Trade Unions in the Comfort Zone: Liberal Authority in Yeltsin's Russia

Norma Jo Baker Nipissing University[1]

Résumé

Beaucoup d'encre à coulé sur l'échec de la présidence de Yeltsin et sur la transformation de la société russe depuis 1991. Mais on a peu étudié la participation des démocraties libérales établies au soutien du « superprésidentialisme » autoritaire de Yeltsin, coupé des évolutions politiques, ni le lien entre ce soutien et la nature autoritaire du projet démocratique libéral moderne lui-même. Un examen de la culture et de l'histoire du syndicalisme russe, ainsi que de la participation des représentants du syndicalisme international, montre que l'on peut voir dans l'absence de remise en question des rapports sociaux de production, au cours des années 1990, le paradigme d'une dynamique autoritaire axée sur l'élite politique plutôt que sur les membres du syndicat. La préoccupation du régime, avec le soutien international, était le démantèlement des relations économiques et des institutions sociales soviétiques. Au vu de la culture et de l'histoire des syndicats russes, le recours des syndicats à une stratégie de partenariats sociaux pour tenter de conserver une place dans une ère nouvelle, en sus de l'écroulement du système de sécurité sociale, a renforcé l'inertie d'une hiérarchie syndicale du haut vers le bas. Le résultat? Bien entendu, une ère marquée par une absence de responsabilité politique, éthique politique reflétant non un autoritarisme inhérent à la Russie, mais la nature autoritaire de la modernité libérale elle-même.

1 Dr. Baker is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Nipissing University. Dr. Baker holds a Ph. D. from York University's Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. From 1997 to 2004, Dr. Baker lived in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Hungary, conducting research and working in post-secondary educational reform projects. Along with her work on Russian trade unions, Dr. Baker's research activities include post-Soviet and Western international education projects, liberal arts transformation efforts in Canada and Central Asia, and global issues of social justice, particularly as encountered in the practice of sociology as a liberal arts project. Her doctoral dissertation addressed the conflictual relationship between capitalism and democracy by tracing the problematic transformation post-Soviet Russia experienced during the era of the Yeltsin regime, particularly as it played out for Russian trade unions and petroleum-based communities in the Khanty-Mansisk region of Western Siberia. Contact: normajobaker@gmail.com

Abstract

While much has been written on the failure of the Yeltsin presidency and the transformation of Russian society since 1991, little work has been done that illustrates the participation of established liberal democracies in supporting Yeltsin's authoritarian, politically unresponsive 'superpresidentialism,' or linking this support to the authoritarian nature of the modern liberal democratic project itself. By examining Russian trade union culture and history, as well as international trade union representative involvement, this paper argues that the persistent neglect of unions in the 1990s to challenge social relations of production can be understood as paradigmatic of an authoritarian dynamic focused on the political elite rather than on their membership. With international support, the regime's concern was with the dismantling of Soviet economic relations and social institutions. Working from the culture and history of Russian trade unions, the unions' efforts to retain a place in the new era through a strategy of 'social partnership,' combined with the collapse of the social welfare system, reinforced a top-down inertia characteristic of the unions. The result, predictably, was an era marked by a politics of irresponsibility, a political ethic is not indicative of an inherent Russian authoritarianism, but that of the authoritarian nature of the liberal modernity itself.

> *Spread the truth - the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering. One set of laws works everywhere.*[2]

> *Why should the status of the majority of the population deteriorate as a result of the transition of one social system to another? No serious justification for this thesis can be found in the literature. In fact, there is and can be no reasoned evidence that the social and labour status of workers will inevitably deteriorate as a result of a democratic, antitotalitarian revolution, much less that there is no alternative to such deterioration.*[3]

2 Lawrence Summers, in 1991, then chief economist of the World Bank (quoted in Reddaway and Glinski, 2001: 237).

3 Rakitskaya (2004: 33).

Introduction

With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991, liberal democracy presented itself to the world as a political regime unequalled in its capacity to satisfy the majority of the globe's inhabitants. Russians opted for liberal democracy in a seemingly overnight rush to join the 'civilised world'. Russia's president Boris Yeltsin, having been broadcast across the globe defying an attempted coup, joined the world stage as liberal democracy's latest hero and Russia's citizens anticipated a new era in which their concerns and desires for the future would weigh into the newly-independent country's political equation. Russia's post-Soviet transition was undertaken with optimism and a great deal of support from Western leaders and institutions, guided and influenced by the political and economic elite of established liberal democratic polities. The vibrant Russian democratic movement, arising from the hothouse atmosphere of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, had oriented the new direction of Russia toward the liberal capitalist world. Western governments, institutions, and the scholarly community had provided advice and assistance; such expertise would help Russia in the transition, and was indeed necessary to the transition process itself.

By the time Boris Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve 1999, Russia was in a state of profound political, social, and economic exhaustion, and commentators would have been hard-pressed to find a Russian citizen who could articulate the enthusiasm of August 1991. The decade had seen the country careen from crisis to crisis: wage arrears, capital flight, an unresponsive political leadership, the collapse of a social safety net, an untrustworthy banking system, vicious civil unrest within the country's own borders - there seemed to be little reason to celebrate Russia's transition to democracy. A decade which had started out with such good will and excitement had fizzled out, yielding a political landscape barren of optimism. The credibility of liberal democracy had been profoundly undermined within Russia.

As organisations representing Russian workers, the trade unions in post-Soviet Russia hold an important place in understanding the derailed dynamic of the transition. Given the crucial social location of Soviet trade unions in maintaining organisation of, and social services provision to Russian workers, the trade unions served as a prism to interpret institutional and societal responses to Russia's systemic experience of transformation.

Trade unions in Russia were integral to the social architecture of the Soviet Union, and struggled with their location in the new era. The experience of the unions illustrate a more general challenge not only with the post-Soviet transition, but with the inhibited nature of liberal modernity's relationship to democracy, a structure founded on anti-democratic social relations of production. As such, I argue that the Yeltsin era can be seen as a pivotal moment which illustrates not the inherent conservatism or political masochism of Russian society, but of the authoritarian nature of liberal democracy itself.

One of the most enduring histories of the present on modern liberal democracy to be found is in the work of Canadian political theorist C. B. Macpherson. Macpherson's analyses of liberal democratic modernity can be seen as an important discursive intervention within an ongoing dialogue on an alternative, transformative project contemporary social relations. In *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Macpherson (1977) notes that throughout its history, liberal democracy is generally understood as composed of two potentially conflictual elements: the market and the development of human freedom. Whereas liberal democracy holds "basic unconscious assumptions" of "capitalist market societies," it justifies itself by claiming to allow for human development in its operations (Macpherson, 1977: 1). For Macpherson, although liberal democracy arose within capitalist relations, its emphasis upon human developmental capabilities does not need to remain permanently coupled with those relations. In fact, what is important is "the recognition of how deeply the market assumptions about the nature of man and society have penetrated liberal-democratic theory" (Macpherson, 1977: 21). Indeed, much of Macpherson's scholarship is dedicated to the resuscitation of the democratic project from within liberal / market-oriented relations.

