalitarians.

1. Fact-Insensitivity and the Third Man

Put very concisely, Cohen's thesis is that any factual reason to endorse a normative principle presupposes a fact-insensitive normative principle (like Cohen, I shall henceforth use the term 'principle' for short).[2] Put somewhat less concisely, the view states that for a fact to serve as a reason to endorse a principle, it is necessary that the agent for whom it is a reason be committed to a further, more fundamental principle, the upshot of which is that any fact-supported principle cannot be an agent's most fundamental principle (Cohen 2008, 232-3). To illustrate his thesis, Cohen uses promise-keeping as an example. He notes that the fact 'keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects' cannot by itself serve as a reason to

[2] Cohen is careful to define what he means by the terms 'fact' and 'principle'. He stipulates that "a normative principle, here, is a general directive that tells agents what (they ought or ought not) to do, and a fact is, or corresponds to, any truth, other than (if any principles are truths) a principle, of a kind that someone might think reasonably supports a principle (Cohen 2008, 229)."

endorse the principle 'people ought to keep their promises'. In order for it to do so, the agent must believe a further principle that connects said fact to the principle it supports, e.g., a principle such as 'people should help others pursue their projects.' The endorsement of this further principle may or may not itself depend on a fact. If it does, however, then explaining the justificatory force of this fact requires commitment to yet another principle. In any such case, whether it is about promise-keeping, respecting property, etc., one will have to stop one's chain of reasoning at an ultimate principle the endorsement of which does not depend on any fact (Cohen 2008, 234-7).

Cohen indicates that his thesis is grounded in three premises. The first is that whenever a fact serves as a reason to endorse a principle, there is always an explanation for why it does so. The second is that the explanation in question must be some further principle the endorsement of which is independent of the fact it explains. Interestingly, Cohen himself does not provide especially compelling reasons for the reader to believe that these premises are plausible. In support of the first, he offers the supposedly self-evident claim "that there is always an explanation for why any ground grounds what it grounds" (Cohen 2008, 236). With respect to the second, he simply challenges the reader to try and come up with a plausible non-principle explanation for why a particular fact provides a reason to endorse a particular principle. Apparently he is confident that no one will be able to do so. Following David Miller (2008, 33-4), I think it is more effective to say that a further principle is needed in order to establish a valid argument. By way of example, suppose you are committed to the principle 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness'. Furthermore, suppose that the reason you think this is because of the fact that 'a selfish character makes utility maximization infeasible'. In order for the factual premise 'a selfish character makes utility maximization infeasible' to logically entail the principle 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness', we need a further principle to serve as a second premise. A good candidate would be 'people should maximize utility'. Explained this way, it is clear why any factual reason requires an explanation. Unless the kind of entailment we are interested in is specifically analytic, no single premise is capable of entailing a conclusion. What is more, the premise we add will need to be a principle, for only a principle that says something about the significance of the fact can generate a set of premises that either deductively or inductively entails the conclusion.

The third and final premise supporting Cohen's thesis states that one's chain of justificatory reasoning actually will stop at an ultimate principle, rather than continuing on indefinitely. Part of the reason Cohen thinks this is so is because he believes it is implausible for the reasons explaining one's endorsement of a principle to be infinite in number. If our minds are finite, then so too are the number of reasons we have for believing a proposition (Cohen 2008, 237). In addition, he also claims that an infinite chain of reasons would violate 'the clarity of mind requirement', according to which his thesis specifically applies to those with a clear grasp of why they endorse the principles

that they do (Cohen 2008, 233 and 237). This stipulation makes sense if one keeps in mind that Cohen's thesis is about the doxastic explanation of belief. He is interested in the beliefs that explain why an agent believes in a principle (or, in some cases, what she must believe in order to believe that a fact supports a principle she is nonetheless somewhat uncertain of). As such, Cohen is specifically interested in cases of belief where a doxastic explanation is, in fact, available. If an agent can explicitly articulate her reasons for endorsing a principle, then we have an available explanation. Alternatively, she might hold a series of inexplicit reasons that could potentially be brought to light with the help of an interrogator. If, however, she does not hold any reasons at all, or, at the other extreme, somehow holds an infinite regression of reasons, then there is no doxastic explanation available for why she endorses the principle she does.

In a fascinating paper entitled "Facts, Principles and the Third Man" (Ypi 2012), Lea Ypi presents an internal critique of Cohen's three premises. She argues that the fact-insensitivity thesis is vulnerable to a version of the 'third man argument', i.e., an argument put forward in the Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* which tries to demonstrate that Plato's theory of forms generates an infinite regress. In the present context, an infinite regress of principles is allegedly generated by two of Cohen's claims. The first claim is that there is always an explanation for why a fact grounds what it grounds. Cohen straightforwardly states this as his first premise, so Ypi is certainly right to attribute it to him. The second claim, this time implicit in Cohen's second premise, is that the explanation for a ground must be something other than the ground itself (Ypi 2012, 200-1). A set of claims along these lines is evidently needed for Cohen's argument to take off. It is in light of the first that the justificatory force of a factual reason requires explanation, and it is in light of the second that something more than an appeal to self-evidence is needed. The problem arises when these assumptions are applied to principles and not just facts. If an explanatory principle also requires an explanation, one which is more than just an appeal to self-evidence, then it seems Cohen is stuck with an infinite regress. Any principle that explains a justificatory fact will itself require a further principle to explain it, and that further principle in turn requires yet another principle, etc. There will be no non-arbitrary point at which one can stop the chain of explanatory reasoning (Ypi 2012, 209-13).

One possible reply would be to explicitly restrict the scope of the assumptions Ypi focuses on. Cohen might say that they only apply to facts, though I think he would be hard pressed to say exactly why. A more convincing response is available via an appreciation for the logical character of his thesis. As previously noted, the reason any justificatory fact requires an explanation is because no factual premise can entail a principle by itself. For the factual premise 'keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects' to entail the principle 'people should keep their promises', we need a further premise such as 'people should help others pursue their projects' to fill the entailment gap. But what is involved in going even further? What

would constitute an explanation of the explanatory principle itself? One possibility is to offer an explanation for why the agent endorses it. This is equivalent to asking whether the explanatory principle is ultimate, and if it is not, then what further facts and principles explain why the agent takes it to be justified. But none of Cohen's assumptions prevent him from eventually terminating this explanation at an ultimate principle. The claim that there is always an explanation for why a fact grounds what it grounds is not analogous to, and thus does not require Cohen to commit to, the claim that there's always a doxastic explanation for why an agent believes a principle. The former is a matter of what is logically required to complete an entailment. The latter is not.

Suppose, however, that we are interested in something other than explaining endorsement. Suppose we take endorsement of the explanatory principle for granted and instead ask why it explains the relevant fact's justificatory force. If Cohen's assumptions committed him to the position that the force of an explanation always presupposes a further explanation, then he would indeed find himself in infinite regress territory. As we have noted, an explanatory principle explains a factual premise's justificatory force by completing the entailment. Since the fact that 'a selfish character makes utility maximization infeasible' cannot logically entail a commitment to character reform by itself, explaining the agent's commitment to 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness' requires an additional premise. However, if Cohen's assumptions committed him to the position that explanatory force always requires an explanation, then pointing to the completed entailment would not be enough. It would be necessary to go even further and explain how forming the entailment itself constitutes a successful explanation. For example, to explain why 'people should maximize utility' (P*) explains the justificatory relationship between 'a selfish character makes utility maximization infeasible' (F) and 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness' (P), we might offer the following hypothetical principle: 'If P* and F, then P'. Of course, the explanatory force of our hypothetical principle would itself have to be explained with a further principle, and the force of this further principle would have to be explained via yet another principle, etc. In other words, if Cohen's assumptions required explaining explanatory force, he would find himself in the same position as Lewis Carroll's Achilles (1895). In his humorous dialogue, Carroll shows that the validity of an entailment must sometimes be taken for granted. To do otherwise would invite an infinite regress, for each time we try to prove the validity of an entailment by adding another premise, we in turn create a new entailment that must be proven valid, and thus an endless chain ensues. To avoid this regress, certain logical forms, e.g., inference rules such as *Modus Ponens* or *Modus Tollens*, must be accepted as basic, and the arguments that satisfy those forms must not require any further premises in order to be valid. Thankfully, though, Cohen's assumptions do not commit him to claiming that the validity of an entailment always requires a further premise. What

Cohen's thesis requires is explicating the implicit premise or premises in an otherwise patently invalid justification. Adding the premise needed to turn a patently invalid justification into a valid one is not the same thing as rejecting the basic status of inference rules.

The last kind of explanation we might offer for an explanatory principle is one that explains why it functions as a ground. This question becomes intelligible once we have noted that explanatory principles serve as premises in arguments. Unlike the other senses of explaining an explanatory principle, Cohen's assumptions actually do commit him to requiring such an explanation. As is hopefully clear by now, though, explaining why a principle functions as a ground does not require an infinite regress. If we want to know why a principle is a reason to endorse another principle, then we just need to figure out which explanatory premise or premises would form a valid argument. Thus were we to be asked why the agent's commitment to helping others pursue their projects entails her endorsement of a promise-keeping requirement, it would not be amiss to mention what we already know, namely that the agent believes the factual premise 'keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects'. Just as the non-factual premise can be invoked to explain the factual premise's force, so too can the factual premise be invoked to explain the non-factual premise.

In summary, I've argued that 'the third man argument', though perhaps applicable to Plato's theory of forms, is not an effective criticism of Cohen's fact-insensitivity thesis. Of the three likely interpretations of what it means to explain an explanatory principle, not one forces Cohen into an infinite regress.

2. The Practical Significance of Fact-Insensitive Principles

In the previous section, I sought to explain Cohen's fact-insensitivity thesis and to defend it against an alleged infinite regress. In this section, I attempt, among other things, to shed light on the role of fact-insensitive principles in practical deliberation. Addressing this matter is important because the nature of the fact-insensitivity thesis encourages doubts about the practical significance of fact-insensitive principles. As we have noted, the principles the thesis establishes are explanatory. They serve to explain why agents endorse the fact-sensitive principles they do. In what sense are explanatory principles useful for deliberation, though? Understanding why we endorse the fact-sensitive principles we do is surely a good thing, but how does that understanding bear on the selection of fact-sensitive principles we are not yet certain about?

The first thing to note is that fact-insensitive principles are not just explanatory. This point comes to light by appreciating, once more, that they are premises in arguments. Though it is true that a fact-insensitive principle functions to explain why one or more factual claims have the justificatory significance they do, they do so

specifically by *completing the justification* said fact or facts are premises in. Of course, logically complete justifications are not always successful justifications. As Robert Jubb notes, explanatory principles are needed to 'logically ground' fact-sensitive principles, but in cases where an explanatory principle is unjustified (or where the factual premise it serves alongside is unjustified), said principle does not suffice to 'epistemically ground' the fact-sensitive principle whose endorsement it explains, i.e., it does not suffice to give us good reason to accept that the fact-sensitive principle is true. By way of example, Jubb points out that the principle "everyone who is evil should be killed", in combination with the factual premise "all people under six feet tall are evil", would explain the agent's endorsement of a fact-sensitive principle which states "everyone under six feet tall should be killed (Jubb 2009, 344)." However, it's clear that the principle "everyone who is evil should be killed", though explanatory, does not justify the (independently implausible) fact-sensitive principle "everyone under six feet tall should be killed", as neither the explanatory principle nor the factual co-premise it serves alongside are acceptable. The upshot, Jubb notes, is that a chain of reasoning that eventually terminates in a fact-insensitive principle explains the agent's endorsement of, but does not necessarily justify, the fact-sensitive principle with which one began (Jubb 2009, 344-5).

Jubb's point is well taken, but the extent to which the distinction between premises that logically ground a conclusion (justify it on the condition that they're true) and premises that epistemically ground a conclusion (actually justify it) threatens the justificatory significance of fact-insensitive principles depends on whether explanatory principles are necessary for logical grounding of *any sort*, or whether they are merely necessary for deductive validity. If explanatory principles are merely needed for deductive validity, then Jubb's point demonstrates not only the insufficiency of fact-insensitive principles for justification, but their lack of necessity as well. Since arguments can be sound without being deductively valid, fact-insensitive principles would not be needed for soundness, i.e., one might have factual premises that *inductively* support fact-sensitive principles, and no further explanatory principle(s) would be needed to account for this. However, if explanatory principles are needed to generate an inferential relationship of any sort, then fact-insensitive principles are at least *necessary* for justification. After all, an argument's soundness is comprised of (a) the acceptability of its premises and (b) the inferential relationship between its premises and its conclusion, so soundness requires, at the very least, that an argument's premises inductively support its conclusion, i.e., that the hypothetical truth of the premises make the truth of the conclusion reasonably likely. As it becomes apparent upon reflection, however, a factual premise cannot even inductively support a principle without a non-factual co-premise to back it up. For example, consider once more the principle that 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness'. This time, though, let us say that the factual premise offered in support of it is the fact that 'a selfish

character is one of the factors that can potentially impede utility promotion'. Without a non-factual co-premise, the above fact provides no inferential support of any kind for the above principle. To invoke it in argument would be a complete non-sequitur. Some further principle is needed to produce an inference, and though one which supplies deductive logical grounding would do, e.g., one that states 'people should remove all factors that can potentially impede utility promotion', so too would one that supplies inductive grounding. For instance, the principle 'people should promote utility' suffices to tell us why the agent has reason to remove potential barriers to utility promotion, but it does not generate a deductively valid argument. The possibility that selfishness does not impede utility in some contexts, or that there may be other, more significant barriers that should be removed instead, demonstrates that the hypothetical truth of the premises 'a selfish character is one of the factors that can potentially impede utility promotion' and 'people should promote utility' supports but fails to guarantee the conclusion 'selfish people should take measures to overcome their selfishness'.

Once the justificatory indispensability of fact-insensitive principles is appreciated, it is clear that nothing prevents exporting a plausible fact-insensitive premise to non-explanatory contexts, i.e., contexts where the project is to select new fact-sensitive principles, rather than to explain the appeal of those already endorsed. For instance, the principle 'people should help others pursue their projects', though initially of interest because it explains the justificatory force of the fact that 'keeping promises is necessary for promisees to pursue their personal projects', would presumably make a contribution to one's moral deliberations after its discovery. Someone committed to this principle might, upon reflection, find that it supports revising the norms she currently lives by, e.g., supports giving more to charity, voting for left wing political parties instead of right wing ones, etc. The extent of her discovery's revisionary significance will depend on the weight she assigns it and the degree to which it conflicts with the other commitments governing her norms, but it could and should make some difference to how she lives her life.

In recent work, Pablo Gilabert explores considerations related to political transition that shed further light on the practical significance of fact-insensitive principles (2011). He points out that an appreciation for the malleability of some feasibility constraints requires that we take a 'transitional standpoint' with respect to the implementation of a fact-insensitive ideal. One of his insights for Cohen's work is that implementing a fundamental principle is not simply a matter of adopting action-guiding principles that reflect feasibility constraints and the requirements of other fundamental principles. It also requires paying attention to the ways in which our actions can affect our social and political context, and thus the ways in which they can affect the feasibility of realizing more desirable arrangements in the future (Gilabert 2011, 59-63). The other insight is that principles the content of which is not beholden to facts comprising *soft* feasibility constraints, i.e., malleable constraints such as culture, prevailing political views,

etc., have an important practical role to play. Were we to amend the content of our most fundamental principles in order to ensure that what they prescribe does not exceed the bounds of what is feasible within our present context, then we would have no standard in light of which to identify which of our factual circumstances pose a barrier to realizing states of affairs even more desirable than those presently accessible. Our principles would be beholden to, rather than critical of, the facts that constrain what is immediately possible to accomplish, and thus would be unable to serve as a standard in light of which to conduct a gradual process of transition.

Cohen expresses thoughts similar to Gilabert's in his earlier writing on analytic Marxism. When reflecting upon the failure of the Soviet Union and its depressing implications for the future of socialism, Cohen argues that socialists should not conclude that capitalism, because apparently more feasible, is therefore more desirable. To do so would be akin to forming adaptive preferences, and though adaptive preferences are psychologically useful insofar as they help us cope with our limited capacities, they can also make us lose sight of what's valuable (Cohen 1995, pp. 253-5). On Cohen's view, a successful socialist society would embody a number of fundamental values much better than a capitalist society does; values such as justice and community (Cohen 1995, pp. 259-64; Cohen 2009, pp. 12-45). And though a successful socialist society is not presently within reach, we should be careful not to forget why it was worth striving for one in the first place. As Cohen puts it, "If you cannot bear to remember the goodness of the goal that you sought and which is not now attainable, you may fail to pursue it should it come within reach, and you will not try to bring it within reach (Cohen 1995, p. 256)." Which facts pose a barrier to bringing about socialism is a debatable matter, but it seems clear that capitalist market relations cultivate social attitudes that aren't conducive to socialist reforms. In so far as implementing socialism requires a strong sense of communal care between citizens, the transition will be difficult if citizens have been socialized into adopting an individualistic mentality focused on the acquisition of personal wealth. Implementing socialism thus arguably requires a change in social attitude, one that could perhaps be accomplished through moral education.

Gilabert's analysis shows how principles insensitive to soft feasibility constraints are useful, but it does not show how principles that are also insensitive to *hard* feasibility constraints are useful. What practical role might principles insensitive to even permanent features of the human condition play? Though I do not pretend to have a comprehensive answer to this question, at least some of the importance of fact-insensitive principles is derivable from our epistemic limitations. We are not always able to determine which constraints are hard and which are soft. Technological and other advancements sometimes overturn the facts constituting a putatively hard constraint. In situations where a set of factual constraints are lifted, it may be the case that previously optimal fact-sensitive principles cease to be so. To be cognizant of this, however, requires an understanding of what one found appealing about those principles, an

understanding that survives factual change and enables one to perceive that the formerly optimal principles now fall short.

Consider the implications of emerging genetic technology. This sort of technology, once it has reached a sufficiently advanced state, will predictably have the power to enhance human physical and mental abilities far beyond the present norm. This possibility raises questions of justice, among other things.[3] In the contemporary distributive justice literature, egalitarian theorists have generally considered it to be a *hard* fact that governments cannot influence the distribution of natural abilities. Nevertheless, they recognize that justice requires addressing natural inequalities. Some theorists, such as Cohen, think that unequal natural ability is an intrinsic source of unfairness (Cohen 1989, 917-8).[4] Others, such as Ronald Dworkin and Kok-Chor Tan, think it is only unfair insofar as it is permitted to affect individuals' access to social goods (Dworkin 2000, 79-90; Tan 2008, 671-3 and 679-80). Whether one thinks unequal natural abilities are intrinsically or merely extrinsically unfair matters little for political practice if only social goods fall within the scope of government influence. If natural abilities can be affected, however, then a seemingly arcane dispute over the precise nature of their unfairness suddenly carries much more practical significance. For one who thinks natural inequality is intrinsically unfair, improvements in genetic technology would be a reason to adopt principles that target more than just the distribution of social goods. In so far as certain ability-boosting genetic interventions are morally acceptable, considerations of fairness may suffice to ground a principle that gives priority to boosting the abilities of the disadvantaged. Noticing this, however, requires clarity about why one supports addressing natural inequalities via the redistribution of social goods in the first place. If it is merely because one thinks the effect of natural inequality on the distribution of social goods should be either mitigated or eliminated, then the emergence of new genetic technology is seemingly unimportant. If, however, it is because one thinks natural inequality is unfair in part due to its social effects but also in and of itself, then the facts associated with technological advancement become normatively significant. Only when we are clear about the content of the principles that explain our fact-sensitive commitments can we react appropriately to factual change.

In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that understanding the explanatory character of Cohen's thesis in terms of what is logically required for either an inductively or deductively valid inference empowers said thesis to avoid a number of difficulties, namely infinite regress and practical impotence. Though Cohen's thesis may still be vulnerable to other difficulties not mentioned here, it is my hope that a proper

[3] For a stimulating book discussing various issues surrounding justice and genetic modification, see Buchanan et al., 2000.

[4] In addition to holding it himself, Cohen attributes this view (perhaps improperly) to Rawls. See Cohen 2008, 96-7.

understanding of it will help commentators hone in on the real issues, whatever those may be.[5]

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HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE

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Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the twenty-first century.* Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 13: 9780674430006. Hardcover: 55.95 CAD. Pages: 696.

Piketty's major contribution is empirical documentation of the long-term trend of the capitalist system toward greater inequality, a trend only reversed in periods after world wars (Piketty 2014).[1] The "the central contradiction of capitalism" (571), according to Piketty, is increasing inequality which is expressed in the formula r>g. This means that "the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an extended period of time… [such that] wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than output and wages" (25, 571). We may recall that Marx described the rule of the past over the present in this way: "capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks" (Marx 1977, 342). Piketty shows that, in general, it is only when growth is high that the tendency to inequality is muted or reversed. Given that the widely accepted prognosis, perhaps excepting currently underdeveloped Third World economies, is for low levels of economic growth (25, 572), the expectation that Piketty's analysis provokes is for increasing inequality for the foreseeable future.

