

Article

**EVERY INCH O' TH' ISLAND:
CUBA, CALIBAN, AND CLANDESTINIDAD**

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Abstract

This article presents the metaphor of the character Caliban seen in Shakespeare's *The Tempest* that has been used as a manner to compare colonial subjectivities in postcolonial contexts throughout the Caribbean. Analyzing the sociological and economical impact of tourism on Cuba, this paper explores how tourism has given rise to a new subjected "Caliban" in Cuba through the promotion of social and economic disparities. The disparities inherent between the tourist and the Cuban in the country are seen all throughout the island: the disparity arrives from outside of the island, affects the operations within the island, and even influences the operations "below" the island through the development of the Cuban black-market. Caliban, as this paper proposes, is subjected in "every inch" of the island, yet no longer by colonialists that arrive by ship, but by tourists arriving by plane.

Keywords

Cuba; Cuban; Tourism; Caliban; Socialism; critiques of capitalism; globalization; social justice; Caribbean; Culture; Postcolonialism; Colonialism; Black-market; prostitution; socialism; communism

Be not afeard; the isle is full of noises

- Caliban in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*

*Cuba has many voices, and they are often contradictory.
The nation is educated but starving for information,
proud but prostituting its daughters,
revolutionary but suffocating.*

- Catherine Moses

Prologue: The New Prospero

The character of Caliban taken from Shakespeare's *The Tempest* has been used as a common metaphor to compare colonial subjectivities in postcolonial contexts throughout the Caribbean. Shakespeare creates the name Caliban as an anagram deriving from both cannibal and Carib (a reference to indigenous people, groups of which the Caribbean was named after, scattered throughout Venezuela, Brazil, and the Lesser Antilles islands). The anagram itself describes the prejudice inherent in the name Caliban. The native Caliban, the subhuman son of the witch Sycorax, is considered by the magician Prospero and other colonizers of the island as a monster. He is both cannibal and Carib, the anthropophagous monster and the native. The Cuban writer Roberto Fernández Retamar, in his now classic essay "Calibán" (1971), understands Caliban to be a metaphor for Cuban culture in which the Cuban people, much like Caliban, were colonized (by Spain and by the neo-colonial threat of U.S. imperialism) and taught the colonizers language (Castilian). Fernández Retamar therefore spins the classic dichotomy of the Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó who took the characters Ariel and Caliban of *The Tempest* to respectively imply Latin American and North American cultures. Instead, Fernández Retamar throws Ariel out of the mix completely—" [t]here is no real Ariel-Caliban polarity" (1989, 16)—and defines Caliban to represent not North America, but the historical context of Cuba. In doing so, he focuses on a new dichotomy between Prospero and Caliban, between colonialism and Cuban culture. For Fernández Retamar, Caliban is the perfect metaphor to highlight the history of Cuban oppression in order to reshape a postcolonial identity out of the mutual oppression and victories achieved by the Cuban people: "I know no other metaphor more expressive of our cultural situation, of our reality [...] what is our history, what is our culture, if not the history and culture of Caliban?" (1989, 14). In qualifying Cuba to represent the culture of Caliban, Fernández Retamar aims to hang a victory medal over Caliban's head. The Cuban revolution of 1959 comes to represent for Fernández Retamar the era of a new beginning, of Che's *hombre nuevo* (new man), the escape from imperialism, and thus the metaphorical victory of Caliban over Prospero. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri adamantly put it, "the culture of Caliban is the culture of resistance that turns the weapons of colonial domination back against it" (2009, 98). Caliban, the "monster," becomes less the timid creature of the cage, and more so the vibrant dragon of the air, liberated, powerful, and resistant.

The difficulty with Fernández Retamar's metaphor is that Caliban's victory—that is, the achievements of the 1959 Cuban revolution—implies simultaneously a new hegemonic structure that remains interconnected to Prospero's colonial lust. Where the subaltern finds victory, so must the power of another find defeat and this hegemonic circle does not stop, it cannot stop, at Prospero's exile. Rather, resistance does not evolve

into the complete elimination of oppression inasmuch as it does the superseding of it. That is to say that Caliban's liberation does not take away his prejudice as monster. Caliban is not the frog, that when kissed, "becomes prince," as Hardt and Negri put it, referring to "the process of the multitude learning the art of self-rule and investing lasting democratic forms of social organization" (2009, viii). Rather, resistance struggles are often more complex than a simple tug-of-war victory between Caliban and Prospero. We see not just one side or the other, but both sides at the same time pulling each end of the rope, fighting not the other side, but the consistent tension between the two. As a dichotomy, the two are intricately connected in a manner that guarantee's a constant tension between oppression and resistance. "The monster's labor is needed," explains Hardt and Negri, "and thus he must be kept inside the island society" (2009, 97). Therefore, although Prospero conquers Caliban, he at the same time requires Caliban to legitimate his power. Likewise, Caliban's victory does not assure that Prospero will encounter his full defeat. On the contrary Prospero needs the monster's labour and will do what is necessary to search it out, whether resisted or not. This is the essence of what Hardt and Negri seem to be implying by the monster's "labour," whereby Prospero seeks the consumption of capitalist labour to fuel his hegemonic control.

Are we then to assume that Caliban's victory implies the end of Prospero's exploitation of labour? Fidel's nationalization of all foreign-owned private companies, many US operated, seemed to give that impression. However, Cuban society today reveals a fair amount of liable realities that shed doubt on Prospero's eternal exit. Capitalist exploitation—which includes corporeal exploitation evidenced in the existence of sex-tourism and prostitution—is a common thread in Cuban society that challenges assumptions of Prospero's absence. What it comes down to is a question that seems to conflict with Fernández Retamar's metaphor of Caliban: how are we to define Caliban as victorious while removing his label of "cannibalistic monster"? The truth is that we cannot, for Caliban's monstrosity is not an image that was wiped away by bearded men in the Sierra Maestra in 1959, but one that is consistently being placed upon him, tugging him without end, always evoking a tension.