With the end of the Soviet project and the loss of an alternative model of social organisation, political discourse was fundamentally transformed into a monologue spoken in the language of market fundamentalism. Within Russia, a political thesis was founded upon the statement that 'there is no alternative' to liberal democracy. This was illustrated by what came to be called the Washington Consensus. Liberal economist Anders Åslund classifies this group as "radical reformers" that included American and Western liberal macroeconomists, "the best economists in the East" such as Leszek Balcerowicz, Vaclav Klaus, and Yegor Gaidar, and international financial institutions including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Åslund, 2007: 33). Thus was a liberal authoritarian approach directed upon the transformation of Russian society, shorn of discussions regarding the social and developmental aspects of democratic theory and locked into market assumptions about modern social organisation.

Similarly, the work of James C. Scott on what he calls state simplifications and authoritarian high modernism are particularly relevant to Russia under the Yeltsin regime. For Scott (1998: 87: 3), the history of European statecraft and state development illustrate optic models of simplification that serve as administrative "maps that, when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade." These simplification schemes are undertaken to provide "rationalising and standardising what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and administratively more convenient format" so as to facilitate taxation, conscription, and state capacity (Scott, 1998: 3).[4] As powerful elites undertake

4 Scott's argument is interesting in the post-Soviet context, given his analysis of twentieth century Russian history and politics. For Scott, Lenin (amongst others) is a prime example of a powerful revolutionary leader whose faith in high modernism "envisioned a sweeping rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition," (1998: 88) but "where it all goes wrong is when it is held by ruling elite with no commitment to democracy or civil rights and

high modernist projects, the vision developed through such map-making leaves aside much of the substance of the social; having been left aside, the population as democratic subjects are rendered administratively irrelevant in the post-Soviet transformation.

Much of the hand-wringing on the state of affairs in Russia since the 1990s has dwelt upon the 'undeveloped' character of civil society, particularly that of the trade unions (Connor, 1991; Cook, 1997; Cook, Orenstein and Rueschemeyer, 1999; Weigle, 2000; Howard 2003). As trade unions in Russia had been established by and for the management of the workforce within Soviet communism, they were hardwired in the service of an authoritarian state. Trade unions in the new regime could not, and would not, serve as representatives for that yet-to-be created democratic citizenry in the new Russia. As the regime moved to enact key transitional moments, its representatives East and West argued that civil society could not be entrusted to find its own voice; the masses would be motivated by their own special interests, which would inhibit the establishment of a market economy. A strategy of eliminating resistance to establishment of market relations and the establishment of a 'normal society,' remains within the literature today as a justification for the anti-democratic nature of the Yeltsin years (Åslund, 2007; Dominguez and Jones, 2007).

I would argue, however, that the problem was not primarily that of the limited developmental capability for political participation by the trade unions or the wider citizenry. Rather, the problem was that under the Yeltsin regime, there was quite deliberately no effort made for a debate on the nature of post-Soviet society to occur. The 1993 crushing of resistance by Yeltsin was only the most violent instance of ensuring no debate occurred. Discussions on transformation focused on speed, not direction or substance.[5] This was particularly the case as the privatisation of the Russian economy was carried out. [6] Privatisation, it was argued, would wean the population from expectations of state support for the maintenance of the social; it would re-educate the citizenry to a market forces orientation, and overcome the deep-seated mentality of authoritarianism. According to Åslund (2007: 35), Yeltsin's 'radical reformers' pursued their policies with the goal of shocking the populace into the

---

who are therefore likely to use unbridled state power for its achievement" (1998: 89). I find Scott's argument here to reflect an unclear perception of 'how it might go right,' but the presentation of the administrative optics of state simplification provides a compelling illustration of the Yeltsin regime's disregard for the population at large, as it sought to master the new Russia through liberal capitalist regimes of ruling.

5 Åslund (2007: 35) writes that "the common conviction of the radical reformers was that these major market reforms had to be undertaken as comprehensively and swiftly as possible."

6 A large literature exists on the implementation of privatisation in the 1990s. See, for example, Alexander Radygin (1995) and Maxim Boycko, Andrei Schliefer and Robert Vishy (1995) for insights into the process and its justification through some of its proponents. Critical analyses of the process include Joseph Blasi, Maya Kroumova and Douglas Kruse (1997). One of the best illustrations of the scholarly mendacity involved in the Russian economic transition remains to be found in the work of anthropologist Janine Wedel (1998).

new era:

> *[P]eople's expectations had to be changed to render the systemic changes credible and irreversible. Balcerowicz ... derived from Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance in social psychology, 'that people are more likely to change their attitudes and behaviours if they are faced with radical changes in the environment, which they consider irreversible, than if those changes are only gradual.'*

A policy based upon enforced disorientation was the order of the day. Similarly, in a recently published collection of essays sponsored by the Club of Madrid, elite governance in the building of democracy is based upon liberal capitalist values and practices, rather than democratic discussions of desired social processes or outcomes.[7]

The norms of liberal democratic capitalism were to be imposed upon Russian society, to ensure the rule of property laws and the right to vote in regular elections. Discussion was irrelevant, and haste, explained through trite platitudes, was the order of the day: there's only one game in town, and in order to play that game, chasms can only be crossed in one leap; bicycles achieve stability only when speed is maintained, etc., etc. Accepted domestic and international wisdom was proclaimed that no viable alternative to liberal market society existed, and Russian society was engaged in negotiating this new reality as imposed by local and global elites. Yet the institutional and cultural framework established by the tsarist and Soviet era remained the unwieldy tools at hand to manage this negotiation.

Labour and Russia's Authoritarian Development

The modern economic development of Russia was characterised by two inter-related elements: the exploitation of its resources for sale on the burgeoning global market, and the management of the economy through centralised control in the tsarist and Soviet era (Dmitrieva, 1996; Schiffer, 1998; Hill and Gaddy, 2003). With decisions on revenue transfers and capital investment made by the powerful political centre, opportunity for local participation in economic decisions was minimal and institutionally limited (Wood, 1987; Dienes, 1991; Van Brabant, 1992; Adams and Brick, 1993; Lavigne, 1995.) This power imbalance was evident in and played out through Soviet trade union structures, created and consolidated with the rise of Soviet power.

By the end of the Civil War, the trade unions were structured as interlocutors between Party and worker in the creation of the socialist labourer; this pedagogical function of the unions was complemented with the allocation of goods and services that the state offered to members of individual work collectives, such as housing, medical care, day

7 As Ekiert and Gryzmaia-Busse (2007: 25) propose: *responsible* public participation does not call into question either democracy or the rule of law. It thus helps to fulfill one condition of democratic consolidation – an elite and popular consensus on the rules of the democratic game – and promotes democracy as the 'only game in town.'

care, vacations, and other basic elements of existence. Within this tightly circumscribed role, the trade unions were junior partners in the Soviet management of workers. The subordination of trade unions to the party-state was a process that unfolded with the disciplining of urban and agricultural workers into a coherent labour force. This labour force would carry out the economic planning and policy as decreed by the Soviet state.