The most significant periods of growth in the 20th century occurred as a result of world wars (15, 471, 572). A main factor is of course the destruction that opened up post-war economic growth, but political factors also are significant. While Piketty recognizes political factors (481, 577), his approach does not allow him to explain or describe them deeply.[2] Regarding the social compromise that produced the "social state,"[3] as he calls

[1] Quotations from, and references to, this text will henceforth be registered in the main text with a page number only.

[2] Marjorie Griffin-Cohen has documented the correlation between war and rising income of the working class based on Piketty's data and argued convincingly that Piketty's analysis undervalues the role of political factors in such a conjuncture (Griffin-Cohen 2014).

[3] Piketty uses the term "social state" to refer to what is usually called in English the "welfare state." The latter term contains the problem that it may be seen as the production of welfare for poor recipients rather

it—or, as we usually say, the "welfare state,"—after World War II, we should mention that the expectations of returning soldiers and the imperative of the ruling class to truncate social mobilization based on these expectations, combined with the recent memory of the Depression, opened political opportunities for the working class in a period of economic growth due to wartime destruction. After the Second World War in particular, the welfare state compromise between workers through their representatives in unions and labour parties, large corporations, and governments led to a period of long-term growth in which real incomes of the working class rose creating a citizen identity that largely overshadowed class consciousness (Angus 1997, 20-27, 40-46; 2008, 50-62).

The general tendency of capital to increase inequality is not only countered by periods of high growth and political action leading to state redistribution, which are what we might call *external factors* to economic forces. The key *internal factors* that tend to decrease inequality are "the diffusion of knowledge and investment in training and skills" (21, see also 71, 571). The increase in what is sometimes called "human capital" signifies labour power as modified by skills, training, and ability (46) that Marx believed could be theoretically reduced to a multiplication of unmodified average human labour (Marx 1997, 135). Again, Piketty does not provide much political analysis of this point, but it is not too difficult to see that if the skills required in a technologically advanced production system are widely distributed and mobilized by workers, then their bargaining power over wages is strengthened and, thereby, inequality is decreased. Nevertheless, one must emphasize that this is one tendency among others and that, as Piketty says, "even with the considerable increase in the average level of education over the course of the twentieth century, earned income inequality did not decrease" (484). Moreover, there is no evidence that education has increased intergenerational social mobility (420).

These political additions—friendly amendments, we might call them—to Piketty's analysis pertain to one of its central hypotheses. According to Piketty, meritocracy is the main legitimation of capitalism to the general population (26, 419-22). We can see that increasing inequality only poses a contradiction for capitalism, apart from outright immiseration, because the system garners loyalty by promising economic prosperity for all successful enterprising individuals and, we should add, interpreting failure to do so as an individual failure of ability or effort. Inequality due to inherited wealth contradicts legitimation by meritocracy. We should note, as Piketty does not, that meritocracy is by definition an individualist response to economic inequality and is thereby compatible with widespread inequality and deprivation. However, it is not too much to say that meritocracy, or class mobility, was a central part of the welfare state compromise, which

than a system of universal social programs funded by high taxes. The Spanish "estado de bien estar" or "state of well-being" captures this sense better even than "social state." It is important to insist on this point since it was the reinterpretation of universal programs as remedial ones for the poor that enabled the Right to begin dismantling the welfare state.

included a universal social safety net and job protection for the working class, as well as an acceptance of capitalist enterprise.[4] To this extent, the increasing inequality that Piketty documents is not only an economic problem for post-welfare state societies, but also a problem of political legitimation.

Education in the widest sense is thus, in Piketty's analysis, the basis of the main internal tendency toward decrease in inequality, even though this countervailing tendency has in general not prevailed over the structural tendency of capital to increase inequality. Moreover, widespread access to higher education regardless of social origin was a key aspect of the claim to individual social mobility in the social state, or welfare state, compromise that temporarily decreased inequality after World War II (484). Piketty's proposal for the social state at a global, or at least regional, level funded by a tax on capital is essentially an attempt to restore that compromise in conditions of a neoliberal global economy.

I want to now concentrate separately on the two aspects of the problem of education in capitalist society that Piketty lumps together without further analysis: investment in education for skills training and the social diffusion of knowledge.

It is obvious that state spending on higher education has fallen drastically with the decline of the welfare state and the globalization of the economy. With the loss of the legitimation of higher education as the production of informed citizens, only skills education as defined by the labour market has had any chance of surviving. Many countries, such as Canada, invest at very low levels in skills training and supply skilled labour through privately funded education or immigration. Thus, a common social-democratic response has often been to argue for greater investment in skilled labour and restriction on immigration to fill remaining absences in the workforce. This politics necessarily implies competition between countries at an international level: one can fund advanced skills training nationally only if the labour force is attracted domestically by appropriate jobs. In practice, this leads to international competition over advanced technology in which the previously advanced countries retain their advantage. In short, it contributes to a decrease in national inequality at the price of greater world inequality. Piketty's proposal for a world tax on capital to contribute to spending on a new social state does not evade this problem. He accepts that a world tax is a utopia and opts for regional economies, such as the European Union (515-8). But the upshot of this would be to fund advanced skills within the EU at the price of restriction on immigration and competition over technological advance.

In summary, social state funding for education at a regional level could mitigate inequality internally only by exporting it to the rest of the world. This is where the other aspect of education, which Piketty does not discuss other than to note its importance to

[4] This is by no means a complete analysis. It leaves out, for example, the gender dimensions of the family wage (Fraser 1996) and an imperialist relation to the so-called Third World.

decreasing inequality comes in: diffusion of knowledge on a social scale. Piketty says, correctly in my view, that diffusion and sharing of knowledge is "the public good par excellence" (21). That is to say, it is not just education for individual social mobility within a meritocratic legitimation, but widespread diffusion of knowledge that might then assume a social purpose. How stands it with education understood in this way?

It was often argued during the period of the welfare state that public funding of higher education contained a contradiction between its individual, meritocratic dimension and the universal social goals that education made apparent. Thus, higher education could make a contribution to understanding the struggle for social equality. To the extent that public funding has receded, this social function has receded also. If one pays a huge private tuition for higher education, then one can expect to be the sole, individual beneficiary. Moreover, skills training driven by the requirements of science and technology predominates over general education. The role of education in decreasing inequality thereby would seem to disappear altogether. So, we may well ask, is there a contradiction in the role of education under current conditions, or has it become just another brick in the wall of the increasing inequality produced by capitalism?

In a statement in *Grundrisse* that has become increasingly relevant and widely discussed in recent years, Marx claimed that there is such a contradiction: The development of large industry comes to depend less on the direct labour time expended in production and more on what he called "the general state of science and technology" (Marx 1973, 705). In such a condition, labour time ceases to be the measure of value and thus exchange value ceases to dominate use value. This contradiction allows "the process of social life … [to] come under the control of the general intellect and … [be] transformed in accordance with it" (ibid., 706). In short, the *socialization and diffusion* of knowledge required by advanced technology tends to burst the confines of capitalist production. Though more cautious at this point, it seems that Piketty regards—and here I agree with both Marx and Piketty—the diffusion of knowledge as a force tending to decrease inequality and perhaps even tending to burst its capitalist bounds.

The contradiction in contemporary education for the skills and training necessary for advanced technological production is this: that capitalist forces tend to confine education to acquisition of skills defined as necessary within the production process whereas such skill acquisition under conditions of advanced technology and its reliance on science contains a universal dimension that we could follow Marx in calling the "general intellect." The dilemma of the capitalist order is to develop advanced skills acquisition while rejecting or minimizing the general intellect that seems to be its product and, thereby, becomes a widespread minimum social level of education required for the contemporary workforce.

Whether capitalism can contain this contradiction is of course an empirical question with many dimensions. The regional social democratic strategy proposed by Piketty attempts to contain the contradiction within a defined frame—no longer national

but similarly restricted—and expel the contradiction outside to issues of immigration and international competition. The neoliberal strategy, which minimizes the social state and its support for education, tends to subordinate the acquisition of education to inherited wealth in the same manner as property, healthcare, sustenance, etc. By confining education to a traditional privilege, the neoliberal strategy avoids a contradiction in education and subsumes it into the more encompassing contradiction of a widening gap between rich and poor. There will be a treason of some intellectuals due to the universal dimension of scientific knowledge and inquiry, as in Marx's day, but no contradiction within technological society itself.

I would thus define the possibility of the radical alternative as expressed by Marx's analysis in this way: for the possibility of an emancipation of the general intellect, the social aspect of the intellect must be recognized and institutionalized so that its internal contradiction can be effective. Piketty's strategy, as a revised social democratic strategy, might be a starting point in this respect, since education would be supported and recognized as an element of social policy tending toward decreasing inequality whose contradiction of the major tendency of capital toward increasing inequality would remain a source of potential conflict and social advance. But even if this might be a viable transitional strategy, the problem goes deeper and further than a revised social democratic strategy can appreciate.

To conclude, the international "No to Austerity" slogans and movements are a start in the right direction. They build on the history of the social rights of the citizen as established by the welfare state, but potentially go beyond it insofar as those rights are now being eroded and the major neoliberal tendency of global capital would be to eliminate social rights altogether. If some accommodation of education as a social right can be attained, the contradiction pinpointed by Marx will be given new life and can be expected to motivate further inventive politics aimed at establishing the social intellect as the governor of production. If a national or regional frame consists in exporting inequality, as I have argued, then the problem for a radical opposition is to find alternative institutional forms in which the general intellect can prosper.

A central aspect of this new life of the social intellect is the relationship between ecology and growth: capitalism relies on growth, which depends upon maximizing certain factors of production and consumption in relative isolation from others; whereas ecology demands the systemic understanding of as many factors as possible. One may expect to see a contradiction in the social intellect between these systemic versus maximizing tendencies. Piketty does mention climate change (567-9) and "the development of new forms of property and democratic control of capital" (569) in passing, but these brief mentions do not enter into the central themes of his analysis or proposal. Given the historical relationship between growth, state funding of higher education, and the tendency to decreasing inequality in the diffusion of knowledge, this absence may be the most significant contemporary implication of increasing inequality for our ability to

confront pressing problems. Piketty has nothing to say about this, but I suspect that this contradiction may be the aspect of higher education most crucial in the future.

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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY MATTERS: REFLECTIONS ON PIKETTY'S CAPITAL IN THE 21ST CENTURY[1]

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Abstract

In *Capital in the 21st Century*, Piketty takes a central liberal claim about economic inequality seriously and asks: does capitalism reward merit? If true, we would expect salaries, presumably rooted in the reward of merit in the workplace, to be more important to personal wealth than inherited money and property, which is just luck. He concludes that capitalism does not reward merit more than inherited wealth. Piketty suggests that this is at once a political and moral problem. As such, it cannot be resolved through economics alone, especially in the profession's current incarnation, characterized by mathematical fetishization. Instead, all of the social sciences and humanities should be mobilized to develop a full description and analysis of economic inequalities, which must then be made a central question for broad, public debate. This is an important epistemological and political argument, although *Capital in the 21st Century* has critical weaknesses. These include an undertheorized empiricism, a tendency to treat economic inequality as a matter of money and not as a social relationship, and a failure to grasp how class, gender, race and age come together in social relationships of exploitation (and not merely as a statistical relationship of inequality).

Keywords

Capital; economic inequality; exploitation; justice; Marx; Piketty

In *Capital in the 21st Century*,[2] Piketty takes a central liberal claim about economic

[1] I would like to thank Marjorie Griffen Cohen for inviting me to be part of the 2015 Congress session she organized on Piketty's book and Mara Fridell for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] All references are to Piketty's (2013) book in French: *Le Capital au XXIe siècle*, éditions Seuil, Paris, France. The translations into English are mine, and are cited with page numbers only.

inequality seriously and asks: does capitalism reward merit? He argues that if this were true we would expect salaries, presumably rooted in the reward of merit in the workplace, to be more important to personal wealth than inherited money and property, which is just luck.[3] His conclusion is that capitalism does not reward merit more than inherited wealth. In fact, using data mainly but not exclusively from what he calls the "rich" or developed countries (North America and Europe), he demonstrates that through most of the last century, inherited wealth "grows" much more quickly than wealth amassed from even relatively high salaries.[4] In France, the only exception over the last century was when inherited capital, sedimented in the form of property, was literally destroyed in the First and Second World Wars, and in the interim economic crisis. Hence, growing (if cross-nationally variable) inequality is a persistent feature of capitalism, which rewards inherited wealth more than "merited" salary-based wealth. This tendency towards greater returns on inherited rather than "merited" wealth from salaried incomes is unjust, even from a liberal perspective that defends merit-based inequality. The normative, political question then becomes how to regulate globalized capital to reduce such inequalities in ways that are "at once just and efficient" (752).In the final chapters of the book Piketty considers possible redistributive initiatives, like a Europe-wide tax on wealth (859-864), as a means to a more just and efficient world capitalist economy.

[3] Or as Piketty succinctly formulates the liberal claim: "The central question: work or inheritance?" (380-383). We might ask, with analytical Marxist philosophers (eg., Cohen 1989), if "merit" is not a question of luck, too, for instance, the luck of "good genes" or of being in an historical moment where certain tendencies happen to be rewarded as "merit," as when obsessive compulsive behaviours are rewarded as meticulous work habits.

[4] As Piketty makes clear, he is sceptical of claims that salaries reflect rewards for talent and hard work (see 524-533). He observes, for instance, that the highest salaries are now so astronomical in many rich countries that it is difficult to justify them as "merit-based". In practice, he suggests that high salaries frequently result from a small pool of similarly situated individuals collectively deciding such salaries—more or less "for themselves." High salaries reflect self-reward rather than any objective merit. Moreover, the existence of any given high salary creates mimetic pressures, to use a vocabulary that Piketty does not, for similarly high salaries in other workplaces and sectors. Salaries are less a consequence of merit than demands arising from comparisons of similar position, regardless of how well any specific individual performs in that position. Further, the fact that CEO salaries do not rise and fall with markets, instead remaining uniformly high, suggests that these salaries are not, in fact, related to "merit" since they do not decline when there is worse market performance (although, of course, it is also true that no single CEO is responsible for the performance of financial markets as a whole). Finally, the idea of "merit" in the comparative sense that CEO A "merits" more pay from better performance than CEO B, because CEO A is more dynamic and generates more profits, supposes information that few companies have—they rarely have the time and resources to 'test' competing CEOs in identical conditions and then offer more pay to the better-performing individual. For all these reasons, Piketty is sceptical of claims that high salaries are linked to merit.

Inequality as a Political and Ethical Problem

In developing this overall argument, Piketty makes several distinct, but related contributions. Although none of these claims are revolutionary as politics or as theory, they are useful within the particular historical moment, challenging a number of hegemonic claims by many contemporary economic "experts". In that sense, Piketty's book meaningfully opens space for critical dialogues around economic inequalities as a political matter of concern to all, even as his explanatory and often conceptual framework remains thin. Despite these shortcomings, here are seven contributions he does make:

First, *Piketty painstakingly describes variations in economic inequality over more than a century in Europe and to some extent other nations, using both existing and original databases.* This continues work since his early doctoral days towards constructing databases enabling him (and others) to describe and analyse inequalities in France, other European countries, and throughout the world (e.g.Piketty 1997; Piketty 2001; Atkinson and Piketty 2010). In wealthy countries, he argues, "new political regulations, taxation and public controls on capital" (76) emerging out of the two world wars and the Great Depression, led to a brief post-war decline in the importance of inherited wealth compared to "merited" wealth from salaries. But the relative importance of inherited wealth then rapidly increased along with economic inequalities more generally, from the early 1980s up to the present. This was the consequence of the combination of new "conservative" economic policies in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the globalization of financial capital and deregulation since the 1990s (summary from p.76).

At the same time, Piketty documents important cross-national variations in the historical transformations of economic inequalities, whether from inherited wealth or salaries, and he describes the sometimes-unique causes of those national differences. American economic inequalities from 1980-2010, for instance, are partly due to the emergence of "super-salaries" (471-474) that have not yet been equalled in other nations, including most of Europe and Japan (508-9). In short, the book contributes to the empirical description of changing economic inequalities in much of the world, arguing that contemporary economic inequalities in many nations now match record levels of inequality from 1910-1920.

Second, *Piketty is explicit—even pedagogical—about the strengths, limitations and inevitable incompleteness of the data and statistics that he uses* (941). He insists that all data is socially "constructed" and warns against "fetishizing" any economic or social statistic as a "mathematical certitude" (103). He explains the rationale behind his decisions to use particular statistical representations. He prefers to describe the distribution of total revenue and total inherited wealth by deciles and centiles, for instance, over "synthetic" indicators like the Gini index of inequality. Not least, he

explains, the former, expressed as money, are easier to viscerally understand than a "fictional" statistical unit like the Gini index (417-420). Hence, he tends towards descriptive statements like the following (to closely paraphrase): the 5% group, that is the richest 5% of Americans, had "annual revenues…between 108 000 and 150 000 dollars per household" in the year 2010, compared to annual revenues superior to 352 000 dollars for the 1% in the same year (467). Or: within the 1% in contemporary France, income from work is often supplementary compared to the principal income, derived from inherited wealth and derivatives (dividends and interest, rents) (443)…

At the same time, Piketty is straightforward about the political uses and abuses of different statistical presentations of inequality. He argues that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) indicators, for instance, rarely describe the distribution of income and inherited wealth within the top 10%. He regrets that such approximations lead to a falsely "softened" image of contemporary inequality (420-421), inevitably distorting critical political debates around such inequalities. In contrast, his own work seeks to present data concerning the top 5% and the top 1% (or even top 0.1%) in salary revenues and, whenever feasible, with respect to inherited wealth. In short, Piketty is explicit about the strengths and limits of different data sources and explains how the presentation of data is likely to influence political decisions.

Third, *Piketty posits inequality as opposed to poverty as a central political and moral concern, not least for purported democracies.* If politics is about common goods and common projects, which demand financing (33), then inequality necessarily enters into the debate about each individual's equitable contribution, given their unequal resources, to the financing of the common good. Specifically, Piketty suggests that in democratic societies all human beings have equal rights to education, health and old age security as basic goods (766), even if they may be unequal in other areas of life. (Piketty does not seem preoccupied with the origins of the consensus he claims exists around universal access to education, health and old age security as "basic" goods). Without transparent information concerning unequal incomes and wealth, it is impossible to equitably and efficiently allocate individual resources to common goods and projects. For this reason, inequality—and not only poverty—is a major political concern.

Further, political concerns around inequality are inevitably intertwined with moral, ethical questions. Thus, Piketty begins chapter one with a reference to the deaths of 34 striking workers at the Marikana platinum mine in South Africa in August 2012 (71-75, see also 939). He does so as a dramatic reminder of the real violence (74), as well as symbolic violence, that accompanies political and social conflict over economic inequality. At stake in such struggles, he argues, are vital questions about "what is just and what is not" (74). In particular, he claims, poverty like that among the miners is particularly morally and politically intolerable when those who appropriate profits from production do not work, which is the case of the mine owners. This is another reason that inequality and not only poverty must be centred in social scientific work: because it is a

major social and political issue, even a matter of life and death struggle. In his view, the question of inequalities originating in wealth generated from inherited property and from poverty despite work is of particular ethical concern.

Fourth and relatedly, *Piketty emphasizes that inequality is a political, not "technical," matter, requiring wide-ranging public debate beyond specialized circles of experts*. He argues that the careful conceptualization of key terms around inequality and related economic concerns is critical to public debates; as is the systematic assembly and study of relevant data (18). But Piketty insists that if such scholarly contributions inform wide-ranging political discussions about inequality and redistribution among the broader public, they can never substitute for them. Indeed, he writes that inequality "interests everyone" and "so much the better". In an instance of what many will argue is wishful thinking, not least given the current reign of the "troika" in Greece, he argues: "Happily, democracy will never be replaced by the republic of experts" (17). In this book, his largely successful effort to write in an accessible way, for a broader audience likewise expresses this commitment to enlarging the public debate around inequality beyond circles of certified, professional "experts", including himself.[5]

Fifth and again relatedly, *Piketty rejects an economistic monopoly around questions of inequality and political economy more generally, instead calling for contributions to these debates by all the social sciences, humanities, and the arts*.[6] He insists that "other social scientific researchers must not leave the study of economic facts to economists" (947), especially given that hegemonic American economics is still dominated by an "infantile passion for mathematics" (63). He suggests that economics is, at best, a "sub-

[5] This commitment to public debates around economic inequalities is consistent with Piketty's earlier works and his role as a 'public intellectual' in France. Typically, for instance, one year before the 2012 French Presidential elections, he co-authored a slim, accessible book (Landais, Piketty and Saez 2011) calling for a 'fiscal' revolution. The book was launched simultaneously with an accessible website allowing users to simulate the effect of different tax policies on the French economy (www.revolution-fiscale.fr). The authors insist that, "The main objective of this new tool is to permit citizens to take ownership of the fiscal question and to thus contribute to the emergence of a broad public debate" (Landais, Piketty and Saez 2011:10). Likewise, Pieketty's efforts to encourage debates around economics among broader non-specialist publics include a regular column in the left-leaning daily *Libération* and a blog with the left of centre daily *Le Monde*as well as frequent interventions in print, radio and television. As of August 2015, *Le Monde* had published over 590 articles referencing Thomas Piketty in some way. (Incidentally, 335 of these are from before September 2012, a year before he published *Capital in the XXI Century*, suggestive of his public stature in France even prior to his latest book).