The "monstrous" tension between Caliban and Prospero represents our metaphorical components of hegemony. The hegemonic struggle between Caliban and Prospero does not disappear with revolutions or time, it merely changes appearance. If it is not Prospero who subjects Caliban to the label of "monster," then it is Trinculo or Stephano, other colonizers arriving to the island cloaked under different names. In the classic play the jester Trinculo and the butler Stephano, both drunk servants of King Alonso (who assisted with Prospero's exile), stumble across Caliban while on the island. Stephano shares some wine with Caliban who believes it to be a "celestial" drink thus causing him to believe that Stephano has come from heaven. In awe of this new celestial being, Caliban offers himself to Stephano begging to be his servant: "I'll show thee every fertile inch o' th' island," declares Caliban, furthering his gesture to Stephano by

exhorting, "And I will kiss thy foot: I prithee, be my god." (Shakespeare 2004, 52). And indeed it is every inch of the island where Caliban, even in the absence of Prospero, finds himself subjugated as the "monster" of society, oppressed, and colonized. Caliban, as Fernández Retamar claims Cuba to be, may appear to have his victory over Prospero, but not over Stephano. For this reason, where Fernández Retamar assumes Caliban's victory, I see only a restructured tension. Where Hardt and Negri see the power of resistance on the side of Caliban, I see at the same time the other side the rope pulled by another power, at times even known for the image of drunkenness and unruliness like Stephano, arriving in the form of tourists to the island. That is to say that tourism is Stephano, a new Prospero that exploits Caliban's labour through the service industry.

By applying the new metaphorical relationship of Caliban and Stephano to the power relations between the national project of Socialism and the capitalist project of tourism in Cuba, I intend to reveal how transnational travel and business places structures of political power in Cuba beyond a concept of "victory" as implied by Fernández Retamar and at the same time within conditions too complicated to be labeled as "neocolonial." This means that the Cuban state and industry of tourism are not synonymous with the binaries of the colonized and colonizer relationship that is so often where the metaphor of Caliban has been placed. We are not dealing with the cliché binaries of communist and capitalist forces or proletariat rebellions and bourgeois defenses. Rather, by adapting Caliban according to a different relationship with Stephano the metaphor becomes set on the subjectivity of power relations itself. The sociological, political, and economic conflicts brought about by tourism in Cuba reveal a system where power remains at work within the island and, moreover, is interacting on a global scale. This globalized relationship between Caliban and Stephano therefore draws attention to the inevitable existence of power discourses in Cuba that cannot be eliminated, but rather remain taut with power imbalances promoted through the capitalist labour market which, evidently, is ramified in Cuba through the tourism industry.

To clarify, Caliban ought to be considered as something beyond the metaphor of a revolutionary people (*el pueblo*). He should be interpreted as a general metaphor of resistance itself. Beyond the subject who rebels against a sovereign power, Caliban represents the character of resistance inherent in the structures of hegemony. Therefore, between Caliban and Stephano we are witness not to the rise of a new "neocolonial" regime, but to a power-structure recast in the era of globalization between a tourist enterprise fueled by capital desires and a country hinging on socialist ideologies. This metaphor of resistance is closer to Silvia Federici's interpretation of the figure of Caliban in her acclaimed work *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation* (2004). Her work uses Caliban as a metaphor to detail the history of state terror and oppression against women during the rise of the capitalist proletariat. According to Federici "Caliban represents not only the anti-colonial rebel whose struggle still resonates in contemporary Caribbean literature, but is a symbol for the world

proletariat and, more specifically, for the proletarian body as a terrain and instrument of resistance to the logic of capitalism" (2004, 11). As Federici argues, Caliban the rebel becomes Caliban the symbol— a *terrain* of resistance rather than a *target*. In particular, there are two conditions of Federici's interpretation of "Caliban" that I draw on. First of all Caliban does not refer to a single resistant subject, but—and I reference here specifically to the philosophical work of Hardt and Negri—to a proletarian "multitude" that, in the words of Federici, acts as an "instrument" of resistance to the logic of capitalism. It is important here to note that resistance does not necessarily imply "victory" or "liberty." Resistance does not refer to a concept of liberation from capitalist exploitation, but rather to the discourse of power in which capitalist industries such as tourism are involved. Caliban, unlike Fernández Retamar's claim, therefore does not represent the condition of a "liberated" Cuban culture, but rather is a symbol of hegemony, discourses of power that are consistently at work in Cuban culture. This distinction between culture and power is important because it de-essentializes the concept of cultural identity—which in Cuba has taken on the term *cubanidad*—and removes the label of "cultural" resistance from the hegemonic discourses of globalization (a key "discourse" here being tourism).

The second insight I take from Federici is to understand Caliban as a corporeal metaphor that evokes the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics. Federici sees the "body" as the starting point for feminist criticism, that is, "as key to an understanding of the roots of male dominance and the construction of female social identity" (2004, 15). In a similar manner, Caliban's "body" is the starting point to understand the roots of tourist dominance and its role in Cuban society. For example, the practice of *jineterismo*—the Cuban term for Prostitution and black market activities in the country (which I will expand on later)—brings the objectification of Cuban bodies into direct contact with the economic disparities entrenched in tourism. Sex-tourism capitalizes on bodies. Consequently the accumulation of bodies for capital gain implicates, to borrow Hardt and Negri's term, a "biopolitical event," (2009, 59). It is an event where capitalism erupts against biology, where bodies and life become structured according to economic capital and consequently seek ways to resist.

