On Pacification

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ON PACIFICATION
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Introduction

ON PACIFICATION: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

MARK NEOCLEOUS, GEORGE RIGAKOS, TYLER WALL

In 1957 at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), one of NATO’s two strategic commands, a speech was given by General Allard of France. France had by that time given up what had become known as its ‘dirty war’ in Indochina, but was happy to continue a series of wars elsewhere which were hardly any ‘cleaner’. Such wars were understood by NATO and its allies, but also by their opponents, as ‘revolutionary wars’, and this was the subject of Allard’s speech: how to defeat the revolution.

Allard’s view was that war against the various communist and socialist movements then in existence had to involve ‘pure’ military action, but that this alone would not be enough. Also needed was a second group of actions, grouped together because they worked in unison: psychological action, propaganda, political and operational intelligence, police measures, personal contacts with the population, and a host of social and economic programs. Of this combined action Allard notes: ‘I shall classify these various missions under two categories: Destruction and Construction. These two terms are inseparable. To destroy without building up would mean useless labor; to build without first destroying would be a delusion’. He then goes on to expand on these terms. The meaning of ‘destruction’ is fairly clear: the co-ordinated activity of army and associated state powers to ‘chase and annihilate … deal spectacular blows … and maintain insecurity’. ‘Construction’, however, means ‘building the peace’, ‘organizing the people’, persuading the people ‘by the use of education’ and, ultimately ‘preparing the establishment of a new order’. He adds: ‘This is the task of pacification’ (cited in Paret, 1964, 30-1).

It is remarkable how often a comment along these lines appears, again and again, in text after text, in the state discourse of pacification (see Neocleous, 2011a; 2011b). The general theme in such texts is that pacification needs to be understood not just as military action to crush the enemy insurgency, but also a broader and far-reaching action to construct a new social order. Such an order would be one in which insurgency would not and could not occur, but it would also be an order in which capitalist accumulation might flourish. General Maurice Challe, for example, liked to talk about the ‘positive’ element of the campaign in Northern Algeria for which he was responsible in 1960, as one which continued the colonial campaigns elsewhere. Zones would be increasingly pacified as army engineers built roads through to its most inhospitable areas, schools and clinics...
were constructed, and ‘civilization’ allowed to flourish (see Horne, 1987, 338). What might be described as ‘pure’ military actions needed to be combined with a wider and more diverse range of political technologies to create a viable social order.

The underlying motivation for this political technology has always been the coercive, often brutal, imposition of capitalist property relations through primitive accumulation. In this sense, contemporary pacification is the ideological iron fist and velvet glove aimed at the continued ‘forcible expropriation of the people’ through a ‘whole series of thefts, outrages, and popular misery’ (Hammond and Hammond, 1913: 27-28) dating back before the Enclosures. Not only was a system of pacification required to curtail subsistence but, as one eighteenth century Lincolnshire noble put it: ‘the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious’ (cited in Perelman, 1983: 38). The extraction of surplus, as Adam Smith (1981: 387) admits, can ‘be squeezed out of [the labourer] by violence only, and not by any interest of his own’ if he can subsist otherwise such as through access to communal land. This, in short, is the foundational bourgeois logic for the compulsion to pacify.

Thus, there is nothing peculiarly ‘French’ about Allard’s approach. The way the French understood pacification in the 1950s was more or less exactly the way every other colonial power understood it going back to the sixteenth century and forward into the second half of the twentieth century and now the twenty-first. And the reason they all understood it in the same way is because the creation of durably pacified social spaces, to use Norbert Elias’s phrase (1996), is inherent to the political project of bourgeois modernity both through imperial domination and domestic control. ‘Pacification’ thus serves as a linchpin for investigating the coercive economic and social formation of populations; it is a tool for grasping the state-sponsored destruction and reconstruction of social order. ‘Pacification’ places at the forefront of our analysis a consideration of the confluence of military conquest and the fabrication of social order: it advances our understanding of the world capitalist economy and its social relationships by arguing that it is also a ‘world military order’ undertaken through a whole host of ‘police actions’. The articles in this special issue of Socialist Studies seek to give some critical purchase to this idea of pacification, and, in so doing, aim to draw direct theoretical connections between socialist struggles aimed at imperial domination and a wide array of resistances that seem far more local and domestic.

The starting point of the articles is that with such a rich history and such a wide set of connotations - on the one hand, defeating communist and radical movements among the people, and thus pointing us to the complex techniques used to do so; on the other hand, of building a new order and likewise pointing to a set of related and equally complex techniques - ‘pacification’ would seem to have huge potential in our understanding of state and corporate power and its role in the fabrication of bourgeois order. This special issue is a first, rudimentary, step to test just how far we might push the
category as a keyword in socialist studies. For us, however, this step is being undertaken under the umbrella of the critique of security, and this perhaps needs a little explanation.

In October 2010 a small group of academics and graduate students convened for two days at Carleton University, Ottawa, to discuss ideas based on the possibility of challenging the hegemony of security. Throughout the discussions one of the themes was to ask what it might mean to talk about a project that we might call ‘anti-security’. The outcome of that first meeting was an edited volume, *Anti-Security* (Red Quill Books, 2011). At that initial meeting it seemed immediately apparent that ‘pacification’ might hold tremendous promise as a vehicle for theorizing police power and the ways in which such power is linked with state violence exercised against radical, democratic social action and for the protection of bourgeois private property rights. A further meeting, with some of the original group but also with new members, took place in Nicosia in September 2012 under the auspices of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control. Although the central theme was again anti-security, one of the main topics of discussion to re-emerge was the possibility of using this category ‘pacification’ for radical politics and critical theory. As a critical concept, pacification had already been developed by Neocleous (2010, 2011a) along these lines, but his chapter entitled ‘Security as Pacification’ (Neocleous, 2011b), Rigakos’ (2011) application of the concept in the same anthology, and their co-authored ‘Declaration’ based on the group’s discussion (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011), stimulated continued interest in exploring how ‘pacification’ might carry enough critical weight for the group to make sense of the hegemony of security. To make sense, that is, of how state and capital operate under, through and with the logic of security and to find ways to subvert this.

We thus set out to consider a number of related questions. First, to what extent can we push the idea that at the heart of pacification is not just the crushing of resistance but also the construction of bourgeois order? Second, how might this be connected to the related idea that pacification is integral to capitalist accumulation? Third, what does pacification mean for our understanding of the nexus of war powers and police powers within the bourgeois state? Fourth, might we understand pacification under the sign of security? Conversely, and fifth, just how far can we push the idea of security as pacification? The essays in this special issue are a first attempt to explore these questions, to pursue the idea of security as pacification, and to consider pacification as the production of bourgeois order in general.

To consider the production of bourgeois order in general requires an approach which seeks to grasp the social totality, which of course means grasping it historically. This has two major implications. First, as much as one finds ‘pacification’ within any disciplinary home, it is firmly ensconced within military history and war studies. There, it is often used as a concept pertaining solely to ‘small wars’ and thus used to dismiss such wars as little more than a sideshow to the progress of capitalist modernity. But such wars are anything but ‘small’: as a colonizing force, they are clearly of major historical
significance and remain at the very heart of capitalist modernity. Our appropriation of the term pacification, with its historical roots in wars of conquest and primitive accumulation, reinforces its analytic utility in that it holds the potential to demonstrate how this history weighs on and is often perpetuated in the present. The study of pacification is a vehicle for the radical re-examination of the fabrication and maintenance of capitalist relations by taking seriously the formative logics of security entrepreneurs from the ‘police scientists’ of the Enlightenment period to their myriad contemporary security planners and policers. The second implication is that as a category of critical socialist theory ‘pacification’ has no disciplinary home. By lacking disciplinary history, ‘pacification’ opens itself to appropriation for critical theory. It affects struggle and critical analysis at multiple levels by mirroring and subverting the very pre-disciplinary logics where imperial planning and policing projects were first advocated as part of a wider project of political economy (see Rigakos et al. 2009). It challenges the ever-increasing intellectual division of labour that segregates ‘security’ as a special issue to be discussed only by experts in military history and war studies. It mimics the pre-disciplinary thinking that facilitated the technocratic proliferation of security planning through ever-increasing intellectual divisions of labour: a form of risk thinking that now colonizes almost every corner of contemporary scholarship. Contributors to this anthology, on the contrary, advance an understanding of contemporary security as pacification that is central to the normal violence of bourgeois dispossession and the imposition of capitalist social relations. This narrative of imperial domination and the fabrication of a world capitalist system through enforced property relations is certainly an old story for Marxists (e.g. Luxemburg 1913; Lenin, 1916), but in this special issue we are interested in more than just this story. We are interested in appropriating and critically theorizing a notion that is at the very root of the thinking and planning that built up this world capitalist system. ‘Pacification’ is thus a notion that has promulgated a wide series of policing actions both domestically and imperially that, until now, silently subtended the global economic system. A notion we wish to excavate and appropriate for critical inquiry.

The essays offered in this special issue are therefore intended as a step in that appropriation. They are meant to be read as a group. They are work in collective progress, and collective work in progress. They are a working through of some of the issues in the concept of pacification. They are meant to be read with one another, alongside one another and, in some cases, against one another. Such is the nature of collective work that it benefits from this broad involvement and, in so doing, seeks to strengthen both socialist theory and political struggle.
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Article

THE DREAM OF PACIFICATION:
ACCUMULATION, CLASS WAR, AND THE HUNT

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Abstract
This article argues that the category ‘pacification’ offers the critique of
security a means of thinking through the connection between war, police and
accumulation. Pacification is a process in which the war power is used in the
fabrication of a social order of wage labour. This aligns the war power with the
police power, and suggests that their interconnection might be understood
through the lens of pacification. The article explores this through one of the
mechanisms through which the war power and police power combine: the hunt.
Capital rests on the hunt: the hunt for vagabonds, beggars, enemies, criminals,
terrorists. Behind this hunt lies capital’s original demand, Let there be
Accumulation! ‘Pacification’ is a category that helps us make sense of the way
the state responds to this demand.

Keywords
Pacification, primitive accumulation, manhunt, war, police, police powers

In the chapter on the genesis of industrial capital in Volume 1 of Capital, Marx
writes:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement
and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent,
the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of
Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins, are all
things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production.
These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive
accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the

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Police Power, is forthcoming in 2014. He is a member of the Editorial Collective of Radical Philosophy.
European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield … These different moments are systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Violence is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power (Marx, 1976, 915-6).

Marx here highlights the fact that capitalism is not a spontaneous order and that, in contrast to the myth of an idyllic origin of private property, in actual history violence plays a central role. What is at stake in Marx’s discussion is the constitution of bourgeois order through what Marx calls ‘primitive accumulation’: the use of force and violence in separating people from a means of subsistence other than the wage. I want to suggest that the insight Marx here offers into the violence of accumulation is one that lies at the heart of the process of pacification.

In a previous essay trying to help map out the terrain of a project organised around the idea of anti-security (Neocleous, 2011a; also 2010), I argued that for tactical purposes critical theory really needs to re-appropriate the term ‘pacification’. The central argument was that we need to grasp security as pacification. I suggested that whereas for most people ‘pacification’ is associated with the actions of colonizing powers, has a close connection to counter-insurgency tactics and is therefore widely understood as the military crushing of resistance, an examination of the theory and practice of pacification reveals a far more ‘productive’ dimension to the idea. ‘Productive’ in that what is involved is less the military crushing of resistance and more the fabrication of order, of which the crushing of resistance is but one part. This is why the key theorists of pacification, from Machuca in the late-sixteenth century, through to General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, General Galliéni, Lieutenant Colonel Lyautey in the nineteenth century, taking in Roger Trinquier and David Galula in the twentieth century, all talk about pacification as a war to build rather than destroy. It is also why the key practice of pacification is nothing less than a feat of enormous social engineering to (re)build a social order. And what is to be built in this new order is a secure foundation for accumulation.

This image of pacification aligns it with what has historically been understood as the police project – the fabrication of social order organised around the administration of wage labour – and connects very closely with the fact that the critique of security reads and treats security as a police mechanism (Neocleous, 2000; 2008; Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). What this means, in turn, and especially so given the connections
between pacification and war, is that to employ the category ‘pacification’ critically we are compelled to connect the police power to the war power. Indeed, as a critical concept ‘pacification’ insists on conjoining war and police in a way which is fundamentally opposed to the mainstream tendency that thinks of war and police as two separate activities institutionalized in two separate institutions (the military and the police). This ideological separation has had a debilitating effect on radical scholarship within the academy, since it has imposed on scholars a banal dichotomy of ‘models’, such as the ‘criminological model’ versus the ‘military model’, and generated a set of what are ultimately liberal concerns, such as the ‘militarization of the police’ and the ‘policization of the military’ or the coming together of ‘high intensity policing’ with ‘low-intensity warfare’. Such models and concerns obscure the unity of state power and act as a blockage on radical thought.

In other words, if radical theory in general and the politics of anti-security in particular are to get any kind of purchase on pacification as an idea then we must address the ways in which it invokes the conjunction of war and police. As much as the art of war is the art of the polis – the polis originates as a guild of warriors, as Weber (1978, 1359) points out – so too the polis connotes police as well as city. ‘Pacification’ is intended to capture the way in which war and police are always already together, the way they operate conjointly under the sign of security, and the way in which this operation is entwined with the process of accumulation. In other words, ‘pacification’ is intended to grasp a nexus of ideas – war-police-accumulation – in the security of bourgeois order. All of which is to say that from the perspective of the critique of security, it is impossible to understand the history of bourgeois society without grasping it as a process of pacification in the name of security and accumulation.