[6] As a recent article by Fourcade, Ollion and Algan (2015) describes, the top-ranked American economics journals are particularly insular, at least when compared with sociology. Extra-disciplinary citations since the end of World War II are stable at about 19-25%, so that the vast majority of citations are to other economists. In the case of extra-disciplinary citations, these refer to finance, statistics, business, political science, mathematics, sociology and law (102). Piketty's explicit appreciation for other disciplinary insights into economic inequality, especially the role of the humanities, stands in striking contrast to such routine disciplinary insularity in the American context.

discipline" (945) in political economy, alongside "history, sociology, anthropology, political science and so many others." In addition, he maintains that the humanities offer important insights. In particular, literature is an entry into understanding the "concrete and embodied" experiences (17) of historically changing and nationally specific inequalities. Novels, for instance, may be uniquely helpful in describing the ways that economic relations of inequality have "implacable consequences" in men and women's lives, "their marriage strategies, their hopes and their unhappiness" (17). Epistemologically committing to this stance, his book frequently uses examples from literature, notably Balzac and Austen (e.g. 377-383, 653-662). These authors are mobilized to illustrate the concrete, personal dilemmas created in societies where inherited wealth dominates over "merited" wealth from salaries, in ways that are at the same time highly structured by gendered laws of inheritance. The "economy" is thus imagined as necessarily subject to analysis from all disciplines. Each has critical insights into economic life as a concrete, embodied experience against those who understand "the economy" as an abstract, reified sphere separate from formal political and social life.

Sixth, *Piketty offers political solutions to the problem of inequality on a national, European, and worldwide basis*. He suggests that developing solutions to inequality requires, first and foremost, greater transparency about income both from work and inherited wealth. Pragmatically, he argues that such transparency may be facilitated, for instance, by laws requiring the automatic transmission of domestic and foreign bank account information, as an initial step towards what he acknowledges is currently a "utopian" project of a global tax on capital (836-852). Such transparency is necessary so that a whole range of democratic participatory measures, not limited to the contrasting mechanisms of the market and the vote (938), may be mobilized and invented. These new democratic forms must allow for everyday citizens to become informed and, especially, to "intervene" in economic decision-making. This transparency, he argues, is the ground zero for democratic decision-making in economic life, which includes the workplace and not merely the formal political realm, as he makes clear when he evokes the murders of South African striking miners (939).

Finally, *it is worth noting Piketty's sometimes simmering, sometimes overflowing expressions of moral outrage at many contemporary economic inequalities. This is not a "stylistic" matter but consistent with his affirmation that economic questions are profoundly political and moral questions*. His discussion of "Vautrin's discourse" (377-380), named after a mercenary, murderous character in Balzac, is a good example. He summarizes this character's lucid, if morally repugnant arguments. The aim is to illustrate the impossibility of rewards from work equalling inherited wealth, even in the luckiest of circumstances, in 19th century France. At the same time, Vautrin is offered up as a straightforward parable concerning the moral depravity encouraged by unequal societies. As Piketty recounts, Vautrin explains to his friend that, "social success through study,

merit and work is an illusion" (378). Even in a brilliant law career will offer only a "mediocre" salary compared to the possibilities offered through inherited wealth. Given this state of affairs, he advises his "friend" to marry a young woman for money but also to murder her brother, who would otherwise be the heir, in order to secure his future fiancée's inheritance. With the clear intent of offering a moral for the present, Piketty concludes the tale with the following question: if economic inequalities in any society are achieved unjustly and immorally, through inheritance rather than work, why not allow *any* immoral pathways to wealth, up to and including murder? (380-381).

Elsewhere, he refers to wealth as the result ("sometimes") of "theft" (713), a theft whose initial injustice is subsequently compounded by the "automatic" economic gains accruing to large fortunes in the absence of appropriate taxation. He also mentions, in passing, Tolstoy's 1926 description of "the capitalist horror" (713), even if he insists at other moments that he is interested in denouncing neither economic inequalities nor capitalism per se but only unjust inequalities and unjust aspects of capitalism (62). Positivists will argue that expressions of outrage negatively affect his "objectivity" as an economic scientist. But post-positivists will understand that this ethical outrage and political commitment vitally informs the ambition, energy and scope of the political economy at the heart of this book.

In short, Piketty's arguments are important, even salutary, at least for the contemporary moment within capitalism if not for all time. He challenges many current, hegemonic economic claims and methodologies. Specifically, against those, like the World Bank, who strive for a "world without poverty" (World Bank 2016), he insists on reviving the debate around inequality and questions of redistribution. (Of course, at the same time, his book participates in and reflects the success of broader struggles, like the Occupy movement, that have sought to put inequality on the political agenda by critiquing the power of "the 1%" vs. "the 99%" (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012)). He insists on the importance of the systematic study of carefully assembled empirical data to informed discussions but he argues against those who would pretend that data analysis alone can resolve economic questions. Instead, he urges broad, public debate around economic concerns, concerns that are at once political and moral—about what is just and what is not. He rejects those who would claim that economic problems are "technical" problems requiring technical fixes by a small group of experts, claims often made explicitly or implicitly by officials at central banks and institutions like the International Monetary Fund.[7] Rather, economic question raise major political and ethical questions of concern to all in democratic societies. At the same time, he challenges pseudo-scientific claims to objectivity, reminding scholars of the socially constructed nature of all data. In particular, he is forthrightly opposed to the statistical fetishization of economic data so

[7] For one description, written for a general audience, of the ways economics is presented as a "technical" concern properly the reserve of professional economics, see Coburn 2016.

prominent in American economic journals and in publications by institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Statistical truths are inevitably partial truths; and they are only one kind of truth. Hence, he argues that all disciplines in the social sciences, humanities and arts must be mobilized to address "economic" matters. Finally, he makes all this arguments from an unusual standpoint: as a white, male economist who is a celebrated scholar in both the United States and in France. [8] Although Piketty is not responsible for the ways that his position reflects gendered, racialized and even broader political-economic power (e.g., France as a former empire and the USA as the declining hegemon), it is likely that this partly explains why he is taken seriously within broader publics and the mass media despite his "heterodox" views.

Critiques and Caveats

Yet, despite Piketty's contributions to challenging some damaging, mainstream economic claims, he can be criticized on multiple grounds. Here are just three:

First, the title of his book inevitably leads to disappointed expectations, especially from those working from historical materialist traditions. If he had called his book, *Economic inequalities: Wealth from work and inheritance over the last 100 years* it would be easier to overlook the ways that his much more modest enterprise compares unfavourably to Marx's revolutionary three-volume *Capital,* which develops a theoretical framework for understanding capitalism, contributing vital concepts like mode of production, use vs. exchange value and drawing out the complexity of exploitative class relationships, as well as providing extraordinary detail about everyday suffering in working class life in 19th century England (about which more below). It is ironic, too, that Piketty suggests that Marx's failing is that he was *overly* theoretical and insufficiently committed to developing and systematically studying the empirical data, which did not support his arguments (p.x). From a historical materialist perspective, it is Piketty who is problematic—but for the opposite reason, appearing to fall into undertheorized empiricism. Much of the time, the book reads as one description after another of historical transformations and cross-national variations in economic inequality without any underlying causal model to explain these. These transformations "just happen". In

[8] At an unusually young age, Piketty was accepted into the highly selective Ecole Normale Supérieure for his post-secondary studies. By his thirties, he was decorated as France's most promising young economist in a national award and he had been appointed to director the Ecole d'économie de Paris, meant to rival the London School of Economics, as well as being an award-winning Director of Research at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France's foremost school of social science. Last year he was to be honoured with a knighthood, an "honour" which he refused, unsurprisingly since it was offered by the Socialist Hollande government, which has consistently shut out the politically-active Piketty from economic policy-making. As Professor Mara Fridell observed to me, however, it is perhaps not unusual to see a white man with such a trajectory forcefully reject the injustice of inheritance and place an emphasis on 'merit'!

the absence of any explicit explanatory framework, Piketty's undertheorized account furthermore tends to deny the political agency that he implies is so important around economic inequalities (and, to use a concept that he does not, around capitalist relationships of exploitation).

To give a concrete example: we read, in sometimes important detail, about the individual lives of the very wealthy. There are, for instance, the descriptions—not untinged with moral disgust—of billionaire Lakshmi Mittal's grotesquely luxurious multiple residences in London, the United Kingdom (p.x). But alongside such descriptions there is very little to suggest the political power of the wealthy (who are not described as capitalists, but in strictly statistical terms as, for instance, "the 1%") as a class or group. Conversely, there is very occasionally a clear statement that working class mobilization matters to economic inequality. Hence, in a rare instance, Piketty refers to "the central role played by movements for the minimum wage in explaining the evolution of wage inequalities in France since 1950" (488). But such recognition of political agency is the exception rather than the rule. The unfortunate use of language about iron "laws" rather than economic tendencies within capitalism (e.g., p. x), likewise arguably obscures the role of both an active, self-interested capitalist class and of working and subaltern movements seeking to defend their interests. In short: the deliberate, political struggles of both classes are nearly entirely absent from Piketty's account, although these have been critical to changes to the welfare state and subsequently to economic inequality in different historical periods and across different national contexts. No alternative explanation, much less explicit theorization of capitalism as an economic "system", is offered to explain the historical and cross-national variations in economic inequality that he describes in such empirical detail. If Marx offered a whole new way of understanding capitalism, against hegemonic economistic accounts by Ricardo (1996) and Smith (2000), Piketty's description of economic inequalities—while a valuable empirical account—is undertheorized and its usefulness ultimately limited as political economy for that reason.

Second, if we are to take Piketty's title seriously and compare with Marx's monumental work, another striking aspect of the former's is his "thin" conception of capital as property and accumulated wealth. This contrasts unfavourably with Marx's thick understanding of capital *as a social relationship of exploitation*. To offer a literary analogy: if Piketty spends time with Austen and the marriage market of middle class women, Marx's *Capital* makes us understand the human suffering in Dickensian detail. Piketty is worried about money; Marx is concerned to show capital as a social relationship. In *Capital*, therefore, we are told, in vivid and often heartrenching detail, about the everyday labour of seven to thirteen year old children, working as much as sixteen hour days in the pottery industry. We hear about grotesquely inadequate daily and hourly wages, but at the same time about the social relationships of capital as manifest in everyday labour: a father recounting how he "knelt down to feed (his seven-year old son) as he stood by the machine, for he could not leave it or stop" (Marx

1906:272). Put another way: from Piketty, we hear quite a lot about money, especially the ways that advantageous marriages to a rich heir promises the quickest route to a life of economic ease. But we hear much less about the social realities of historical and contemporary capitalism in everyday working class lives. A near-total absence of a consideration of race, gender, age, as well as the idea of class, likewise reflects this weak understanding of capital as money rather than as an exploitative social relationship. Despite a recognition of the role played by slavery in the American economy (250-258), for instance, even the mention of the deaths of the Black miners in South Africa is silent on the ways that racist legacies of apartheid make Black working class lives, in particular, without worth beyond their instrumental value as cheap labour. Nor does Piketty consider the ways that gender matters to capitalism, so that there is a virtually total absence of consideration of the role of women's unpaid socially reproductive labour to the capitalist mode of production. The consequence is that Piketty sometimes reads as if economic inequality was "just" an argument about money while Marx reminds us that such economic inequalities are an outcome of a capitalist mode of production that shapes social existence for all classes, classes made up of social beings who are routinely racialized, gendered and sexualized.

Third, from a strictly ethical perspective, even non-Marxists might ask about the limits of taking seriously the liberal premise that economic inequalities that arise from "unearned" wealth are particularly morally reprehensible. Instead, it might be argued that gross economic inequalities, whatever their origins— "merited" or not—are problematic if we believe that all human beings are equal. Put another way: even if every wealthy person were a genius fully using their unique talents and every poor person both objectively limited in talent and objectively lazy, we might object to the former living in great luxury while the latter live in more or less significant "merited" discomfort. Piketty suggests that main ethical question is the liberal problem of meritocracy, but it might be argued that this is not, ultimately, very interesting as a moral focus. Rather, if we take human equality seriously, then the real question is how to politically transform existing social relationships towards a rough economic equality across all human beings. In short, the problem with capitalism is not that it is not meritocratic, but that it is so systematically unequal and exploitative.

Final Thoughts

Many other critiques and caveats are possible. For instance, Piketty calls on the use of all the social sciences in the study of economic inequalities, but his own work ignores almost all these contributions, whether by feminist sociologists (eg., Acker 2006), analytical philosophers (eg., Cohen 2000), social geographers (eg., Harvey 2005:15-19), or others. There is, further, an unacknowledged tension between his hints at an expanded space for democratic action, including in the workplace (938), and his tendency in much

of the text to follow liberals in separating out economics and the formal political sphere.

Nonetheless, he makes some important contributions. In the contemporary historical moment, the most important of these, perhaps surprisingly, are epistemological: his rejection of naïve positivism, statistical fetishism, and economistic monopolies for understanding economic inequalities, alongside his embrace of insights from the arts, humanities, and the social sciences. Finally, his suggestion that a whole range of democratic interventions are welcome in the economy, beyond the market and the vote (938) — while remaining undeveloped — arguably points towards a politics of transformation that is necessary within a world capitalist system where economic inequality and exploitation are both ordinary and, as Piketty underlines, morally untenable.

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OUR DEAD LABOUR AND ITS RENTIERS

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First, let it be noted that in a well-worn tradition of the liberal academy, *Capital in the twenty-first century* tosses around some pro-forma dismissals of Marx in its Introduction and Conclusion. Thomas Piketty has insisted repeatedly to the liberal media that he is not a Marxist. We hope the furry bellies of the target audience are suitably stroked.

Yet Piketty is clearly, emphatically gesturing in *Capital in the twenty-first century* to Marx. Is he pretending to erase and supplant the community of Marxist scholarship? Is this book a cuckoo's egg?

Piketty's voluminous, complex, collaborative analysis is not always consistent. There are surely moments when Piketty takes a posited "law" too seriously, distorting his analysis. Why does he presume to pose laws? Why the quirky redefinition of capital? If you try to apprehend capitalist relations without reference to the labour theory of value, aren't you losing sight of exploitation? Isn't Piketty's advocacy on behalf of regionally-administered capital taxation tantamount to advocating technocracy against open, reciprocated class conflict, against the insurgency and revolution that is required to further human development? This review addresses these critical questions in the course of mapping four points of resonance between Piketty and Marxist scholarship.

Deriving Dead Labour via Transhistorical Abstraction

Piketty uses historical and international data primarily to take aim at the profession of economics' ideological and empirically-weak dismissal of economic inequality. Where these economic authorities have repeatedly attempted to give us comforting economic-convergence "laws" based on 20-30 years of optimal income data, Piketty and his coworkers distill contrasting "laws" based on 150 years of data across

countries and across both income and wealth. These boil down to two interrelated conclusions:

First, under particular, *quite capitalist* conditions, a patrimonial middle class can develop. But fifty percent of the population of any nation-state will never have a share of the accumulating wealth (260-62; 346-47).[1] So in the capitalist system, instead of developing our human capacities, half of us or more will be exposed without buffering to deforming and stunting exploitation, marginalization, enthrallment, and man-made disasters.

Second, what you can say about capitalism based on more comprehensive data is that (with limited exceptions) capitalism provides wealth accumulation for the 1% rather than shared prosperity. Capitalist societies are currently returning to antidemocratic patrimonial capitalism. The first conclusion of the Piketty group's studies is that this return is a political achievement (20-21). In *Capital in the 21st Century*, and Piketty underscores this in follow-up interviews, positing laws is mostly a *device* of emphasis and critique, *aimed at the economics profession* and whomever takes their "laws" too seriously (168; Piketty 2014b; Dolcerocca & Terzioglu 2015). Piketty's "laws" do not usually demand naturalization or reification. They demand recognition. They convey the observed tendency of capitalism (187). Methodologically, Piketty's time framework not only shuts down the "best of all possible worlds" view authorized by the conservative economist's short data range,[2] it also corrects the impression that 18th-19th century specialists would have from that era that structure, and not politics, determines inequality.

Piketty's methodology allows us to observe how inequality develops through capitalism's inherent rentier development, strengthening the capitalist class in private-capital countries (169). Some historians dispute Piketty's methodology, his aggregating use of economic history research (Thomson 2014), and therefore the basis of his claim that capitalism produces high inequality. This constitutes a disciplinary rejection of the transhistorical abstraction methodology, which not only underlies Piketty's redefinition of capital and derivation of capital's "laws", but is also foundational to Marx's dialectical understanding (Fracchia 1991). The specification of what a phenomenon, for example capital, has in common across historical and spatial moments is distilled from the aggregated macro-historical analysis, so that an historical permutation (e.g. of capital) may be understood in comparative relief against this derived transhistorical abstraction. Marx's transhistorical abstraction methodology is designed to address the "fish describing water" problem, and to restore the capacity to ask non-trivial questions about developing

[1] Piketty (2014) will be referred to by page numbers only.

[2] To claim that capitalism = democracy, for example, Kuznets creamed his sunny curve data, rather parasitically, from the start of the brief low-inequality era built on the back of socialist and labor struggle: 1913- 1948 (Piketty 2014, 13).

or changing relationships in context. Sacrificing these questions to obtain the finest-grained resolution, while a higher-status approach today, poses a perennial trade-off problem (Toulmin and Goodfield 1962).

The Politics of Laws

Like Piketty, Marx also used the "laws" argumentation technique in opposition to conservative political-economy, as where Marx proposed the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and then adumbrated the political countermeasures to the tendency. "Haters" of theory as the examination of the "abstractions of value that rule our lives" have viewed this argumentation technique, along with transhistorical abstraction, as evidence of Marxist "totalization" (Noys 2015, 4). Yet Marx's "Counterpoint to the Tendency" analysis reveals an unharmonious, overdetermined, yet very *political* economy, in which capitalists seek to maximize their control over the accumulated dead labor by, where they can, increasing the intensity of exploitation, depressing wages below the value of labour power, cheapening elements of constant capital, and inducing population increase, globalization, and financialization (Marx [1894] 1967, Ch. 14).[3] For control, "A portion of the old capital… has to give up its characteristic quality as capital, so far as acting as such and producing value is concerned," Marx explains (Marx [1894] 1967, Ch. 14).

"How is this conflict settled and the conditions restored?" (ibid.) The distribution of crisis, Marx says, is "decided through a competitive struggle in which the loss is distributed in very different proportions and forms, depending on special advantages or previously captured position" (ibid.) For Marx, capitalism's structural limitation is neither automatic revolution nor declining profit rate per se, but rather the capacity to secure capital. "Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!" Marx underscores (Marx [1887] 1967, Ch. 24). Piketty takes Marx's conceptualization of capital quite seriously. As Piketty formulates Marx's crisis theory, as C/V approaches ∞, so r → 0, but with the countermeasures, r is sustained—at the cost of democracy (Piketty 2014b, 106-7). Bolstering a declining rate of profit or prioritizing the rate of return on capital requires political power resources: conscious capitalist class social cohesion and capacity for collective action.

Alienation Gestates Exploitation

The Marxist analysis of how capitalists combat capitalism's limits is advanced by Piketty's finding that in capitalism, the rate of return on capital can be high and at odds with growth. Marx notes that capitalists don't think in terms of preserving value

[3] Capital V III, Chapter 14. See also Grossmann 1992; Okishio 1961; Van Parijs 1980.

formation, but in terms of profit maximization. Likewise, as Michal Kalecki (1971) observed, in the capitalist incentive system, in which fungible capital provides capitalists extra degrees of interest-maximizing strategic freedom, profits are subsumed to the ultimate priority of preserving control over capital. The absolute capitalist use value is the reproduction of exploitable labour power, Marx affirms, and of conditions under which this labour power may be exploited (Marx [1887] 1967, Ch. 25). Capital has been constituted in alienating workers from capital, and alienation is the condition of exploitation. The condition of alienation is control, the sort of stultifying grip that results in anti-labour policy in all its forms, and that has been shown to translate into a complete evisceration of democracy (Gilens and Page 2013). But capital can transcend capitalism, the order of the rentiers of labour.

Much of capital has been constituted under competitive conditions. It is motivated by what we recognize as capital proper, invested immediately for wage-labour exploitation and exclusive profit. Yet Piketty's definition of capital is that it is all things people make, except our cognitive and emotional capacities and skills—except human capital. This means that capital includes not just private capital, the *sine qua non* of which is exclusion, but also more inclusive forms of property: public capital, rental property, and even smallholdings like homes. It can have use value to non-capitalists (213). For Piketty, capital "reflects the state of development and prevailing social relations of each society" (47). Capital is *uncertain* power, for example, as in capitalization (49). But de-alienated capital could be public, not private, and "useful to everyone".

Where conservative economics denies exploitation with marginalist theory, Piketty, like Marx and Kalecki, is affirming that capitalism is the compulsion to *alienate* from workers their class' dead labor[4]—assets, resources—as well as, when useful, the human capacities for communication, organization and creativity, so that capitalists can extract rent from their labour. Exploitation is the denied horror—the "worst form" of inequality, "always morally indefensible. You have to deny it rather than defend it," Therborn says (2014, 732). Moreover, alienation, as the Duchess of Sutherland well knew (Marx 1853), constitutes the essential social condition permitting exploitation.