Hardt and Negri's idea of a "biopolitical event" can be challenging, but remains an important concept in the context of tourism in Cuba. According to Hardt and Negri, a biopolitical event represents "the production of life as an act of resistance, innovation, and freedom [leading] us back to the figure of the multitude as a political strategy" (2009, 61). What then would be the multitudinous political strategy of Caliban against Stephano? We know that Stephano complicates Caliban's political stance. Based on a study of urban tourism in Cuba Andrea Colantonio and Robert B. Potter highlight the tension of two political forces at work in Cuba:

It can be argued that today's Havana (and Cuba as a whole) is characterized by two diverging forces that are pulling the city in two different directions. One force is embedded in the Cuban leadership's socialist ideology and is driven by an inward-looking model of development which aims to preserve the social achievements of the 1959 Revolution despite the scarcity of financial resources. The second force is exerted and driven by the global economy and the tourism industry, both of which are pulling Havana into the world market economy and forcing the city to look outward rather than inward. (2006, 5)

Indeed Caliban's island renders a unique location in the world, a place covered by billboards, signs, and propaganda praising the communist victory, yet in the meantime is built upon a capitalist market fuelled by tourism. So, is the answer to loosening this political tension achieved through political strategies of the multitude? Taking from Fernández Retamar's interpretation of Caliban, Prospero was defeated by Caliban through a political strategy of the multitude conducting a violent revolution leading to the establishment of socialism. The arrival of Stephano, however, requires us to reevaluate how political strategies play a role in the multitude. Caliban's encounter with Stephano cannot be resolved through mere political strategy, for the environment between them is already wrought with an economic dependency on tourism that makes it implausible to be solved alone by political or revolutionary means. The international market of tourism demands Cuba's contingent involvement with globalization, which as Hardt and Negri exclaim brings capital to a position where it "creates, invests, and exploits social life in its entirety, ordering life according to the hierarchies of economic value" (2009, ix). Can Caliban truly be liberated in a socialist state when waves of global industry and influxes of tourists are seen and felt throughout every inch o' th' island, from the *Capitolio* of Havana to within the clandestine operations of *jineterismo*? Perhaps the more important question, and what Stephano obliges us to consider, is whether the notion of Caliban's so-called "liberation" should even be the focus here? Simply said, Stephano may require the monster's labour to enjoy the island, but the monster requires Stephano's resources to survive on the island. It is a power relationship built upon exploitation and expediency.

Hardt and Negri's traits of resistance, innovation, and freedom remain at work between Caliban and Stephano creating a biopolitical event, however they are restructured based on mutual economic strategies rather than resistant political strategies. The "event" does not seek to kick out the capitalist presence of tourism, but strategizes how to benefit from its inevitable co-existence. Stephano pays to see every inch o' th' island and Caliban is consequently able to drink Stephano's wine; the relationship is mutually beneficial. In this sense, I disagree with Hardt and Negri's perhaps too propitious belief that the biopolitical event "inaugurates an alternative production of subjectivity" (2009, 63). To eliminate Prospero does not provide Caliban with a *new*

subjectivity but rather makes room for a *new relativity*, a re-structured power discourse with Stephano. Resistance remains at work here, only as a "terrain" of hegemony characterized by the subversion of power (to switch positions of power) rather than the overthrowing of it (to become power itself). The difference is an understanding of "place": the former sees Stephano resisted while remaining on the island, the latter sees Prospero resisted until removed from the island. One is rooted in the realities of globalization while the other is rooted in ideologies of post-colonial liberty. Being that Cuba's "terrain" of hegemony must balance between exploitation and expediency there are, unsurprisingly, consequences to be had in a relationship of this type, residual tensions that occur across every inch o' th' island. These tensions, which I now turn to, are three-fold: there are economic divisions occurring "above" the island, cultural commodification occurring "within" the island, and corporeal exploitation occurring "below" the island. The manner in which both Caliban and Stephano tug on each side of these tensions represents well the modern conditions and challenges of Cuban identity under the plights of globalization and transnational industries such as tourism.

I. Above the Islands: Dollars and Planes

Beginning in 1991, *el período especial en tiempo de paz* (the Special Period in time of Peace) brought about a historical shift in the Cuban economy. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cuba's dependency on their communist allies led to a drastic decline in economic resources necessitating economic reforms for industries of agriculture, health, education, and especially aliments and nutrition. The current tourism industry in Cuba is in many ways indebted to the Special period. With the severity of economic conditions after the Special Period Cuba was left desperately looking for means of stabilizing an already declining economy. The answer was evident, not within banks and business offices, but among the iconic palm trees, white-sand beaches, fat cigars, and classic *guantanamera* lyrics accompanied by old *trova* guitars—the solution was tourism. By the time of the Special Period, the benefits of tourism were questioned due to the possible risks implied both politically and socially. Before the revolution tourism was directly associated with the very institutions that inspired the revolution in the first pace: social disparities and societal corruption exemplified in casinos, prostitution, drugs, and other illegal activities. In fact, before WWII tourism in Cuba was not only tied to illegal activity in the country but in many cases was organized and run by illegal organizations. Much of tourism, especially in Havana, was fuelled by the money and influence of the US mafia whereby casinos, hotels, and nightclubs were seen under the direct supervision of organized crime figures such as Meyer Lansky and Charles "lucky" Luciano who, notwithstanding their social connections with Batista himself, were largely influential in promoting tourism from the US. The role that tourism would play at the end of the

twentieth-century was thus stigmatized by the memory of what tourism had once represented. Nonetheless, the economic necessity of the time obliged Cuba to return to the external sector of tourism to benefit their economy. To avoid the mistakes of the past, tourism was to act as a stimulus for other sectors of the economy as well so to promote national unity rather than corruption. Acting on an ad hoc basis, the Cuban government promoted tourism alongside national reforms targeting areas such as the environment, science and technology, education, healthcare, and transportation with the intent of connecting the tourism industry with the promotion of other institutions across the country. According to Colantonio and Potter the result saw Cuba acting as the "critical catalyst for social change and political transition in both former and current socialist countries" (2006, 5). Fuelling this change, tourists arrived by the thousands, representing a rapid production in tourist targeted businesses. According to recent statistics in the *Caribbean Tourism Organization* (2013), Cuba saw nearly 2,850,135 tourists, arriving second to the Dominican Republic as the most visited Caribbean country in the world. Caliban was and continues to be a popular stop-over for the curious Stephano.

Tourism thus sits today on an economic throne within the island surpassing its sugar and tobacco industry as the primary form of revenue in the country. However, the promotion of tourism differs from other markets of commodities such as sugar, tobacco, or coffee. What is promoted is no longer the quality of an item, but the quality of an experience. Thus, as Rosalie Schwartz aptly describes it, with the arrival of tourism "pleasure became the island's business" (1997, xxi). The consequence of this reality is found on the flip-side of the coin whereby the promotion of pleasure concurrently necessitates a supply of service. One's pleasure depends on another's service, and this is without doubt the ideological mirror of supply and demand in the tourism industry. In tourism, where there is a greater supply of pleasure there will inevitably be a greater demand of service. As such, there are various social repercussions of this industry that have made headway in Cuban society, the return of pre-revolutionary social divisions being most evident. Tourists that arrive in Cuba take the position of the "consumers of pleasure," whereas the Cuban workers in the tourism industry become the "producers of pleasure."