Starting with Marx’s category of ‘primitive accumulation’, which I believe helps us understand the police power at the heart of class war, the intention in this article is to make ‘pacification’ a central category for our understanding of that war. To stress the ‘active’ or ‘productive’ nature of pacification, the article places the manhunt at the heart of the process, seeking to posit the hunt for workers, for criminals, for terrorists, and for the enemies of order as integral to the most significant demand imposed on human beings in the last 500 years: let there be accumulation!

Let There Be Workers!

Marx begins his analysis of primitive accumulation by claiming that it plays the same role in political economy as primitive sin does in theology.

Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote about the past.
Long, long ago there were two sorts of people: one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living... Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort finally had nothing to sell but their own skins. And from this primitive sin dates the poverty of the great majority who, despite all their labour, have up to now nothing to sell but themselves (Marx, 1976, 873).

Marx’s ironic turn of phrase is designed to open up the important move he makes, one in which he shifts from mocking the concept as used by Smith to using it as a serious concept in its own right.

For Marx, primitive accumulation is the process that constitutes capitalist social relations as the separation of the bulk of the population from the means of production (Marx, 1973, 489). This process is of obvious crucial historical importance, since without separating workers from the means of production capital could not have come into being; without such separation there could be no capitalist accumulation. The secret of the expression of value lies in how capital manages labour, and that reveals in turn the fundamental secret of accumulation, namely ‘the appropriation of unpaid labour’. In other words, the underlying principle of accumulation is that capital must have at its disposal the unpaid labour of workers. Marx restates the key point time and again: capitalist accumulation has for its fundamental condition the expropriation of the worker (Marx, 1976, 152, 168, 672, 743, 748, 793, 613, 940).2 This is why capital constantly seeks to remove all means of subsistence other than the wage, why it always searches for ways to force down wages, and why it has to permanently discipline people into and in their role as productive and efficient workers.

One of the purposes of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation is to show that in contrast to the story told in political economy, where accumulation is simply assumed to have emerged in peaceful and idyllic conditions, in actual history violence is integral to the process. This violence turns out to be central to the argument through the whole of Capital, but Marx addresses it at length in the chapter on ‘the genesis of industrial capital’ where, as we have observed, he connects the extirpation and enslavement of human beings during the conquest of the colonies to the wider commercial war of the European nations: the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system and the whole system of protection depend on the coercive power of the state to transform the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode. Capital comes into the world ‘dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt’ (Marx, 1976, 926). Capital is fabricated, and it is fabricated through sheer force. Capital demands ‘Let there be workers!’ (Marx, 1973,

2 I have explored the importance of this in Neocleous, 2012, pp. 941-62, on which this section is based.
Two points to note here about this mechanism by which people are made to work within the conditions posited by capital. The first is that it is a permanent feature of capitalism. This permanence is important, since it is easy to treat primitive accumulation as a concept applicable solely to the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism – a view encouraged by the fact that the discussion of primitive accumulation requires a discussion of historical enclosures and colonialism and the convention of translating ‘ursprüngliche’ as ‘primitive’ rather than ‘original’ or ‘previous’ (‘ursprüngliche’ being Marx’s translation of Smith’s ‘previous’, which those translating Marx’s work into English rendered as ‘primitive’). In fact, we need to understand primitive accumulation as the foundation of capital not just historically but permanently: capital presupposes the divorce of workers from the conditions of the realization of their labour, and as soon as it is able to stand on its own two feet capital reproduces this divorce over and again. Hence Marx’s claim that ‘accumulation merely presents as a continuous process what in primitive accumulation appears as a distinct historical process’ (1972, 272, emphasis added). In other words, ‘primitive accumulation’ is not a term describing a period in the emergence of capitalist relations or a transitory phenomenon characteristic of the ‘prehistory’ of capital but, rather, captures capitalism’s need to permanently form markets and re-create its own labour supply. If the separation of labourers from the conditions of labour independent of capital is (not just was) the social constitution of capitalist social relations, then we need to understand primitive accumulation not as a historical process exhausted by the consolidation of capital but, rather, a permanent feature of accumulation (Luxemburg, 1913; Balibar, 1970; Midnight Notes Collective, 1992, 318).

The second point to note about the process is that it is a form of war. Not ‘war’ in the classical military sense of organised inter-state violence, but, rather, a ‘social war’ or ‘civil war’. In a speech at Elberfeld in 1845 Frederick Engels commented on ‘present-day society, which … produces a social war of all against all’ (Engels, 1975a, 248). This was a major theme of The Condition of the Working Class in England, published the same year, which describes ‘the social war, the war of each against all’. Everywhere is barbarous indifference, hard egotism and nameless misery: ‘every man’s house is a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law’, meaning that ‘everywhere [is] social warfare’. Such comments appear as a gloss on the perpetual war of the state of nature as described by Hobbes, but Engels points to the class dimension of this war. ‘Let us proceed to a more detailed investigation of the position in which the social war has placed the non-possessing class’, an investigation which takes in the miserable condition of the working class, the deaths from overwork and malnutrition, and the use of the law against any attempt on the part of the working class to resist such conditions. ‘Is this social war, or is it not?’ asks Engels (Engels, 1975b, 329, 331, 554, 502,
Marx likewise refers to ‘civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against capital’ (1977, 147), and in Capital writes of the struggles over the working day as part of a ‘protracted and more or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the working class’ (Marx, 1976, 409, 412-3). As joint-authors of the Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx and Engels also write of the ‘more or less veiled civil war’ that takes place in bourgeois society with the development of the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1984, 495).

It is too easy to say that when Marx and Engels use the term ‘war’ in these ways they do so in a rhetorical sense (Malesevic, 2010, 22) but, much as Marx and Engels do delight in more than the occasional rhetorical flourish, their claims about the social war are meant to be taken seriously. Hence when in Capital Marx comments that ‘force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one’, and that force ‘is itself an economic power’ (1976, 916), the term Marx uses is Gewalt, better understood as ‘violence’, and he is describing the process which underpinned the rise of capital and created the proletariat. The violence is a form of war.

What Marx is talking about when he is describing primitive accumulation, then, is class war. Now, as well as brute force, two of the main weapons used by the ruling class in this war are law and police: the Acts outlawing vagabondage, begging, wandering, and myriad other ‘offenses’ on the one hand, and the enclosure of the commons through the theft and transformation of the commons into private property on the other. This is the ‘bloody legislation’ against the expropriated which transforms peasants into vagabonds and paupers and then transforms vagabonds and paupers into good workers, and is integral to Marx’s analysis of accumulation. Marx cites an Act passed under Henry VIII in 1530: ‘Beggars who are old and incapable of working receive a beggar’s licence’, but ‘sturdy vagabonds’ are to be beaten and punished. ‘They are to be tied to the cart-tail and whipped until the blood streams from their bodies, that they are to swear on oath to go back to their birthplace or to where they have lived the last three years and to “put themselves to work”’. A later Statute under Henry VIII repeated and strengthened this with new clauses: ‘For the second [offense] for vagabondage the whipping is to be repeated and half the ear sliced off; but for the third relapse the offender is to be executed as a hardened criminal and enemy of the common weal’. A further Act of 1547 ordained that if anyone refuses to work ‘he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has denounced him as an idler’.

The master … has the right to force him to do any work, no matter how disgusting, with whip and chains. If the slave is absent a fortnight, he is condemned to slavery for life and is to be branded on forehead or back with the letter S; if he runs away thrice, he is to be executed as a felon. The master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as
any other personal chattel or cattle. If the slaves attempt anything against the masters, they are also to be executed. Justices of the peace, on information, are to hunt the rascals down. If it happens that a vagabond has been idling about for three days, he is to be taken to his birthplace, branded with a red-hot iron with the letter V on the breast and be set to work, in chains, in the streets or at some other labour. If the vagabond gives a false birthplace, he is then to become the slave for life of this place, of its inhabitants, or its corporation, and to be branded with an S. All persons have the right to take away the children of the vagabonds and keep them as apprentices, the young men until they are 24, the girls until they are 20. If they run away, they are to become, until they reach those ages, the slaves of their masters, who can put them in irons, whip them, etc. if they like … The last part of this statute provides, that certain poor people may be employed by a place or by persons who are willing to give them food and drink and to find them work. Slaves of the parish of this kind were still to be found in England in the mid nineteenth century under the name of ‘roundsmen’.

Marx continues with an Act of 1572:

Unlicensed beggars … age are to be severely flogged and branded on the left ear unless some one will take them into service for two years; in case of a repetition of the offence … they are to be executed, unless some one will take them into service for two years; but for the third offence they are to be executed without mercy as felons.

Remaining with the English case, Marx goes on:

James 1: Any one wandering about and begging is declared a rogue and a vagabond. Justices of the peace in Petty Sessions are authorised to have them publicly whipped and to imprison them for six months for the first offence, and two years for the second. Whilst in prison they are to be whipped as much and as often as the justices of the peace think fit… Incorrigible and dangerous rogues are to be branded with an R on the left shoulder and set to hard labour, and if they are caught begging again, to be executed without mercy.

And on it goes through the development of the criminal law. Note that the creatures who would haunt the bourgeois mind at this point historically, the vagabonds, paupers, beggars, criminals, as well as their social cousins who will later emerge (the ‘undeserving
poor’, the ‘skivers’, the ‘squeegee merchants’, the ‘feral youth’, the ‘delinquents’), will be
the ones on which war will be declared time and again, but are the subject of police power,
by definition, for they are the enemies of order. Yet as we know, ‘police’ at this time was
concerned not just with order in general, but referred to ‘a bundle of measures that made
work possible and necessary to all those who could not possibly live without it’, as
Foucault puts it in History of Madness (2006, 62; also Neocleous, 2000). This bundle of
police measures in aid of war and war measures in aid of police to make work possible and
necessary – that is, to put the poor to work, to make the working class work and thus, in
effect, to make the working class – is the state’s response to the demand ‘Let there be
Workers’!’. It is nothing less than the secret of accumulation. Might this also be the secret
of pacification?

Let’s Go Hunting!

In the context of his discussion of police in History of Madness, Foucault describes
the 1656 Edict which established the Hôpital Général. Pointing out that the institution
was expected to ‘prevent begging and idleness, the sources of all disorder’, Foucault cites
Paragraph 9 of the Edict, which forbade ‘all persons … to beg in the city and outskirts of
Paris, or in the churches, at the doors of churches, at the doors of houses or in the streets,
or anywhere else, publicly or in private, by day or by night … on pain of whipping for a
first offence, and the galleys for men and boys upon a second offence’. The Edict was
passed on 27 April, 1656, and Foucault notes that two weeks later the militia of the
Hôpital Général ‘went out hunting for beggars for the first time, and brought them back
to the different buildings of the Hospital’ (Foucault, 2006, 62-4). Foucault does not make
much of this, yet it contains an important observation: the hunting for beggars. Elsewhere
he describes the ‘great police sorting out process’ which began with ‘the hunting down of
vagrants, beggars, the idle’ (Foucault, 1996, 83).3 We have also earlier cited Marx quoting
the Act of 1547 to the effect that ‘Justices of the peace, on information, are to hunt
the rascals down’ as well as his description of Africa as a preserve for the ‘hunting of black
skins’. Through the lens of police (Foucault) and the lens of accumulation (Marx) we are
alerted to nothing less than the world historical importance of the manhunt.

‘Governments mounted special searches or manhunts for vagrants’, notes A. L.
Beier in his history of vagrancy law.

The Statute of Winchester (1285) had required regular round-ups of felons
in towns, and there were frequent searches for vagrants in London from
1514 and about the same time in some provincial towns. But national

3 He makes a similar observation in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977, 88), but again does not make a
great deal of it.
campaigns were seemingly first instituted under the Tudors. The Vagrancy Act of 1495 ordered [searches and round-ups] in all the towns and villages of the realm, as did a proclamation of 1511 and another of 1530. The poor law of 1536 also commanded officials to conduct nightly and daily 'privy or secret' searches for ‘all rufflers, sturdy vagabonds and valiant beggars’, and a new Act in 1610 established regular swoops for the first time (1985, 155).

As Beier notes about England, and as others have noted about such hunts in other European cities (for example, see Geremek, 1994, 215), the logic was driven by the very fact of vagrancy itself, a protean concept to describe social disorder in all its manifestations: the status of ‘vagrancy’ was a criminal one merely because it was at odds with the established order, and this condition affected all those beggars, hawkers, travellers, peddlers, harlots, cutpurses, minstrels and other masterless men and women whose status and condition looked like vagrancy to the ruling class. As such, it was also decidedly political and thus the tensions surrounding it intensified during periods of unrest. Hence in England the periods of intense hunting for vagabonds of 1560-72 and 1631-9 followed rebellions of a more direct political nature (Beier, 1985, xxii, 4, 152, 155-6). In this regard, it is worth registering that the Old French term *Meute* referred to ‘the hunt’ but also connoted ‘rebellion or insurrection’ (Canetti, 1962, 97).

Such searches and roundups constituted the foundation of police power. Or, to put that another way, the police power was forged through the hunting of the idle poor, the beggar and the vagabond (Chamayou, 2012, 78). This hunting of beggars, vagabonds and the idle needs to be set in a wider context, one that alludes more directly to the police power in the making of the working class.

We have become accustomed to thinking in terms of strict categorizations of the historical forms of labour. These are usually ‘slave’, ‘serf’, ‘wage-labourer’, but often also understood as ‘free’ versus ‘coerced’. In fact, various forms and degrees of contractual (‘free’) and yet coerced (‘unfree’) labour existed as late as the late-nineteenth century, in western industrialized nations as well as the colonies. There are three points to be made in this regard.