Solidarity, Mobilization, Scholarship

Most of the critiques in the 685 pages of Piketty's *Capital* are leveled at the economics profession, but critique cannot alter the function or tight, hierarchically-enforced content control of that community. *Capital* is here to galvanize everyone else. That is why Piketty is alive to the contributions of the besieged social sciences and humanities communities of scholarship, modeling the incorporation and valuation of their ways of knowing. He believes the accumulation of knowledge desperately requires

[4] "The past devours the future" (Piketty 2014: 942).

Arts scholars' assistance. The neglected scientific problem of triviality can only be addressed through comparative, particularly historical-comparative, method. Even the study of economic facts cannot be left to economists, whose institutionalized scientism requires their neglect. Fundamentally, both economics' scientism and other scholars' dismissal of science work hand in glove, abandoning agenda-setting to more powerful networks (575).

Piketty likewise rejects the market-niche ideology that policy is for liberals only while social movement is the proper object of Leftist concern. "It would be a big mistake if some on the left believed, "'Progressive taxation, that's a technocratic thing. We don't really care. We care about revolution, and capital ownership.'" This is partly because progressive tax reform, like any effort to provide the footing and resources to the working class for it to pursue social and economic rationality, is only possible as the result of "huge mobilization." For example, "the income tax in European countries was accepted by the elite only after World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution as part of a counter-struggle against its influence" (Dolcerocca & Terzioglu 2015). Progressive taxation is but one aspect of producing "a regime based on transparency, on information about income and wealth that is necessary for the workers involvement in management." Also necessary are new forms of governance, "new forms of ownership," and "new forms of sharing power between those who own capital and those who own their labor…The shareholder company is not the end of history" (ibid.).

In *Capital* Vol. 3, Chapter 14, Marx began to tally the ways in which, at the point where capitalist interests dislodge from economic growth, capitalists and their political agents use capital to keep the 99% alienated from capital. Here is where Piketty picked up Marx's agenda. Piketty's comparative, transhistorical research confirms that capitalist incentives inherently drive development toward a belligerent, high-inequality society, congealing rigid castes and the pseudo-speciation of racialization, subjugating women with the traditional protectionist devil's bargain, wiping out developmental democratic institutions and dispositions, and depleting material well-being, as the ecologists and social epidemiologists have documented. Liberalism, whether conservative or genteel, cannot contain capitalists' strategic breadth and compulsion to control. Only revolution and anticolonialism, socialist realism, as Piketty says "a big fight and a big mobilization," and sometimes "violent shocks" (Dolcerocca & Terzioglu 2015) can do that. [5]

Piketty earns the right to call his book *Capital* not through rigorous Marxist scholarship, but due to his propensity to understand social systems as developing, though not necessarily maturing; due to his ability to see the boxes to think outside them; and due to his effort to prioritize solidarity and mobilization. This isn't the heir we were expecting, but he may be an heir we need at the moment.

[5] Disruption is what puts a brake on rentier parasitism (Piketty 2014: 147-158).

Author's Note

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HOW USEFUL IS PICKETTY'S ANALYSIS FOR POLITICAL ACTION?

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Probably no other progressive economist since J.K. Galbraith has received the attention that Thomas Picketty has from his book *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. For example in anticipation of a symposium in Vancouver, *Business Vancouver* ran a piece with the title "Picketty Mania: Just Don't Throw Your Underwear" (June 23, 2014). He became an economics superstar who created a surge in academic attention to inequality, something usually confined to the research of a small number of under-appreciated, left-wing economists.

Picketty's work is certainly important and I want to stress the ways that it is, but I also want to question the significance of his analysis for political action. This will be examined by looking at the major issues currently confronting global economies and where Picketty stands on these issues. Also examined will be just how significant his approach is to political activism. My main point will be to show that Picketty gives little attention to political activism as a significant force for reducing inequality within capitalism, something that stems from his neglect of its significance in the changing shape of capitalism at crucial points in history.

Importance of Picketty's Work

Picketty's research puts the distribution of wealth and inequality in Europe and North America at the centre of economic analysis of capitalism. This involved a massive amount of research into the distribution of both income and wealth over a long period of time, information that has not been available previously. In doing this he examines three things: inequality from income, inequality in capital ownership, and the interaction between labour and capital inequality.

Picketty calls himself a political economist and stresses the deeply political nature of economics, mainly to show that there is no economic determinism regarding inequality. He says this because he recognizes the ability of states to reduce inequality, if they want to, and clearly at times the state has been active in redistribution. But since the 1970s this has changed, specifically because of public policy related to privatization and changes in tax regimes. Almost all wealth is now private with public wealth at about zero. His main "theoretical" point is that a country that saves a lot and grows slowly will over a long time accumulate a huge capital stock (relative to income) that will affect the social structure and distribution of wealth. North America is characterized as consisting of "hypermeritocratic" societies where the initial accumulation occurs through enormous labour inequality (this is corporate managers who have had their "hand in the till"). Europe's wealth structure is typified as consisting largely of "hyperpatrimonial" societies where inheritance is the main driver of wealth accumulation. Both types of accumulation lead to an inegalitarian spiral.

In the earlier parts of the 20th century this inequality was reduced by actions associated with historical events, according to Picketty -- the two great wars and the great depression of the 1930s. So, he sees progressive taxation as being more a product of two world wars than it was of democracy. The disastrous fiscal situations in these cases meant that even those on the political right supported progressive taxes and high marginal tax rates. But also, these three emergency conditions led to government actions of nationalization, rent control, indexed minimum wages, and highly progressive taxes (sometimes confiscatory) on income and inheritance.

Solutions

Picketty's solutions to inequality fit squarely into a traditionally liberal economic framework. He believes that education and access to technology is a great leveler and the best way to improve labour productivity is to invest in education. Interestingly, he does not see improvements in social mobility through education occurring in the long run. He is also a strong supporter of free trade ("free trade and economic openness are ultimately in everyone's interest") and globalization. Real gains accrue from both, primarily through economic growth. Picketty sees economic growth as crucial to the reduction of inequality, although the low growth regimes in developed countries anticipated for the future, coupled with no political appetite for egalitarian change, means reductions in inequality are unlikely to occur.

For Picketty, the most important policy tool to reduce inequalities would be a global capital tax, a tax not simply on real estate but on all capital. Because of the huge increases in top managers' remuneration (which they more or less set themselves), Picketty favours a confiscatory marginal tax rate for the very top wealth owners. The

point of this is not revenue-generating (past the initial stage of the tax), but to change behaviour. He recognizes that only the huge reductions in marginal tax rates have made enormous corporate remuneration packages worthwhile. But altogether Picketty is very pessimistic about the possibility of a tax like this occurring. He asserts it cannot be done by individual nations, and sees little likelihood of international cooperation on high marginal tax rates.

Neglected Issues

Both the analysis of the rise of inequality and the possibilities for change neglect a very significant aspect of public policy and change. That is the actions of groups and people and the policy issues that affect their activities. Picketty does not, for example, give much weight to how capitalism in rich countries was influenced in the periods from 1920 – 1970 by the actions of people. Picketty is an excellent economic historian and his long-run data are convincing. But he is not really a historian of social or democratic change. While he occasionally gives a nod to trade unions and other activists, the overall treatment of their contributions is weak. It did matter that people fought for minimum wages, unemployment insurance, public health institutions, education, employment standards, and a whole host of social protections. These not only kept people out of poverty, but were also significant for economic stability within capitalism. Neither the state nor corporations were natural allies in these struggles, even though the system in general benefited. The struggles were real, and they were productive.

Also not examined by Picketty are the deliberate low-wage policies by developed nations that coincided with their globalization initiatives. This has accelerated in the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. Austerity policies by governments routinely undermine the social and economic gains people had made. The massive increases in available labour through globalization have been the primary motivation for the wage declines. Capital's continual impoverishment of work in poor countries means that increasing quantities of low-wage workers now more easily cross national boundaries without citizenship rights. This is the over-arching context for the downward pressure on social supports and wages, but even more direct actions occur as governments adopt balanced budget policies and undermine labour protections.

Altogether, the solutions section in *Capital* is not the most important part of the book. The call for progressive taxes can give some support to those groups who recognize the disastrous nature of "austerity" policies, but ultimately Picketty gives very little credence to activism toward changes in the future. The story of inequality relates to the top and the rest. Picketty has given attention to the top, but it's "the rest" that also needs analysis. The top now flourishes because governments relinquished control over capital

and have been captured by capital. The bottom stagnates because governments consciously do the bidding of capital to control wages.

Picketty does not show that inequality is intrinsically bad for capitalism. That is, it does not negatively affect the working of the system itself and he does not put the primary blame on inequality for increased economic volatility. His main arguments are that inequality is bad because it is unfair and undemocratic. This is true, but the ultimate message – that inequality can continue without disrupting capitalism (unless people revolt), coupled with his lack of optimism about policy to control the inegalitarian spiral, means that this is ultimately a book with analysis, but with few pragmatic ideas. This means that there is still lots to do. Picketty has given great ammunition for doing something about a growing problem for society but these are arguments that will have absolutely no impact on the class that benefits from inequality and that is important, because they are the ones who have the collective ears of governments. My sense is that the analysis now needed relates to the harm inequality does to economic performance as well.

THE RULE OF VALUE AND THE COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE: A RESPONSE TO PETER HUDIS' MARX'S CONCEPT OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM

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This new study by Peter Hudis is based on a thorough and compelling reading of nearly all of Marx's work. It centres on a theme that many have seen as a distinct one subordinate to economic analysis, history, class struggle, politics, etc. The singular merit of Hudis's argument is that it shows that Marx was primarily a thinker of time, and thus of historical transition, so that the theory of post-capitalist society goes to the very heart of Marx's work as a thinking of capitalism as a transitory social form. Moreover, Hudis' analysis shows the deep coherence of Marx's analyses of proposed alternatives and that Marx's own view is rooted his account of the fundamental structure of capital as the production of value. The text proceeds chronologically with four chapters—the young Marx, the drafts of *Capital* (including *Grundrisse*), *Capital*, and the late writings—bracketed by an introduction and conclusion. The chronology shows the emergence of Marx's mature theory of value as expressed in the first volume of *Capital*, its use for evaluating proposals for post-capitalist socio-economic structure, and its relevance for assessing the record of Marxism in enacting that alternative. It is an excellent interpretation of Marx, both philosophically and politically, and deserves to be widely read.

Hudis reconstructs the argument of the first chapters of *Capital, Vol. 1* through the distinction between exchange-value and value, showing that Marx's previous work did not make this distinction. Beginning from the commodity, Marx shows that the comparability of commodity prices depends upon a common quality that constitutes their measure. This measure is in labour, but not labour in its concrete use. It is labour solely in its abstract form—the undifferentiated labour time of any human individual whatsoever. Commodities are exchanged as equals if the abstract labour expended on them is equal. However, this is not the actual labour expended, not even as measured by time, since that would make products produced by less efficient labour more expensive.

Abstract labour is abstract not only in the senses that it is labour of any sort whatever expended by any person whatever, but also in the sense that it is the labour that is socially necessary to produce the product at a given socio-historical juncture. Equivalence of socially-necessary labour determines equivalence of value embodied in commodities. Hudis calls this the "substance" of value (Hudis 2012, 150)[1] which, as we will see later, contains somewhat of an equivocation between the quantity and form of value.

The logical movement in Marx's argument from the exchange of commodities, to labour, to abstract labour, Hudis describes as a movement from quantity to quality and from (necessary) appearance to essence (154). The necessity of the appearance of value through commodities accounts for the fetishism of commodities whereby the social relations of the producers appear to be relations between products (155-6). Seeing through appearance, or, more exactly, seeing that appearance is the necessary appearance of an essence, requires the standpoint of different social relations. Thus Marx discusses pre- and post-capitalist social relations of production to clarify the nature of capitalist production relations. So, a major component of Hudis' argument is that "the alternative to capitalism" is not a sub-theme in understanding Marx but the central theme through which the necessary fetishist form of capitalist relations can be seen as such. It is a compelling argument, a species of the enlightenment argument that one must stand outside a certain form—in this case, capitalist social relations—for the essence of that form to be determinable. Since the essence of the capitalist form is the determination of exchange of commodities by the socially-necessary labour time that generates value, the essence of pre- and post-capitalist social forms is that they are not structured by value (6-8, 17, 154, 191). Alternatively stated, in non-capitalist social forms there is labour but not abstract labour.

Before considering the analysis of alternatives to capitalism that this starting point generates, let us consider some of the issues inherent in this concept of value. In my view, this is a correct understanding of the logic of the early chapters of *Capital, Vol. 1* that usefully shows it as a completion of Marx's prior trajectory and the basis for other remarks in the *Grundrisse* and later, more politically oriented analyses. So, I do not want to argue with Hudis' interpretation of Marx, since I believe his work to be of the highest scholarly level, except with respect to the concept of value itself. There are three issues here that deserve further probing with respect to the reduction of value to abstract labour and the concepts of simple labour and socially-necessary labour time.

First, let us note that value *never* appears as such. Even if we set aside local fluctuations in prices due to extrinsic factors, the price of a commodity never, in principle, corresponds to its value. Abstract labour is the source of value, and as Hudis

[1] Further references to this book are given as page numbers in parentheses within the text without additional data.

comments on this crucial element of Marx's logic (150) of the "substance" of value, equal amounts of abstract labour *in principle* produce commodities of equal value, so that considering the system as a whole "the sum of all prices is equal to the sum of all values" (138), even though individual prices of commodities always diverge from their values. While Hudis recognizes that prices never correspond to values, he attributes this solely to the fact that "abstract labour is measured by a social average that is constantly fluctuating and changing, especially because of technological innovation" (138)—which is the difference between socially-necessary labour time and actual labour time in a given instance. Hudis' argument attempts to make the divergence between price and value a matter of this difference only, whereas, as we will see, Marx himself understood it to be an essential feature of the appearance-essence relation under capitalism.

While abstract labour is the sole determinant of value, according to Marx, value in the actual capitalist economy is shared between wages, capital, and landed property—known as the "trinity formula." As Marx put it in *Capital, Vol 3*, "In capital—profit, or still better capital—interest, land—rent, labour—wages, in this economic trinity represented as the connection between the component parts of value and wealth in general and its sources, we have the complete mystification of the capitalist mode of production ... ." (Marx 1971, 830). Since the actual value produced by a specific quantity of abstract labour is divided between capital, wages, and landed property, the value of the commodity does not correspond directly with the abstract labour that produces it. This is known historically as the "transformation problem" whereby many Marxist economists attempted unsuccessfully to find a way of rigorously relating price to value.[2] This failure has led many interpreters of Marx, especially those for whom explanation of the actual workings of capitalist economy was the fundamental concern, to abandon the concept of value. But it can be seen that the "transformation" of value into price is a problem that *in principle* cannot be resolved.

For the sum of values to be equal to the sum of prices, there would have to be a common measure of price and value in which this could be expressed. But this is exactly the problem: there is no common measure of the appearance of capitalist society and its essence. The difference between the trinity formula and the productivity of labour cannot be reduced to the difference between socially-necessary labour and actual labour. Two identical commodities, produced under identical conditions and quantities of abstract labour, will not have the same price unless the percentage division into capital, wages, and landed property is also identical. Since this could only be the case under contingent conditions, there is *no way to rigorously relate the quantity of abstract labour to commodity prices*. In other words, the "in principle" never holds. This essential disparity is due to the difference between the *appearance* of productivity in capitalist society in the

[2] For an overview of the transformation problem, see Sweezy (1970) chapter VII.

trinity formula and the essence of that productivity in abstract labour. To attribute this disparity to the difference between socially-necessary labour and actual labour is to assume precisely the absent common measure of price and value. The consequence of this is that any correspondence between value and price could not be between individual values and prices, or between the sum of values and the sum of prices, but has to be in the relation between the sphere of price and the sphere of value—that is to say, in a concrete explication of the appearance-essence relation. Thus, since value never appears within the categories of capitalist society; its validity can only be in the relation between the sphere of prices as a whole and the *source* of that sphere in the productivity of labour. Therefore, even though value never appears within the sphere of prices as such, it could be a valid and necessary concept if it could be shown that the *sphere of prices as a whole* could only be understood through reference to value.

The second issue concerning value pertains to the measure of commodities by the abstract labour-time embodied in them. Such a relative measure presumes that a reduction can be made between skilled labour-power and simple labour-power—for, if no such reduction could be made, the concrete difference between labours would prevent an abstract standard rendering them comparable. No doubt it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure quantitatively the difference between any two concrete labours in terms of a multiple of simple labours. Again, there might be a motive here for abandoning the postulate of reduction to simple labour which would be a second reason for abandoning the concept of value. However, the theoretical postulate that skilled labour contains an exponential value of simple labour might made credible by the fact that the capitalist system is a system, that similar commodities are equalized in price, such that the system itself presupposes such an exponential relation—even if its exact proportion cannot be determined in any given case.

The third issue regarding value is that socially-necessary labour-time is a measure that necessarily includes within itself a relation of the individual labour-time of abstract labour to the system of labour as a whole. For any temporal unit of abstract labour to be socially-necessary, it must be a certain determinate fraction of the whole labour-time expended on a given product. It may be impossible to actually measure this fraction, but it must be possible to say that the labour-time expended in making 1000 staples, for example, is higher in one productive unit than another. This can be indirectly measured: if we assume that the capital invested, the machinery utilized, landed property rented, and extraneous factors such as transportation are held constant, then the difference between the production prices of two enterprises making staples will be due to the percentage of socially-necessary labour they require. An enterprise making staples utilizing more than the socially-necessary labour will experience a pressure to lower that amount, whereas an enterprise using less will reap greater profit. So there is in the percentage of socially-necessary labour a capitalist mechanism tending to move capital toward enterprises with a lower percentage of socially-necessary labour—thus, a tendency to lower the amount of

socially-necessary labour. While socially-necessary labour may be impossible to measure as such, especially due to its dependence on social and historical factors,[3] nevertheless it is arguably an abstraction necessary to explain the tendency to reduce socially-necessary labour-time under capitalism. This tendency is rooted in the comparability that the concept expresses between the individual abstract labour-time in a given enterprise and the average labour-time across the whole system (with regard to a given product).

What do these conceptual issues regarding value mean for the relation between value and price? Recall: value never appears within the sphere of prices; the reduction to simple labour is a postulate whose proportion can never be determined; and socially-necessary labour-time represents a postulate concerning the relation between a given labour (part) and the system of labour (whole). The first conclusion seems to be that value and price can only be related as two systems and not as individual prices and values. Second, the concepts of reduction to simple labour and socially-necessary labour-time both postulate a proportionality between the individual production and the social production of a given product and, finally, of the whole production system.[4] If we reject the alternatives of abandoning one or all of these concepts, we are forced to recognize that the concept of value is an underlying concept of essence that could explain the *sphere of prices* (though no individual price) as a proportional relation between every specific, concrete labour and the whole system of production. We may say that this is exactly what makes capitalist production a system—that every part is related to the whole and the whole is expressed in each part.

The part-whole relation incorporated into this social proportionality of the social labour process in relation to individual labours is enabled precisely by the structure of capital as value-production. Capitalism is a system *precisely* because it incorporates into itself a measure that brings all individual labours in relation to the system of labours as such. This is the ground for the concept of abstract labour and of value itself. Labour thus has a dual function in capitalism, as Moishe Postone has clearly outlined, so that while "labor may seem to be purposive action that transforms matter in order to satisfy human

[3] Marx argues that there is a "historical and moral element" in the determination of the value of labour-power unlike in the case of other commodities, where the value of labour-power is the "number and extent of his so-called necessary requirements" which "depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilization attained by a country." But if the values of other commodities are determined by socially-necessary abstract labour, then the value of reproducing labour-power will indirectly determine the values of other commodities. So, this difference must be one between direct and indirect determination by a historical and moral element and not a case of determination versus indifference (Marx 1977, 275).

[4] Thus, Deleuze is correct to see abstract labour as a "system of ideal multiple connections ... [which] is then incarnated in the concrete differentiated labours ... [through] the simultaneity of all the relations and terms which, each time and in each case, constitute the present" (Deleuze 1994, 186). However, Deleuze fails to see that Marx first shows the constitution of this abstract multiplicity to be required by the capitalist economy in order to then show why it always fails as such. It is not a theory of capital but its critique.

needs," its real significance "in terms of the process of creating value… is its role as the source of value" (Postone 1993, 281).[5] Post-capitalist society, we may then conclude with Hudis, would contain no abstract labour and therefore no socially-necessary labour-time and also no value. What, then, would measure or regulate the relation between individual production and the system of production? There seems to be no such measure inscribed into the post-capitalist system.[6] This is where my concerns with Hudis' representation of Marx turn toward a doubt about the communist alternative that he presents.