To maintain the labour divisions between producers and consumers of pleasure Cuba had to divide their currency as well. The increase in tourism implied an increase in international currencies flooding the system which coerced Cuba to adapt to and work within the global economy. Tourism, being the only true sector of the Cuban economy readily available to lead the country's development, then placed the Cuban government at a crossroads whereby both the need for foreign investment and foreign currency were knocking at their doors. According to Marguerite Rose Jiménez, tourism was the obvious choice to give way to economic development due to "Cuba's abundance of natural resources, which provided a competitive edge over her Caribbean neighbors," emphasized in the fact that, "Cuba has more beachfront than all of the other Caribbean islands put

together" (2008, 147). Therefore, to promote the growth of tourism the government implemented two important reforms, the first emerging out of the October 1991 Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party that granted protection for foreign-owned property, thus permitting foreign companies a 49 percent share in business operations within the island. The second reform came in 1993 with the legalization of the US dollar. This was later revised in 2004 when the US dollar was removed from circulation and replaced by the equivalent valued currency of *pesos convertibles* otherwise known as CUC or at times as *doláres* or *divisas*. As tourists arrived with wallets filled with CUC and entered a country of citizens living on wages of *pesos nacionales* (CUP)—a 25 peso to 1 CUC exchange rate—an inevitable disparity between economic value was realized. Those with CUC held the keys to the "high-life" while those with CUP were locked within their quotidian scarcity.

The economic division in Cuba is also evident within the social lifestyle of Cubans. Tourists exchange foreign currency directly into CUC at airports or at specified hotels with exchange offices while Cubans are paid in CUP. Therefore the life of the tourist, for the most part, runs on the CUC which includes all basic operating services such as transportation such as *turitaxis* (taxis paid for in CUC), accommodations such as hotels or *casa particulares*,¹ and tourist activities including restaurants, clubs, tours, and purchased goods. This is indicative of what the tourist represents, that is, a means for access into the CUC currency both by the Cuban economy and by the Cuban entrepreneur.² Tourism is then seen in two ways, both as the foundation of economic development and as the access beyond peso salaries through entrepreneurship with tourists which often implies working within networks of the Cuban informal sector which I will discuss further in part three. Stephano is thus both the developer and the escape route, the grounding and the flight of the economy.

The economic disparity between Stephano and Caliban is no secret. In fact, many restaurants will mirror the dual economy by having dual menus. If a Cuban walks into the restaurant they will receive a menu in pesos while a foreigner will receive the same options shown on a menu in CUC indicating that the tourist is to pay likely five to ten times higher the price for his plate. This makes sense for Cuban business which is able to subsidize prices for citizens while gaining their profit from tourists. Other measures in the market system ensure this. For example, it is illegal for a foreigner to stay at *casa particulares* paid for in pesos, or for that matter to stay anywhere overnight that does not have a license or permission to house foreigners and is not paid for in CUC. The

¹ *Casa Particulares* (Particular Housing) refers to bed and breakfast style accommodations throughout the country whereby Cubans with lodging licenses are able to host foreigners in their homes.

² The dual currency system has been weighing on the Cuban government. Since 2015, there have been serious discussions of eliminating the CUC, a process already in transition. However, although the equivalent distribution of pesos is now permitted in the island, the anticipated removal of the CUC is likely to create economic inflation.

legislation on hotels and housing however has previously led to consequential social disparities. Until recently Cubans, unless authorized personnel, were not permitted access into tourist areas such as resorts and hotels for fear of prostitution, crime, and harassment. In many areas of the island Cubans are still harassed by law enforcement if caught fraternizing with tourists. Cubans that are seen with foreigners are often stigmatized as *jineteros/as*, a term referring to either street hustlers, black market vendors, pimps, or prostitutes. Where there is economic discrepancy social prejudice is never far off. As such the divisive tools of tourism in Cuba have recently been alluded in sociological contexts as a "tourist apartheid" implicating that the division between Cubans and tourists is imitative of the racial segregation practiced throughout the early 1900's in the US. Wittily, Ana Alcázar Campos depicts the tourist apartheid to be funded on the "reino dólar" (the dollar kingdom), thus indicating that tourist segregation is directly associated with economic disparities (2010, 316). This is, overall, an issue of balancing social disparity while defending economic prosperity; it is a tension of protecting the tourist experience while protecting Cuban rights — both important objectives in Cuban society.

II. Within the Island: Window Shopping for an "Authentic" Culture

Above the islands tourists arrive on jet planes colliding a globalized market into a socialist state. Meanwhile, within the island the changes that occur to accommodate Stephano are felt both within the social and economic spheres. Likely one of the greatest ramifications of tourism within the island is seen in the dramatic attempts to develop an "authentic" culture that appeals to the desires of tourists who arrive on the island in search of the "real" Cuban experience. In Cuba, cultural authenticity is very much a reflection of the tourist's desire. In his theoretical insight of the tourist experience described in *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* (1976), Dean MacCannell describes a connection between the tourist's search for authenticity and the mystification of social reality. "Authenticity itself," as MacCannell claims, "moves to inhabit mystification" (1976, 93). In other words, the tourist reality is often staged or "mystified" to some extent in order to satisfy the desires for a real and authentic experience. An example of this can be seen in the musical constructions of cultural nostalgia in Cuba through the rise of the folk-rooted group *Buena Vista Social Club*. Vincenzo Perna explains that the rise of this album, recorded in 1996 in Havana "constructed a nostalgic representation of Cuban culture that fits flawlessly into the neo-colonial image of the island promoted by the tourism industry at the turn of the millennium" (2005, 240). It was in fact an American musician, Ry Cooder, who helped to create and record the album thus promoting the band beyond Cuban borders to US audiences. In a comment made in *Folk Roots* magazine, Cooder in fact admits his marketing ploy of *Buena Vista*: "People

want to go somewhere and stay at home, to travel in their armchair. That's fine. Journey with us now for an hour or so and that's enough" (Perna 2005, 240). One could say that the truly "authentic" Cuban sound that extended from the voices of Cubans such as Ibrahim Ferrer and Compay Segundo was however inspired, promoted, and invented from abroad. MacCannell notes that the consequence of structuring such authenticity is that "a kind of strained truthfulness [becomes] similar in most of its particulars to a little lie [...] social structure itself is involved in the construction of the type of mystification that supports social reality" (1976, 93).