First there is the fact that the distinction between servitude and slavery was never clear. When Caliban in Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* is referred to as a ‘slave’ despite being a ‘servant’ the slippage is not accidental. Likewise, in the work of a key bourgeois thinker such as John Locke, one finds that the distinction between slave and servant is made yet keeps breaking down, with Locke sometimes using the second term to refer to the slave proper. He speaks of a Planter’s ‘Power in his Family over Servants, born in his House, and bought with his Money’ (Locke, 1988, 131). Blackstone in his *Commentaries on*
English Law insists that there is no room in English law for ‘absolute slavery’ yet allows for forms of compulsory labour which appear to be a kind of not-quite-absolute-slavery.

Second, this oscillation between slavery and servitude is also a reflection of the extent to which degrees of ‘quasi-slavery’ continued to exist, partly a remnant of villeinage, partly an outcome of the law failing to distinguish theoretically between a slave and a serf, and partly due to the various Vagrancy Acts which facilitated the idea of slavery as a form of punishment. The English Vagrancy Act of 1547, for example, one of the harshest of Tudor laws and cited by Marx to that effect, created the category of ‘slave’ as means of punishing the idle and recalcitrant poor. As we have seen, the definition of ‘vagrancy’ was extended to cover any unemployed worker refusing to work for mere board, and anyone transgressing the provisions of the Act could become a slave for two years to the person informing on them. Those attempting to flee this punishment could be made slave for life. Parliament eventually repealed the law – not without a fight, since many still spoke of its advantages and continued to do so after its repeal – but the law itself is suggestive of the ways in which the categories of slave, servant, vagabond and worker were permeable.

Third, even when laws such as this were repealed, pockets of indentured labour remained. English law made the violation of many labour agreements punishable with imprisonment, and workers would be freed only after they had returned to their employers and completed the service in question. This service might last for a year, but would often be extended against the will of the worker as punishment for the original absence. This was transplanted into the colonial law of America, such that in both England and colonial America ‘contractual labor’ existed in varying degrees of ‘unfreedom’ (Steinfeld, 1991; Steinfeld, 2001). Indeed, well into the nineteenth century, runaway apprentices were still legally being hunted. This whole process of indentured labour was managed by irregular payment of wages such that workers could not leave their jobs without forfeiting several weeks or months of pay, a process that in real terms can feel like slavery.4

These forms and degrees of coerced (‘unfree’) and yet contractual (‘free’) labour inform us that by targeting the ‘vagrant’ or ‘idle’ poor, the manhunt was also de facto targeting the emerging working class. Put another way: the class of ‘free’ wage labour was forged through the manhunt, which was thereafter central to the political administration of formally free but materially coerced labour.

In a parallel process, the hunt was also central to strategies of accumulation and domination in the colonies. I have written elsewhere about the centrality of Captain

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4 This latter point explains why as late as 1957 an ‘Abolition of Forced Labour Convention’ needed to be passed by international human rights movements in order to ‘provide that wages shall be paid regularly and prohibit methods of payment which deprive the worker of a genuine possibility of terminating his employment’. The reason given was that such deprivation was ‘analogous to slavery’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1957).
Bernardo de Vargas Machuca’s work on ‘Indian militia’ fighting and suggested that we might read it as perhaps the world’s first extended treatment of pacification. Machuca argues that the military colonization of the Americas requires a kind of political violence in which the methods of those being pacified are adopted by the pacifiers. Local knowledge of crops and animals is necessary, but more important is the fact that the Indians fight like hunters. In this light Machuca advocates skirmishing, ambushing and fighting on the move, essentially as a permanent ‘hunt’ against the enemy ‘hunters’. Through the adoption of ‘Indian militia’ ways of fighting, colonial warfare took the form of a continuous manhunt (Machuca, 2008; 2010; see Neocleous, 2011a). In so doing Machuca put his finger on a key aspect of the wars of colonial accumulation. More generally, the wars with the other ‘Indians’ found across the globe often took the form of manhunts intended to capture slaves for labour. Armed expeditions were carried out to hunt down fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the woods, and the wars of extermination against those populations who resisted the conquest of their land were essentially manhunts (Hadden, 2003, 18, 50, 184; Steinfeld, 1991, 44; Chamayou, 2012, 30-1, 72; Gott, 2012, 124, 480-1).

Concerning the continent described by Marx as a preserve for the commercial hunting of black, Jean and John Comaroff write that warfare in South Africa took the form of nocturnal ambushes, ‘shading into raiding’. Just as ‘combat and commerce were closely interconnected, [so] too were warfare and the hunt, between which there was a strong metaphorical and material identity’. The war-hunt was a foray beyond the safe confines of the polity and territory and yielded significant proceeds in terms of goods, resources and labour (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, 164). The British Commander charged with defeating the Xhosa in Cape Colony, Colonel Graham, spoke of ‘depriving them [the Xhosa] of the means of subsistence … for which the whole colonial military force is constantly employed in destroying prodigious quantities of Indian corn and millet’ and of ‘taking from them the few cattle which they conceal in the woods’. But he spoke also of having to ‘hunt them like wild beasts’ (cited in Gott, 2012, 178) in order to achieve the goal.

Taking all this into account, it is no exaggeration to say that capital’s conquest in the West was founded on a vast manhunt that continued across the Continents for almost four centuries: the hunting of blacks in Africa, the hunting of ‘Indians’ in the Americas and the East and West Indies, and the hunting of the poor across Europe. Capitalist accumulation was secured through the manhunt. As such, it simultaneously generated and engaged in whole series of related hunts, such as the hunt for pirates, the lynch-mob, the pogrom and the witch-hunt.

‘The witch-hunt rarely appears in the history of the proletariat’, notes Silvia Federici, but such hunts took place where the war of enclosures was most intense and then exported to the American colonies as a police measure. As a strategy designed to ‘instill terror, destroy collective resistance, silence entire communities, and turn their
members against each other’, the witch-hunt was also a strategy of enclosure: ‘class war carried out by other means’. Federici’s point is that the witch-hunt, which reaches its peak between 1580 and 1630, needs to be understood in terms of the process of primitive accumulation, a simultaneous pacification of women to parallel the pacification of the working class (Federici, 2004, 163, 176, 220).

‘The police is a hunting institution’, notes Grégoire Chamayou (2012, 89), ‘the state’s arm for pursuit, entrusted by it with tracking, arresting, and imprisoning’. One can see this in the various technologies of police which have become so central to modern police forces: the police dog (Neocleous, 2011b), the psychological profile, the fingerprints, the photographs, the police helicopter, and now the drone as a technology for ‘unmanning the manhunt’ (Wall, this volume; Chamayou, 2011; Neocleous, 2013).

But the tracking, arresting, and imprisoning are all traceable to the very origins of capitalist accumulation and the centrality of the hunt to those origins. We might say that the manhunt was nothing less than a core police power in the pacification of the proletariat as well as the accumulation of capital.

Pacification, it should be noted, enters political discourse in the late-sixteenth century, denoting ‘a process or operation (usually a military operation) designed to secure the peaceful cooperation of a population or an area where one’s enemies are thought to be active’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The OED also proposes that to pacify is ‘to reduce to peaceful submission’. In taking from the Roman tradition of imperial glory through military domination, in which pax implied ‘pacification’, ‘pacification’ was understood in terms of the verb ‘pacificate’, now obsolete but which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries meant ‘to make peace’; the OED entry for ‘peace-keeper’ notes the emergence of the term in the very late-sixteenth century and ‘peacemaker’ just a little earlier. Playing on the constitution of internal order, ‘pacification’ quickly came to describe the creation of a certain kind of peace, order and security. Pacification, then, is a military act dressed up as the ‘peace’ of civil society. It was at the very same point historically that the category ‘police’ (‘Policie’, ‘Policei’, ‘Polizei’) became central to political thought, denoting the legislative and administrative regulation of the internal life of a community to promote general welfare and the condition of good order. Within this frame of good order, the key function of police was ‘keeping the peace’. As Max Weber puts it, ‘the increasing demand of a society accustomed to absolute pacification for order and protection (“police”)’ was a key driving force in the direction of the bureaucratic state and capitalist accumulation (Weber, 1978, 972).

Thus we might say that the invention of capitalism saw the invention of the police dream of society. The creation of the ‘well-ordered police state’ (Raeff, 1983) was a process of pacification. Capital and police dream of pacification: a dream of workers available for work, present and correct, their papers in order, their minds and bodies docile, and a dream of accumulation thereby secure from resistance, rebellion or revolt.
Yet there is more to be said, for as much as hunting is a police power so hunting is also a practice of war, as our discussion of the colonies has already suggested. Historians of war have tended to identify three principal forms of land war: the pitched battle, the siege, and the raid. Our conceptions of medieval and early modern war tend to rely heavily on the idea of siege and our conceptions of modern war tend to rely heavily on the idea of a pitched battle, but both have a tendency to minimise the predominance of the *raid* in the history of warfare, as recent scholarship has shown. ‘The most lethal and common form of warfare was the raid’, notes Azar Gat (2006, 117). The raid, however, has historically taken the form of the manhunt (Whitman, 2012, 28), which is why Aristotle (1996, 19) describes war as a form of hunting: a hunt for human rather than animal prey. ‘Most warfare was at base a form of the hunt for human prey’, notes James Whitman (2012, 35). ‘When we survey the history of human warfare with a careful professional eye’, he adds, what we overwhelmingly discover is ‘not heroic confrontations between armed warriors in a “fateful day” of pitched battle but the brutal hunt for human prey, in which armed men turn their weapons on defenseless members of their own species’ (2012, 26). ‘The war pack originally emerged from the hunting pack’, notes Canetti (2003, 192), a process that amounts to guerrilla war: a radical dissymmetry in the weapons, a form of fighting which consists less of pitched battles and much more of a process of tracking down and raiding. This war as hunting and hunting as war took on a capitalist hue when the rising bourgeois class and its state powers applied it to the tracking down of the vagrant non-worker.

Capital’s secret, then, lies in its ability to martial all the power the state can muster – manifesting itself variously as war power, as law power, as police power – in response to its own demand ‘Let there be workers!’, right down to its willingness to hunt down the labour it wants. Paraphrasing Aristotle’s claim that ‘the art of acquiring slaves … [is] a

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5 In their account of capital and the ‘war machine’ Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 395) deny this, claiming that ‘it is certain … that war does not derive from the hunt’. Yet they make this claim solely on the conception of the hunt as a relation between man and animal, thereby completely overlooking the hunt as the relation between man and man and thus as a class relation.

6 It is worth noting the remarkable historical loop undertaken by the concept of ‘raid’. The original meaning of ‘raid’ is ‘a military expedition on horseback; a hostile and predatory incursion, properly of mounted men’. The word appears to have died out by the seventeenth century, but was revived again in the nineteenth century by when the horses had disappeared from the picture and the term refers to an ‘invading troop or company’. In the twentieth century, the development of air power saw ‘raid’ connote ‘an aircraft on a bombing operation’, thereby giving us the concept of the ‘air-raid’ and, from there, given the role of air power as police power (Neocleous, 2013), it gets transformed into the ‘police-raid’. And note that the ‘dawn raid’, so beloved by police because it targets people when they are least aware and active, is also Stock Exchange slang for an early morning operation to buy a substantial number of shares in a company, thereby cutting out the opportunities for competitors in the commercial war. In the concept of the ‘raid’, in other words, we find once again the nexus of ideas at the heart of pacification: war-police-accumulation.

7 The comment centres on a discussion of Canetti’s arguments regarding the pack in *Crowds and Power*. 
species of hunting or war’, we might say that the art of producing wage slaves is a species of hunting or class war. This is not just about the actual hunt, though it is certainly that, but is also very much about the modes of classification, lines of demarcation and processes of administration drawn within the bourgeois order by the ruling class in order to define who might be hunted (Chamayou, 2012, 2). And the question of ‘who might be hunted?’ always needs to be placed alongside another question: what are the obstacles to further accumulation? To end, we might explore this a little in the context of the ‘security issue’ of our time.

Let There Be Accumulation!

‘I have … ordered that the full resources of the Federal Government go to help the victims and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act’. Thus spoke President George Bush on 11 September, 2001. Later that day and on the following day he was at pains to call the attacks on the World Trade Center an act of war, but one which required a response in the form of a hunt. ‘Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts’ (Bush, 2001a; 2001b). Two years later, as the war on terror shifted to Iraq, Bush commented that ‘all I know is we’re on the hunt [for Hussein]. It’s like if you had asked me right before we got his sons how close we were to get his sons, I’d say I don’t know, but we’re on the hunt’ (2003a; 2005a). This wasn’t just about Hussein, but was part of the nature of the war-police operation: ‘We’re at war in a different kind of war. It’s a war that requires us to be on an international manhunt’. Bush could not stop himself: ‘We’re on the hunt’ he insists again, elaborating further on other occasions by describing a ‘global manhunt for terrorist killers’ and ‘an unrelenting international manhunt’ (Bush, 2003b; Bush 2004a; Bush, 2004b). Zarqawi was talked about in the same language when he became the focus: ‘Zarqawi understands that coalition and Iraqi troops are on a constant hunt for him as well’ (Bush, 2005a).

Such formulations have been understood as part of Bush’s inheritance of the standard Republican trope of the gunslinger and the ubiquity in the US of the image of social order taken from the Western, and there is of course some truth in this. ‘Welcome to Injun country’, is said to be the comment made by soldiers serving in Afghanistan and Iraq on meeting new arrivals there, exactly the same phrase as was used in Vietnam. ‘The red-Indian metaphor is one with which a liberal policy nomenklatura may be uncomfortable’, notes Robert Kaplan, ‘but Army and Marine field officers have embraced it because it captures perfectly the combat challenge of the early 21st century’ (Kaplan, 2004). Hence the hunt for key individuals replicates the hunt for key Indians: the hunt for Bin Laden was codenamed ‘Geronimo’. Beyond the individuals, the metaphor remains pervasive in American military discourse because it ‘suggest[s] chaotic and dangerous
territories that must be pacified, war against non-white peoples, guerrilla and terrorist forms of combat, and ultimate victory’ (Porter, 2009, 44). Most of all, however, the metaphor refers back to earlier colonial wars and thus reveals the permanence of the process of primitive accumulation.