As Hudis argues, the coherence of Marx's proposals for an alternative to capitalism is that they abolish the system of value through which surplus value is appropriated by the capitalist class. The issue that remains is to elaborate the part-whole relation implied by the abolition of the system of value. Hudis argues that neither state appropriation of the role of capitalist (165-8), nor socialist schemes that confuse actual labour-time with abstract labour-time (158-9), can abolish capitalism. He argues that Marx's proposals are consistent in that they focus on the elimination of wage-labour, which means the elimination of abstract labour and value, but do not necessarily imply the elimination of local, subsidiary markets(192)—only a generalized, or universal, market, since that is based on wage labour. He argues that Marx's proposals are consistent in that they focus on the elimination of wage-labour, which means the elimination of abstract labour and value, but do not necessarily imply the elimination of local, subsidiary markets (192) but only a generalized, or universal, market since that is based on wage labour. Nor does it imply an elimination of the determination of wages by actual labour time (194) -- which is not an average, nor based upon output, but "the natural measure of labour" (195). Post-capitalist society is thus marked by a system of labour oriented to the actual, concrete labour process in which subsistence is measured by actual time worked rather than the productivity of that time, so that there is no external standard imposed upon concrete labour which is "a varying and contingent standard" (196). In practice, Hudis supports cooperatives based on the free association of workers (179-82). While cooperatives in a capitalist economy may be forced to "become their own capitalist [since] ... the system of value-production informs or governs their decisions as to what to

[5] On this dual function, see Hudis (150). Despite his agreement on this point, Hudis regards Postone's theory as leading ultimately to regarding capital as the objectified agency under capitalism and undermining the subjective aspect of revolutionary action (16-21).

[6] I think that this is the problem to which George Henderson points in *Value in Marx: the persistence of value in a more-than-capitalist world* (47-55, 65-71). While Henderson suggests that this is why Marx saw post-capitalist society as the realization of value, it seems to me, and Hudis, clear enough that value is characteristic only of capitalist society for Marx. The valid point in Henderson's mis-characterization, however, is that a post-capitalist society would have to reckon in some form the relation between individual product and social production. See my 2014 review of Henderson in *Socialist Studies/Études socialistes* 10, No. 1.

produce, how fast to produce, and in what form to produce" (180), a post-capitalist society would remove this external standard so that the social relations of workers would become transparent to themselves (159) and, thereby, there would also be a transparent relation between labour and its products (210). But if the products of one cooperative are to be exchanged, bartered, or passed on to another, some method of reckoning of the labour of one cooperative with another is implied—even if it only be through the products themselves.

Again, I have no argument with this political project as such. I rather have a doubt about its conception, a doubt that will take us back to the part-whole relation in my three earlier probes of Hudis' use of the concept of value. The doubt is whether the very idea of socialism as an actual, concrete regime of labour depends for its escape from value on the presumption that such socialism is not a social system at all. If it is nothing more than "the concreteness of the concrete," then there is no common measure, and without a common measure, how is it organized on a general scale? If it is not organized on a general scale, then it is not a system but a collection of heterogeneous parts without any common measure at all. If it is organized as some sort of system—let's say a participatory democratic one—then there will need to be some deliberation that measures these parts and makes decisions about relative priorities. Such deliberation would be a form of systemic deliberation that would need to balance, prioritize, and in some way determine the relation between parts. How is such a measure possible without being in an important sense external to the concrete process of actual labour in each of the parts toward which Hudis' argument proceeds? Let us go back to value.

There are three ways of viewing value in capitalist society: as the *source* of value, through the *form* of value, and regarding the *quantity* of value. Labour was established as the source of value not by Marx but by the political economists against whom he mounted his critique. Regarding Ricardo, as Hudis shows, "Marx indicates that positing labour as the source of value fails to get to the critical issue—the kind of labour that creates value" (137, cf. 8). Thus, labour as the *source* of value as discovered by classical political economy is synthesized by Marx with a critique of the *form* of value based in abstract labour through social proportionality.

Hudis has very little to say about the third, and more traditional, claim of Marxist economists that abstract labour determines the quantity of value.[7] Ernest Mandel sees only two aspects of value, missing the political economists' claim that labour is the source of value, which he explains through the distinction between quantity and quality. "From a

[7] The quantitative aspect of the theory of value clearly precedes Marx and is one of the main preoccupations of political economy. It would be consistent with the argument of this review to regard the persistence of the quantitative issue in Marx as a legacy from political economy in fact overcome by his own theory based upon, as Hudis says, synthesizing the *source* and *form* of value. See chapter 1 of Meek (1956).

quantitative point of view, the value of a commodity is the quantity of simple labour ... socially necessary for its production," while "from a qualitative point of view, the value of a commodity is determined by *abstract* human labour" (1992, 38). Mandel argues that the quantity of value, as determined by abstract labour, accounts for price insofar as "these fluctuations (in prices) do not occur at random but around a definite axis" (Mandel 1971, 47). Moreover, he regards the difficulty of quantitatively measuring value as exclusively due to the difficulty of getting information because the books of capitalist enterprises are not available to public scrutiny (Mandel 1992, 45). To so maintain, he has to propose a relation, albeit a fluctuating one, between the quantity of abstract labour and the price of the product. Such a relation, it has been shown above, is impossible because it must necessarily be routed through conceptions that imply a common measure, postulates of a part-whole system-relation, and a distribution of surplus through the trinity formula. The conclusion that I proposed above is that the relation between value and price can only be in the relation between the sphere of prices as a whole and the *source* of that sphere in the productivity of labour. In short, the quantity can never in principle be determined.[8] Relative prices are determined through the socio-historical "moral" dimension of the trinity formula—nothing more or less.

The issue of the quantity of value is not central to Hudis' argument, which centres on the form of value production; however his attempt to save some analogous version by equating the sum of value with the sum of prices illustrates his too-close proximity to the traditional Marxist versions of the alternative to capitalism that he wants to criticize. If there were such an identity between the totality of value and the totality of prices, then the totality of prices might in principle be organized on some other basis than value. Whether through the state or some democratically elected committee, traditional Marxism proposed to run the social economy as a whole. It thus assumed some form of measure of individual labours against other forms (Moore 1993).[9] Insofar as labour in post-capitalism is only concrete, actual labour and is not measured by what it produces, such a measure requires a measuring of a plurality of concrete particulars without any common measure—which is a clear impossibility. One might argue at this point that the final goal of communism would be such a condition of general wealth that no such measure would be required, but this in turn would imply that any currently foreseeable post-capitalism would be in compromise with some remnant of the production of value.

[8] G. A. Cohen (1981) showed that the quantitative labour theory of value could not pertain due to its abstraction from the difference between the time of production and the time of buying-consumption. He argued as a consequence that labour does not create value per se, but the things that have value, which is a position entirely compatible with the one I argue.

[9] Stanley Moore (1993) argued with great erudition that Marx's mature theory could only arrive at an implication for socialism, whereas Marx himself was philosophically committed to communism throughout his life.

This may satisfy some, but it rests upon the idea that communism would not be a system, not a totality, because it would renounce any measure, since any measure is necessarily non-concrete. Such a goal is in that sense an attempt to reject abstraction altogether. Perhaps it might be more perspicacious to recognize that there can be no regime, or system, of the concrete—that the concrete always remains to be re-discovered under any common measure (Angus 1997, 186-97). This would not only imply that Hudis' admirable politics of worker cooperatives will always require some measure between cooperatives but also that cooperatives can always themselves be accused of missing an important concrete dimension in their regulatory regimes. In short, life—which is the concrete—will go on. This requires some distance from Marx's goal of communism if we understand communism—as I believe Hudis is correct to say that Marx thought of it—as an impossible system of the concrete.[10]

Apart from this residue of a traditional economist Marxism that infects the idea of an alternative by implying some form of management of the whole system, I think that Hudis fails to confront the more pressing theoretical issue of a post-value system and the related issue of the pertinence of this theoretical issue to the analysis of the capitalist system itself. Briefly, I have argued that 1) the concept of value underlies the sphere of price, and 2) concepts that postulate a part-whole proportionality of specific, individual labours and the production system are essential to understanding the capitalist system. From this point of view, the central issue is the very systematicity of capitalism itself, since it is value that expresses this systematicity and value that must be replaced in an alternative. By a system I mean an organized whole that attempts to represent all relevant factors within itself in proportional relation determined by a given measure. As explained above, it is possible that we might interpret communism as the rejection of any such measure, and therefore as not a system in this sense, but, in that case, it seems to become an ideal incapable of becoming a real, historical system. But, to the extent that some form of systemic organization is necessary—which means a reckoning of all forms of labour in some comparative form—communism seems to require some equivalent for value. Hudis' argument for cooperatives is a valid implication from Marx's work, but it evades the question of what form of organization, if any, is required among cooperatives to

[10]This conclusion implies a critique of Hegel's attempt to reconcile abstraction and concretion, an attempt which no doubt influenced Marx's conception of communism, but I cannot get into that here other than to note the appendix containing Hudis' translation of "Marx's excerpt-notes on the chapter 'Absolute knowledge' in Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit. There Marx notes that "Hegel keeps developing the tedious process of the beautiful soul, whose result is the pure universality of knowledge, which is self-consciousness. ... the concept is the knowledge of the self's act within itself as all that is essential and all existence ..."(220). Such a self-enclosed absolute that is both content and totality would be a baleful influence on an alternative to capitalism and an even worse one if it were implied in the critique of capitalism itself.

construct a system of general production. If each cooperative can evade the capitalist external standard (159), it cannot become a pure internality to itself.

I will conclude with a suggestion. Labour as the *source* of value and value as underlying the sphere of prices, which Marx took over from the political economists, can be understood this way: capitalism *attempts* to formulate a complete and coherent system of prices extending to the whole of value. But this systematicity always in principle fails. The non-price externalities of clean air and environmental goods are the most obvious examples of this fact. Characterizing systematicity as an *attempt* in this sense means that what drives it forward is the putting of prices onto value in an ever-widening scheme that never arrives at its terminus. The form of value is the basis for capitalism to monopolize the productivity of labour and nature as commodity prices. The source of labour is the basis for a critique of this attempt, since labour always produces forms of value that are not-yet-commodified. This is the basis for the appearance-essence distinction whereby Marx attempts to take the thinker-reader from apparent systematicity, through the in principle failure of systematicity, toward the productivity of labour as the source of value. If this suggestion is accepted, it implies that communism indeed remains an ideal of concreteness never realizable as a system. If systematicity is the problem, then there can be no systematic escape.

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THE IDEAL IMMANENT WITHIN THE REAL: ON PETER HUDIS' MARX'S CONCEPT OF THE ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITALISM

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Abstract

Self-emancipation and humanism—rejected by some Marxists as unnecessary in the development of historical materialist theory—are in fact embedded at the core of any meaningful historical materialism. This comes out clearly in Peter Hudis's *Marx's Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism*. The principle aim of the book is to unearth the "prefigurative"—the vision of a new post-capitalist world—from the writings of a Marx usually seen as agnostic on the question. The search for this prefigurative Marx leads directly to the issue of how to reconcile the objective with the subjective, the objectively determined laws of motion in the economy with the emergence of a mass revolutionary subject. In tackling this Hudis opens up areas of inquiry central to the development of counter-hegemonic theory and practice in the 21st century.

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The overall aim of Peter Hudis in *Marx's concept of the alternative to capitalism* is to unearth "the prefigurative"—the vision of a new post-capitalist world—from the writings of a Marx usually seen as agnostic on the question. The search for this prefigurative Marx raises an old issue: how do we reconcile the objective with the subjective, the objectively determined laws of motion in the economy with the emergence of a mass revolutionary subject?

There was a strand of the 1960s and 1970s New Left which identified the late 19th and early 20th century heirs of Marx and Engels as being imprisoned by the objective: overly relying on the laws of motion imputed to capitalism. This "objectivism" led inexorably to a praxis of passivity: calmly waiting upon the final crisis, to which those laws of motion would inevitably drag us. This objectivism was often called "Second International Marxism" (Colletti 1974), invoking the theoretically over-determined, but often inert politics of the Socialist International, an inertia on full display when the vast majority of its member parties collapsed into national chauvinism with the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

The healthiest threads of subsequent New Lefts, from the 1970s to the present, have recoiled from this objectivist fatalism and embraced notions of self-emancipation, insisting that socialist revolution requires a self-active subject, a mass self-active subject. In other words, it requires a left that totally embraces democracy, cooperation and coalition building. This self-emancipationist New Left could and can be found in rank and file opposition to bureaucratic unionism; in anti-racist, feminist, and LGBTQ movements; and in the anti-war and anti-imperialist movements that emerge every time imperialism slouches towards another bloody adventure in the Global South.

Hudis pens a clear and devastating précis of some contemporary "objectivist Marxists," theorists who "contend that Marx's critique of capital is best understood as an analysis of objective forms that assume complete self-determination and automaticity" (Hudis 2012, 9)[1]—historical materialists who take the only possible subject in historical change (human beings) and transform it (us) into the passive object of history—making "capital in the abstract" the sole "active" subject. For certain of these theorists—Rob Albritton for instance—it means a collapse of a theory of capitalism into a theory of the market, an insistence on, in other words, a complete separation of the market and the state—and thus a denial that state-intervention can ever be associated with capitalism (14). Inevitably, this becomes an apology for the great state-capitalist dead-end we know as Stalinism.

Hudis, however, makes it clear that the alternative to Albritton's objectivism cannot be found in the subjectivism of people like Antonio Negri. The insistence, by theorists such as Negri, that the laws of motion of capitalism are determined by class struggle can appear as a very tempting turn in critical theory, a way of asserting "agency" into the development of the economy. But its subjectivist face is, at the very least, a substantial over-correction to contemporary determinist historical materialism (26-32), and is sometimes worse: a back door through which hegemonic ideas can easily flow. Take the following widely adhered-to "class struggle as the objective" syllogism

[1] Further references to this text are made with only the page number in parentheses.

1. Class struggle drives up wages;
2. Wage increases lead to declining profit rates;
3. Declining profit rates lead to crisis.

This "class struggle" historical materialism sounds quite radical, but in fact accepts a key tenet of neoliberal political economy—that capitalism's economic problems are not inherent to capital itself, but can rather be laid at the feet of labour, of workers' struggle for a living wage. These workers are described as militant by the historical materialists and greedy by the neoliberals. Historical materialists give this a radical gloss and say "our struggle for higher wages necessarily points towards a revolutionary rupture with capitalism." But it has actually proven much easier for neoliberals to make the case that "we can avoid crisis if we don't allow a struggle for higher wages". In any case, the whole class struggle syllogism collapses in on itself when wages increase during periods of capitalist expansion: which, of course, is when wages do, in fact, increase.

A good portion of how we resolve the tension between the objective and the subjective turns on an assessment of Marx's intellectual debt to the German philosopher Hegel. This has been a particularly annoying nugget on which the objectivists put much weight. If there is a subjectivist Marx, they argue, it is the young Marx, the Marx too influenced by Hegel. Once the maturing Marx gets over his youth, he also gets over Hegel, and embarks on "real" economics in his monumental study of capitalism. The mature Marx has made the move from liberal moralism to scientific socialism. This story is, however, not true. Hudis unearths the Marx of 1875 (i.e. the "old Marx" not the "young Marx") and gives us the following: "My relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel, and the presumptuous chattering of the epigones who think they have buried this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me" (5, n.7).

Let's approach the main issue of the book from a different angle—why do any of us do what we do? Some of us try to analyze the laws of motion of capital. But none of us begin with "Capital" in the abstract. We begin with famine in Bangladesh, war in Vietnam, segregation in the Deep South, attacks on the right to choice on abortion, Minamata disease rearing its head in Akwesasne, police killing of Black youth in Ferguson, the exposure of the mass epidemic of sexual violence through the scandals swirling around Jian Ghomeshi and Bill Cosby. These are our motivations, and because of these issues of social justice (or rather our rage against social injustice) we start asking questions. Peter Hudis shows this was how it was for Marx as well. Hudis quotes a lovely letter from the 19 year old Marx, addressed to his father, a letter in which Marx says that he will no longer counterpose the ideal to the real—he will now be completely committed to Hegelianism (38). This is the same young Marx whose "very earliest writings also display a powerful feeling for *social justice*" (39). This "feeling for social justice", Hudis is

arguing, remains integral to and embedded in his later analytic (political economic) dissection of "the real". The admonition to no longer counterpose the ideal to the real does not mean: "be a materialist not an idealist". It means "look for the ideal immanent within the real". The essence of Hudis's book is that within our real (actually existing capitalism) there has to be immanent an ideal (an emergent or possible socialist society) and that Marx knew this, even if he did not focus on it or make a big deal about it.

Hudis takes us on a journey to show that this ideal, immanent within the real, is only realizable through real, active, human agency. This is not only visible in Marx's youthful 1843-1844 writings on Alienation, but equally so in the voluminous first, second and third drafts of *Capital* and in the three volumes of *Capital* itself. Here in mid-life when analyzing the laws of motion of capitalism, and a few years later when the late Marx interrogates the distant past (the nature of pre-class society) or contemporary events (the Paris Commune)—in all circumstances it is humans who emerge as the subject of historical change—labouring humans to be precise. At the centre of the story of *Capital* is the struggle of labourers to reduce the length of the working day. The story of the different phases of pre-class society is the story of the evolution of different phases of human labour. The story of the Paris Commune is the heroic story of the political and economic agency of human artisanal labourers in that moment of collective democracy. The essence of this millennia-long story of human agency is the push towards real democracy and real freedom. For Marx, "Freedom of the will is inherent in human nature" (40). This freedom is not contingent or "zero-sum"—that is, freedom for me and lack of freedom for others. For Marx, the meaning of freedom was identical to that espoused by Rosa Luxemburg: "Freedom is always the freedom of the one who thinks differently" (Luxemburg 1961, 69).

Understanding the limited and in fact "unfree" nature of contingent freedom certainly means a break from Stalinism, a political tendency associated with a horrifying 20th-century regression to mass forced labour in the Gulag. In a certain sense, that is why this book has been written. Stalinism has existed on many levels. The word signifies: a counter-revolution against Soviet power; a totalitarian state structure in the post-Thermidor society; the apologetic historical materialism carried by Stalinist epigones in the West; and the shadow over Western historical materialism, where any emergence of humanism or a historical subject immediately implies a critique of actually existing communism—and is therefore pushed into the background. Theoreticians might well be critical of the first two or even the first three of these significations of Stalinism. But the fourth—the denial of human agency in the historical process—is deeply embedded in the structuralism of Althusser, Poulantzas, Albritton, and others. In this sense, their theories, and the theories of other historical materialists who bury the subjective under the fictive self-movement of structures, are intimately linked to Stalinism's long shadow.

The truth is, historical materialism is inconceivable without a human subject—and this is true not just for Marxism but also for Marx himself. Focusing on the question of humanism, insisting on a "subjectivism" as part of the essence of historical materialism, opens the door to what an alternative to capitalism will look like. We can "prefigure" socialism, if we accurately comprehend actually existing mass subjectivity.

How will labour lose its alien crust? How will production become something performed for human need, and not for private greed? Here an old fact becomes less accidental and more central to Marx's thought—his love of the Paris Commune. There is a famous quote from Marx's study of the Paris Commune where he says that the commune was "the political form at last discovered under which the economic emancipation of labour could be accomplished" (quoted in Lenin 1964, 436). This remains a beautiful and compelling statement. However, Hudis (185) uses a richer and much deeper translation of Marx's original quote: "Such is the Commune—the political form of the social emancipation, of the liberation of labour from the usurpation of the (slaveholding) monopolies of the means of labour" (Marx 1975, 487). This version makes it absolutely clear – the solution to the objective contradictions of capitalism lies in the subjective actions of the labourers.

Hudis makes the point that this is not a momentary observation of Marx, but rather the crystallization of a notion of alternatives to capitalism immanent in his entire method. The barrier to seeing these alternatives is created in large part by the influence of Stalin and Stalinism. It cannot, however, be reduced to this influence. Remember—the Rosa Luxemburg quote above was directed not at Stalin and the Stalinists, but rather Lenin and the Leninists, for whom freedom too often meant precisely the contingent freedom critiqued by Marx.

Some of Lenin's political positions are completely in tune with a self-emancipationist left. The Lenin of 1906 argued about the necessity "really to apply the principles of democratic centralism in Party organization" by which he did not mean more centralism, but rather more democracy. He called for party members "to work tirelessly to make the local organizations the principal organizational units of the Party in fact and not merely in name, and to see to it that all the higher-standing bodies are elected, accountable and subject to recall" (Lenin, cited in Liebman 1975, 51). The application of democratic centralism, understood this way, "implies universal and full *freedom to criticize*, so long as this does not disturb the unity *of a definite action"* (Lenin 1962, 443). Equally important is the Lenin of 1902, who threw down a "tribune of the oppressed" gauntlet which resonates to this day. "[T]he Social-Democrat's ideal should not be the trade-union secretary, but the tribune of the people, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of the people it affects" (Lenin 1961, 423).

But there were other sides to Lenin's politics. A "subjectivist" correction to passive determinism can—and often does with Lenin—represent a false freedom. Lenin and the Leninists were fiery opponents of Second International passivity. But their subjectivist corrective tended to shift agency from the mass to the minority organized in a vanguard party. Over time this evolved into a voluntarist subjectivism, a subjectivism which pressed so hard against the passivity of the Second International that the link between theory and practice was eventually completely broken.