The management of labour in the Stalinist era was characterised by a legal code structured around severe punitive measures to keep labour in line; the unions were expected to fit within this dynamic and trade union personnel were under severe threat if they did not comply. (McCauley, 1969; Deutscher, 1973; Seigelbaum, 1988; Filtzer, 1992). With Stalin's death in 1953, an easing of the atmosphere was initiated. Labour and trade union policy underwent a shift at this time, from viewing individual members of the proletariat as enemies of the people, to formally viewing the proletariat as a vital and even positive element of the production process. A new labour code was developed in 1956; trade union structures were criticised for not having defended workers during the Stalinist years, and 're-education' became the tool of disciplining within the sphere of labour.

The important role of resource allocation of social goods and commodities continued for the unions, and for a fractional contribution from wages, trade union members were eligible for such perquisites. Activism within the official trade union structure also assisted individuals in the allocation process. These roles and eligibility to access were carried out through interpersonal and politically unbalanced power relations.[8] Trade unions served a vital function to distribute goods and services in an economy with a wholly-planned system of production and exchange.

In the managed economy's system of trade union allocation of goods and services, the loss of a job meant the loss of housing, food coupons, day care, and other necessary elements of life. The unions allocated these resources to those workers who were seen to reflect the ideological standards of Soviet propaganda; the controlled access and allocation of such necessities served as a vital tool in labour disciplining. In this the trade unions were not established nor situated to promote, protect, and defend workers' rights within the enterprises, but rather to manage the allocation of 'rewards' (housing, pay packets, foodstuffs) to all members of the enterprise, from the executive manager on down to the *vakhtyor* who monitored building access.

---

8 See Ledeneva (1998: 29) on blat (the word can loosely be translated as 'connections' or 'contacts') as it played out in social benefit allocations. Sarah Ashwin identifies social benefits provision conducted through the trade union structures as "state paternalism" (1999b: 11) and that benefit distribution was resolved through individualised, personalised contacts (1999b: 14). Thus workers approach the trade union and enterprise elite as supplicants, rather than as subjects; although this "does something to improve the standing of the union, it does nothing to transform the nature of workers' relationships to either the union or their employer" (Ashwin, 1999b: 100). In her recent research on trade union approaches to 'social partnership' and conflict resolution through an avoidance of strikes, see Ashwin (2004).

It was this tradition of trade unions in the service of maintaining labour peace and the management of the social that perestroika inherited in the 1980s. Highly centralised and structured through enterprise-based lines in city-wide, regional, and national configurations, Soviet trade unions as institutions, and the personnel placed therein, were ill-equipped for systemic changes. Despite calls for the unleashing of energy from below in order to foster a vibrant civil society, *perestroika*-era trade unions were in no way fitted out for this task, nor were trade unions equipped to manage, let alone lead, in the fractious labour relations which arose as the USSR collapsed. The unions were structured to implement central policy in production targets and allocate rewards, and little more. The enterprise-based structure of the trade union, and that enterprise's dependence upon the centre, further limited any proliferation of vibrant trade union and civic activity to address the Soviet economic and political stagnation.

Thus historically close relations with enterprise management and state structures of governance were an outcome of the system of production, with each enterprise itself fit into a nation-wide, industry-wide, and highly integrated scheme of production and consumption. Competition for all resources, including labour, compelled a mindset that saw labour and management in enterprise, regional, sectoral, and ministerial segments working together to ensure a share of total resource allocation in the national economy. To not work in concert with each other would almost assuredly lead to a breakdown of the enterprise's place in the overall scheme of production, not to mention potentially bringing down the wrath of the Soviet government upon the enterprise and trade union management.

Although Western political regimes were able to give credence to trade unions as critical institutions in civil society, a number of commentators have argued that this was not the case in post-Soviet Russia (Connor, 1991, Cook, 1997; Cook, Orenstein and Rueschemeyer, 1999; Weigle, 2000; Howard, 2003; Mandel 2004). The Soviet history and culture of Russian unions, and their enterprise-structured approach to representation, meant that the unions thus constituted were beyond redemption as institutions which represented the interests of workers. With a labour relations approach that emphasises 'social partnership' with government and industry, the traditional trade unions contravened international norms with the continued formal inclusion of all enterprise staff, including senior managers. Efforts to form 'independent' unions, particularly in the mining industry, met with limited success and showed a disappointing lack of solidarity with other sectors of the Russian economy. Yet as harbingers of the possible they provided promising examples of potential labour transformation, perhaps most particularly to the international labour community.

Scholars have also illustrated the important manner in which the inheritances of the Soviet era have shaped post-Soviet trade union responses to the chaos of the post-Soviet era (Clarke et.al., 1993; Clarke, 1996; Ashwin, 1999b; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999, Ashwin and

Clarke, 2002; Mandel, 2004). Ashwin makes an important contribution in historicising 'worker solidarity' in the context of the Soviet experience. The labour collective is, she notes, the site of crucial social support and of conflict, in that "the common interests of workers and managers in relation to the outside world co-existed with sharp conflicts of interest between [these] two groups within the enterprise…this contradiction had a huge influence on workers' subjective collective identification (i.e. as a class), both in the Soviet era and during the transition" (Ashwin 1999b: 8-9).

Thus the circumscribed role of the trade unions limited their role and efficacy in transformation to defenders of workers' rights. Stolid, unimaginative trade union structures remained in place, although at the national level the overarching federation of trade unions, formerly the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (ACCTU), was reborn within the Russian Federation as the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR).[9] The FNPR inherited the structure and property of the ACCTU, and also inherited its membership: in 1998, the FNPR via its local and regional trade union structures claimed membership of some 60 million of Russia's 72 million strong labour force.[10]

In these circumstances, Western trade unions were of limited assistance. There was, of course, a long history of tense relations in the international labour movement during the Soviet era. Trade union organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) openly opposed the Bolsheviks and disavowed the Soviet communist project. Resistance to Soviet and post-Soviet trade unions remained characteristic of the ICFTU, which only admitted the FNPR to its membership in 2000.[11] The attitude of separateness was an important component of the Cold War reality, a reality that, unfortunately, was initially carried over into the post-Soviet period by the American labour behemoth, the AFL-CIO.

The AFL-CIO began its overt activities in Moscow in 1992, with the opening of the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI).[12] The FTUI was committed to the Yeltsin regime's transition

9 In Russia, *Federatsyia Nezavisimikh Profsoyuzov Rossii*.

10 Membership in 2007 is listed at 27,800,000, an approximate 38% of the Russian labour force. By way of contrast the AFL-CIO membership is listed as 8,400,400, and the US has an estimated 14% of unionised workers the labour force. See the International Trade Union Confederation website for membership information. For data on labour force size collected by the Central Intelligence Agency, see *The World Factbook: Russia and The World Factbook: the United States* (2007: online) and Herzenberg's "Reinventing the United States Labour Movement, Inventing Postindustrial Prosperity: A Progress Report" (2000: online).