In this regard we need to treat the hunting of Bin Laden and Hussein as just one aspect of a much larger hunting operation. This took the form of a hunt for terrorists in general, which in turn folded into a hunt for an amorphous enemy: ‘we hunt an enemy that hides in shadows and caves’; ‘we are on the hunt for the enemy, capturing and killing the terrorists before they strike ... we’re on the hunt for the enemy, and we’re not going to rest until they’ve been defeated’; and on it went (Bush, 2001c; 2006; 2005b). This hunting took place not only in Iraq and Pakistan, but was also part of the domestic scene as it coincided with, played off and reinforced an even wider hunt for criminals. Three times in the space of three months in 2004 President Bush commented on the importance of law and police powers as mechanisms for hunting the criminal-enemy as well as the terrorist-enemy. ‘The PATRIOT Act … allows Federal law enforcement to better share information to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets … If these methods are good for hunting criminals, they are even more important for hunting terrorists’ (Bush, 2004c; 2004d; 2004e). This was also understood as part of a wider ‘Call to Hunt for Terrorists’ in which the broader citizen body was to be mobilized (Murphy, 2005).

This broadening out of the hunt suggests wider issues at stake beyond the trope of the gun-slinging law-enforcing sheriff. For a start, such hunting has come to dominate the scene of sovereign power in America. ‘How do we organize the Department of Defense for manhunts?’ asked Donald Rumsfeld (cited in Scarborough, 2004, 20), and within the US military and security elite the idea was taken seriously. One report written by two army Majors and an air force Captain noted that ‘the fundamental question concerning manhunting is whether the United States government (USG) is properly organized to conduct manhunts? Currently, the USG has no central organization that oversees manhunting’ (Marks, Meer and Nilson, 2005, 75). George A. Crawford, an intelligence and security officer with over 20 years experience at high level, developed an argument in a report from within the Joint Special Operations University and a paperback book concerning ‘the viability of manhunting as a core element of American national security doctrine’ (Crawford, 2008, 282; Crawford, 2009, 1, 7, 9, 34-40). A further document treats the manhunt as a link between Special Operations Forces and law enforcement agencies, arguing that ‘both SOF and law enforcement have interests in finding people’, that ‘the notion of manhunting has considerable merit’ for both war and
police, and that ‘for both SOF and LEAs ... the characteristics of manhunting are basically the same’ (Alexander, 2010, 58-60).8

The arguments of Crawford and others situate contemporary security strategy within the long history of warfare and/as the manhunt. But then might we not do the same, only situating contemporary security strategy within the long history of class warfare? What is noticeable about the contemporary manhunt is that the wider this hunt gets - from named individuals, to terrorists in general, to criminals, to the enemies of order and security - the more it opens up the space for us to consider the war on terror through the logic of pacification. This renders it less a manhunt in the form of the Western and more a manhunt in the classical sense of war-police-accumulation; less a war on and hunt for those responsible for terrorist acts, and more war of and hunt for global accumulation. For although capital no longer hunts for workers in quite the same way as it once did during its early formation, it still demands ‘Let there be accumulation!’, and still uses all the means of violence at its disposal to meet this demand. In historico-political terms, then, the hunt for Hussein in 2003 and his capture in December of that year was of far less significance than a whole raft of other measures within which the hunting needs to be positioned. Take, for example, the revision of Iraq's patent law enacted just a few months after the hunt and capture of Hussein.

For generations, farmers in Iraq operated in an essentially unregulated, informal seed supply system, whereby farm-saved seed and the free innovation with and exchange of planting materials among farming communities was standard agricultural practice. Yet the Coalition Provisional Authority established after the invasion of Iraq changed the law (with Order 81), making it illegal for Iraqi farmers to re-use seeds harvested from new varieties registered under the law. As the GRAIN organization noted in an opinion piece on the war being waged against Iraqi farmers, ‘the purpose of the law is to facilitate the establishment of a new seed market in Iraq, where transnational corporations can sell their seeds, genetically modified or not, which farmers would have to purchase afresh every single cropping season’. In other words, the historical prohibition of private ownership of biological resources was to be replaced by a new patent law allowing a system of monopoly rights over seeds, with the rights in question almost certain to be held by multi-national corporations (GRAIN, 2004, 1-2). This was then supported and sustained by the broader measures entrenched in the new constitution established for the country in October 2005, which requires that the state in Iraq manages the Iraqi economy in accordance with modern - that is, 'liberal' - economic principles and to ensure the development of the private sector. Such changes demand that we read the ‘war on terror’

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8 With 'live' police hunts becoming regular features on TV, the manhunt also now offers another moment of the spectacle of security, reinforcing points made elsewhere in this volume by McMichael, Saborio and Wall.
through the wider frame of neoliberal strategy: what is important is the hunt for accumulation, not the hunt for Saddam.

From an anti-security perspective, what is most telling about the war on terror is not the ousting of dictators or the violation of liberty and law in the name of security and order, but the pacification of peoples, and this pacification takes place first and foremost through the separation of workers from the resources for anything like an alternative mode of being beyond capital. Remaining for the moment with the means of subsistence (or as the security-mongers like to call it, ‘food security’), the generation of a new seed market in Iraq must be situated in the context of TRIPS (Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Operating under the auspices of the World Trade Organization but pushed through by major corporations within the multi-national information industries and their lobbying group the Intellectual Property Committee, TRIPS enacts an ideology of intellectual property rights which presupposes that ideas and genetic material are commodities like any other, to be marketed as such and managed by monopolies through patent and copyright law. Resources once used by peoples on a collective basis become appropriated as property for accumulation, from the Indian neem plant now patented for oral hygiene use to the West African karité butter now appropriated by the cosmetics industry. For this process to work the legal status of the resources have to be changed from being the common property of indigenous communities to being the patented property of corporations; the ‘intellectual commons’ becomes private property, human need overridden by accumulation and profit.

This stress on intellectual property has become central to contemporary accumulation strategies, and this centrality is the reason why the figure once so widely feared and hated by the bourgeois class during the rise of capitalism, the pirate, has once more come to the fore. To put that another way, this is why piracy-hunting is once again all the rage. Because TRIPS is centrally concerned with intellectual property, it moves very quickly and easily between the patenting of certain products as medicine to the question of ‘pirated’ products under copyright. In so doing, the geopolitical problem of securing an accumulation regime increasingly reliant on intellectual property becomes bound up with the overwhelming hegemonic power of the concern with ‘terrorism’. Hence the contemporary line, now seen in government documents and journalism everywhere, that ‘Piracy is Terrorism’.9 Although such claims often refer to activities taking place in Somalia and elsewhere, and reinforce the idea that some states are outside the international legal order (viz., ‘pirate states’), it is remarkable how frequently the claims also refer to the importance of intellectual property for accumulation in general.

The equivalence between piracy and terrorism gained legitimacy in 1995, when New York’s Joint Terrorism Taskforce claimed that profits from counterfeit T-shirt sales

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9 A quick internet search for this phrase offers over 6 million hits.
helped fund the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. But following 9/11 a wide range of organizations have naturalized the relationship between piracy and terrorism, and in September 2003 Interpol extended its list of organizations seen as security threats and suspected of using profits from pirated material. Chechen separatists and Northern Irish paramilitaries were added to a list which already included Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, FARC, Albanian and Basque separatists, anti-Arroyo agitators in the Philippines, and the Cosa Nostra. As a consequence, the widespread assumption is that profits from pirated films and games funnel back to organizations which supposedly threaten our security (Govil, 2004, 380). A conference on ‘Security Measures for Music’ – the title being somewhat revealing of our times: even music is now a security issue – held by the Indian Music Industry in Chennai in 2003, was informed by a former police commissioner that music pirates in Europe, the US and Pakistan have strong links with terrorist organisations, and that rooting out music piracy was a means of countering terrorism. Thus we are told, for example, that pirated films sold in Canada help fund the LTTE and that pirated games sold in the UK help fund Al Qaeda (Rangaraj, 2003). The general story runs as follows:

They [the terrorists, the pirates] run what looks like legitimate businesses, travel to ‘business meetings’ in Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and New York, and pay fictional ‘employees’ with money that feeds and houses terrorist cells. They run computer manufacturing plants and noodle shops, sell ‘designer clothes’ and ‘bargain basement’ CDs. They invest, pay taxes, give to charity, and fly like trapeze artists between one international venture and another. The end game, however, is not to buy a bigger house or send the kids to an Ivy League school - it’s to blow up a building, to hijack a jet, to release a plague, and to kill thousands of innocent civilians’ (US Dept. of Transportation, 2003).

In the political imagination of the security state, the crime of piracy is apparently so profound that it is not close to terrorism, but actually is terrorism, in that it constitutes an attack on accumulation itself. The hunt for the terrorist is thus always already the hunt for the pirate, and vice versa, but what is once again obvious is that what is really at stake in such hunting is never this or that pirate but, rather, the pirate in general and thus accumulation in general: ‘suffer pirates, and the commerce of the world must cease’ (Newton, 1742, 2).

This process has therefore unsurprisingly been called the ‘new enclosures’ or the ‘second enclosure movement’, and is one of the reasons why there has been a resurgence of interest in ‘primitive accumulation’ as a category. Just as historical development of the ‘old’ or ‘first’ enclosures was crucial to accumulation and pacification, so the ‘new’ or ‘second’ enclosures reminds us of the fundamental role that intellectual property
currently plays in international accumulation and thus of capital’s constant demand: Let there be Accumulation! TRIPS thus needs to be set alongside other international arrangements such as NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), which allows the dumping of heavily subsidized food products by US-based corporations onto the markets of other countries within the Agreement. In Mexico alone this has led to the ripping from producers of an estimated $1 billion a year in earnings and to the forcible dispossession of some 2 million farmers of their means of subsistence (and who, as migrants, thereby become a ‘security problem’ and who therefore have to be hunted down).

The pirate has always been interpellated as communis hostis omnium – ‘the enemy of all mankind’ – and the hunt for the pirate thereby easily legitimized. But the hunt for the pirate, as a criminal-enemy, and thus as a threat to both internal security and global order, has involved powers used in prosecuting both belligerents and criminals (Simpson, 2007; Heller-Roazen, 2009). The pirate, in other words, must be made to succumb to the war power and the police power. As we have seen, the exercise of such powers in the name of capital and to realise the demand for accumulation is the process of pacification.

The great secret of pacification is thus the very secret Marx reveals about capital: that wage labour must exist, must be constant and must be regular. In other words, if the point of pacification historically was the use of political and legal power to manufacture wage-labour as the grounds of accumulation, this remains the case today. From the perspective of a politics of anti-security, the violent dispossession and proletarianization of peoples in the name of intellectual property rights and manifested through the hunt for the criminal-terrorist-pirate is the contemporary instantiation of systematic pacification. For both capital and the state, the hunting will never end.

References


Article

UNMANNING THE POLICE MANHUNT: VERTICAL SECURITY AS PACIFICATION

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Abstract

This article provides a critique of military aerial drones being “repurposed” as domestic security technologies. Mapping this process in regards to domestic policing agencies in the United States, the case of police drones speaks directly to the importation of actual military and colonial architectures into the routine spaces of the “homeland”, disclosing insidious entwinements of war and police, metropole and colony, accumulation and securitization. The “boomeranging” of military UAVs is but one contemporary example how war power and police power have long been allied and it is the logic of security and the practice of pacification that animates both. The police drone is but one of the most nascent technologies that extends or reproduces the police’s own design on the pacification of territory. Therefore, we must be careful not to fetishize the domestic police drone by framing this development as emblematic of a radical break from traditional policing mandates – the case of police drones is interesting less because it speaks about the militarization of the police, which it certainly does, but more about the ways in which it accentuates the mutual mandates and joint rationalities of war abroad and policing at home. Finally, the paper considers how the animus of police drones is productive of a particular form of organized suspicion, namely, the manhunt. Here, the “unmanning” of police power extends the police capability to not only see or know its dominion, but to quite literally track, pursue, and ultimately capture human prey.

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Drones, pacification, militarization, police manhunt, vertical security

Why, oh why must you swoop through the hood
Like everybody from the hood is up to no good
Run, run, run from the ghetto bird Run.

Ice Cube, “Ghetto Bird” (1993)

In the name of “security,” battlefronts bleed into home fronts as military technologies charged with the pacification of foreign others “outside” national space are tasked with the pacification of others on the “inside.” This is perhaps most evident with the emergence of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or aerial surveillance drones, as they migrate from the securityscapes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to the United States “homeland”. Known for their powerful surveillance cameras, thermal imaging, hovering capabilities, aerial flexibility and, depending on the model, destructive missile strike capabilities, drones have emerged as a contemporary icon of the cutting edge of air power. US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta once stated that drones are “the only game in town” in terms of combatting “terrorism” (Shachtman, 2009) – a logic embraced by an Obama administration seemingly undeterred from accumulating civilian deaths while expanding and ramping up drone attacks premised on a secretive “kill list” of “suspected terrorists,” (Becker and Shane, 2012) including US citizens (Cole, 2011). Clearly, aerial drones are not merely a game, as Panetta would have it, but indeed a bloody business mobilized by the imperatives of security and accumulation. Yet the drone market is not confined to foreign theaters, as the US security state and security industries are increasingly imagining drones as “dual-use” scopic technologies that can readily be deployed across a myriad of spatial contexts removed from foreign policy, at least on the surface (see Wall and Monahan, 2011). One such context is the policing of domestic order, especially what is commonly but problematically referred to as routine “law enforcement” or “crime fighting”. That is, military aerial drones are now being “repurposed” as domestic security technologies.