The study of the Bolshevik experience cannot be reduced to a study of Lenin and the Leninists. Lenin's was just one wing of what was a mass, variegated phenomenon. Within the Bolsheviks, there were self-emancipationist tendencies. The rank and file militants, most of them Bolsheviks, organized in St. Petersburg's Inter-District Committee (the *Mezhrayonka*, whose supporters were known as the *Mezhrayontsi*) are a superb example. This self-emancipationist wing of Bolshevism was often at odds with the Leninists. The specific dispute with the *Mezhrayontsi* was Lenin's insistence, from 1912 on, of a hard-break from all other tendencies other than the Leninist. The *Mezhrayontsi* respectfully disagreed, and—in defiance of the Leninist leadership-in-exile—implemented on the ground what we would today call "coalition building" or a "united front strategy", building a network that would play a key role in the February 1917 Revolution (McKean, 1990; Thatcher, 2009). But by 1918 and 1919, it was the Leninist wing which came to dominate both the Bolshevik party and the new Russian state.

This state tried to impose its will on an impoverished, semi-peripheral, largely peasant country and force it onto a path of socialist revolution. The Russian masses were with them when that revolution led to the overthrow of the Czar. But when an extreme voluntarist subjectivism pushed the Bolsheviks to try and force the pace of history, the Bolsheviks lost the masses. With first a minority of the working class—and then increasingly just a Russian minority within a multi-national empire, and then increasingly just that section of the Russian minority organized in the party, state or Red Army—this subjectivism led to an increasingly substitutionist approach to revolution. It also led to increasingly desperate and doomed adventures, the 1920 invasion of Poland and the 1921 armed uprising in Germany (the March Action) being just two (Kellogg, 2013).

Both of these cul-de-sacs—that of the Second International passive objectivists and the Third International Leninist voluntarist subjectivists—proved fertile soil on which to nourish the Stalinist monstrosity which rose on the bones of the shattered Russian Revolution. At the level of theory, an "objectivist" reductionism imposed itself on two generations of Stalinist-influenced theoreticians, Althusserians and Poulantzans for instance, reducing capitalism to structures, reducing praxis to either passivity or uncritical party-building (critiqued brilliantly by E.P. Thompson in his *Poverty of Theory* (1978)). At the level of practice, the dead-hand of determinism was periodically replaced

by the red-hand of a really horrendous voluntarism. Stalin's Third Period abroad and Stakhanovism at home, Mao's Great Leap Forward and Cultural "Revolution"—these and others were the barbaric heirs of a refusal to acknowledge the limits imposed by material reality. If for Lenin and the Leninists, subjectivism was a political mistake—a mistake in large measure forced on them by isolation, poverty and desperation – then for Stalin and the Stalinists subjectivism became something more—it became a crime.

A central task in this discussion is to challenge mechanical understandings of the way in which consciousness changes inside the working class. According to Hudis:

> He [Marx] consistently holds throughout his life that revolutionary consciousness spontaneously emerges from the oppressed in response to an array of specific material conditions. He does not hold that such consciousness is brought "to" the masses "from without"—in direct contrast to Lasalle, Kautsky and Lenin, who held the contrary position. At the same time, Marx does not equate the *consciousness* that emerges from the oppressed with revolutionary *theory*. The latter does not emerge spontaneously from the masses, but from hard conceptual labour on the part of theoreticians. Revolutionary theory needs to elicit and build upon mass consciousness, but it is not reducible to it (80–81).

A large part of the archaeology performed by Hudis involves digging into Marx's "voluminous excerpt notebooks, most of which were unknown until recently" (2, n. 1). The existence of "voluminous excerpt notebooks" is interesting in itself. Why, we might ask, did Marx find it necessary to so diligently copy out excerpts from the works he was reading? Perhaps the answer to this is not "subjective"—i.e., having to do with the personal work habits of Karl Marx—but rather "objective"—i.e., having to do with the context in which Marx was writing. He was, after all, living through what with the benefit of hindsight we can identify as a very, very early stage of capitalism. It must have been difficult indeed to peer inside this early capitalism and extract from it a sense of its dynamics, let alone a sense of a possible socialist future which might emerge from the struggle against this system. Seen this way, we can understand that: a) there is in fact a prefiguration of a post-capitalist society inherent to Marx; but b) given the opaqueness of the context in which he was writing, he was understandably reluctant to articulate his notion of post-capitalism, and is therefore rarely explicit; and c) from both of these flows the need for the big archaeology engaged in by Hudis. What results is summarized by Hudis very clearly:

> Marx's entire body of work shows that a new society is conditional upon a radical transformation of labour and social relations. The measure of

> whether such a transformation is adequate to the concept of a new society is the abolition of the law of value and value-production by freely-associated individuals.
>
> This goal is not achieved, however, merely by some act of revolutionary will. It is achieved by discerning and building upon the elements of the new society that are concealed in the shell of the old one. This includes elucidating the forces of liberation that arise against capitalist alienation—which includes not only workers but all those suffering the ills of capitalist society, be they national minorities, women, or youth—which Marx referred to as the "new forces and passions" for the "reconstruction of society" (206).

The capitalism of our day may not be the late capitalism announced by Ernest Mandel two generations ago (1975), but it is certainly at the very least post-adolescent. In this more mature and therefore less opaque capitalism we can use the method of Marx—a critical apprehension of contemporary mass subjectivity—to add details to our sketch of post-capitalism. Perhaps we can go further than accepting an economic definition of class which limits us to adding on to the working class the struggles of "new forces and passions", and instead expand our notion of the proletariat to include these new forces and passions. That will mean when assessing capitalism and post-capitalism, in order to hear today's working class, we will have to listen to the experiences of all of today's subaltern struggles: from the strikers wildcatting against Walmart to the Zapatista uprising, the World Social Fora, Occupy, Idle No More, civil society in Gaza and the protesters on the streets of Ferguson. Here we will encounter sites of struggle with evolving and instructive lessons in participation and democracy, lessons from which our generation of historical materialists can learn immensely. If we free ourselves from a narrow objectivism (and economism) and let ourselves listen to the new notions of freedom emerging from these contemporary movements against neoliberalism, against imperialism, against racism, and for popular sovereignty, then—after rescuing Marx from Althusser and Negri—perhaps we might be able to rescue democracy from the neoliberals. Peter Hudis has given us a very helpful set of tools with which to approach such a task.

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Review Essay

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Barker, Colin, Laurence Cox, John Krinsky and Alf Gunvald Nilsen. 2013. *Marxism and social movements*. Leiden: Brill Press. ISBN: 978-90-04-21175-9. Hardback: 167.00 USD. Pages: 473.

Abstract

Marxists have sought to critically analyze and contribute to (left revolutionary) popular movements. Yet they have not explicitly theorized the term "movement" nor its relationships to other key Marxist concepts, such as class struggle and hegemony. This book seeks to fill that gap in a historical moment when there are worldwide "anti-systemic" movements against austerity, against inequality, against the "democracy deficit," and to protect hard-won rights for subaltern classes, all within the context of the world's most important economic crisis since the 1930s. Analysis helpfully moves back and forth between theory and empirical cases, with a view to informing more effective revolutionary political praxis. The empirical scope is deliberately and usefully broad. Cases are drawn from a range of national contexts in the global North and South and concern movements from the 19th century up to the present. The book's major shortcoming, however, is its failure to draw upon the whole range of historical materialist theorizing, including work by Black socialists, feminist socialists and Indigenous communists, among others. Nonetheless *Marxism and social movements* makes a useful, if radically incomplete contribution to both social movement theory and historical materialism.

Although Marxism has sought to critically analyze and contribute to (left revolutionary) popular movements, Marxists have not explicitly theorized the term "movement" nor its relationships to other key Marxist concepts, such as class struggle and hegemony (1). This book seeks to fill that gap, especially in a historical moment when, the editors contend, there are what look like worldwide "anti-systemic" movements against austerity, against inequality, against the "democracy deficit," and to protect hard-won rights for subaltern classes, all within the context of the world's most important economic crisis since the 1930s (2). Yet despite the relevance of historical materialism today, paradoxically, from the 1980s and through the 1990s there has been a turn away from Marxism and class analysis, including in social movement theory which

now neglects historical materialist insights and, more broadly, political economic analyses.[1] This shift reflects a decline in the importance of organized labour since the 1970s, revealing the material underpinnings of this theoretical turn away from Marxist class analysis. To remedy this, the book re-centres Marxism as a critical theory of social movements understood both in relation to Marxist understandings of capitalism and class struggle and in conversation with mainstream social movement theory, which the editors argue has much to gain from a sustained dialogue with historical materialism. Finally, this book argues that historical materialist analysis has a political vocation, since it may be mobilized in service of contemporary "social movements from below" (65), helping them to more strategically intelligent action, even while theory is vitally informed by social movement praxis (423).

Throughout, the authors emphasize that they seek to develop a nuanced Marxist theorizing about movements. This finely grained approach rejects overdetermined structuralist models, instead emphasizing human agency and therefore historical contingency. Likewise, against variants of Marxism that identify class narrowly, they insist upon class as a "social nexus of relations" necessarily concerned with contingent, but persistent, relations of inequality around gender, race, sexuality, caste and more (53). Indeed, this book might have been stronger had it drawn more consistently upon the whole range of historical materialist theorizing that does just that, including work by Black socialists, feminist socialists, Indigenous communists, and socialist theorists concerned with sexuality and disability. These theorists and actors are present, but unevenly so, tending to be included "topically" and, too often, at the margins. Despite this shortcoming, across eighteen chapters as well as a substantive introduction, *Marxism and social movements* makes many useful, and necessary contributions to both social movement theory and historical materialism. Not least, the authors accomplish this through detailed descriptions and analyses of a range of historical and contemporary emancipatory struggles, from 19th century popular insurgencies against British imperialism in India by soldiers, peasants and landlords, to fraternal and gang organizations among newly-urban workers in China from 1900-1950, to Egyptian worker and popular militancy before and during the Arab spring of 2011. The successes and failures of these and other diverse movements are instructive for analytical purposes, suggesting challenges, contradictions, limits and possibilities for current struggles seeking to create spaces for more just human relationships. Finally, the international scope of the cases described follows through on the editors' own insistence, grounded in Marx, that it

[1] See especially 84-91, where contributors Gabriel Hetland and Jeff Goodwin document the near-total absence of Marxism from social movement journals, major social movement books and award-winning social movement articles in (American) English-language scholarship since the late 1980s through to the present.

is important to understand apparently isolated struggles as actually or potentially related within the context of capitalism as a *world* system.

Theorizing Social Movements from Marxism

In their introduction, the four co-editors stress that the Marxist theory they propose is not the straw man often taught by post-structuralists: a rigid, top-down Althusserian Marxism (261-262). Instead, they understand Marxism as a theory "that is resolutely committed to popular emancipation 'from below'" (12), an approach that emphasizes human agency with respect to the production of both material relationships and the ideological and cultural "superstructure" (18: 261-262). As contributing editor and author Colin Barker observes in his chapter, social movements are carried out by human beings who are active agents who reflect on their actions and who seek to resolve problems engendered by everyday capitalist relations. Often, working class and subaltern people do so in ways that disrupt the routine reproduction of exploitative class relationships, so potentially changing these relationships and themselves in the process (47). In other words, within capitalism, workers produce "things" but also "social relations and symbolic forms" (18). Indeed, they even produce themselves through their struggles and as they labour. This means that workers are, at least potentially, their own salvation [2]—they are capable of bringing about their own liberation from exploitative, alienating capitalist relationships through their "political labour-rebellions" (332).

Yet, workers need not do so in isolation. Rather, they may be informed by organic intellectuals for working class and subaltern movements, including but not limited to Marxist social movement theorists. For editor and contributing author John Krinsky, a distinctive insight of Marxist theory is to contextualize particular moments of protest within the "totality" of capitalist social relationships, including the play of political, economic, and legal actors and institutions, both domestic and foreign (108-9). As an instance of this type of analysis, co-authors Patrick Bond, Ashwin Desai and Trevor Ngwane consider capitalism's "combined" but "uneven" development, including booming finance alongside manufacturing deindustrialization as manifest in South Africa (235). In their view, such uneven development tends to foster "intensely localized and self-limited" politics in urban centres, as different sectors of urban society react to the specific, local consequences of neoliberal capitalist politics and policies. Notably, they observe that there have been recurrent protests against the cost of medication to treat HIV/AIDS and against cuts to water and electricity services by those unable to pay for (expensive) privatized service provision in the 1990s (238). In contemporary South

[2] To use a religious vocabulary, about which the chapter on CLR James, by Christian Hogsbjerg, has some suggestive insights: see my discussion below.

Africa, such political-economic struggles are bound up with disappointed hopes in—but nonetheless continued if declining popular engagement with—the Tripartite Alliance.[3] After decades of anti-Apartheid struggles with a strong anti-capitalist element, the Alliance has embraced hegemonic forms of neoliberal capitalism. Yet, neoliberalism is neither simply a local nor national dynamic but a worldwide politics of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation that arguably became hegemonic with the fall of the Soviet bloc beginning in 1989. This neoliberal phase of capitalism is institutionalized legally, for instance, via the "intellectual property" (237) agreements negotiated by the World Trade Organization, or via World Bank "advice" to debtor nations that warns against state provision and subsidies of essential goods like water (239). In short, there is protest and opposition to immediate hardships in "formal townships and shack settlements" (237) in South Africa. These hardships include lack of access to medical treatments, water, electricity and other vital goods and services. But both this austerity-induced privation and the protest that rises to challenge it must be understood within a complex of forces. This requires recognition of the roles of multinational corporations and international financial institutions in producing neoliberal policies that — profitably for multinational corporations – privatize water and electricity provision and define vital medicines as private "intellectual property." In addition, understanding both austerity and anti-austerity movements requires attentiveness to national and local party and trade union politics, politics increasingly constrained worldwide by a powerful capitalist class.

Relatedly, this "total" approach to understanding social movements requires, too, a resolutely international orientation. This means discerning interconnections across apparently distinct struggles that are often geographically distant. Thus, as David McNally suggests in his concluding chapter, historical materialist theories of social movements make clear the ways that apparently separate protests "from Cochabamba to Cairo" may, in fact, be linked because they challenge worldwide capitalist dynamics and relationships that are manifested locally. Hence, as McNally describes, the so called "water war" in the year 2000 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, mobilized "(a)s many as fifty to seventy thousand" (405) against water privatization. The protests in Cochabamba saw trade union workers join with Indigenous peoples and the popular classes, including "the unemployed, the self-employed, the young, and the women" (406) in struggles that ultimately led to an end to water privatization and were part of the emergence of a new left in Bolivia. Of course, this mobilization likewise recalls the South African urban protests against the attribution of municipal water provision and distribution to the French multinational corporation Suez. These developments were echoed later in Egypt, among other places, as part of the so-called Arab spring. Specifically, in Cairo in January

[3] The African National Congress, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the South African Communist Party (234).

and February 2011, workers' movements that had been engaging in illegal strikes since a neoliberal austerity programme was implemented in 2004 (417) joined with democratic activists demanding regime change. This resulted in escalating protests. Known in Cairo as the 25 January Revolution, this movement, which was also inspired by the Tunisian uprising in December 2010, eventually led to the overthrow of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (418-19). Among other transformations, this regime change opened up, albeit tentatively and contingently, new spaces for worker organization in Egypt.

From a Marxist social movement perspective, these apparently "separate" struggles in Bolivia and Egypt — and in South African urban centres — have, in fact, common dynamics. Not least, workers' struggles played an important role as part of mass popular movements against the routine reproduction of alienating and exploitative class relationships, as well as against authoritarian state regimes. In the cases of Bolivia and Egypt, if not with respect to the so-far more limited South African urban protests, these movements suspended, at least for a time, the "normal" political-economic relations of neoliberalism. They challenged states, seeking to bring about more democratic regime change and protesting state policies in the interests of capital. Sometimes, such events spilled over national boundaries, inspiring struggles at once similar and distinct in other countries. But even when they remain locally and nationally bounded, such struggles imply a *potential* for transnational unity, rooted in a shared political-economic critique of the capitalist dynamics that they arise to combat. For instance, movements against water privatization in Bolivia and South Africa participate in a common struggle against the sale of water as "private property." At the same time, the existence of these movements draws attention to local manifestations of capitalist drives towards the privatization of the global commons and local reactions against such dynamics. There is, in short, a dialectical movement back and forth between social movement practices and Marxist theorizing of them, so that an important role for theorists is to draw attention to links among apparently "distinct" movements while at the same time assessing any given movement's potential, if far from inevitable, revolutionary character (15; 120).

Reactionary Class Struggles, Black Liberation and LGBT Movements

As the authors insist, none of these arguments about the complex nature of working class and subaltern struggles within world capitalism should be taken to suggest uncritical celebration of expressions of popular agency (20; 378). In his chapter, for instance, Marc Blecher observes that worker "self-organization" may mean the creation of patron-client relationships characterized by intense, gendered violence. Blecher acknowledges that in the 1920s in Tianjin, China, mostly young, uneducated, newly-urban workers did organize, sometimes in fraternal and women's organizations that offered mutual support. In other cases, however, workers organized through gangs that exercised monopolies over

whole sectors of the economy, "attributing" workers to contracts gained with capitalist factory owners. In practice, Blecher maintains, many such gangs "did not so much contract female labour to factories as virtually come to own the young women" (152). Working-class agency may include such expressions of gendered violence against other workers. As editor and contributing author Colin Barker starkly observes with respect to working-class actorhood across Europe, subaltern agency, including in the contemporary period, is not necessarily enlightened: "Some (workers) become strike breakers, racists, wife beaters, and homophobes" (57). Working class actors may be reactionary, even fascist, harming other subaltern classes and groups seen as threats rather than potential partners in solidarity against a powerful capitalist class and an exploitative, alienating capitalist system.

Indeed, Neil Davidson's chapter is devoted to "Right-wing social movements," many of them movements "from below." His chapter describes how in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, for instance, most white workers refused to stand in solidarity with freed Black slaves, especially in the South. Instead, many actively participated in the "institutionalized regime of terror" (281) against the Black population, including the torture and murder of at least three thousand Blacks from 1890 to 1930 (281). Likewise, many white South African workers refused to act in solidarity with Black working-class leaders in the 1920s (329-330), although such solidarity would have benefitted both Black and white working-class actors in their struggles against the more powerful capitalist class. Moreover, such racism by white workers is hardly an historical phenomenon, with xenophobia and racism apparent in such contemporary slogans as "British jobs for British workers" (291). Nor is the current conjuncture of worldwide economic crisis under neoliberal capitalism likely to create a more enlightened white working class (296). Rather, a world working class on the defensive may well be attracted to racial scapegoating. The ascendency of the far-right Front National in the current political landscape of France, especially in historically Communist regions like the North where I live, is suggestive of the ways that working and subaltern classes in crisis may turn towards racism as a "solution" consciously constructed by cynical political party leadership.

Such arguments, foregrounding persistent racisms within actually-existing world capitalism, are symptomatic of the contributors' efforts to make clear that they reject Marxisms that ignore racism and other unjust inequalities around gender, normative sexualities, ethnicity, and religion. In this vein, specifically, there is Christian Hogsbjerg's chapter, which insists on the importance of Black liberation theorist CLR James to historical materialist theorizing of social movements. As Hogsbjerg describes, James understood that anti-colonial struggles in Africa in the 1930s were a critical part of anti-capitalist movements, not least because they opposed "forced labour, land alienation and colonial taxation" (329) while asserting Black humanity. Aspects of these movements, especially when religious, were sometimes dismissed as mere superstition (331) by

European analysts, presumably including Marxists who may have argued that religion is an "opiate" for the masses. Yet such interpretations likewise reflect implicit racial judgments, in which African traditions and religious practices are rejected as "irrational" compared with a supposedly reasonable, technically superior Western agency.[4] For his part, James explicitly refused such dismissals of African actorhood. Instead, he insisted that religious language may express as much as it disguises African — and from Africa, universal — working-class and subaltern aspirations. Specifically, James argued that the Zambian (then Rhodesian) Watch Tower Movement of the 1930s, related to the Jehovah's Witnesses, expressed a powerful anti-imperialist, pan-African liberation ambition in religious language (331-332). Rather than thwarting working-class and anti-colonial revolutionary potential, James insisted such religious movements "represent political realities and…aspirations" (332) and ought to be recognized as potentially emancipatory for that reason. Put another way, Black liberation in all its manifestations, including those expressed in religious, anti-colonial vocabularies, is critical to understanding revolts against a world capitalist system.