11 The ICFTU was dissolved in 2006 when it merged with the World Confederation of Labour to form the International Trade Union Confederation; FNPR remains a member of the ITUC.

12 The Free Trade Union Institute had a long history in parts of the world with labour environments causing anxiety in American power structures. Harry Kelber (2004) provides a brief history of the AFL-CIO and FTUI. In late December 2002, FTUI Director Irene Stevenson was barred from re-

to a free market economy. Such a position became increasingly tenuous with respect to two particular positions. First, the FTUI chose only to work with what it considered 'independent' unions - in particular, those it helped to organise and fund - and not the main representatives of the Russian labour force, the FNPR and its member organisations. This left the wealthy American organisation the possibility of working with less than 30% of the Russian labour force. Such a tactic served only to further split a labour movement that was structurally, culturally, and imaginatively flat on its back. By choosing its partners on this basis, such a strategy was, in fact, simply a small scale replication of the support given to Yeltsin and his cohorts as appropriate and worthy beneficiaries. Neither approach mobilised nor democratised representative organisations or the broader society. Secondly, upholding support for the Yeltsin regime in fostering social partnerships in the context of wage arrears required a convoluted leap of logic that most Russian workers found impossible to make.

The insistence of the AFL-CIO and other Western unions that Russian counterparts be self-financed through membership dues was increasingly nonsensical; workers weren't being paid on a consistent basis, if at all, precluding the possibility of a dues check-off system. Short of foreign financing, the only practical methods available to support the functioning of unions were to continue to accept payments, or promises of payments, from enterprise management, retain the office space available in enterprises, and to introduce extracurricular for-profit schemes. Trade unions were conducting chocolate bar drives, selling eggs and panty-hose, and looking to create insurance schemes; more lucrative trade union structures in Russia turned profits on casinos and resorts.

Despite their lackluster performance in the defense of labour, and the almost invisible pace of transformative efforts to become organisations responsive to their membership, the traditional trade unions remain the most readily available concept and experience of worker representation to the Russian labour force. Discounting their relevance, or demanding that they be 'like us,' loses sight of the extent to which they remained relevant to Russian workers, particularly during the Yeltsin era when the trade union role of goods allocation became even more important in daily life. In the absence of representative and responsive governance and institutions of market relations, the state not surprisingly remained the focus of protest for the traditional unions. To reject working with the traditional unions out of hand, because their leadership was not radical enough and their organisational principles reflecting local traditions of a corporatist ethic, can be perceived as once again closing off the debate with Russians in a manner akin to elite discourse on 'there is no alternative.'

Trade union responses to the new imperatives of a liberal market and the global economy

---

entry into Russia, effectively closing down the FTUI activities. The Free Trade Union Institute has been globally reorganised as the Solidarity Center; although activities within Russia are circumspect the Center is actively engaged in other areas of the former Soviet sphere.

mitigated against amelioration of deteriorating social and economic conditions, as well as against substantive participatory democracy. The post-Soviet transition to a market economy converged into a Western-supported superpresidentialism, a new style of authoritarian Russian rule which once again demobilised the population at large and fostered a politics of irresponsibility on the part of the Yeltsin regime, a lesson in governance requisite of modern liberal democracy that was not lost on Russia's subsequent president, Vladimir Putin. Thus, the bewailing of the 'authoritarian' nature of Putin on the part of Western leaders is not a little disingenuous; the activities of foreign governments in legitimising Yeltsin's democratic authoritarianism laid the foundation for Putin's unabashed style of 'strong governance.'

In Yeltsin's Russia, transformative intervention was carried out in collaboration with powerful Western support. The post-Soviet experience reinforces the assessment of Macpherson the challenge to decoupling authoritarian market relations and the project of human development. Similarly, the era shows the nature of state simplification and authoritarian high modernism characterised by Scott. Within the paradigm of contemporary liberal democracy, a transition to democracy remains successful insofar as that transition limits the area of debate. What is important is not democratic participation *per se*, but rather, the establishment of liberal democratic rules of conduct (McFaul, 2001). The establishment of private property, wage labour, and market allocation of resources are fundamental; once these are established, civilised discourse will allow any remaining or newly-arising problems to be resolved within a formal political sphere shorn of social substance, but operating within the rule of liberal law.

The post-Soviet systemic transformation involved limiting the sphere of debate upon the withdrawal of the state from property ownership and control. During the 1990s, Russia was the subject of a liberal capitalist project which was constructed and carried by a numerically small but powerful group of political and financial leaders within the country, and with the elite international financial, political, and academic support. But rather than fostering a democratic system, Russia's transition to democracy reinforced an anti-democratic authoritarianism. This was accomplished through the solidification of power to Western-supported and Western-designated 'democrats' (Wedel, 1998; Cohen, 2000; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001). In the 1990s, democracy came to be identified solely with support for Yeltsin and his cronies; the resulting 'superpresidentialism' in Russian's historical context, simply meant a continuation of authoritarianism while laying the basis for the abdication of responsibility for the state of society and economy on the part of the post-communist elite. In Western liberal analyses, Yeltsin was portrayed as a victim of circumstances, and liberal democracy once again showed a remarkable lack of self-reflexivity in assessments of Russia's transition to democracy (Weigle, 2000; McFaul, 2001; Morgan, 2007).

It fell to the Yeltsin regime to shear the political agenda that had been widened in the late *perestroika* period, and the regime admirably did so. This shearing away of that which may be debated is the *sine qua non* of liberal democracy. Indeed, Russia's difficult transition in the 1990s was not due to listening to the wrong liberals, but rather, was characteristic of liberalism itself.

The Experience of Liberal Disciplinary Measures

The elimination of hyper-inflation, that important macro-indicator of Western economies, was hailed as a great leap forward in normalising Russia's economy. A further move in this direction was the creation of a banking system, yet some 3,000 neophyte banks by 1994 – whittled down to 1,500 by 1998 - existed in a largely unregulated system with haphazard roles being assigned for and created by them. In such an unregulated context, rapacious chaos combined with fiscal imagination was the order of the day (Pettingill, 1998; Menshikov, 1995). Bartering became the norm serving as yet one more convoluted element of Russia's transition to capitalism. Despite these elements of crisis, the Russian economy was categorised as one of the high-performing 'emerging' economies, and international financial institutions kept lending to, courting, and supporting the Yeltsin regime: from a $53.8 billion USD Soviet external debt in 1989 to, a decade later, an estimated $140 billion USD (Simon, 1999).