As the case of aerial drones demonstrate, in fundamental ways the contemporary politics of security is routinely measured through a “technological fix”, most commonly through a visual prosthetics pregnant with the possibility of violence (Feldman, 1997). This fixation on seeing, knowing, and ordering through optical enhancement can also be seen with the ubiquitous information and biometric technology such as body scans, facial recognition systems, smart cards, national ID cards, cell-phone tracking devices, geospatial satellite-tracking devices, Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), and a plethora of other technologies aimed at collecting “intelligence.” All of these coercive looking
technologies convert information into “intelligence” through the mediating capacities of screens, databases, and networks that function by abstracting bodies from their local contexts to facilitate various interventions (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). Just like UAV systems, all of the above technologies have been and are currently deployed in both “counter-insurgency” and domestic policing operations – suggesting that these technologies never solely belong to the domestic order, but to the order of security and pacification. This order is rooted in the “boomerang effect”, whereby control technologies deployed abroad in colonial and military campaigns “boomerang” back to the metropole to be deployed against “homefront” populations (Graham, 2010; Foucault, 1997; McCoy, 2009).

The case of police drones speaks directly to the importation of actual military and colonial architectures into the routine spaces of the “homeland”, disclosing insidious entwinements of war and police, metropole and colony, accumulation and securitization. Yet the pervasive trafficking of technologies between military and police are often met with a persistent denial, namely, the normalization of a pervasive assumption that imagines “colonial frontiers and Western ‘homelands’ as fundamentally separate domains” rather than seeing these spaces as “fuse(d) together into a seamless whole” (Graham, 2010: xix). But, as I attempt to demonstrate, it would simplistic and misleading to suggest that the pacification of foreign populations and securing of global markets, to which military drones have played an important part of late (see Benjamin, 2012; Turse and Englehardt, 2012), is somehow removed from the pacification of domestic territory and securing of markets on the “inside.” Although at the time of this writing unmanned vertical policing is not yet widespread, making the analysis here admittedly speculative, my purpose here is to demonstrate the union of war power abroad and police power at home. Police drones then must be understood as continuous, and in no way detached or dissimilar, from contemporary US pacification projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The article therefore unpacks how police UAVs, like the military drone, are bounded by the logic of security and the practice of pacification as these vertical tracking technologies are tasked with the hunting of human prey. In this sense, police drones underline the unmanning of the police manhunt, that foundational practice of police power where the “reserve army of labour” is quite literally hunted and captured.

The Rise of Drone Patrols

Unmanned military commodities routinely create profits for the US security industry, with the hunt for locating new “internal” drone markets yet another instance of this, alongside the removal of “obstacles” to capital accumulation. This is one face of the perpetual hunt for new markets (Marx, 1867/1976). Faced with the fear of future budget cuts and pending wars, the US security state and partnered security industries are
persistently manufacturing “adjacent markets,” or any civilian market where military technologies can be peddled (Lake, 2011). A defense executive has stated that the industry goal for military ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] technologies is “to push it down to the state and local governments to see if there is a mission to support” (cited in Lake, 2011). Importantly, the “mission support” mentioned by the above executive is the “public safety market,” as a different defense executive states: “a number of our influential products have dual-use capability to locations and missions adjacent to our primary overseas ISR mission. One such example is local law enforcement, emergency first responders and border protection” (cited in Lake, 2011). The military drone is at the forefront of the so-called green-to-blue pipeline, or the movement from military to domestic security applications.

Prior to 2012 there had been one major obstacle to domesticating drones, namely, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations blocking widespread access to national airspace by both public and private institutions. In February 2012 this obstacle, if not completely demolished, was reworked into a much less significant impediment with passage of H.R. 658, a law requiring the FAA to expedite the process of handing out Certificate of Authorizations (COAs) to government agencies such as the police and border patrol and also private enterprises so that they can operate micro-drones. It has been estimated that by 2018, there could be 30,000 drones flying in US skies – a mixture of military, public safety, and private drones (Smithson, 2012). The passing of the bill was largely due to sustained pressure by drone stakeholders, primarily Congress’s Unmanned Systems Caucus, the Association of Unmanned Vehicles International (AUVSI) and its corporate members, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various lawmakers, and domestic policing agencies. These stakeholders argued that the lack of access to US airspace was a hindrance to both capital accumulation and much needed security measures. As a spokesperson for the AUVSI has stated, “The potential civil market for these systems could dwarf the military market in the coming years if we can get access to the airspace.” Michael Huerta, an FAA administrator, has stated: “What we’re hearing from the Congress and the industry is, “This technology is evolving quickly and we don’t want the FAA to be too cautious so as to hold up technological innovation” (quoted in Lowy, 2012).

Unsurprisingly, “public safety” agencies across the US have embraced this move to “re-purpose” and “re-deploy” military-style UAVs, specifically micro-drones weighing from 4-25 pounds and from 2-8 feet in length. A Texas official has stated, “Public-safety agencies are beginning to see this as an invaluable tool for them, just as the car was an improvement over the horse and the single-shot pistol was improved upon by the six-shooter” (Clarridge, 2012). To police drone enthusiasts, UAV systems evoke a “technological sublime” (Nye, 1994), or a certain reverence, awe, and arousal concerning great engineering feats and technologies. In this case, drones are a technological sublime that points to the dream of securing the insecurity of domestic order. Outfitted with
potent cameras and potentially night vision, facial recognition, thermal imaging and even lethal and non-lethal weaponry, drones are said to be a dreamlike, “silver-bullet” scopical commodity animating the fantasy of security. Police micro-UAVs have been imagined for a plethora of circumstances: natural disaster assistance, search and rescue, special events and other large gatherings such as protests, traffic congestion and enforcement, high speed pursuits, locating fleeing/hiding suspects, hostage rescue and barricaded subjects, drug interdiction, and in surveillance/intelligence operations. Indeed, the police applications of this appear endless, with innovation a likely outcome of their adoption in everyday police practices. As one spokesperson for a local government that purchased a drone remarked, “As we get into this we’ll be able to find more uses for it” (Butts, 2012).

Perhaps the most well-known case of domestic UAVs is the implementation of drones by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the aerial monitoring of US border regions with Mexico and Canada (Becker, 2012; Rockwell, 2011). Currently, the CBP has 9 drones with plans for more in the future (Dinan, 2012). But drones are also emerging beyond the seams of US borderscapes as increasing numbers of US police departments are seeking military-style aerial drones as key domestic policing technologies. To list only a few examples, drones have been acquired by FAA authorizations or have been applied for by policing agencies in Seattle, Colorado, Texas, Maryland, California, North Dakota, Florida, South Carolina, Alabama, Utah, Idaho, and Arkansas. For instance, Miami-Dade police received a grant from the Department of Justice in order to acquire 2 Honeywell T-Hawk drones, at $50,000 each, that can fly and hover at altitudes up to 9000 feet. The local government of Canyon County, Idaho purchased a Draganflyer X6 with DHS grants (Butts 2012). Like other similar drones, the Draganflyer X6 can stream video to officers on the ground and also comes equipped with thermal imaging technology. The Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) has four Wasp III drones that reportedly are available on a case-by-case basis to any policing agency in the state (Newton, 2011). In October of 2011 the Sheriff’s Department in Montgomery County, Texas, also with assistance from DHS grants, unveiled a 7-foot long drone called the “Shadowhawk”. This particular drone, from Texas-based Vanguard Industries, is equipped with cameras and heat sensor and night vision technology and the platform can be armed with “non-lethal” and “lethal” weaponry. As of May 2012, it was reported that the Shadowhawk had yet to be deployed, but officials stated that they were waiting for the “right incident” to “present itself” (Flake, 2012). It is not an understatement to say that both the idea and the reality of police drones have become normalized in policing circles. As one New York Police Department (NYPD) spokesperson puts it, drones just “aren’t that exotic anymore” (CBS, 2012).

Despite all of these developments, the opening of the police drone market has been met with critiques from liberals and conservatives alike, ranging from concerns about safety concerns such as mid-air collisions and loss of signal scenarios, even though the issue of privacy, unsurprisingly and problematically, has dominated popular critiques
(see Henry, this volume). For the security industry these issues are to be solved through “public relations”. Speaking at a Counter Terror Expo, a government official stated that “We have a very tall challenge to change public perception. Otherwise, we’ll be stopped cold in our tracks if we don’t do this thoughtfully. We have to bring the public along every step of the way” so that they realize “we will not be watching backyards” (Stone, 2012). Indeed, going so far as to hire a public relations firm to “bombard the American public with positive images and messages” (Morley, 2012), the AUVSI has admitted that one of the big challenges for the emergence of domestic UAVs is winning “hearts and minds”. An AUVSI spokesperson has stated that “We’re going to do a much better job of educating people about unmanned aviation, the good and the bad. We’re working on drafting the right message and how to get it out there. You have to keep repeating the good words. People who don’t know what they’re talking about say these are spy planes or killer drones. They’re not” (Morley, 2012). But it is important to note that the majority of military UAVs are primarily equipped for aerial surveillance and intelligence-gathering, and are not equipped with lethal systems and are not nearly the size of the Predator and Reaper “hunter-killer” drones that have received most attention – hence there are more commonalities between military drones and police drones than this spokesperson suggests. Indeed, one suggested solution to successfully normalize drones in national airspace is to cease calling the technology “drones”, but rather “remotely piloted vehicles” (Morley, 2012) because the word “drone” is so associated with targeted assassinations, kill lists, and dead civilians.

Clearly, the rise of police drones reveals a bundle of issues concerning technologies of violence, questions of security and the powers of marketing. How might we understand the police drone, without falling back on liberal worries about ‘safety concerns’ or loss privacy? How might we situate the drone within the wider frame of the critique of security and the logic of pacification?

Security Fetishism & Insecurity as Opportunity

Animated by the fetish of security (Neocleous 2008), the rise of US police drones exemplify how logics of (in)security circulate and proliferate so creating new configurations of state power and accumulation. Although police officials justify drones by claiming they are cheaper than helicopters and better protect officers from “harm’s way”, discourses of security remain the most forceful argument, as police officials routinely exclaim drones offer an extra layer of “public safety”. Prior to the passing of H.R. 658, New York Democrat Charles Schumer stated that the domestication of UAVs is ultimately a matter of “national security”:
The FAA has been very hesitant to give authorization to these UAVs due to limited air space and restrictions that they have. I certainly can appreciate those concerns; but when we’re talking about Customs and Border Protection or the FBI, what have you, we are talking about missions of national security. And certainly there’s nothing more important than that (quoted in Barry 2012; emphasis mine).

Unmanned police power then can firmly be situated in what Feldman (2004) dubs “securocratic wars of public safety” where national security and public safety concerns converge and become inseparable. As “the supreme concept of bourgeois society”, as Marx once put it (cited in Neocleous, 2008: 30), and a “general economy of power” as Foucault (2007: 10-11) suggested, security exercises an insidious mutability and malleability, and both writers also recognized the securing of insecurity as always unfinished and perpetual. Consequently, the “war on terrorism” slides into those other perpetual security projects, such as the “war on crime” and “war on drugs”, while homeland security, public safety, and national security become interchangeable – hence the normalized overlapping techniques of military and police power in which drones are but one example.

Both imperial and domestic police UAVs are first and foremost security commodities invested in and bounded by the prerogatives of security and accumulation, accentuating how security becomes commodified in neoliberal “risk markets” (Rigakos, 2002). If the commodity form is said to address or alleviate some form of human need, and the security commodity specifically that of insecurity, then the police drone addresses the local security state’s need, or desire or dream, of pacifying territory and populations (Neocleous, 2011). Police agencies turn to security industries in order to better enhance their security objectives while security industries aggressively market military products to “public safety” institutions in order to secure accumulation. That is, the emergence of police drones speak to the ways the security state and security industries are virtually indistinguishable, as attested to above with the entanglement of the AUVSI, DHS, Congressional Unmanned Caucus, policing agencies, and the FAA’s relinquishing of the control of airspace due to the intertwined imperatives of security and accumulation.

This entails not so much the retreat or “hollowing-out” of the state or a privatization of the state, but a security industry intimately intertwined with the state (see Neocleous, 2008). The state appears as “pimp” (Zedner, 2006) to an increasingly powerful security industry, with local police forces the main client. And yet there is no clear separation between the security provided by the pimp and the commodity sold by the prostitute. Much like the “child protection industry” (Katz, 2001), drone industries, and security corporations in general, do not produce and market security commodities such as UAVs because they are particularly interested in surveillance and security per se, but first and foremost because they are interested in accumulation (Neocleous, 2008). Yet
they also recognize that to secure accumulation, a healthy security state must be forged and nourished.