In another chapter, although in less detail, Hetland and Goodwin consider lesbian and gay movements against institutionalized heteronormativity. They observe that these struggles represent a potentially "hard" case for supposedly narrow "economic" Marxist understandings of what constitutes politically relevant social movement praxis (92). In making their case, Hetland and Goodwin draw on a range of socialist theorists who have written about lesbian and gay movements, often analyzing from their standpoints as LGBT- (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and transsexual)-identifying individuals. Specifically, they are concerned with the ways that Marxism may offer new insights into LGBT movements. They argue, for instance, that urbanization linked with capitalist development enabled the emergence of lesbian and gay identities (94), as family households were broken up and reconstituted on new bases in cities. Once the "objective possibility" of LGBT identities (94) was realized, many then demanded fulfilment of their rights. In today's struggles, these demands counter stigmatizing exclusions of LGBT persons and same-gender relationships and families, but likewise make claims for

[4] A typical, recent example is a *National Geographic* article "explaining" that Ebola has spread in West Africa in part due to the persistence of unhelpful traditional African "cultural beliefs" (Thompson 2014). The article observes, too, that the non-profit Médecins Sans Frontières was forced to withdraw from some Ebola-stricken communities because of a "deep-seated suspicion of outsiders." It goes without saying that such observations, which emphasize an apparently permanent, insular African character, utterly fail to put in context justified concerns by many Africans of former colonial powers, including medical practitioners. On the latter, recall, for instance, deadly pharmaceutical experiments on African populations. Drug trials conducted by Pfizer killed eleven children in Nigeria in 1996, for instance, leading to a financial settlement with the parents in 2011, although Pfizer admits to no wrong-doing (Smith 2011). Hence, CLR James' rejection of tendencies that identify African beliefs and actorhood with superstition and irrationality are, unfortunately, still pertinent today.

material welfare rights that become accessible when life partners and families are legally recognized as such. The latter possibility, however, depends upon the existence of a welfare state that is itself a consequence of prior working-class efforts to create alternatives to participation in the "market nexus," as Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990) might put it. In short, the ground upon which lesbian and gay movements move, and even more fundamentally, the ontological possibility of a LGBT identity, is partly shaped by the sedimented, institutionalized outcomes of prior (class) struggles and capitalist development, including urbanization.

Hetland and Goodwin observe, moreover, that from a Marxist perspective it is clear that lesbian and gay communities are far from homogenous. Although middle-class definitions of LGBT identities and rights prevail, such hegemonic definitions mask but do not resolve persistent class and racial inequalities within LGBT movements. Thus, for instance, the American military's "Don't ask, don't tell" policy hurt working-class, racialized lesbian and gays most, since military personnel are disproportionately drawn from among racialized working and subaltern populations (99). An historical materialist recognition of the importance of the "dynamics of capitalism" (99) therefore brings new insights into contemporary gay and lesbian movements. This includes a renewed appreciation for the material struggles of LGBT movements, but at the same time, a concern that their dominant, middle-class character may lead to a turning-away from the militancy that is vital to achieving material gains for all LGBT persons in the workplace (100-101). Presumably, Hetland and Goodwin are advocating for a LGBT movement that is attentive to the working-class and subaltern, often racialized, persons within it. Among other characteristics, this would mean a resolutely counterhegemonic LGBT movement that questions market ideologies that seek to incorporate demands in ways that do not disturb fundamental capitalist relationships that are alienating to working-class and racialized gays and lesbians (102).[5]

Such approaches complement Marx's own recognition that struggles against capitalism are never "only" economic but necessarily linked to national liberation, anti-slavery and anti-colonial movements (53), among other struggles for emancipation. As Marx put it with respect to slavery: "Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded" (Marx quoted in Barker's chapter, 53). So conceived, historical materialist theorizing of social movements is *necessarily* concerned with uprisings against multiple forms of oppression, "whether based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, skill or sexuality" (53). These movements, as Barker insists, "are not *distinct* from or *opposed* to class struggles but are mutually interdependent parts of the social movement against capitalism as a totality" (53). Historical materialist analyses of

[5] Hetland and Goodwin use the common LGBT shorthand, but in practice, they do not address the specific struggles of transgender and transsexual working-class movements.

social movements are not only about trade unionism, as the classic institutionalized face of class struggle, but address the many dimensions along which working-class and subaltern peoples struggle in an exploitative and alienating (264) world capitalist system.

"A Willingness to Fight and an Energy for New Approaches"

Taken together, the contributions in *Marxism and social movements* illustrate editor and author Laurence Cox's argument that the working class demonstrates a persistent, if uneven, "willingness to fight." In his chapter, Cox writes that at the same time, these subaltern movements innovate "new approaches" in their struggles against a world capitalist system that is itself in movement (145). Innovation is evident at once theoretically and practically; for instance, with the emergence of a Global Justice Movement with aspirations to prefigure a more just world beyond neoliberalism and perhaps beyond capitalism, as Elizabeth Humphrys chronicles. At the same time, innovation is pragmatically evident, too, in the diversity of movement tactics adopted across different local and inevitably changing contexts. In Chris Hesketh's chapter about anti-capitalist actions in southern Mexican provinces of Oaxaca and Chiapas, for instance, he describes a wide array of movement "tactics," including armed rebellion, autonomous governments or "communes" outside the state, barricades (210) and blockades (223), public protests in public spaces, mega-marches (218), human circles of state buildings, the take-over of radio and television stations (219), community assemblies (222), the re-possession of privatized land (225) and the creation of alternative schools (227), among other strategies adopted by different parts of the movement at various moments in the movement's development. Innovation is a necessity as social movements adapt to changing circumstances, which includes finding ways of challenging, or escaping, sometimes-fatal violence by the state and private armies.

Indeed, one of the helpful aspects of this book is the description of the impressive range of counterhegemonic approaches developed by working and subaltern classes in their struggles. In highly unfavourable political contexts like Argentina in the aftermath of the 1976-82 military junta (379), for instance, Heike Schaumberg argues that the dispossessed championed "disorganization" to counter the "organized" disciplining of authoritarian state bureaucracies (379). Ironically, however, such "spontaneous" mobilizations against the state and against the power of "banks, transnational capital, the IMF…." (380) did, in fact, demand organization — but in ways unrecognizable to capitalist logics (380). This unrecognizability may have made such protests difficult for capital and the state to repress. Yet in other national contexts, subaltern classes transformed very established, highly visible symbols and instances of state power. Rather than being "disorganized" they organized to transform the disciplining state. In his chapter, for instance, Alf Gunvald Nilsen describes how Adivasi peasants mobilized

against the Narmada Valley Development Project. In part, they did this by re-appropriating state discourses and official state occasions for their own purposes. On Independence Day in the year 2000, for instance, they turned the annual nationalistic celebration into an expression of "the people's continued resistance against the injustice and exploitation within a nation" (177). They explicitly and vocally opposed official state versions of "freedom and development" (177), bound up with capitalist profit-making imperatives, with their own alternatives. This included the building of micro-dams against the mass dam of the Narmada Valley project, which has displaced hundreds of thousands while causing irreparable ecological harm. More fundamentally, in so doing, these peasants and their allies participated in struggles that began to transform a distant, unaccountable state into one that had to respond to mobilized citizens, aware of their rights and determined to exercise them (180).

Other forms of worker organization contain contradictory tendencies, so that conscious human choice may play a particularly important role in determining the direction of such movements. For instance, professional trade union officials in the United Kingdom with relatively secure employment and salaries many times that of their rank-and-file workers, as Ralph Darlington documents, inevitably work in "changed social conditions," relatively distant from those they are supposed to represent (193). At the same time, they may be sincerely committed to improving their members' lives. Moreover, they are elected to do so. Thus, there are formal pressures on trade union officials that may be harnessed to support worker militancy rather than conciliation with the employer and the state (198-199). In other cases, movements must respond to cynical efforts to co-opt potentially rebellious classes. Hence, as Chik Collins observes in his chapter (347-348), the conciliatory language of community-government "partnership" under the Conservative United Kingdom government of John Major tended to make it difficult to express explicit, vocal opposition. Community organizations representing the poor were encouraged to express frustrations within clearly-defined boundaries, but they were ultimately pressured to "responsibly" buy into partnerships with the state. In other words, "partnership" language was a thin disguise for quiescent participation by the poor in the implementation of neoliberal programmes at their own expense (353). Yet hegemony is never a permanent achievement, and at community meetings of the poor in Scotland, Chik observed eruptions of clear, oppositional rhetoric. This is a reminder that there is always the possibility of protest emerging, even in contexts where there are concerted efforts to contain them.

Even so, working-class struggles as emancipatory struggles are never given, but are always achievements. As Elizabeth Humphrys observes, movement activists may retain a very narrow vision of their "single-issue" engagement (365) and refuse broader coalitions. This is a tendency that Bond, Desai and Ngwane likewise observe among some stubbornly local South African urban movements. Yet, through the everyday practices of struggle, some actors may come to see their own "local" struggles as part of a broader,

sometimes contradictory mosaic of movements (365-366, in Humphrys's chapter). The participation of Australian activists in the Global Justice Movement, which since at least the year 2000 has articulated a transnational, political-economic critique of capitalism, is one such example. Likewise, Bond, Desai and Ngwane observe that capitalism's uneven development tends to foster social antagonisms "among those from whom capital is extracted" (255). Like Humphrys, however, they maintain that this is not a fatality. Rather, insofar as human beings are a "nexus of social relations" rather than single-minded "revolutionary subjects" (255), their experiences of multiple oppressions under capitalism holds out the possibility for new strategies that recognize and reinforce interdependence (255) across multiple locations. In short, there is always the possibility of what David McNally describes as the "deepening" and broadening of organized political action into the revolutionary moment, that is, those times when protests extend to "ever more diverse sections of the working people, from domestic servants and commercial employees to artists, actors and rural workers" (420).

Finally, in Hira Singh's chapter, he reminds social movement actors and analysts that in hindsight, even historic defeats may turn out to be victories. Specifically, Singh suggests that the Indian Revolt of 1857, when the dominant Indian landowning class revolted against the colonial state, meant a short-term loss for merchants and peasants. Yet, in the longer term, he maintains that the short-term "winners," both landlords and colonial British authority (311), actually lost. In particular, landlords were pacified and with that pacification, lost their legitimate function as warriors, becoming "superfluous" (312). This hastened peasant revolts that were the ultimate undoing of colonial authorities. Although this was an unintended consequence of the revolts, it does suggest that subaltern mobilizations may weaken elites, while strengthening the popular classes. Experiences of revolt, even when immediate "failures," may be important to future successes for that reason.

"First Liste(n) Closely to What is Said"

As these detailed analyses of a range of case studies suggest, all the contributors are committed to learning from, as much as expertly "informing," the social movements that they study but also seek to accompany in their efforts to challenge and move beyond an unjust world capitalist system. Laurence Cox expresses this as a commitment to avoid "theoretical imperialism," instead attentively listening to what social movement actors themselves say about their struggles. The aim, he suggests, is not to standardize concepts too quickly in the name of a logical formalism, but to accept nuances and differences as social movement actors struggle with much more powerful opponents (146). With Cox, I agree that it is important to "theorize in ways adequate to this reality — and to do so in dialogue with participants and their own modes of thought" (146). But as many authors

in this book likewise point out, so doing is never a simple task, since hegemonic ideas rooted in unequal material relationships make the interpretation of experience a task that is far from transparent. This is true with respect to an important, systemic shortcoming of this book.

In brief, despite Hojsberg's chapter on Black liberation and Hetland and Goodwin's contribution to thinking about LGBT movements, *Marxism and social movements* only incompletely achieves its stated aim of taking seriously the multiple dimension of class struggle, including those aspects that challenge institutional and "attitudinal" racism, heteronormativity, gender inequalities and more. There is virtually no discussion of disability advocacy from historical materialist perspectives, for instance, even though about 15 percent of the world's population (World Health Organization 2011), the vast majority of them inevitability from the working and subaltern classes, are disabled by social relations, institutions and infrastructures built around normative bodies and minds.[6] In addition, it is not too much to say that nearly the entire canon of historical materialist feminism is absent from this book. There is no mention – never mind serious integration — of the arguments put forward by a wide range of historical materialist feminists, both historical and contemporary. There is literally not a single reference to work by Joan Acker, Abigail Bakan, Radhika Desai, Radha D'Souza, Martha Gimenez, Nancy Hartsock, Frigga Haug, Rosemary Hennessy, Chrys Ingraham, Claudia Jones, Maria Mies, Shahrzad Mojab, or Lise Vogel, among many others. Himani Bannerji, Johanna Brenner, and Dorothy Smith are mentioned — but briefly, without any serious, detailed exploration of their rich work. Similarly, theoretical contributions from the global South and by anti-racist and anti-colonial Marxists are thin, despite the contribution by Hira Singh.

Among others (such as Bakan 2012 and Coburn 2014), Smith (1999) has written incisively about how such exclusions occur. Too often, for instance, women's contributions are marginalized as a "separate" concern from "mainstream" (Marxist) theorizing, so that there is little prestige in incorporating "minor" feminist insights into (historical materialist) theorizing. The fact that the four main editors are men and that the eighteen chapters and introduction feature just two women contributors, neither of whom especially highlights feminist materialist insights, may be a "material" explanation for such silences. Along similar lines and for probably similar institutional reasons, Marxist insights into racism, including by some of the above-mentioned socialist-feminists, are largely minor. Anti-racism is addressed separately, as in Hogsberg's useful chapter on CLR James as an emblematic figure within the Black liberation movement, but this is a separate "topic" rather than being integrated across the book. Lesbian and gay

[6] For historical materialist insights into disability see, for instance, Erevelles 2011 and for insights not explicitly Marxist but certainly sympathetic to them, see Davidson 2008.

movements are addressed in detail in a few pages, but then forgotten. This means that the accounts we have of Marxist insights into social movements — despite their diversity — are ultimately partial. They objectively centre mostly white, mostly male, mostly British — and mostly able-bodied and straight — perspectives into social movements within world capitalism. Symptomatically, the first page of the bibliography lists 23 separate individuals, for instance, all of whom are men, while the last page lists 20, of whom 14 are men. There are whole chapters, like Nilsen and Cox's chapter on "What would a Marxist theory of social movements look like?" in which socialist women theorists are virtually absent, as if no Marxist feminist has any insights worth considering with respect to historical materialist theorizing of social movements.

This is not a charge against the identities of the authors, which in any case, none of us chooses. Rather, it is an observation about their social position within unequal gendered, classed, and raced relationships in a capitalist world riddled with heteronormative and disabling institutions. From historical materialist perspectives, the editors' social location — which is arguably similar — may have contributed to the exclusion of "standpoints" (Harding 2004), like materialist feminisms, that are more likely to emerge from those who experience — for instance — gender and race inequalities as problematic in everyday ways within capitalism. In this, the apparently strong, collegial relationships among the editors[7], while likely facilitating the editorial work, may ultimately have been a disservice to the intellectual breadth. All this is not to say that the book is not useful. On the contrary, in my review I have sought to highlight the strengths of the book, which merits the serious consideration I have sought to give it. But it seems to me that the book might have been significantly more "open" than it is to insights by Marxist feminists, anti-colonial Marxists, socialist experts on disability and so on. This would have required an explicit effort to move beyond "naturally" collegial circles. We need, as Marxists, to listen closely to what is said by the whole range of historical materialist scholars and activists. But to begin to do this in our scholarly work we need to be reflexive about the limits of our own visions. Indeed, this reflexivity and a willingness to reach beyond our own circles is vital if we really are going to challenge — and one day transcend — the unjust, exploitative, and alienating world capitalist relations that now shape our lives.

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Books Reviewed

Cairns, James and Alan Sears. 2012. *The democratic imagination: envisioning popular power in the twenty-first century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN: 9781442605282. Paperback: $24.95. Pages: 224.

Reviewed by Hugo Bonin

Gray, Mel, Coates, John and Hetherington, Tiani eds. 2013. *Environmental social work*. London, England: Routledge. ISBN: 9780203095300. E-book: 45.40 CAD. Pages: xx + 340.

Reviewed by Walter Wai Tak Chan

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Reviewed by Bill Carroll

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Reviewed by Garry Potter

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Reviewed by Aziz Choudry

Cairns, James and Alan Sears. 2012. *The democratic imagination: envisioning popular power in the twenty-first century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN: 9781442605282. Paperback: $24.95. Pages: 224.

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Democracy poses a challenge. At its most simple, it is an obstacle to those who are in power and wish to maintain their place. However, democracy also presents challenges for those engaged in radical politics as they struggle with both its complexity and its potential. Democracy, by its vastness and ramifications, poses a challenge to those who study it.

With *The Democratic Imagination*, authors Cairns and Sears compose a great introductory text, both accessible to a wide readership while demanding questions on the future of democracy in Western countries, all without giving easy answers. As such, those looking for a more in-depth analysis of democracy, whether from a historical, theoretical or technical perspective, might remain unsatisfied.

Contrary to most introductions, which tend to present democracy as a more or less continuous story from Ancient Athens to the contemporary world, the book presents two conceptions of democracy and then opposes these conceptions on a number of different subjects. The first concept is 'official democracy', the one taught in schools and by government agencies as 'a particular form of administration in which 'the people' elect representatives who have specific decision-making power' (7). In this view, democracy is mostly restricted to the affairs of the State, although the range of State powers varies depending on political context. Therefore, a social-democratic and a neoliberal government are necessarily involved in the same domains in society and with the same intensity.

The second concept outlined in the book is 'democracy from below'. Similar to direct democracy, this term refers here to 'processes of self-government that are based on the establishment of popular power in all areas of life' (13). Here, contrary to the official stance, democracy is something viewed as desirable beyond the State, in places such as the school, the workplace or the household. In this version of democracy, 'official democracy', while clearly a step forward, is not enough and needs to be either reformed or radically transformed, depending on which author is writing. While sketching these conceptions, the authors make clear that neither of them exists in a pure form and that current democracy is often in tension between those two conceptions.

Once this distinction is established, Cairns and Sears explore a series of topics (citizenship, representation, bureaucracy, education and body politics) in which they present the analysis and challenges of both democratic conceptions. While some of the themes are treated in a relatively classic manner (the discussion of democratizing the economy in the second chapter might be familiar to many readers), others are more original. For instance, in their chapter on body politics, Cairns and Sears skillfully present an overview of the complex relation between democracy and violence, especially in a revolutionary context. Afterwards, they present the ways the two perspectives on democracy studied in the book have dealt with body politics. While 'movements from below' such as second-wave feminism or LGBTQ liberation managed to reclaim their bodies from State and Capital appropriation and regulation, proponents of official democracy have pictured government expenses as a fat body (or as a 'gravy-train') that need to be cut off. By showing how body politics shift along different political lines, the authors allow us to look critically at democracy and its relation with ableism, patriarchy, racism, cissexism and heteronormativity.

Although interesting, at times the discussion of the topic might not go far enough for some of the readers. For example, the authors' analysis of the relation of democracy and knowledge offers a useful summary of the debates on the role of expertise in democracy while expanding the question by talking about pedagogical democracy. However, their proposition of 'problem-based learning' as an example of the fact that 'democracy goes together with an unleashing of learning powers' (128) can be seen as problematic. Indeed, considering how this approach has been successfully integrated in school curriculums without causing transformations to the structure of education, the potential for democratizing education seems rather limited. Therefore, a deeper analysis of radical pedagogy and its attention to the question of democratic education might have been beneficial to all.

One can also consider that the overall structure of the book, with its small thematic chapters, while great for course reading, might lack a more cohesive narrative. Although the authors try to mitigate this effect by drawing links between the chapters, it tends to feel a bit like overlapping (e.g., presenting the model of shop-steward unionism in both chapters four and five). Fortunately, these types of shortcomings are rare and will only bother the most demanding readers.

The Democratic Imagination is an accessible book on a topic that is too often cast either in an oversimplifying light or obscured by academic disputes. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, readers looking for an introduction to the importance of debating democracy will enjoy this well-written and well-documented presentation. Most of all, the openness of the authors in admitting their own biases and intentions will allow the reader to pursue their own questions and discussions, whether in books or on the streets.

This defence of the necessity of thinking imaginatively about democracy comes at the right time. Indeed, throughout the book Cairns and Sears put a much needed emphasis on creativity, imagination and criticism as a road towards self-governance. In her 2014 National Book Award acceptance speech, fiction writer Ursula K. Le Guin noted something similar, stating that, "we live in capitalism, its power seems inescapable – but then, so did the divine right of kings. Any human power can be resisted and changed by human beings" (2014). Be it from a literary or political perspective, our democratic imagination seems to have a crucial role to play in the years to come.

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A timely book! With this past December's United Nations climate change summit held in Paris, a study headed by Nobel Laureate Jonathan Patz established a clear link between bad health and a warming planet. Harm from climate change includes spikes in the rates of respiratory diseases caused by fine particulate pollutants, infections transported by mosquitoes and polluted water, and food insecurity from reduced crop yields and an increase in plant diseases ("Climate change called public health threat," 22 September 2014). Natural disasters like the increasing power of hurricanes are related to climate change. The result is trauma, loss of housing, and loss of economic security.

The United States, accounting for five percent of the global population, emits around twenty-five percent of world greenhouse gases (Rashid 2007). Yet pollution's negative consequences disproportionately affect the poorest nations, pushing poorest of the poor in those societies to famine and epidemics. Dr. Patz suggests that United States energy policy is in effect exporting hunger and disease to the rest of the world. Does this

not sound like a worst-case scenario of global imperialism? Indeed it is meaty content for the erstwhile social activist.

Social work, as a major human services profession in industrialized countries, operates an extensive infrastructure responsible for significant carbon emissions and other forms of pollution. I thus feel social work serves as a test case for how all professions can become ecologically sustainable. The historical lineage of *Environmental social work*, an edited compilation, includes John Coates's (2003) *Ecology and social work: Toward a new paradigm* and Michael Zapf's (2009) *Social Work and the environment: Understanding people and place*. These earlier works were quite cohesive because they had solo authorship and a singular vision. This volume is more ambitious. It is an analysis, from multiple authors, of social work's engagement with the nonhuman environment, a jumping off point for future projects. Editors Mel Gray, John Coates, and Tiani Hetherington have brought together 23 authors to write this hefty tome (hefty because it is a lot of e-pages and caused me to have sore eyes).