When speaking of "authentic culture" it is important to emphasize that Cuban culture, although involved the production of the tourist experience is not derived from tourists. It is tourism that "mystifies" experiences in a culture, but not culture itself that is "mystified." The key to understanding the difference is predominantly a question of economics. Through tourism what is experienced as "authentic" does not refer to what is quotidian, but rather what is marketable. What MacCannell terms as *mystification* could just as easily be a synonym in this context for *commodification*. By connecting the authenticity of culture with market values, Cuba has in fact packaged culture into a capitalist storefront for window-shopping foreigners who, coming upon their desired option, walk into the location that meets their eye and purchase their desired experience. This is what Rose Jiménez describes as the commodification of culture whereby "cultural practices are transformed into something whose value is measured by sales in the marketplace" (2008, 152). In this sense, tourism tends to promote the "mystical" or "commodified" perspective of Cuban culture, motivating artists to conform their work to the market of tourists. Seeming as tourism provides access to the preferred currency of CUC, then artists are likely to direct their efforts toward this market. As such, to draw the attention of Stephano, Caliban can never truly show him the whole of the island, only the parts that count. For one's business depends on assuring that Stephano does not get bored looking through all the windows. This is, in turn, a positive market strategy for Cubans seeking to be more entrepreneurial. For artists, musicians, artisans, dancers, vendors and other performance-based professions directly associated with tourism, marketing their skill-set to the "authentic" experience tourists are looking for provides the ability to sell and receive a commission for their work that otherwise would likely not exist. Tourism, in this way, becomes a great promoter for Cuban artists, acting as a financial catalyst for their work and an audience for their performance.

The tension of authentic culture must be recognized as an issue founded on the commodification of tourism, but not on the tourist. Being that cultural commodification can never cover every inch o' the' island, we are left then with a divide between what parts to show, and what parts to hide. In a manner of speaking, Cuban culture becomes a "hide-and-see" game for the tourist. MacCannell calls this split of culture the "front" and "back" regions, adding that when the tourist shares with these back regions of culture they in turn experience a stronger level of cultural intimacy believing that they have had an

authentic contact with the culture. The truth is that the tourist experience, no matter how far "back" they enter into the culture, can never set the bar for the "authentic" cultural experience, for the concept of authenticity here is a category of invention; it is the creation of a capitalist logic, not the definitive measure of cultural identity. Authenticity, in this way, tends to divide culture in categories rather than unify it. For example, an "authentic tour" cannot possibly cover the whole of a city. For this reason, there is an urban division that occurs in tourist-heavy cities such as Havana, split between the "authentic" cultural regions, and the other local regions. For the most part, Havana sees a division between the northern region dense with tourism and the southern end of the city less populated by tourists. Colantonio and Potter confirm that the division between northern and southern municipalities in Havana is both spatially and socially relevant, creating what they term as a "socio-spatial change in Havana" (2006, 133). The split is contingent on differing levels of economic output to the areas, the northern receiving a great deal more investment due to the tourist sectors found there. Consequently, where tourism thrives in Havana, so too does government investment and local business. The economic focus on the northern zone of Havana has likewise affected the social constructs of the city. As an example, Colantonio and Potter make a connection with the tourism industry and its influence over local recreation. Many of the new clubs and nightlife facilities in Havana are being built within newly refurbished hotels rather than within the city's neighbourhoods. Combining the old stigmas of Cubans not being permitted in hotels ("tourist apartheid"), plus the reality that the entrance fees of these nightclubs often cost around 10-20 CUC, there is a strong divide then created between Cuban and non-Cuban clientele. For the majority of Cubans who would risk venturing into the hotels the entrance fee of nightclubs are far above their price range, limiting the access only to tourists or wealthy Cubans. The use of high entrance prices and hotel locations for nightlife creates what Colantonio and Potter describe as "urban tourism enclaves" that divide the local residents recreational needs from that of the tourists (2006, 134). It would appear that the division of recreational services in fact reflects the spatial divisions evident in the Capital city implying that tourism in Cuba is both geographically divisive inasmuch as it is socially.

The Cuban economy tends to follow the divisive residuum of tourism. Local business leans to the northern end of the city where there is greater remuneration for services, both in the formal and informal sectors. Many businesses within the formal sectors are connected to the tourism industry such as hotels, restaurants, bars, clubs, retail stores, and tour guide centres. According to Archibald R.M. Ritter, we can understand the formal economy to include "those enterprises and activities that are within the regulatory and taxation powers of the state, though also benefiting from a wide range of supportive public policies" (2005, 3). Nonetheless, if Cubans have any entrepreneurial interest outside of their specific career, options are limited. Most Cubans are limited to accepting meagre salaries as stipulated by the government even within highly educated jobs such as

a lawyer, doctor, professor, or trades worker. Ironically it is jobs such as taxi drivers, or careers within hotels, resorts, and restaurants that are better paid. These jobs have access to tourists and thus the potential to be paid in CUC.