As attempts to domesticate drones suggest, the logic of security presupposes a social order or even local context that is haunted by the spectre of insecurity. That is, police drone stakeholders are reliant on the presence of what could be thought of as “opportunities of insecurity” that are often tragic, transgressive, or perceived as “disorderly” to help justify the continual reproduction, circulation, and intensification of the security-accumulation assemblage. Here it is useful to think of this in terms of the “disaster capitalism” outlined by Naomi Klein (2007), in which human and environmental devastation is seen as an occasion for state power and capitalist accumulation to expand. As Klein shows, “homeland security” itself is largely an economy where unchecked police powers and unchecked capitalism insidiously converge after “9/11” (386). This point on disaster capitalism in reference to police drones is poignantly demonstrated by the following graphic by Lucintel, a market research group:

As the column above demonstrates, diverse and random events, most of them tragic or transgressive in that lives have been injured and/or order breached, are framed as not upsetting or disconcerting in terms of human suffering or harm, but as the necessary conditions for “growth” of the UAV civil market. Reworked as “requirements” and “opportunities,” these various events ranging from forest fires to automobile
accidents, from criminalized activity to an influx in foot or vehicular traffic, are understood as the required conditions of possibility for the domestic drone market. And as the middle column shows, these opportunities to capitalize on tragedy and transgression are structured by the uncertain and unpredictable, the ambiguous and illegible, as they play out on a local scale. In addition, the column on the right points to how the intertwined logics of security and insecurity, order and disorder, animates the whole process, as the pursuit of security is understood as perpetual and can never be achieved. The spectre of blindness and ignorance haunts or animates security to develop and deploy greater capabilities to “see” and “order”.

Police drones are but one useful case study demonstrating how the security state and security industries are reliant upon, and actively propagate and mobilize fear, suspicion, and anxiety around “public safety” issues to simultaneously justify hardened security measures and secure accumulation. Of course, this is nothing new per se, but is just one example of the ways in which demands for security are at once demands for accumulation (Katz, 2001; Rigakos, 2002; Spitzer, 1987). Indeed, security capitalizes on devastation and insecurity by converting them into a plethora of opportunities for state power, social order and capitalist accumulation to be bolstered and reproduced (Cowen and Siciliano, 2011; Feldman, 2011). Thus Cowen and Siciliano speak of a “securitized social reproduction” whereby individual bodies, groups, asymmetrical social relations, and the larger order of capitalist accumulation are secured through classed and racialized practices of targeted policing. This process, I suggest, needs to be understood as central to the process of pacification. The remainder of this article thinks through the cultural and political dynamics configuring the domestic deployment of police drones in this light. I suggest that aerial police drones are nothing less than a human hunting technology in the service of pacification.

Pacification, Scopic Verticality and the Manhunt

Police drones are often described as part of a long history of police “militarization” where both martial vocabularies and military practices and technologies (Kraska, 2001) abound within modern policing’s “technostructure” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2001). Yet as tempting as the militarization discourse is we must resist seeing the boomeranging of military drones to the policing of domestic populations as solely an issue where martial logics and technologies straightforwardly convert police power into war power. The militarization discourse often lends itself to a problematic “blurring” trope where the military invades and corrupts, “militarizes”, the previously noble police profession. As Guillermina Seri (2012) argues, “There is a distinct police role in facilitating authoritarianism and state violence” (119), and this is precisely what is missed in discussions of the militarization of the police. The police and military might operate
with “different notions of risk” such as arrest/prosecution as opposed to simply kill (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 151), yet insisting on this divide obscures the fact that war and police have long been sutured together in the name of security. That is, the boomeranging of military UAVs is but one contemporary example how war power and police power have long been allied, and it is the logic of security and the practice of pacification that animates both (Neocleous, 2011; Neocleous, this volume).

Most often pacification is evoked in regards to military strategy and tactics, primarily in reference to counter-insurgency efforts to “win hearts and minds” in the US/Vietnam war – although it has a much longer colonial history (Neocleous, 2011). But as others have pointed out, the “external pacification” of distant territories and peoples has historically developed alongside the “internal pacification” of domestic territories and populations (see Kuzmarov, 2012; McCoy, 2009), the former primarily being consigned to the military whereas the latter a policing project. In his ethnography of the LAPD, Herbert (1997) identifies police surveillance as one important means by which the police routinely aim for “internal pacification.” In this regard internal pacification can be understood as a “process fabricating a ‘peace and security’ within the social order to match the ‘peace and security’ imposed on colonial subjects” while “ordering the social relations of power around a particular regime of accumulation” (Neocleous, 2011). Security is pacification (Neocleous, 2011). As a critical concept, pacification therefore also forces us to ask questions about who is being pacified, why this is so, and for what particular objectives, while simultaneously presupposing subjects that resist efforts at their pacification (Rigakos, 2011).

In other words, the usefulness in thinking the politics of security in terms of pacification is that the military and police are located on a continuum of state power, aiming to order disorder with quite similar practices and hardware, as opposed to two separate spheres with different operating logics (see Rigakos, 2011). In this light, we must be careful not to fetishize the domestic police drone by framing this development as emblematic of a radical break from traditional policing mandates – the case of police drones is interesting less because it speaks about the militarization of the police, which it certainly does, but more about the ways in which it accentuates the mutual mandates and joint rationalities of war and police. Put in a slightly different way, the police drone is but one of the newest technologies that extends or reproduces the police’s own design on the pacification of its territory. Indeed, the military and police are united in their mandate to pacify their respective territories and populations (Herbert, 1997). For certain, surveillance and intelligence-gathering, and the continual threat of violence, structure the organizational animus of not only militaries but also domestic policing – an animus moved by the “demand for order” (Silver, 1976). But such “order” is not only reproduced but also actively fabricated by police power (Neocleous, 2000). Much like the police helicopters armed with powerful high-resolution cameras, flying above city streets,
sidewalks, alleyways, parks, homes and lawns, unmanned vertical policing extends the police dream of pacification through air power, or a scopic verticality.

Importantly, as a technology of pacification the drone must be understood, in its logic and design, as a technology of police and not merely military power. The police drone, on this view, is not a feature of police “militarization”, but a technology already structured by police logic – and here I am referring to the broad notion of the “social police” that predates yet still structures the uniformed institution now thought of as “the police” (Neocleous, 2000; see also Foucault 2007). That is, air power has long been a form of police power in that the inauguration of modern air power, the 1920’s and 1930’s, was defined by the police concept (Neocleous, 2013a). Put another way: although most histories of air power trace its origins to military power, often speaking of WWII as the crucial historical moment, Neocleous (2013a) demonstrates how air power was originally conceived by its earliest proponents in Britain and the US as an explicit police technology to be used to govern in the most general sense the colonized and other “dangerous classes”. More specifically, he shows how in the 1920s many of the debates taking place in metropoles concerning colonial populations framed air power as a police technology deployed to pacify indigenous peoples and fabricate order by crushing rebellions and policing minor resistances, separating the indigenous from traditional means of production, conducting aerial surveillance including land surveys and censuses, and in winning hearts and mind through moral effect. Of course, air power as police power was not only discussed – but actually exercised by metropoles in the “securing” of a slew of colonized territories. Perhaps most relevant to note for our discussion of police drones in the US is the 1921 “Battle of Blair Mountain”, when West Virginian coal miners were aerially bombed by the private militia of mine owners, to say nothing of the military planes that were also used to conduct reconnaissance. Most recently, the 1985 bombing from a police helicopter of the headquarters of the activist organization MOVE helps in further demonstrating that air power has in fact long been a form of police power. The drone belongs to this history.

UAVs are said to better assist police with their goal of rendering illegible geographies legible from above. “An illegible society”, Scott writes, “is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare” (Scott 1998: 78). As Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have shown, the domestic policing of insecurity, just like the military sibling, involves the collecting of information regarding a population and territory with aims of constructing “a more accurate map of the territory and a more reasonable profile of the...people who inhabit it” (135). As an “extra patrolman in the sky” (Miller, 2011) that is mobile and flexible, the police UAV extends the police mandate of ordering terrestrial space by technologically mediating the territorial through the aerial – “vigilant visualities” (Amoore, 2007) take flight within a politics of verticality (Weizman, 2007). The drone patrol lends itself to visually ordering what appears disordered if observed solely from eye-level, or ground-
level – the terrestrial patrol is always limited by its locality. In this sense the drone is like the police helicopter. Of police helicopters, Adey (2010) writes that “Verticality implies security from the insecurities below” (58; emphasis in original), and this logic certainly structures the drone stare. One police official has stated drones provide “a good opportunity to have an eye up there” and that the technology provides “a surveilling eye to help us to do the things we need to do, honestly, to keep people safe” (quoted in Benjamin, 2012). In this sense, police drones are said to provide earth-bound police officers with a superior aerial vantage point in order to negotiate risks, threats, and disorders through the aerial distancing of subject and object. UAVs, enthusiasts therefore claim, provide much-needed public safety interventions by producing better state knowledge. This reproduces the commonsensical refrain that the state is “the knowing subject” (Neocleous, 2003), even though what is often taken as seeing better or more – legibility – is actually itself always a partial view, or a simplification and miniaturization that excludes other forms of knowledge (Scott, 1998). As Feldman (1997) states: “The circuit formed by vision and violence is itself circumscribed by zones of blindness and inattention” (Feldman 1997: 29).

It is not simply a detached aerial view of an entire city that is imagined by police, but also the ability to intervene on a local level. Much like air power in combat, the police pursuit of mastering the atmosphere converges with a desire for an “unblinking eye – an omnipresent view provided by efficient UAV cycles and sequences that seeks to observe an asymmetric yet omnipresent threat with the capacity to unpredictably surprise and disrupt” (Adey et al, 2011: 179). No matter how high the UAV soars in order for the police to gain an ocular superiority, it is important to remember that since the aerial view is always tethered to the ground it is never merely ocular. Rather, it is a “vision that is practiced and touched” (Adey, 2010: 109). This touch, I suggest, is realized in the culmination of a particular form of organized suspicion, namely, the manhunt.

Chamayou (2011) has recently argued that the aerial drone is the contemporary emblem of the militarized manhunt. Hence the foundational structure of the “war on terror” is not a Clauswitzian duel between states, but the asymmetrical hunt for human prey. Here we could mention the quite literal hunts for Bin Laden and other suspected insurgents, Saddam Hussein after the 2003 invasion, and of course the “targeted killings” of suspected enemies on a drone “kill list”, including US citizens. Key to the chase is the process of identification leading the hunter to the location of the hunted for either capture or killing, but primarily for the latter. The hunt has been a central component of pacification and accumulation (Neocleous, this volume), and as already stated, the drone is the quintessential emblem of this new “manhunt doctrine” of contemporary warfare (Chamayou, 2011). The drone,

…is the mechanical, flying and robotic heir of the dog of war. It creates to perfection the ideal of asymmetry: to be able to kill without being able to
be killed; to be able to see without being seen. To become absolutely invulnerable while the other is placed in a state of absolute vulnerability. ‘Predator’, ‘Global Hawk’, ‘Reaper’ – birds of prey and angels of death, drones bear their names well (Chamayou, 2011).

The drone, then, is a technology of manhunting, and this is true whether the drone in question is solely capable of surveillance or one of the “hunter-killer” drones equipped with Hellfire missiles. The drone is oriented to both the “capture” of state-produced images and the capture of those marked as Other. Historically though, the state-sanctioned manhunt has configured the animus of domestic policing more so than it has organized military violence abroad (see Chamayou, 2011; 2012; Neocleous, 2013b). That is, the state’s deployment of the manhunt has historically belonged more to police than the military. Therefore, keeping with the argument made in the previous section that air power has long been police power, we can say that the unmanned military hunts so clearly important to the war on terror belong not only to the logic of war, but to the logic of police.

On this note, we might find it helpful to understand drones as not only a hunting technology in the service of external pacification, but a relation of domination animating the very heart of police power (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, 2013). A consideration of manhunting as an actual relation between dominant and dominated is to take seriously “technologies of predation indispensable for the establishment and reproduction of relationships of domination” (Chamayou, 2012: 1). As the “state’s arm of pursuit, entrusted by it with tracking, arresting, and imprisoning”, Chamayou (2012) writes, policing is a hunting institution claiming a “monopoly on legitimate tracking” and capture (89). Policing as a human hunting institution is grounded in the historical and routine workings of the police – patrolling, investigating, tracking, capturing, and even killing (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, this volume). Although the practice of the police manhunt is often associated with high-profile, media-driven pursuits, most recently observed with the organized hunts for ex-LAPD cop Christopher Dorner and the two Chechen-born brother suspects in the Boston Marathon bombing, we should resist seeing the hunt as only or even primarily as a form of spectacle. That is, policing as fundamentally the practice of hunting human prey is best attested to by the routine, normalized, and hence often invisible, operation of police power. As one writer for a police magazine affirms, “Law enforcement exists to keep society safe from criminals, which means apprehending and arresting those who would do harm. Police manhunts for wanted criminals are daily occurrences throughout America and Canada. Most manhunts are routine police work and garner little public attention” (O’Brien 2009; emphasis mine). Because the manhunt is a practice of the powerful hunting the relatively powerless, the police hunt for human prey, like all forms of manhunting, performs a far-reaching asymmetry in terms of the resources and means of tracking (Chamayou, 2012), and this is
epitomized by vertical security technologies such as the police helicopter and now the police drone.

Police drones extend the traditional police hunt in powerful ways by augmenting the grounded patrol agent with a vertical optic of advanced tracking technology. An unmanned systems editor for Janes Defence Weekly has stated that drones “could be used for anything you currently use a police helicopter for, so to follow a car chase, or to find a suspect who is hiding or for search and rescue missions. The cameras they carry can be very sophisticated, they can lock onto a car and follow it, without having someone constantly monitoring the pictures. They can then be transmitted back to police HQ” (Elgot, 2012). One Miami-Herald journalist, perhaps unwittingly but nevertheless tellingly, articulates police drones as manhunting technology when he writes that the local police drone has the capability of “training powerful lenses on its prey” (Rabin, 2011). The website for Vanguard Industries offers a short video promoting their Shadowhawk to “public safety” agencies that positions the viewer to see from the aerial view as the unmanned system engages in mock scenarios of the police hunt. In one scenario, titled “Tactical Night Time Ops: Officer Directed to Suspect”, the viewer observes thermal imaging technology illuminating a human body hiding in what appears to be a wooded area. Over the radio we hear the suspect referred to as a target, as the drone operator guides a terrestrial officer to the precise location of the hunted. We then see the officer, silhouette illuminated with his weapon drawn, approaching the suspect as the human prey kneels as the officer arrests – a hunt and then a capture. Interestingly, a Monmouth University survey (2012) found that 67% of US citizens supported the use of police drones to track down “runaway criminals” and 64% supported drones policing “illegal immigration”.