Perhaps the most characteristic social marker during the Yeltsin regime was that of the phenomenon of non-payment. From governments to their suppliers, civil servants and social benefit recipients, amongst firms in economic exchanges, and between firms and their employees, debts were incurred but were simply not paid. Non-payment problems ballooned during the decade as the old economic structures of intra-union payment were abandoned in favour of formally stated market-oriented and profit-oriented methods, but these new structures were being put into place with no systematic, over-arching agency or agent responsible for enforceability.

Local firms and individuals adapted to the situation in a variety of ways. Debts and taxes were often paid in kind: one oil industry joint venture paid utility bills via a donation of used computer equipment; further payments were made by offering computer training and expertise. 'Taxes' were paid to municipalities through bartering of equipment and labour – in one reported instance, road crews were utilised to repave municipal roads in the Khanty-Mansisk district of Nizhnevartovsk in order to pay company taxes. Not surprisingly, companies could mutually reinforce activities to sustain themselves better than Russia's citizens.[13] For unpaid workers, barter transactions belied the ability for claimants to ascertain governmental or enterprise revenues, limiting the possibility of assessing how much money has changed hands or is in governmental revenues.

13 Desai and Idson (2001: 6) use 1996 data to note that "[o]nly 16% of the 2.6 million enterprises registered in the country paid [wages] in full and on time."

The historical tradition of collaboration with enterprise management and government, along with the generalised collapse of political and economic structures characteristic of Yeltsin's Russia, left Russian trade unions confounded in the 1990s. With very limited exceptions, trade unions in Russia were inherited from the Soviet era and structured so as to receive production guidelines and commands fitting into the overarching order of things - that role collapsed with the overarching order itself. They were to transmit the goods and services accrued to their constituency - that method of accrual similarly collapsed as state allocation dissolved and market mechanisms were put forward. But the constituency remained, and the need for trade unions' historical role in the allocation process was, in fact, reinforced in the post-Soviet era of the 1990s. This was especially the case of *monogoroda*, single-industry cities in isolated locations, where the community's economic dependency upon a single employer rendered the populace and the municipalities severely limited in finding options for an alternative tax base, employment, housing, or other social elements of life.

Given the manner in which unions were developed, and individual employees were integrated into consumption and commodity access patterns through trade unions, labour 'solidarity' was oriented toward the management of social life. As this collapsed and with no clear-cut authority or obligations claimed by enterprises or government, there was no discernible structure nor agent to confront. Nor was any agency or individual claiming responsibility for social and economic conditions. Yet political and economic unravelling did not foster revolt, but rather than ethic of paralysis, rather than passivity, in terms of protest; the cultural history of totalitarian power contributed to the fostering of a citizenry unsure of how to proceed. Not that protests didn't occur; they certainly did. But as one Siberian resident said in a personal interview with the author during the autumn of 1998, "it takes energy to fight; we're too busy living."

Such a context acted to perpetuate individual dependence upon personal connections within the unions and society more generally, and to perpetuate the traditionally acquiescent role of the trade unions within the productive structure. It was particularly in this context of the spiralling non-payment crisis and unclear lines of responsibility that post-Soviet trade unions floundered as the 1990s wore on. Developing new activists, and a new way of thinking about labour relations, proved a profoundly difficult task. In the late *perestroika* years, fractured relations abounded between various leftist and labour organisations. The unions as a representational force were largely discredited with the collapse of a regime which had predicated its propaganda upon the basis of claims to represent labour. Both structurally and in the concrete personalities involved, the trade unions' collusive practices with management were prolonged by the very chaos that arose from the collapse of the command economy. Soviet trade unions' historical role in benefits allocation was perpetuated as 'the market' clearly was unable to provide. Even in instances where goods

might become locally available, the lack of wage payments prevented purchasing power by any incipient consumer base. As the market appeared further and further from the reaches of Russia's citizens, the dependence on self-production of food became increasingly important for survival (Kitching, 1998; Artemov, 1998; Desai and Idson, 2000).

The focus of frustration, for employers and workers, appeared to remain in important ways turned upon the political and economic centre, in particular, with the federal governmental structures based in Moscow, and any basis for social and political change was more readily perceived to be between workers and enterprises against the government (Ashwin, 1999a; 1999b; 2004; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Ashwin and Clarke, 2002). This dynamic reinforced the diffused nature of 'making do' in post-Soviet society, and supported the perpetuation of an ethic of political irresponsibility on the part of unions as well as of the Yeltsin regime.

The Russian wage arrears crisis provided an exemplary circumstance which illustrated difficulty in carefully attributing blame and exercising power accordingly. As Deborah Javeline notes, "thoughtful and accurate assessment of a problem's origins and solutions can often get in the way of collective action because many problems of the contemporary social and economic world have highly complicated origins and solutions and are likely to defy simple explanations" (2003: 108). [14] Such thoughtful, accurate assessment is highly valued in liberal society, and the evolving emphasis upon rational discourse - lest one be confused for an unreconstructed communist - discouraged protest in the context of undifferentiated responsibility.

In the post-Soviet era East and West, the discourse of elections and elite policy management was constructed within the paradigm of liberal democracy and subject to the vagaries of the market. The market, of course, is claimed to operate outside the substantive exercise of power of trade unions and political leaders, yet it sets the terms of social, political, and economic debate. The specifics of the Yeltsin era reflect the history and context of post-Soviet Russia, but are easily recognisable as outcomes of liberal democracy's authoritarian nature and context shorn of participation (or even the need for participation) that would constitute a vibrant democratic polity. The post-Soviet experience does not only highlight the authoritarian nature of Russia, but rather, it highlights the comfortable fit of liberal democracy with an authoritarian politics.

Within liberal democracies, trade unions are superfluous to economic management and decision-making, although important to the maintenance of labour peace within unionised environments. In post-Soviet Russia, the trade union culture of management-union collaboration had a longer shelf-life than the accepted paradigms which had created the culture. The trade unions in their post-Soviet manifestation were carried forward

14 Crowley and Ost (2001: 204) also note the challenges to effective protest in a climate of diffused political responsibility.

by inertia and, paradoxically, their role as social benefits providers in Yeltsin's Russia was reinforced when the market and the state did not step in to manage the provision of social and economic goods necessary for the maintenance of its constituency. The unions existed in the Yeltsin era, then, through a persisting dynamic of collaboration with enterprise management, and remained focused upon the centralised state structures and personnel in Moscow. In the absence of political accountability for economic decision-making processes, with the tradition of enterprise-focused worker representation, and with day-to-day survival as a full-time job, such a focus made sense.

Similarly, efforts to organise working class parties were unable to take root in the Yeltsin era.[15] In the 1995 and 1999 elections, efforts were made to have trade unionists elected to the State Duma, while the trade unions continued with their top-down approach toward coalition-building, to the detriment of electoral success. Lacking the political cachet, funding priorities, and limited democratic will to organise themselves, national trade union structures joined in a remarkably unsuccessful alliance with powerful enterprises managers. Despite the calls from the centre for such an alliance, Clarke (2001: 47) notes that "branch and regional trade union organisations were embedded in their own structures of social partnership and were not willing to compromise their positions for the sake of solidarity with the FNPR leadership." Independent unions did not fare any better; their miniscule membership alone did not provide electoral numbers to successfully elect working class blocs of representatives in the Duma. Such 'strong leader' allegiances and approaches to representative politics serve not only to reinforce social partnership objectives, but to reinforce the authoritarian nature of liberal democratic politics.