Should a career in tourism or other state employment not pan out, a secondary option is to seek employment as a *cuentapropista* (a self-employer). Examples could include private work running bicycle taxis, small restaurants, *paladares* (home-based restaurants), street vending including *pregoneros*³, vending at an outdoor market, art and craft sales, cell-phone repair shops, street musicians, artists, artisans, or *casa particulares* (bed and breakfasts). *Cuentapropismo* (the art of being a *cuentapropista*) is a leading force of entrepreneurial business in Cuba and owes its existence to the tourist market. For the government, this is beneficial in that it provides work opportunities outside of government funded jobs either for *cuentapropistas* or those who have lost state jobs due to cutbacks. It is only recently however, under president Raúl Castro's leadership, that steps have been made in Cuba to create further employment opportunities for *cuentapropistas*. Under a new economic strategy set out by the Communist Party Congress held in April 2011, the role of the *cuentapropista* has gained a greater recognition. As an example of this individuals are now permitted greater access to start home-run businesses, often operated on the front porches or within living rooms. This has created a boom in private enterprise specifically in businesses such as *paladares*, artisan and craft shops, hardware and kitchen item sales, and clothing retail. Logically then many of these businesses appear where tourism is most prevalent, in hopes of finding revenue in CUC rather than pesos.

Even though *cuentapropismo* provides greater employment opportunities to the formal sector, the economic realities still prove limiting. Although doors are being opened slowly for access to new businesses the division in currency between CUC and national pesos limits Cuban access into numerous markets. As an example, mobile phones have recently entered the market, monopolized by the government legislated company Cubacel. Recognizing that Cubacel charges approximately 40 CUC to activate a cell phone and a monthly minimum of 5 CUC to continue the plan leaves many Cubans scrambling financially to keep their plan active. According to recently published statistics in the National Office of Statistics and Information in Cuba (ONEI), the average Cuban only earns around 455 pesos, averaging out to less than 20 CUC a month. This would imply that the average Cuban would need to spend at least a quarter of their salary every month in order to keep their cell phone plan active. For this reason Cubacel has marketed outside of Cuba, allowing non-Cuban residents to recharge Cuban cellphones, often providing promotions to "double the recharge for the price of one." In a manner of speaking then, remittances become a primary investment in the company. Internet access

³ A *pregonero* is a specific street vender known for their *pregón* (literally "street cry") that is characterized by their song-like calls they use to announce their sales throughout the streets.

has also crept into the economy, but remains costly for the average Cuban. Although the extension of public wifi zones across major municipalities has been introduced (at approximately 1.20 CUC/hour) the prices of internet limits its use outside of hotels and resorts. University students are given extremely limited access to the internet and only certain professionals such as doctors, educators, or government officials are guaranteed email access. For the most part then, internet is most easily accessed in the tourist sector. Even a car market has also crept into Cuba in the last year due to new laws limiting the restrictions on vehicle ownership in the island. Similar to Cubacel or internet access this market proves extremely pricy. One Canadian news article comically summarizes this market: "New Car Sales in Cuba: Where a sedan costs as much as a Ferrari" (Garcia 2014). Indeed, that is what the vehicle market appears to imply, seeing as a 2009 Jeep Santa Fe can be seen going for 90,000 CUC, a 2011 Kia Picanto for around 40,000 CUC, or a 2002 Toyota Yaris becoming yours for only 25,000 CUC. Never mind the newer 2013 Peugeots that reach from a minimum price of 90,000 CUC to over 260,000 CUC. Overall, what we see is that new corporate ventures within the formal sector become extremely limiting for the general Cuban population while smaller entrepreneurial ventures such as *cuentapropismo* is working to provide more job opportunities. The tension of the Cuban markets hinges, in part, on the dual currency that caters the higher valued CUC to the wallets of tourists, corporations, or aid from foreign remittances. Above the island is where the real money comes from, but within the island, even as a *cuentapropista*, it can still prove difficult to get access to these funds. Tourism therefore becomes both the access and the limitation to the formal market. At the same time that it provides a market for *cuentapropistas* is also monopolizes other markets unavailable to Cubans citizens. This leads many Cubans to seek work in the informal sector of the economy where they can conduct business in the informal market or "underground." Caliban thus takes the journey below the island.

III. Below the Island: Underground Jockeys

Beyond the division of currency, urban space, and social life in Cuba, tourism also influences the division of the economy which is split between both the formal and informal sectors. For the most part Cuba's informal sector implies any economic activity occurring without proper government regulation. Agna Martha Wierzbicki describes the term informality to refer to "the incompleteness of judicial orders in the realization of certain economic activities" (2005, 3). However, defining informality in Cuba is difficult due to the fluctuating status of the formal sector, as well the progressing nature of the informal sector. Cuba is a place, where at times everything appears illegal to some extent. There is illegal forms of transportation, food, medicine, hotels, markets, music and art, gatherings, education, and more. Moreover, the legislation is constantly changing. As I

already noted, the role of *cuentapropistas*, thanks to the tourist market, has gained greater access into the formal sector of the economy. As well new markets such as cell phones, internet, and vehicles have entered the market, revealing a relaxation on past restrictions for new business. What was once illegal at one point appears to be formalized at another.

The fluctuations in the formal sector are often matched by changes within the informal sector. For example, with the arrival of cell phones, there has consequently been an influx in informal cell phone vendors and cell phone repair shops. The same goes for internet access, mechanic work, construction labour, food distribution, cigar and rum markets, transportation, and even illegal tour guides. Each of these forms of informal work are largely indebted to the dual currency in Cuba. Where the CUC market progresses the informal economy is likely follow. Furthermore, this dual economy creates an inevitable tension in Cuba whereby a capitalist regulated economy ends up running below socialist legislation. In his study of international economics Giancarlo Gandolfo explains that if there are controls placed on capital movements, as is obviously the case in Cuba, then "clandestine capital movements provide a way to evade these controls" (2004, 62). This is threatening to the Cuban government since a capitalist market undermines the socialist framework of societal equality. In Cuba, capitalism then evades control through division and dispersion. Hardt and Negri confirm: "[t]hrough processes of globalization, capital not only brings together all the earth under its command but also creates, invests, and exploits social life in its entirety, ordering life according to the hierarchies of economic value" (2009, ix). It is in this way that the informal sector of the economy gives Cubans access into a capitalist system whereby the value of goods can be bartered and exploited and moreover, to the benefit of many, done so in the currency of CUC.