To further push this argument we only need to consider that the move to weaponize police drones has already begun before the exclusively surveillance variety has become common in US skies. This is not all that surprising if we recall the bombings of Blair Mountain and MOVE headquarters, and more directly, the fact that military drones developed first as surveillance technologies and only later germinated into the hunter-killer drone. For example, the police version of the Shadowhawk can be armed with a taser and a stun baton. As one journalist reports: “The most relevant weapon for chasing fugitives might be the beanbag launcher. Its ammunition, though, isn’t called a beanbag; it’s a ‘stun baton’”. A Vanguard official stated: ”You have a stun baton where you can actually engage somebody at altitude with the aircraft. A stun baton would essentially disable a suspect” (Moore, 2011) – here the coercive violence underpinning routine policing is buttressed by the capability to not only track but to literally capture with a potential debilitating blow to the hunted suspect. In a report on military UAV applications for domestic policing, two military researchers discuss a military training exercise experimenting with a “UAV non-lethal payload” that “is directly relevant to civilian police missions.” Here they discuss that with little training, an individual agent
was successful in dropping “smoke canisters, steel spikes for destroying tires, and propaganda leaflets, all with incredible precision” (Murphy and Cycon, no date provided). Although commonly mentioned police drone “payloads” are “less than lethal” such as tasers, tear gas, high-pitch sound weapons, and rubber bullets, it is not hard to imagine police drones with firearm capabilities – as the non-police version of the Shadowhawk is equipped with a 12-gauge shotgun and grenade launcher that has been deployed to hunt Somali “pirates” in the Gulf of Aden. Interestingly, this move to weaponize police drones coincides with the US military’s increasing emphasis on weaponizing its own micro-UAVs – as exemplified with AeroVironment’s Switchblade.

In South Carolina, two agencies joined forces to create a surveillance drone that allegedly can also be weaponized, according to the Sheriff: “We do have the capability of putting a weapon on there if we needed to…We could put one on there. Hopefully we would never have to use it” (Talarico, 2011). In the candid language of a professional hunter of humans, the Sheriff stated, “This is an example of where jurisdictional boundaries are broken down for a criminal…Quite simply put, they can't run” (Talarico, 2011). Manhunts always risk a certain embarrassment for the state as they expose the state’s failure of non-capture (Chamayou, 2012), and here we can see how police drones are imagined as one possibility of reducing this potential public humiliation.

Although drones are only just now emerging as domestic policing technology and therefore unmanned manhunts exist, as of now anyway, primarily in a police imaginary, there are already concrete examples of unmanned manhunts. In what is probably the first time a police drone actively assisted in the arrest of a suspect, in 2009 the Texas Department of Public Safety used the Wasp III to assist a SWAT team in executing a search warrant on a home that they believed had weapons and drugs inside and eventually the pursued man was arrested (Newton, 2011). In 2010 an unmanned hunt took place in Britain when a vehicle was allegedly stolen and one of the two suspects successfully outran police, who claimed to lose sight of the suspect in a thick fog. Merseyside police then deployed a small drone with body heat detection: “Using its thermal imaging equipment the device quickly located its target in bushes beside the canal through his body heat and relayed live pictures to a police van nearby. Foot patrols then went and arrested him” (Hull, 2010). The anti-social behavior taskforce official stated: “These arrests demonstrate the value of having something like the UAV.” But the aerial hunt of domestic suspects is not monopolized by the police themselves, as attested to by the fact that in 2011 a US Predator drone assisted North Dakota police in the surveillance and arrest of cattle ranchers (Bennett, 2011). While looking for several missing cows on a 3,000 acre farm, the county Sheriff was chased off the property by three men with rifles. The next day a Predator drone from the local air force base was called in, along with a SWAT team and bomb squad and additional officers from nearby departments. Flying 2 miles overhead, the Predator’s powerful surveillance system was able to locate the ranchers and discern that they were unarmed – the 3 men were then
arrested in a police raid (Bennett, 2011). Although this specific case of using military drones domestically was challenged in court, a judge controversially ruled in favor of the state (Koebler, 2012). Furthermore, following media reporting of this event, state authorities admitted that not only do Predator drones frequently assist this particular police department but that Predators are used in domestic investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (Bennett, 2011). As the LA Times reports, “Officials in charge of the fleet cite broad authority to work with police from budget requests to Congress that cite "interior law enforcement support" as part of their mission” (Bennett, 2011). Similarly, it has been reported that military drone operators in Nevada have trained by practicing their aerial tracking techniques on civilian vehicles driving on US roadways. Upon observing this firsthand, a journalist inquired: “Wait, you guys practice tracking enemies by using civilian cars?” A training exercise only, said the Air Force officer (Mazzetti, 2012).

This movement towards the unmanned hunt is also illustrated by what police say they are going to use them for. In Maryland, a police department stated in official FAA documents that a drone would be deployed to aerially monitor “people of interest (watching open drug market transactions before initiating an arrest)” as well as “aerial observation of houses when serving warrants”, the searching for marijuana fields, and search and rescue missions. Similarly, an Arkansas department has stated in FAA documents that their drone is equipped with powerful infrared and zoom cameras that can pan and tilt in order to “track objects of interest even when the helicopter’s nose is pointed away from the object.” Montgomery County police’s Shadowhawk will be used to “enhance and support tactical operations”, such as “SWAT and narcotics operations will utilize camera and FLIR systems to provide real time area surveillance of the target during high risk operations.” Alabama police purchased a drone “In response to the need for situational awareness and intelligence” that will be deployed “in response to a specific dedicated law enforcement mission in a defined area” such as “covert surveillance of drug transactions” along with “pre-operational planning and surveillance, maintaining operational security, and obtaining evidentiary video”. In Ogden City, Utah, a small city with just over 82,000 residents, local authorities asked the FAA to approve, although ultimately denied, the use of a “nocturnal surveillance airship” that would provide “law enforcement of high crime areas” with hopes of identifying “suspicious activity.” As these examples clearly demonstrate, the police themselves articulate the police drone as first and foremost tracking and pursuit technology – not a technology only for an abstract aerial view, but a grounded, normalized police practice of targeting. This clearly provides

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3 Political activists have been concerned about the police use of drones to pacify protests and public dissent. And since the manhunt is always vulnerable to a reversal of roles between hunted and hunter (Chamayou, 2012), it is unsurprising that activists have started deploying their own counter-surveillance (see Monahan, 2006) drones during political protests (Ackerman, 2011).
the police a powerful new tool to track and capture whoever it deems suspicious, yet the drone imaginary outlined above – “criminals”, “fugitives”, drugs, “high crime areas”, “suspicious activity” – predict that policing’s unmanned manhunt is predisposed to tracking and capturing the poor and downtrodden.

Unmanned hunting never exists outside of the political, economic, and cultural configurations that form subjects as objects. “Seeing more only means having more suspects”, as Knechtel puts it (2006: 21). In other words, drone systems are incapable of an impartial objectivity, but rather perform a “techno-cultural production of targets” (Gregory 2011, 173) where institutional mandates, cultural logics, political rationalities, and technological limits circumscribe the very rules of delivering state surveillance and violence. Today the drone is the quintessential visual prosthetic that forges political subjects asymmetrically through the narrow optics of tracking and targeting measurements and the contextual deficiencies of political economy and cultural inscriptions. Unmanning the police manhunt is loaded with violence regardless of individual drone capability as they only exist in relation to the broader organizational animus of state power.

The founding act of police was the hunting of the poor, vagrants, beggars and the colonized (Chamayou, 2012; Neocleous, 2013b; see also Sheldon, 2008). This history still weighs on the present, and the drone needs to be situated within this history, a history which is, in effect, the history of pacification. Let me finish with a recent experience to highlight this point.

While I was amongst a group of police officers one day, an officer brought up how he had recently watched on CNN a police helicopter hunt down a fleeing suspect. This quickly morphed into a brief comment on police helicopters, specifically how the LAPD air units notoriously instill fear into residents. Yet this quickly then morphed into how, as one officer stated, in the near future aerial drones would be the preferred choice for providing vertical security. Another officer, echoing media reports, expressed how micro-police drones would be able to fit in the trunk of a patrol car and deployed at the officers whim. On this, one officer joked how he would like to someday intentionally crash his hypothetical drone into what is essentially the “ghetto” part of the city in order to literally wipe them “off the map”, while the other officers laughed at the thought.

As this example suggests, and as Chamayou (2012) argues, the hunt has long induced great pleasure in those doing the hunting while the hunted prey exists and moves through space in a constant state of anxiety, largely due to the “radical dissymmetry” in the technologies of tracking. For those living under the drone stare in warzones abroad, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Occupied Territories, fear and nightmares define their experience. Although it is too early to completely understand the specific ways police drones might also induce fear and terror into citizens of the Global North, the alarm and dread produced by police helicopters in the vertical patrolling of urban space is a useful parallel that points to the affective trepidation potentially provoked in a near
future with ubiquitous unmanned policing. In many ways, even those bourgeois communities and citizens usually eclipsed from the police gaze will come under the stare of unmanned policing, to the extent that air power obliterates any useful distinctions between suspect and bystander, target and non-target. As one LA journalist wrote in 1992, “Hearing LAPD helicopters circle overhead is a nightly phenomenon over much of the Los Angeles basin, even in middle-class neighborhoods like my own…the helicopters contribute to the perception that something is very wrong with this city”. He continues:

Their circular flight patterns have a way of making people feel as if they're smack in the center of a crime drama. They get under people’s skin in a way that the soaring crime statistics can’t…every time the helicopters hover and circle overhead I’m reminded of my anxieties. I was insecure before the Los Angeles riots. Now the sight and sound of helicopters above compounds the tension (Strausser, 1992).

If this is the case for this seemingly privileged journalist, it is certainly true that the captives of wage labor, the dispossessed, perpetually hunted poor will burden the brunt of any aerially-induced terror and fear. The aerially-induced anxiety of the police helicopter hunt is best depicted in the rapper Ice Cube’s song, “Ghetto Bird”, where he writes “Why, oh why must you swoop through the hood like everybody from the hood is up to no good” and “Run, run, run from the ghetto bird Run”. This is not meant to jeopardize the suffering of those who are “living and dying under drones” by the hunter-killer Predators and Reapers by turning their suffering into “our own”. But it is to suggest that domestic policing’s unmanned manhunt is also circumscribed by not dissimilar relations of domination that is generative of its own peculiar patterns of physical and psychic insecurity.

I am arguing, then, that the police drone underlines the power relations between those that are dominated and those that do the dominating, the hunted and the hunters. Within this relation stand the everyday hunters that are the police. The rise of police drones makes more perceptible this radical asymmetry between the techniques of the hunters and the hunted, or brings this relation of domination to the forefront, in similar but in even more dramatic fashion than the SWAT team or armored vehicle. As a nascent verticality organizing state suspicion, tracking, and capture, the unmanning of the police manhunt is but the newest symbolic marker of the pacification project that the poor and oppressed have been living and dying with all along. But the very notion of pacification always presupposes populations that resist and is therefore never a completed, fulfilled project (Rigakos, 2011).
References


Research Note

PACIFICATION AND INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES IN CANADA

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Abstract
Front-line police operations are deeply entwined with less visible activities – or practices not commonly identified as policing – that are carried out by a wide range of participants as strategies of settler-colonial pacification operating through the organizing logics of security and liberal legalism. Using open source texts and records obtained through access to information requests, this article unmaps some of the contemporary strategies employed by Canadian institutions to pacify Indigenous resistance. As a contribution to the body of work seeking to develop the politics of anti-security, the analysis disrupts the binary categories that animate security logic by examining the public order policing approach of the Ontario Provincial Police, the framing of Indigenous resistance as a security threat, and the integral role of Indian Affairs in securing the settler-state.

Keywords
colonialism, pacification, Indigenous, resistance, police

Since December 2012, Indigenous peoples and their non-indigenous supporters have engaged in a wide range of direct actions such as round dance flash mobs, blockades of rail-lines, highways and bridges, hunger strikes and demonstrations. These actions, affiliated with the Idle No More movement and reflecting varying degrees of militancy, have been on-going throughout what is now known as Canada, and solidarity actions have occurred around the world. Thus far Canadian police forces largely appear to be following a public order policing approach emphasizing flexibility and communication with protesters. Under this model, police discretionary power is exercised to allow protests to occur while maintaining the safety and “security” of all involved by minimizing physical violence. This approach is often described as “soft” policing in

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2 My thanks to the two anonymous reviewers, Elaine Coburn, Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
contradistinction to “hard” policing characterized by immediate enforcement through coercive force. Yet as Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) argue, this distinction between “soft” and “hard” policing is one of the false binaries at the root of security logics that (re)produce, in this case, the Canadian settler state. Front-line police operations are deeply entwined with less visible activities – or practices not commonly identified as policing – that are carried out by a wide range of participants as strategies of settler-colonial pacification operating through the organizing logic of security and liberal legalism.

My approach in this paper is to turn the research gaze onto state institutions and dominant discourses to unmap colonial strategies (Razack 2002) deployed by the state and settlers in pacifying Indigenous resistance. As a settler, I realize that the role of non-Indigenous scholars as ‘experts’ presents risks of drowning out Indigenous voices as experts on their own experiences, both of colonialism and of resistance. I have attempted to address this by focusing my analysis on settler colonial strategies more than speaking or commenting on Indigenous resistance.