The editors hope to shift social work from a purely anthropocentric conception of the environment to one including non-humans and the physical world. The book seeks to expand environmental social work scholarship beyond the current small, self-referencing circle of environmental devotees, dealing with mainly theoretical issues to a wider social work community who produce and apply knowledge to daily ecological questions. The editors also wish to connect the social work profession with environmental activism. I feel the book does this successfully as each chapter touches on activist themes.

The passion that John Coates has for this work is unmistakable. A writer for the Global Alliance for Deep Ecological Social Work, Coates is former Director of Saint Thomas University's School of Social Work. He possesses a distinguished track record in propounding social work in taking appropriate climate action, notwithstanding the profession's general collective disinterest. Mel Gray is an Australian academic, and Tiani Hetherington is a recent PhD graduate also from Australia.

The book comprises of three sections. The first section deals with theoretical approaches. Section II consists of case studies of social work actively involving the nonhuman environment. Section III looks at environmental education in the profession, especially curriculum's role in disseminating (or not) a bio-centric ecological perspective. Overall, the book has fourteen chapters plus opening and concluding chapters. Length-wise it is quite long and there is a rather ponderous repetition of material. The writing can be uneven. Much of it is rather dense with numerous APA-style references piled one on top of another. However, some articles read very well. A few were absolute marvels of erudition.

Some highlights of the theory section – Fred Besthorn illuminates a useful distinction between environmental justice and ecological justice. Environmental justice,

based on a utilitarian moral philosophy, conceives of the environment as a resource or a service for humanity. It leads to an argument for an equitable distribution of natural resources for humans and solidifying humanity's role as controller and steward of the earth. Ecological justice on the other hand is humanity in service to the environment. Besthorn prefers the latter.

Another outstanding chapter is Susan Taylor's fascinating take on rehabilitating seal pups at the Marine Mammal Center in Marin County, California, an exemplar of venturing outside typical professional boundaries. This chapter however would have been better placed in the case study section as its focus is not theoretical. Absolutely indispensable is Frank Tester's chapter on the relationship between human rights law and the structural violence of neoliberal governments and allied corporate polluters (e.g., the Alberta tar sands industries). Although he adopts what I feel is a rather old-fashioned concept of class struggle, Tester provides sharp insight into the reasons for why the United Nations and current international law have failed to adequately engage with climate change. Other articles in Section I include a focus on how climate change is particularly devastating on marginalized groups in society. Despite the highlights, I wonder: where are theories originating outside the social sciences? Social science in my estimation cannot by itself form the foundation of an ecological professional practice because the very nature of ecology demands a wider learning.

Section II brings together case studies of practice. New York academic Benjamin Shepard describes community garden activism using an "Earth First" organizing technique. A chapter on ecological community service for criminal offenders in Houston Texas is especially noteworthy because it details a nut and bolts look on such an endeavor. I find it telling both the Texas criminal justice system and the Gulf Coastal Plain ecology are broken, even shattered. Other topics include working with drought-affected families in Australia, animal companionship, the moral status of nonhuman life, and negotiations with corporations on corporate social accountability. This broad range is commendable and may interest a diverse audience.

Section III discusses environmental education within the profession. A range of curriculum options are presented. Peter Jones asserts that a "bolt-on" approach – where environmental problems are added onto an existing professional curriculum as one more topic or course – is the least favorable. He feels a transformed social work curriculum with ecology, human and nonhuman, at its center would be the best option. He rightly advocates for indigenous knowledge as the curriculum's foundation. Mishka Lysack presents useful information on the science of species extinction and human's emotional response to such extinction. However, some ethicists might object to Lysack's inclusion of E.O. Wilson's ideas (known as "the father of sociobiology," Wilson has advocated biological determinism in human society). Another article explains the U.S. National Association of Social Workers' official policy toward the natural environment. One

article discusses using an interdisciplinary case study method to educate people on how to protect the ecologically-sensitive Altamaha River Basin in Georgia, USA.

This book I feel has two major omissions. Firstly, indigenous knowledge is kept at the margins. To me, the majority of indigenous knowledge is completely congruent with a non-anthropocentric, ecological way of life. It is like a good cup of coffee – all the ingredients are there, exquisitely blended. You can't tell where the milk ends, and the sugar begins. For example, the Nehiyaw (Cree) knowledge of berry-picking builds relationships amongst people and amongst nonhuman beings. Family and friends go out to pick berries and encounter wildlife (other plants, rocks, wind, water, and insects) as part of natural rhythms. At the same time, berry-picking gathers good foods to enjoy now and to be preserved, giving thanks to fruits and not letting such treasures go to waste. A rich and intimate knowledge of such land based indigenous practices should form the centerpiece of a book on social-environmental work. Sadly it does not.

Secondly, interdisciplinary alliances are feeble. Of 23 writers, only one, Frank Tester has formal training in biological science. A foundational text on environmental social work should detail descriptions and theories of the ecosphere from biologists, environmental scientists, and physical scientists, blended into a "social" or "convivial" as well as Indigenous knowledge ethos. Unfortunately, it doesn't happen here. When questioned by climate-change deniers, how credible would the person be who has scant knowledge of biological processes forming the ecosystem? Not very credible! By itself, social science cannot adequately address climate change. Like the ecological spirit which birthed this book, social scientists must join forces with physical and biological sciences, as well as indigenous methodologies. Without this, the endeavor becomes unbalanced. The interdisciplinary work covered in the book does not extend any further than adjacent social sciences such as economics and peace studies and completely leaves out the physical sciences. (The exceptions are Taylor's work with marine mammals and Lysack's compilation of recent scientific work.) Taking a purely social work point of view, as this book often employs, may be too constraining for something that by necessity draws insight from a plethora of knowledge.

This book attempts to be discourse-changing. In this, it's partially successful. The book greatly appeals as an ecological justice sourcebook for social workers and social work trainees. There are useful informational tidbits on U.N. climate conventions and national environmental policies. It is less successful in broadening the field from a rather small group of social work ecology enthusiasts, given the rather weak links toward the physical sciences and indigenous methods; in order to carry out an effective practice, I believe it's necessary to have solid foundations in the underlying theory. Thus, given the somewhat inadequate theory base, the practice articles although informative on their own seem rather disjointed and autonomous when taken as a whole.

If the aim is critiquing and remaking the project of modernity as it stands today, with its unfettered pollution, resource extraction, and obsession on growth, it's a radical project indeed. Social work is arguably one of the foundational pillars of the modern nation state in the West. To lead social work to a wholeheartedly natural ecological perspective means to tamper with the Fordist, Keynesian paradigm that ipso facto legitimizes the profession, a paradigm backed by bureaucratic institutions, legislation, and capital. This paradigm can be summed up as: it's just us. No animals or lands matter. It's a race to take and take and take, and dump our waste without care. This book suggests possibilities for a radically transformed social work which roots out on a global scale both the physical and political processes undermining justice. An Olympian task indeed, and beyond the capacities of any single text or author. The social work profession may wish to start humbly, getting its hands dirty in the mud, and become comrades with hunters, peasants, and biologists alike. Fred Besthorn makes clear the point: "Social work must eventually change the central philosophical ground of its conceptualization of justice. In a practical sense, no matter how social work languages its idea of justice, in the end all justice is ecological."

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In this engaging and accessible text, Lawrence Cox and Alf Nilsen pursue one key idea: social movements—current and past—make up the fabric of capitalist modernity. This thesis is firmly rooted in the soil of classical historical materialism. The authors thus distinguish movements "from above" and "from below," which develop in a dialectical relation. Through this lens, they view social movements as integral to how we make our own history. The authors have produced an excellent though inevitably selective synthesis of social science in the historical materialist tradition. They do this by standing on the shoulders of quite a few giants.

The book is deeply structured around Marx and Engels's contributions to social ontology (human needs, capacities and praxis, structure and agency), to the analysis of capitalist development worldwide, and to normative thinking through the imperative of Marx's Thesis 11—with the early chapters laying out the ontology and the later ones drawing on the theory of capitalist development. Antonio Gramsci figures quite significantly throughout: the analysis is framed around a problematic of hegemony and counter-hegemony and it takes up key Gramscian questions around the transformation of common sense into good sense, the need for subaltern groups to move beyond immediate interests, the need to construct an alternative political project around a system of alliances, and the radical contingency of organic crises. Gramscian cultural scholars Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall provide insights on such issues as militant particularism, the emergent character of culture, and the contingent relationship between encoding and decoding within ideological practice. Soviet linguist Valentin Volosinov's dialectical theorization of language (which in my view remains far more incisive than a heap of poststructuralism) is tapped for insights on consciousness and ideology. British social historians, especially EP Thompson, fill out the analysis of agency, history, and the making of classes. Contemporary political economists David Harvey, Bob Jessop and David McNally supply the structural framework for an analysis of movements from above and below in the current era. Michael Lebowitz's *Beyond Capital*, an exploration of the political economy of labour and its implications for a Marxist reading of social movements, is acknowledged as a significant precursor text. *We make our own history* is not so much an original contribution as it is a synthesis of these perspectives. And it is not a "social movements" text in any conventional sense. Rather, it disturbs the boundaries that constitute this genre, insisting that movements (including the institutionalized residues of past movements) should not be consigned to a subfield of

sociology, but recognized as a central aspect of modernity. That said, this book will be valuable to movement activists and in university courses that take up social movements, political sociology, and critical political science.

Cox and Nilsen develop their synthesis through critique of extant formulations, including mainstream social movement theory (which they dismiss in a summary manner) as well as academic Marxisms of two sorts: the overly structural (most political economy) and the overly voluntarist (autonomist celebration of movement agency without "real discussion of how the movements they work with could go *beyond* their current mode of existence") (16). Instead of these "contemplative" approaches, the book offers a praxis-oriented take, emphasizing the connection between theory and "the struggle to change the game" (23). However, it suffers from two blind spots. On the one hand, Cox and Nilsen are too dismissive of conventional sociology. In my view, historical materialism needs to engage with conventional social science, and to learn from that engagement. Formulations such as new social movement theory, resource mobilization theory, and the extensive literature on the discursive framing of collective action contain insights which could have enriched Cox and Nilsen's analysis. On the other hand, the book ignores most of its precursors on the critical side of social science—including key books by Larry Ray (*Rethinking critical theory: emancipation in the age of global social movements*, 1993) and Steven Buechler (*Social movements in advanced capitalism*, 1999)—as well as my own *Organizing dissent* (1992, 1997) and related articles, which presented a Gramscian analysis that resonates well with Cox and Nilsen's. The authors also assume the from above/from below motif can be generalized from their class-centred narrative to various categories of subalternality, such as gender and race/ethnicity, and they invite others to pursue such work. Yet it is not clear how one might transplant that motif into, for example, the politics of disability (structured around centrality, marginality and normalization) without losing a sense of the specific dynamics of power in contexts less immediately shaped by the dialectic of class. A final weakness in my view is the cursory treatment this book gives to the global ecological crisis. Apart from occasional references to ecological struggles, the analysis is bereft of political ecology, a crucial field for contemporary Marxism.

The arc of the book reaches from initial thoughts on social ontology, through presentation of "a Marxist theory of social movements", to a detailed account of the development of capitalism in a dialectic of movements from above and from below. The final chapter focuses on the movement-of-movements against neoliberalism and arrives at a diagnosis of our times, including some useful ideas on transnational transformative politics, and how movements from below might break the current stalemate that comprises a global organic crisis. But as an indicator of how fast events move, the final chapter, written late in 2013, asserts that the planned "long war on terror" is "basically over" (160). This glitch recalls the well-known misdiagnosis of the 2008 financial crisis—

that neoliberalism had met its demise. In a similar spirit, we may ask if what these authors call neoliberalism's "twilight" is the best terminology, given its many lives. This question returns us to this important book's core message. If we make our own history, then the future—including neoliberalism's—is radically open, and the onus is on us not only to understand but to change the world.

Not Enough Fight: a Review of *Fight for Your Long Day* and an Argument about the Sessional Situation

Kudera, Alex. 2010. *Fight for your long day*. Madison, NJ: Atticus Books. ISBN 978-0-9845105-0-4. Paperback: 18.99 CAD. Pages: 265.

Reviewed by Garry Potter
Wilfred Laurier University

This is in some respects an excellent book. It won the 2011 Independent Publisher (IPPY) Book Award - Gold for Best Regional Fiction (Mid-Atlantic), it has been favorably reviewed in numerous journals including the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, and it already has a certain cult status among contract academic faculty (adjuncts as they are called in the US). The numbers of people who identify with the book's main character—Cyrus Duffleman—are growing rapidly. This is easily understandable, as ever increasing numbers of people share Duffleman's working conditions and resentments, as casual labourers in the neoliberal, ever more factory-like institutions of higher education.

Duffleman needs to work four lecturer/tutor jobs, plus an additonal one as a university security guard, to keep himself financially afloat. Among a long list of his worries, the lack of any health care benefits in his short term contractual employment particularly worries him. Canadian contract academic faculty also lack much in the way of a benefits package, but at least our country has a decent national health insurance plan. One can well imagine Duffleman being something of an enthusiastic and grateful proponent of Obamacare, but Obama is not the president of his fictional US; rather it is President Fern/Bush. This is a satirical novel, but satire generally involves humor, albeit sometimes a rather bitter laugh. But this book is much more sad than funny.

The four educational institutions spread around Philadelphia that Duffleman works at are very different in terms of their wealth and their class—yes, class—of student intake. The novel thus gives something of a cross section of "allegedly higher" education in America. For all those who have ever taught in higher education, Kundera's portrayals of classroom discussion—going brilliantly, limping along, out of control—will very much ring true. So too will the various cost management strategies employed by the

administrators strike a resonant chord. Duffleman's fictional universe is very similar to the real world conditions faced not only by US adjunct professors (the American name for sessionals) but Canadian and other countries' (the UK and Australia for example) sessionals as well; this is why so many of them love this book and identify with its main character. And this, to me, is what is most sad! Many people identify with Duffleman's resentments and disappointments; this is understandable. What is sad though, is that probably many also identify with his self-flagellating resignation to his situation. Our poorly paid contract academic faculty not only endure poor pay and working conditions but a constant implicit insult to their professional worth.

There is very sad irony in the title of this book: *Fight… for your long day*. Duffleman's "long day" is Thursday, the day when he must teach on all four of the different campuses where he is employed and then conclude with a security guard shift until midnight. He certainly does have to fight to get through his "long day". He fights, a pretty much losing battle, to preserve his dignity. He fights to try, completely unsuccessfully, to preserve his self-esteem. He is constantly doubting his own self-worth, measuring his own human value by his paltry paycheck. He fights, partially successfully, to preserve his integrity; or at least he is constantly guiltily, though ineffectually, obsessing about it. What he doesn't do at all, is in any way *fight to change his situation.*

It is interesting to note that while the Duffleman character reflects upon many, many things about economic disparities and race and class and gender in America, about the changing conditions of higher education and his own supremely exploited position within it, there is one word that never even passes through his mind; there is one word that is never mentioned even once in the entire book: union!

The character of Duffleman is in some respects that of a good man but not all. There is a pathos about him that is, well, pathetic. You tire of his inwardly directed anger and his terror of authority; after a time you are impatient with his lack of a sense of self-worth and become particularly impatient with his guilt. I have known many, many contract academic faculty. I was one myself for many years. The sessionals I know *are not* pathetic! They are intelligent and strong and active. They are not wallowing in bathos; and yes, most of the ones I know anyway, are ready to fight to change things!

There are, of course, structural difficulties to overcome. But that is precisely where the struggle is, what the struggle is. Canada with the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) (not quite a union but like a union in some respects), with the CAUT Defence Fund (our union of unions), with Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), is better off in this regard than is the United States. But better off than abysmal is still not very good.

The last sad irony to reflect upon here is less to do with the book *Fight for Your Long Day* than to do with this review of it. As I said, the sessionals I know, are intelligent and strong and ready to fight; it is the *tenured faculty* that need waking up! It is the

tenured faculty that needs to understand that standing with their contract faculty colleagues is in *all* our interest. It is the only way decent higher education can be preserved against the neoliberal assault upon it!

Perera, Suvendrini and Sherene H. Razack. eds. 2014. *At the limits of justice: women of colour on terror*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 978-1-4426-2600-3. Paperback: 42.95 CAD. Pages 632.

Reviewed by Aziz Choudry
McGill University

What qualifies as terror and violence? Comprising thirty chapters/creative contributions, this collection arises from a 2012 workshop convened in Toronto by, and about, women scholars of colour and Indigenous women scholars theorizing multiple sources of violence and terror and interrogating the conceptual contents of these terms. A short book review article can hardly do justice to a book of this length and breadth. Bringing together established and emerging scholars from several countries, this ambitious collection questions the meaning(s) of terror; the forms that are commonly recognized; its racialized and gendered effects; ways in which both practices and representations of terror and violence circulate across time, spaces, and place; and what these practices and representations do. One of this collection's strengths is that it moves across and beyond the more familiar and less well-documented sites in the context of a seemingly never-ending "war on terror". The book is divided into six sections. These are: "Mundane terror/(Un)livable lives," "Violence is a far country: Other women's lives," "Terror and the limits of remembering," "Thinking humanitarianism/Thinking terror," "Terror circuits," and "Theorizing (at) the limits of justice." Geographically, chapters discuss Palestine, Chile, Australia, Canada, Abu Ghraib, the killing fields of the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Guyana, Jamaica, USA, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, and locations across the African continent. Many contributions also have a transnational focus, making interconnections between different sites and locations and considering relations of proximity and distance from terror. A major concern of the book is to think through ways in which knowledge—the praxis of knowing and doing—is produced at the limits of in/justice.

Editors Suvendrini Perera and Sherene Razack note in their introduction:

> A problem we face as racialized women is that each time we encounter hegemonic discourses on terror, and attempt to circulate critical counter-narratives, we are seen not as academics who have carefully researched an issue, but rather as persons with a personal and therefore partial and non-objective analysis (6).

Many of the chapters engage with the ways in which both public knowledge and academic scholarship are produced from and about experiences of terror. For example, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian's chapter engages with everyday forms of violence inflicted on Palestinian women under Israeli occupation during pregnancy and while giving birth, as well as the administrative controls which narrate Palestinians – including unborn and newborn children – as terrorist Others. She suggests that birthing Palestinian women's voices and ways of knowing about their conditions are key to producing knowledge for reclaiming and asserting their rights, documenting and challenging the hegemonic accounts produced by the Israeli security regime. Other chapters engage with ways in which experiences of state repression—arrests, violence, harassment, intimidation and surveillance —can help build a deeper analysis of state power, the nature of liberal democracy, and the interests of capital from the standpoint of those targeted. As Sunaina Maira notes in her chapter, forms of state surveillance and violence are racialized, which influences the intimacy of surveillance and its regularization in people's everyday lives. Maira's ethnographic research in California reveals that one reaction among primarily South Asian-, Arab-, and Afghan-American youth has been to normalize surveillance in their everyday lives rather than to bear a burden of private shame.

With its emphasis on illuminating forms of state terror and violence, this book includes Robina Thomas' chapter on the violence of Canada's Indian residential school system for Indigenous communities and Nicole Watson's critical assessment of the Australian federal government's imposition of its controversial Northern Territory Emergency Response onto Indigenous communities in the name of protecting Indigenous children from sexual abuse. Many chapters explicitly attend to historical and continuing practices of terror—invasion, occupation, colonialism, imperialism, militarism, and racism—asking how violence is both remembered and layered onto the present. In part, the book seeks to challenge what Bannerji (2003) has called the hegemonic cultural common sense of these concepts, constructed as they have been through processes of knowledge production that are shaped by, and which attempt to erase, the traces of colonial/imperialist relations and histories.

While the ethics and politics of memory is a theme running through many chapters, Teresa Macias' insightful discussion of the biopolitics of torture (under the Pinochet dictatorship) and the telling of histories of torture through the national commission on truth and reconciliation (and by extension similar state commissions) problematizes the politics of recognition and reconciliation. She argues that in these

contexts where truth-telling processes are controlled by the state, survivors of torture are both excluded and subsumed to a nation-building project (in this case, a neoliberal Chile). She asks us to contemplate possible alternatives, to think and act differently in relation to documenting torture and being accountable for the past. Citing an excerpt from Grenadian poet Merle Collins, Alissa Trotz also poses some thoughtful wide-ranging questions in her chapter on coming to terms with racial terror in 1960s Guyana, asking what kind of public intellectual work is most appropriate to raise more complete and more complex questions about "historical and contemporary processes of violence, nationalism and state formation in the Caribbean and elsewhere, reading across superficially separate spaces in the region and beyond for the resonances that exist" (304), beyond standard academic formats. Indeed, one feature of this book is that several chapters include poetry, photography, and other visual artistic representations.

There is much to recommend in this book, although the writing is sometimes uneven, and at times unnecessarily dense. *At the limits of justice* is a timely and welcome book which makes contributions towards a framework for thinking through (but not necessarily resolving) the meanings of terror and violence, as well as the geopolitics and circuitry of forming, sustaining, and circulating these concepts. In doing so it is an ambitious project seeking to illuminate historical continuities, geographies made and remade by old and newer forms of imperialism and colonialism.

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