The conflictive nature between socialist ideology and the capitalist informal sector creates a unique situation in the country in which the "underground" markets represent a culture of political dissidence in Cuba. As such the informal sector has given way to a Cuban subculture which is to say that the informal sector in Cuba extends beyond merely the economic. The term *clandestinidad* (literally "clandestinity") implies that there exists a whole underground or clandestine subculture balancing on the informal affairs throughout the country. This culture, in particular, balances on the work of *jineterismo*, a word coming from the term *jinete* meaning "jockey" or "rider." According to Amir Valle, the term finds its history in the cavalry soldiers during the Cuban war of independence from Spain known as the *mambis* who were renowned for their persistent fight for Cuban liberty (2000, 7). Satirically then, *jineterismo* has come to represent the "liberty" offered by the dollar currency that male *jineteros* and the female *jineteras* aspire for through informal activity. As Valle explains, *jineterismo* now "has come to represent all those who attempt to obtain dividends in the complicated trauma of sexual commerce, the traffic of narcotics, and the black market" (my trans; 2000, 7). One should, however, be wary of

Valle's notion of the "black market." *Jineterismo* is more wide spread than typical black market activities such as prostitution and narcotics. It is difficult to say that someone selling a cigar or food items like lobster or beef on the street is a "black market" dealer on the same level as someone selling drugs. Both are actions of *jineterismo*, but not necessarily of the "black market." For that reason, I attempt to avoid categorizing *jineterismo* as a "black market"; the more suited word in Cuban contexts is the "informal market."

One question that is likely to arise concerning *jineterismo* is the role of gender. For the most part, there is a rather strong division between the masculine and feminine roles of *jineterismo*. Often the male role (the *jinetero*) represents a variety of street hustlers and informal workers. This can include anything from that of pimp to an illegal taxi-driver. The female role (the *jinetera*) however has generally referred to female prostitutes. Male prostitution is certainly not excluded from informal activity either, however taking on a different the term known as a *pinguero*. G. Derrick Hodge explains this terminological distinction in his essay "Colonizing the Cuban Body":

The new [male] sex workers had to distinguish themselves from the female sex workers, *jineteras*, now reemerging with vigor since the legalization of the dollar. They could not simply masculinize *jinetera*, since that would suggest that they, too, are penetrated by tourists . . . So, to the slang term for "dick" (*pinga*) was added the suffix *ero*, meaning, a man whose activity, or profession, has to do with his pinga. (2006, 632)

The rise of *jineteras* and *pingueros* after the legalization of the dollar is a direct result of the return of the pre-revolutionary industry of sex tourism. Sex tourism brings with it serious consequences for the communist state by representing the most destructive force of capitalism. Prostitution implies by far the most desperate and grave form of capitalist ventures whereby it is no longer objective commodities that are marketed, but subjective commodities; no longer the sale of objects, but of bodies. Sex tourism degrades the Cubans from a citizen of production to an object of consumption. For this reason Hodge acquires the concept of commodification and describes *jineteras* and *pingueros* to represent what he calls the "commodification of desire," by which he refers to the "transformation of sex, body, and desire into a marketable product" (2006, 634). Sexual relationship, for the prostitute, is no longer a personal desire, but a capital apparatus; it becomes a tool for market exchange. Therefore, in the similar manner for which tourism commodifies a perspective of culture through the market of authenticity, sex tourism promotes the commodification of desire through the market of Cuban bodies.

Jineteras and *pingueros* represent the most contradictory aftermath from Caliban's and Stephano's reunion, which I have previously described to represent a "biopolitical

event." Firstly, it is contradictory because sex tourism exploits Cuban bodies for capital gain placing a negative stigma on tourism in general. Sex tourism is not indicative of tourism in general and the sex tourist does not represent every tourist. The inability to generalize obliges us to look at sex tourism as a consequence, as "collateral damage," of tourism rather than the tourist. On the other hand, because sex tourism is so heavily supported and economically funded by tourism we are witness to a "biopoliticization" of the tourism industry as a whole. That is to say that the tourism industry becomes directly linked to the biopolitical disruption of Cuban bodies— their sexuality, their health, and their identity. It is biological because sex tourism transforms bodies into tools of capital; it is political because tourism, in Cuba, is politically overseen, defended, and promoted. Sex tourism therefore complicates the Caliban-Stephano relationship and, in a manner of speaking, attempts to reduce the globalized relationship to a colonized conflict. We see, for example, Hodge describe *jineterismo* as the "colonization of the Cuban body" (2006, 628). To title *jineterismo* as a form of colonization also implies that there is a hegemonic relationship between tourism and Cuban prostitutes whereby *jineteras* or *pingueros* are in some manner "forced" by tourists into their colonized position. Although it is true that sex tourism objectifies bodies in a similar way that colonizers historically have objectified indigenous populations, such a comparison often proves too parochial. One must not ignore that prostitution in Cuba is not without choice. The agency of both sides, the *jinetera/ pinguero* and the sex-tourist must be considered. Nonetheless, the difficult economic conditions of the island may be understood to place a "colonial-style" pressure upon individuals that is at times hard to overcome. In poverty, one's temptation of dollars is for another an irrefutable decision to submit. Stephano can be convincing like that.

The dilemma with viewing sex tourism in Cuba as a "neo-colonial" activity is that in doing so one immediately negates the agency of the *jineteras* and the *pingueros*. Sex tourism as neo-colonial desubjectifies the participants, that is, it associates them not as subjects, but as corporeal "territories" that are conquered. The reality is that *jineterismo* is too dynamic to be a neocolonial discourse; there is agency on both sides promoting its existence. In the late nineties, for example, the stigmas of *jineterismo* in fact started to shift from that of judging the *jinetera* to encouraging her. The *jinetera* became true to her name, a female *jinete*, riding herself towards her economic "liberty." The well known *timba* band from Havana *La Charanga Habanera* led by Afro-Cuban musician David Calzado released the album *Pa' que se entre la Habana* in 1996 flaunting a hit song titled "El temba," an Afro-Cuban slang for a middle-aged man with plenty of money. The song represents well the shifting perspective of *jineterismo* in Cuban culture. The lyrics of the song present an Afro-Cuban man who in recognizing that he cannot support the woman he loves tells her to find herself a *temba* so that she can have everything she wanted. The song seems to encourage the woman to act like a "gold-digger" and give herself up to an older man with money. Simply put, the song encourages the female subject to act as a

jinetera. The lyrics guide the listener to have pity on the man while sympathizing with the woman who appears to only be able to find what she deserves in a rich older man:

But taking into account
There is no salary in order for you to keep
Your dreams of a queen [. . .]