The Authority of Liberal Democracy

In 1991, Soviet leaders declared defeat and accepted liberal democracy as the new model to pursue in Russian development initiatives. Free markets and democracy were the rallying cry to be adopted, based upon the wealth of experience of economic and political knowledge gleaned from Western presentations of its own path to liberal democracy and capitalist markets. In the new paradigm, getting the state out of business would rationalise economic distortions and allow the unfettered economic forces of the country to develop. Market signals rather than planners would be the new agents of history. The West would advise and, as necessary, give financial aid, loans and technical expertise to Russia.

Yet despite their own demands to depoliticise the economy, both Western supporters and Russia's Westernisers continued to prop up the new development model by propping up the politicians themselves. Democracy could only be created with a strong hand. Support for the Yeltsin regime came to be identified with support for liberal democratic reforms (Lukin, 1999; Cohen, 2000; Reddaway and Glinski, 2001). The President was a law unto

15 Of course, the questionable efficacy of working class parties in established democracies highlights the problems of such parties in defending workers' rights in any case – witness Canadian Auto Workers President Buzz Hargrove's alliance with the Liberal Party in the 2007 federal election, and noted resistance to "the insanity of the environmental movement" (Canadian Press, 2007: online).

himself, and presidential decrees were the basis by which significant transformations were made to economy and society. As Sokolowski (2003: 422) notes, Yeltsin "sought to construct the president *as ruler of those who govern*, rather than one who is himself responsible for governing." The result was that the Russian government itself lacked accountability, and the President ruled by decree and gave little indication of interest in the concerns of the population.

As the regime bumbled through the decade, growing and increasingly vocal discontent with the regime's decisions and policies were evidenced. By the summer of 1998, international lenders as well as the Russian labour movement increasingly voiced disgust with the regime and the reform process. The early part of the summer saw an increased popular willingness to protest. A favourite tactic that summer was the blockading of the Trans-Siberian railway, which had been used by pensioners in 1997 to protest unpaid pensions. Miners in the Kemerovo region of Siberia began blockading the railway again in July of 1998, holding up cargo trains but initially allowing passenger trains through (Moscow Times, 1998). The stated reason for the protest was that a similar 'rail war' had been called off three months earlier when Yeltsin promised the payment of back wages and retraining money would be forthcoming - it was not. The Kemerovo blockade was lifted by 19 July, but unpaid workers in Sakhalin then used the same tactic to squeeze out a portion of back wages owing. Later that month, some fifty coal miners in the Russian Far East took the local mine director hostage in his office (Saradzhyan, 1998). And in Moscow, a protest of several hundred coal miners encamped in front of the White House was joined by 1,500 unpaid defence industry workers.

The trade unions, particularly the FNPR, supported these short-term actions but declined to lead; as Ashwin and Clarke note, "the FNPR leadership was always afraid that its demonstrations would compromise its democratic credentials..." (2002: 50). At the trade union level as well, then, leadership operated through a diffusion of responsibility, and lack of leadership in response to the making of a market society constituted 'democracy.' Something in this taut context of economy and society would have to give; it did, with the event of the August 1998 rouble meltdown, a signal of ineffectual politics that likewise deflated the efforts of liberal democratic regimes to continue with the fallacy that Yeltsin's presidency would yield stability, prosperity and democracy.

Immediately following the rouble crisis of August 1998, an international navel-gazing exercise was undertaken on the question of 'Who lost Russia?' The IMF, the democrats, the communists, the oligarchs, the privatisers, and the people were all named as culprits for the failure of reforms, by virtue of being too lenient, too interventionist, too obstructionist, too greedy, too fast or too slow, and of course, too passive. A self-reflexive look at liberal democracy itself, as a project of social, political, and economic organisation that claims to

enfranchise populations and satisfy needs, was certainly called for; once more in history, however, that opportunity was squandered.

Liberalism and the Politics of Irresponsibility

The Yeltsin era to 1998 did not yield a market economy or a democratic polity. However, the regime had learned new tactics of authority in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet era, the government of democratic Russia disavowed claims of political obligation to the citizenry. The divesting of political and economic obligations, and the framing of responsibility and authority from Party to market, had limited and redirected the strategic focus whereby redress could be pursued.

Facing an ephemeral foe proved beyond the imagination of trade unions that had been created and cultivated in a climate of corporatist, top-down policies, with little experience of initiating local, regional, or national strategies. Withdrawal to the micro-level of life made immediate sense, but as a long-term strategy to effect change this had obvious limits. A fractious global labour movement is unsure how to picket the market, and in the Russian context, it was even less possible to figure out who exercised control even in the more immediate social and economic arena.

Limited relevant concrete advice or assistance came from international labour organisations; the cultural differences in union mandates, structures and activities, compounded in the context of wage arrears and an underperforming liberal political economy were profound and difficult to overcome. For individuals dependent upon personal relations of power to maintain basic conditions of life, the 'market' was even further away than the legendary tsar in Moscow. A market removed political obligations of the bosses, and stripped away the social and economic facts of life which had been the responsibility of trade unions and enterprises.

With the implosion of Soviet power, and the avowed adoption of liberal democracy, formal validation was given to include the local citizenry as an active and vital element in political decision-making. All members of the society would be entitled to participate in the decision-making processes as community and society was rebuilt. The trade unions, as nominally powerful representatives of the Russian majority, were conceptually and strategically situated to take up this mantle. Yet in the context of non-payment, and governmental abdicated of responsibility for social services, a philosophy of social partnership and the traditional collaboration of enterprise trade unions with management counterpoised to the central government was strengthened. With the lack of government funding to continue their activities, and the rising wage arrears crisis undermining membership funding of the unions, the trade unions relied increasingly upon the enterprises themselves in order to continue to exist. The disintegration of Soviet power was complemented by the lack of

an alternative accountable agent to take this place. The collapse of Soviet power meant the collapse of an identifiable agent of responsible (although unresponsive) authority, the Communist Party.

The weak political response by Russian society was historically grounded in a centuries-old discourse of authority. Throughout modernity, Russia's rulers and intellectual elite declared the strategic path which would secure the place of the polity amongst the civilised nations of the world. This model was replicated within trade union structures, whereby the unions served the pedagogical function of disseminating Party policy, while encouraging the meeting of production standards through disciplinary recourse, social services, and commodity allocation in the command economy. This reinforced a non-participatory ethic amongst the populace; the sphere of political responsibility, such as it existed, was that of the knowledgeable layers of society who could discern the overarching plan, and the place of various components of that plan.[16]

When Soviet power collapsed, the clearly-designated responsible party collapsed with it, and international supporters with solid liberal democratic expertise and credentials came to play a key role in the transition from communism. Intervention from these experts was carried out with domestic support by a small group of powerful individuals, who were declared to have the capacity to understand the need for staying the course. Given the intense degree of pressure which this new liberal vanguard were prepared to bring to bear, democratic participation was once again inhibited. The focus for responsibility shifted from an omnipotent Communist Party to ephemeral market forces. The declaration by an international and domestic elite that liberal democracy was the only alternative for Russia went hand in hand with the legitimating of a decree-happy, irresponsible and unresponsive President.

The historical marginalisation of all but authoritative agents of state power, and structures which fitted within that model of top-down direction, was rebranded in the name of liberal democracy and thus incorporated into the post-Soviet order. Rhetoric aside, the Yeltsin era was no repetition of previous revolutionary experiences. In the early twentieth century, the Bolsheviks had to work from a defensive position, one which required the support of important political sectors of the population - most notably, the army, the peasantry, and the urban proletariat in conflict with global capitalism. This is distinguished from the Yeltsin period, whereby the assumption of power was taken by an integrated elite already in place. But a concerted effort to bring on side the international community was much more successful in 1991. And if the Bolsheviks had been concerned with politicising complaints to the level of revolutionary fodder as charges against the tsarist system itself, the Yeltsin regime was concerned with depoliticising those complaints to the level of whining, laziness, and the classic inability of the majority of the population to see its 'true'

16 See Baker and Thompson (forthcoming 2009) on the reinforced nature of authoritarianism in post-Soviet pedagogical practices in the practices of the liberal arts.

interests. The project of human development noted by Macpherson as one component of liberal democracy had been decoupled in the Yeltsin era, and the establishment of liberal democracy was solely focused on the establishment of market relations.

The Soviet enterprises, and the trade unions fitted within that enterprise and national structure, faced profound difficulties in this context. Liberalism's efforts to narrow the focus of the political made it increasingly unlikely that the relationship between industry and labour would move beyond a coping strategy addressing the exigencies of the moment. As funds for the trade unions dried up, and as enterprises divested themselves of day care centres, housing, resort camps, health care and the like, the relationship between unions and enterprise manageers was strained. But a continued focus upon collaborative sustenance in an era of social partnership left unions within their comfort zone of relevance as social partners with enterprise management, seeking to access resources through the consolidated power of governmental authority.

With international consensus, then, the government of Russia went on the offensive against its population, and the history of centralised command to secure a better future was refitted into the discourse of liberal capitalist modernity. In a leap of logic revealing an intense contempt of Russia's population, democracy came to mean giving virtually unlimited power to a few declared democrats. Support for Russian democracy came to mean support for Yeltsin and his economic dream team. Political participation was exclusionary, with the active approval of liberal democratic governments and international financial institutions, and in the name of democracy itself. Russia's Yeltsin-era experience of liberal democracy branded any alternative strategies as reflecting intellectual ignorance of how the world 'really' worked, or reflected a neo-bolshevist desire to return to the communist past.

Unlike previous excursions into remaking Russian society, however, the Yeltsin-era transition was undertaken with the authority and validation of liberal capitalist democracies. This collaboration offers insight into the affinity between liberalism and the authoritarian legitimating of a politics of irresponsibility. In the 1990s, powerful international commentators and political supporters of the regime declared democracy to be evident in Russia on the basis of formal mechanisms of legitimisation such as voting structures, a tripartite formal relationship between government, business, and labour, and a constitution declaring itself to be based upon liberal democratic principles and the rule of (property) law. The unconscious assumption of liberal democracy noted by Macpherson were made unapologetically manifest. Scott's proposed authoritarian high modernism as rendered manageable through a state simplification project of mapping the social ensured that the social and political substance of post-Soviet Russia were sheared from the administrative map. Support for the Yeltsin regime became the necessary and sufficient

conditions for the creation of liberal democracy in Russia; the result was a closing off of the debate of alternative visions or substantive political participation. Authoritarian power was perpetuated with the consensus of liberal capitalist democracy; the demobilisation of a popular politics was necessary to institutionalise economic reforms. These authoritarian activities were carried out in the name of creating a social interest in the future; liberal democratic intent excused the illiberal, authoritarian outcomes. The rhetorical and policy framing of the new order was simplified to a stark presentation beyond the scope of argument: there was no alternative.

In 1995, Boris Kagarlitsky commented that "the self-confident heirs of the communist regime learned nothing from the regime's fate" (1995: 24). I would disagree completely. The Yeltsin regime learned one of the most valuable lessons of modern history. As in tsarism before it, Soviet communism collapsed so speedily in part because there was an easily-identified agent in power. By claiming such power, responsibility is identified and an assault is more easily focused upon those structures of power. Disallowing or discrediting public participation, and denying responsibility for the state of the union, is a much more successful way to ensure political impotence. If you can accomplish this with the support and assistance of the 'civilised' world of capitalist liberal democracy, so much the better.

At the beginning of the Yeltsin era, Russians were presented with the ultimate liberal simplification: there is no alternative. Modern liberal democracy simplifies the social, political, and economic landscape so as to accommodate what the modern administrator wishes to bring into view for purposes of management. This mantra of visual singularity encapsulates the simplification of modern liberal political dialogue. The 1990s saw liberal democracies complicit with Russian elites in the post-Soviet transformation. The proclamation of the universal applicability of Western economics verified the lack of options facing Russia. But once again, debate and discussion, an arguably more democratic manner in which to foster a participatory polity, were left out of the equation. The affinity between Russian authoritarianism and liberalism's authority in declaring that 'there is no alternative' illustrate the limitations of contemporary politics. The dilemma of getting to democracy is not reflective of the immaturity and unrealised potential of Russian political culture, but rather, of the authoritarian foundations of liberal modernity itself. The 'shearing' of participatory democracy is evidenced through Russia's Soviet and post-Soviet experience. Political irresponsibility becomes normalised through these structures; liberal democracy's self-presentation is distilled into the rejection of any alternative but this politics shorn of substance.

REFERENCES

Adams, W. and J. W. Brick. 1993. *Adam Smith Goes to Moscow: a Dialogue on Radical Reform*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Åslund, A. 2007. *How Capitalism was Built: the Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Artemov, V. 1998. "Work and Free time of the Employed Rural Population in Siberia: Time-Budget Trends (1970s to 1990s)." *Society and Leisure*. Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn), pp. 379-393.

Ashwin, S. & I. Popova. 2006. "Professionals in a Cold Climate: Responses to Economic Transformation in Russia." *International Journal of Human Resource Management*.

_____ 2004. "Social Partnership or a 'Complete Sellout'? Russian Trade Unions' Responses to Conflict. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 42, No. 1, March, pp. 23-46.