Look for a *temba* so that you can keep up
with what you enjoy, so that you have [. . .]

So that you have what you had to have,
A sugar-daddy with all the money. (author's trans.)

Repeated multiple times for emphasis, the second last line of the song "So that you have, what you had to have" stems from a line in the poem "Tengo" (To have) written by the Afro-Cuban poet Nicolás Guillén. David Calzado thus draws a comparison between the satisfaction of needs described in Guillén's poetry to the failure of the Cuban man to meet the needs of a woman as described in the song. In this sense *jineterismo* becomes justified, even encouraged, by the conditions of poverty and ignores the cultural damages that it invokes.

The real difficulty of *jineterismo* lies in the tension incurred between the "performance" of the *jinetera* or *pinguero* and the "gaze" of the tourist. Tourism is the greatest provision of *tembas* to the island, tempting numerous young women and men to prostitute themselves in order to make money greater than the general Cuban salary, or in hopes of marrying a foreigner and getting a pass to escape the island. This perspective represents the "gaze" of Stephano, a gaze motivated by erotic desire and fantasy that tempts Cubans with visions of wealth. The flip side is the "performance" of Caliban, the *jineteras* and *pingueros* who see their activity in *jineterismo* as a resistant stance to their economic scarcity and to Socialist ideology. They are the ones who "search to have what they had to have." They are entrepreneurs who have found ways to "*resolver*" (resolve) their difficult economic circumstances, *resolver* being a common expression that arose in Cuban culture during the economic crisis of the Special Period. In this way sex tourism is used to demonstrate agency; it becomes an instrument, for *jineteras*, of feminine volition. *Jineterismo* is then considered as an economic strategy of Cubans utilizing whatever means available to them to capitalize on— bodies included. Their resistance becomes based on strategic entrepreneurship utilizing the capital industry available to them in the informal market rather than a political resistance against capitalism conducted in the formal market. For *jineteras* and *pingueros* such a perspective claims a *bodily subversion* of power rather than a *colonization of bodies*. One can see how this perspective

complicates the nature of sex tourism which, for the most part and rightly so, is considered to have an incredibly negative impact on culture and identity. As it is, a truly biopolitical event is always controversial and convoluted like *jineterismo* because when people become valued economically and structured politically their agency carries an agenda of resistance. Ironically, in the case of Cuba's informal sector, this resistance is corporeal rather than material. Resistance is shrouded "under" the island where bodies themselves become the armaments against socialism locked and loaded in a market economy otherwise unavailable "on top."

Conclusion: Caliban's Conundrum

Cuba, Caliban, and *clandestinidad*. All three are interconnected throughout every inch o' th' island. Caliban walks Stephano off of the plane, onto Cuban shores, and within the urban clandestine shadows. It is a mutual encounter. Stephano's tour throughout the island sustains Caliban's existence while Caliban's existence attracts Stephano's presence. The relationship, although mutually beneficial at times, is unstable. Stephano arrives by ship, Caliban greets him in rags. Tourism is birthed out of the economic disparities that echo the prejudices, exploitation, and injustices of colonialism. This makes tourism and colonialism an easy comparison due to the clear examples of how tourism exploits the lower socioeconomic class, maintaining a system where one's demand of pleasure becomes the supply of another. That said, we must of course recall that in the context of "Caliban" we are referencing a socioeconomic discourse by using metaphors. Furthermore, we are using metaphors that are already charged with the notion of hegemony. Caliban has, since Rodo's discussion of *Ariel* in 1900, been synonymous with colonized subjectivities. As such, Caliban as a metaphor has been used as a way to highlight the exploitative practices against postcolonial cultures. Our metaphorical reference of "Caliban" has inevitably rooted our discussion in the postcolonial contexts of hegemony and power. Consequently, the temptation is to scoop the metaphor "Caliban" out of a postcolonial and literary history and spoon-feed it to readers as proof of the continued existence of neocolonial practices. On the contrary, I have emphasized that Caliban ought to be considered as something different, as a symbol that goes beyond Fernández Retamar's metaphor of a revolutionary people and represents the act of resistance itself. That is, Caliban is not the successor against postcolonial exploitation, nor the helpless victim of it. He is the struggle, the tension, that runs somewhere in the middle. There are too many metaphorical generalizations to cross over should we denote Caliban as a "neocolonial" subject in today's globalized world. For that reason, I have emphasized that he should be interpreted as the general metaphor of resistance, something that imitates Federici's reflection of Caliban as a *terrain* of resistance. In a manner of speaking Fernández Retamar was right in declaring Cuba to represent Caliban,

however only if Cuba is understood as a place rather than a *pueblo*, a transcultural "terrain" that has historically represented the meeting point of cultural, social, racial, gender, political, and economic conflict in the Caribbean.

How, therefore, do we map out this "terrain" in the context of tourism? It is a rocky terrain that provides easy routes into the island, but no easy routes throughout the island. Caliban's tour is no easy feat. He leaves us no easy answers, only more questions: Under the scope of a global tourist industry, how can Caliban possibly show Stephano the island without evoking some form of postcolonial exploitation? How can tourism possibly operate within Cuban culture in a way that avoids demeaning practices such as sex-tourism? How can the Cuban economy grow internally and, at the same time, be dependent externally? How can Cuba continue to promote Communism while relying on Capitalism? These are the questions that Caliban's encounter with Stephano leaves us with, questions that, for the most part are more complicated than the conclusions of Caliban's victory or defeat. These questions also remind us of Caliban's greatest challenge: to show the island to a stranger who has already imagined the *pueblo*. The greatest issues of tourism stem from this conundrum. Questions of cultural authenticity, sex-tourism, race, gender, and social prejudice are fuelled by imagined perceptions of Cubans that exist outside of Cuba itself. They are fuelled by the denotations of difference and diversity that are inevitably evoked through the many cultural and globalized contact zones of tourism. They are promoted by the labels that keep being stuck on them, those monstrous labels of cannibals and Caribs.

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