Ashwin, S. & S. Clarke. 2002. *Russian Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Transition*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave

_____ 1999a. "Redefining the Collective: Russian Mineworkers in Transition" in *Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World*. M. Burawoy and K. Verdery (eds.). Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, pp. 245-272.

_____ 1999b. *Russian Workers: the Anatomy of Patience*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

_____ 1996. "Forms of Collectivity in a Non-Monetary Society." *Sociology*, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 21-39.

Baker, NJ and C. D. Thompson (forthcoming 2009). "Ideologies of Civic Participation in Central Asia: Liberal Arts in the Post-Soviet Democratic Ethos." *Education, Citizenship, Social Justice*.

Blasi, J., M. Kroumova & D. Kruse. 1997. *Kremlin Capitalism: The Privatisation of the Russian Economy*. Ithaca: Dartmouth Press.

Boycko, M., A. Schliefer and R. Vishy. 1995. *Privatising Russia*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Burawoy, M. & K. Verdery. 1999. *Uncertain Transitions: Ethnographies of Change in the Postsocialist World*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield.

Canadian Press. 2007. "Green Insanity Looms: CAW Buzz Hargrove says Manufacturing could Suffer if Environmental Standards too Tough." Online: http://www.thestar.com/Business/article/202828

Carr, E. H. 1985. *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*. New York: W. W. North & Company, Inc.

Clarke, S. 2001. "Russian Trade Unions in the 1999 Duma Elections." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 43-69.

_____ (ed). 1996. *The Russian Enterprise in Transition: Case Studies*. Cheltanham: Edward Elgar Press.

Clarke, S., P. Fairbrother, M. Burawoy & P. Krotov. 1993. *What about the Workers? Workers and the Transition to Capitalism in Russia*. London: Verso.

Cohen, S. F. 2000. *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Connor, W. 1991. *The Accidental Proletariat: Workers, Politics and the Crisis in Gorbachev's Russia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cook, L., M. Orenstein & M. Rueschemeyer (eds.) 1999. *Left Parties and Social Policy in Post-Soviet Russia*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Cook, L. 1997. *Labour and Liberalisation: Trade Unions in the New Russia*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Crowley, S. & D. Ost. 2001. *Workers After Workers' States: Labour and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield.

Dienes, L. 1991. "Siberia: Perestroika and Economic Development." *Soviet Geography*, Vol. 32, No. 7, pp. 445-457.

Desai, P. & T. Idson. 2000. *Work Without Wages: Russia's Non-Payment Crisis*. Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

Deutscher, I. 1973. *Soviet Trade Unions: Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Dmietrieva, O. 1996. *Regional Development in the USSR and After*. London: UCL Press.

Ekiert, G. and A. Grzmaia-Busse. 2007. "Strengthening Pluralism and Public Participation in New Democracies." In *The Construction of Democracy: Lessons From Practice and Research*. J. Dominguez and A. Jones (eds.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 20-44.

Filtzer, D. 1992. *Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953-1964*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herzenberg, S. 2000. "Reinventing the United States Labour Movement, Inventing Postindustrial Prosperity: A Progress Report." *International Institute for Labour Studies*. (IIES). Online: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/papers/2000/dp119/index.htm

Hill, F. and C. Gaddy. 2003. *The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners left Russia out in the Cold*. Washington, D. C: Brookings Institution Press.

International Trade Union Confederation. *List of Affiliated Organisations*. Online: http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ITUC_List_Affiliates_02GC_230707.pdf

Javeline, D. 2003. "The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (February), pp. 107-121.

Kagarlitsky, B. 1995. *Restoration in Russia: Why Capitalism Failed*. Renfrey Clarke, Translator. London: Verso.

Kelber, Harry. 2004. "AFL-CIO's Dark Past (5): Kirkland Builds a Secret Global Empire with U.S. Funds to Control Foreign Labour." Online: http://www.laboreducator.org/darkpast5.htm

Kitching, G. 1998. "The Revenge of the Peasant? The Collapse of Large-Scale Russian Agriculture and the Role of the Peasant 'Private Plot' in That Collapse, 1991-1997." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 26, No.1 (October), pp. 43-81.

Lavigne, M. 1995. *The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Ledeneva, A.V. 1998. *Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lenin, V. I. 1971. *On Socialist Economic Organisation: Articles and Speeches*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lukin, A. 1999. "Forcing the Pace of Democratisation." *Journal of Democracy,* Vol.10, No. 2, April, pp. 37-45.

Macpherson, C. B. 1977. *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mandel, D. 2004. *Labour after Communism: Auto Workers and their Unions in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Malia, M. 1998. *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McCauley, M. 1969. *Labour Disputes in Soviet Russia 1957 – 1965*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

McDaniel, T. 1996. *The Agony of the Russian Idea*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McFaul, Michael. 2001. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change From Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Menshikov, S. 1995. "Russian Capitalism Today." *Monthly Review*, July-Aug, pp. 81-97.

Morgan, P. 2007. "In Praise of Yeltsin." *Quadrant*. September, Vol, 51, No. 10, pp. 68-70.

Moscow Times. 1998. "Miners Block Rails for Fourth Day." July 7, p. 2.

Pettingill, G. 1998. "Banking in Post-Crisis Russia." *American Chamber of Commerce in Russia Newsletter.* (November-December)

Radygin, A. 1995. *Privatisation in Russia: Hard Choices, First Results, New Targets*. London: Centre for Research into Communist Economics.

Rakitskaya, G. 2004. "The Unannounced Reform of Social and Labour Relations in the 1990s." *Problems of Economic Transition*, Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 29-45.

Reddaway, P. & D. Glinski. 2001. *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy.* Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Saradzhyan, S. 1998. "Coal Miners Take Boss Hostage." *Moscow Times.* July 29, p. 3.

Saunders, D. 1993. *Russia in an Age of Reaction and Reform: 1801-1881.* New York: Longman House.

Schiffer, J. R. 1998. *Soviet Regional Economic Policy.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Scott, J. C. 1998. *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seiglebaum, L. H. 1988. *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simon, R. 1999. "Russia's Crisis." *Capital and Class*, Vol. 68, pp. 1-8.

Sokolowski, A. 2003. "Institutional Determinants of Chronic Policy Failure in Yeltsin's Russia." *Demokratizatsiya*, Summer, 2003, pp. 412-439.

Sorenson, J. B. 1969. *The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 1917-1928*. New York: Atherton Press.

Szamuely, T. 1974. *The Russian Tradition*. London: Secker & Warburg.

The World Factbook. 2007. Online: https://www.cia.gov/library.

Van Brabant, J. 1992. *Remaking Eastern Europe: on the Political Economy of Transition*. Volume 23 of International Studies in Economics and Econometrics. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press.

Wedel, J. 1998. *Collision and Collusion: the Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Weigle, M. 2000. *Russia's Liberal Project: State-Society Relations in the Transition from Communism*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wood, A. 1987. *Siberia: Problems and Prospects for Regional Development*. New York: Croon Helm.