Drawing on open source texts and on records obtained through access to information requests, my focus is on public order policing, “securitization” and the framing of Indigenous resistance as national security threats to the state and private sector interests, and the policing role of Indian Affairs in securing the settler-state. My analysis seeks to disrupt some of the binary categories that animate the entwined logics of security and liberal legalism that legitimize these practices. The organizing of the world into dichotomous categories, as Monture-Angus (1999, 42) notes, is “a colonial manifestation.” Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) argue that disrupting security logic is crucial to counter its de-historicizing and de-politicizing effects. As settlers and as academics, this is a refusal to be complicit in the exercise of colonial power by inhabiting and legitimizing its categories.

Policing, Security and Liberal Legalism

Drawing on the work of Foucault (2007), Neocleous (2000) and Rigakos et al. (2009), policing is understood as the production or “fabrication” of social order that is amenable to processes of capitalist accumulation. Police power is exercised through a range of techniques and institutions. The police – as a specific institution – is a significant state agent of policing, distinguished by its capacity to use “legitimate” violence to produce this social order. Security is a mode of policing that is historically-specific to the development of capitalism, and organizes society through the politics of liberalism and its technologies of individualism and responsibilization. Liberty, defined in large part by individual accumulation, consumption and possession, is secured through policing; conversely, policing is legitimized by the necessity or demand for liberty (Neocleous
As Neocleous (2011) argues, this organizing logic of security-liberty should be understood as pacification – the production of social relations and institutions in place of existing forms of social organization. More specifically, it is the fabrication of a “new” society through the destruction of an existing one.

Pacification has an historical-materialist basis in imperialism and colonialism whereby imperial powers attempt to transform societies in ways that facilitate the territorial expansion necessary to the accumulation of capital (see Alfred 2005; Neocleous 2010, 2011). In the context of settler colonialism, pacification attempts to eradicate existing Indigenous societies while establishing a new society on expropriated land that also erases its colonial past (see Wolfe 2006; Veracini 2010). As Wolfe (2006) emphasizes, settler colonialism is not about replacing, or substituting, a society but the construction of a new one. Pacification thus involves both destructive and productive policing practices, which encompass a wide range of strategies deploying sovereign (repressive), disciplinary and governmental modalities of power simultaneously. The specific permutation of these modalities is dynamic and dependent on context; however, overtly coercive strategies – while always present – tend to take a backseat to political and ideological techniques of pacification, specifically those of liberalism. As Manuel and Posluns (1974) argue, “the common good” is an important discursive device in legitimating and securing colonial social order (see also Alfred and Corntassel 2005).

The legal apparatus is therefore a central means of pacification (Neocleous 2010, 2011). Yet it is the omnipresence of state violence that enables disciplinary and governmental techniques (see Alfred 2005). This is evident in the specific legal strategies deployed in fabricating settler colonial order such as the expropriation of land and resources, the displacement and confinement of Indigenous peoples, the criminalization of means of subsistence outside of waged labour, and assimilationist mechanisms such as residential schools and the outlawing of cultural practices. These strategies work to disrupt and destroy Indigenous identities and social, political and economic relations while establishing an order facilitating capitalist accumulation (Monture-Angus 1999; Alfred 2005; Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Coulthard 2007). At the same time, these policing techniques are continuous with those that fabricate class structure through the protection of private property, the ordering of spaces, moral regulation and the criminalization of alternatives to the wage labour market.

There is a dialectical relationship between pacification and resistance, as other contributions in this issue also show, and this relationship sustains a permanent social insecurity inherent to capitalism and the settler state. Thus, pacification is on-going and constantly shifting, shaped by forms of resistance and broader historical-spatial dynamics (see Alfred and Corntassel 2005). Settler colonialism must be understood as a continuing process of constituting society rather than as a temporally-bounded “event” of the past that the “new” society has moved beyond (Wolfe 2006). Anti-colonial and class struggles
are enduring features of settler colonial states and as Simpson (2008, 13) states, “Indigenous Peoples whose lands are occupied by the Canadian state are currently engaged in the longest running resistance movement in Canadian history,” predating the state itself. Pacification projects are on-going “wars” against resistance in the fabrication of order (Rigakos 2011). Using settler-colonial pacification as a conceptual framework, I examine some key facets of the contemporary policing of Indigenous resistance in Canada, which operate with/in security-liberal logic; these policing practices should be understood as continuities of settler-colonialism shaping colonial and class relations. This requires sketching out the interconnectedness of state institutions, which are woven together by the logic of security-liberalism to operate as means of settler colonial pacification vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples and nations.

Comaroff and Comaroff (2007, 144) describe the use of law as a means of “political coercion, even erasure” in the colonial context as lawfare. This conception captures the simultaneously destructive and constitutive power of law in settler-colonialism. The contemporary Canadian legal apparatus is organized in and through the framework of liberal legalism, which is symbolized by the constitutional enshrining of individual rights. Canada’s inclusion of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in its 1982 constitution marks its status as a liberal democratic nation-state within the global order, engaged in practices favourable to investment and accumulation (see Goodale 2005). Drawing on the arguments of Brown (1995) and Ford (2002), liberal legalistic “rights” establish norms for behaviour that produce “good” liberal subjects by shaping conduct to be consistent with security logic. In critiquing the politics of recognition, Coulthard (2007) argues that the dominant liberal rights-based discourse, in which these politics are based, constitutes Indigenous peoples as “subjects of empire.” This regime of legal liberalism is a central mechanism through which threats to settler state sovereignty and capitalist accumulation are managed.

Thus, within a “liberal democratic” society, “legitimate” means of engaging in political contention include the electoral process, judicial mechanisms to enforce the rule of law and uphold rights, and participating in acts of political dissent in public spaces. The latter instance brings participants into contact with the police institution. Here lies the paradox for Indigenous struggles. The liberal democratic political, legal, judicial, and police institutions are the colonial institutions of the settler state whose legitimacy is being challenged and whose existence is predicated on the elimination of Indigenous societies. Indigenous scholars such as Monture-Angus (1999), Henderson (2002), Alfred (2005), Coulthard (2007), and Corntassel (2008), have emphasized that the arena of liberal rights-based discourse works to limit self-determination in ways that reproduce and reinforce these colonial institutions.

Reflecting the dialectical nature of resistance and pacification, it could be said that gains (although not without significant limitations) have been made in the arena of lawfare, such as the constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights and the
resolution of some land claims. For example, the removal of Indian Act prohibitions on political activities in the 1960s facilitated mobilizations relating to the Canadian constitution. In turn, the formal protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 has provided a basis for legal challenges to violations and encroachments. Similarly, the lifting of restrictions on use of government money to research land claims is crucial for being able to bring these claims forward. However, these legal processes are always limited by their contradictions or “logical consistencies” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 612). The specific claims process established in 1973 is a prime example of this contradiction as the state – through Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) – plays a dual role as both negotiator for and defendant against Indigenous challenges.3 Between 1970 and 2006, only 275 specific claims had been completed of the 1337 filed. With an average of 20 years to settle a claim, communities and land are vulnerable to further encroachments as the claim moves through the process (Gordon 2010; Pasternak, Collis and Dafnos 2013).

Moreover, the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights has been compromised through law itself. Although the 1997 Delgamuukw decision affirmed that section 35 protected Aboriginal title the court ruled that the guarantee of exclusive use and occupation of land could be infringed by the Crown based on “valid” objectives. As Henderson (2002, 37) states, “[b]y their interpretations of the constitutional order and of our treaty order, the courts created the colonial structure of federal Indian law.” Aboriginal and treaty rights have been further targeted through the comprehensive claims process, a form of “modern treaty-making”, which is based on extinguishing Aboriginal title (see Monture-Angus 1999; Henderson 2002; Alfred 2005; Coulthard 2007; Gordon 2010). As Coulthard (2007) argues, rights are “recognized” by the state (and settlers) as long as they do not disrupt political-economic relations. Most recently, these constitutional protections have been further eroded through the Conservative government’s unilateral adoption of omnibus Bill C-45, which included legislative amendments impacting Indigenous self-determination (see Diabo 2012). Diabo (2012) describes these as part of a “termination plan” enacted by the Harper government, which follows a legacy of political-legal attempts to destroy Indigenous communities through assimilation.

In the context of these colonial political and legal mechanisms, direct action such as blockades and reclamations are often options of last resort, particularly when communities are faced with the imminent loss or desecration of land and rights (Alfred 2005; Borrows 2006; Maaka and Fleras 2005). Such actions are spaces of direct interaction with the police institution, which has been central to the displacement, dispossession and repression of Indigenous peoples in the colonial project (Samuelson and Monture 2008; 3 In June 2011, INAC changed its name to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. As most of my sources precede the name change, and for the sake of continuity, I use INAC throughout this paper.)
Gordon 2006, 2010). The liberal legalism of lawfare further extends to this arena of resistance in the state’s management of protests and the legitimization of coercive policing that bears a closer resemblance to warfare.

**Pacification Through Protest Policing**

In the context of the emergence of liberal legalism in the late twentieth century, Canadian police forces began instituting formal policies and guidelines reflecting the adoption of a “measured response” or negotiation-based approach to public order policing. Following trends in most Anglo-American and western European nation-states, this “new” policing model emphasizes communication and negotiation with protesters, with the purported aim of averting an escalation of physical violence. Explicitly working through liberal legalistic discourse, the aim of this “new” policing is to balance the rights of protesters with ensuring public safety (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy 1998; McPhail and McCarthy 2005). The exercise of dissent in this context is shaped by the responsibilization of subjects to police themselves and others according to the bounds of “acceptable” (that is, legal) behaviour as agreed upon in negotiation with the police.

This “new” approach is often juxtaposed – by police as well as in academic literature – to an “escalated force” approach characterized by coercive policing and disregard for civil rights. In Canada, the “shift” in public order policing has been particularly associated with the policing of Indigenous peoples’ protests, blockades and reclamations. This “shift” has therefore been framed by police forces as consistent with, or emblematic of, a more “progressive” policing that is conscious and respectful of rights and of the unique context of the protests. The juxtaposing of these two official policing models positions current practices as desirable according to liberal democratic ideals; the effect, however, is to mask the enduring coercive power underlying these techniques.

Paralleling the imbalance of “negotiation” found in the land claims process, police forces play a dual role in “facilitating” protests while serving as agents of the state with a primary concern to keep the “peace” of settler-colonial order. The notion of a “negotiation” is grounded in the liberal legalistic conception of contractual agreement between autonomous parties, with the inference that the participants have an equal amount of influence and power in shaping the outcome. However, the police institution, being invested with the state’s monopoly of use of violence, maintains significant leverage in “negotiations” around the conditions and parameters of protest; the spectre of coercive force is ever-present, whether overt or not. The “flexibility” of this policing approach is an enhancement of discretionary power in the application and enforcement of law.

The exercise of police discretion is informed by, and shapes, distinctions between “good” and “bad” protesters (Waddington 1998; King and Waddington 2006), which reproduces a binary of the good liberal subject and the “uncivilized” Other – a
fundamental feature of imperialism and colonial control (see LaRocque 2010). Those who do not actively cooperate with police direction, and who engage in disruptive direct actions, would fall into the latter category. The justification for use of overtly coercive or “hard” policing tactics is legitimized by the unreasonableness and irresponsibility of individuals who do not exercise their rights “properly” through “neutral” and “objective” (that is, liberal) legal and political processes or institutionalized forms of protest. Racialization and racist discourse furthers the othering of Indigenous peoples engaged in disruptive direct actions as the “uncivilized” Other – the “internal dangerous foreigner” in the settler colonial state (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009). The logic of security-liberalism neutralizes the threat of resistance by attempting to institutionalize it within “legitimate” liberal democratic channels while also providing legitimization for the state’s use of overt and covert repression to manage potential threats to “public safety” – i.e. security – posed by those who have not been or cannot be pacified as good liberal subjects – or “subjects of empire” (Coulthard 2007).

It is significant therefore that implementation of “negotiation”-based policing policies has occurred along with the enhancement of coercive capacities, evident in the normalized use of paramilitary tactical units (such as Emergency Response Teams or tactical teams), joint-training between law enforcement agencies and armed forces units, the proliferation of “less-than-lethal” weaponry, the adoption of command and control structures, as well as the prioritization of intelligence-led policing practices and surveillance. To distinguish these capacities – and their augmentation – as somehow discrete from the adoption of measured response/negotiation based policing is to reproduce a liberal and artificial distinction. Rather than oppositional or contradictory, these strategies reflect an intensification of the politics and techniques of security and liberal legalism.

To illustrate the institutionalization of these policing strategies, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) serves as a clear example. The shooting of Anthony “Dudley” George by the OPP during the 1995 Ipperwash reclamation was a significant catalyst in the formalization of a negotiation-based public order policing approach by the organization. The OPP’s reforms in this respect were built upon three pillars: a plan for developing better relationships between the force and Indigenous communities, the introduction of Aboriginal Relations Teams and Aboriginal liaison officers, and the development of guidelines in a “Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents.” The guiding principles of these reforms are to build trust that would, in turn, enhance communication and improve the prospects for avoiding violent confrontation. Underlying these principles is an assumption that lack of direct communication – hindering police knowledge of potential protests and negotiation over

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1 In 2009, the OPP’s Aboriginal Relations Teams and Major Events Liaison Teams were rebranded with a common name as Provincial Liaison Teams.
their parameters – increases risk and thus the potential for violence. At the same time, the OPP formally adopted an intelligence-led policing framework, as well as made changes to public order policing such as by adopting a command and control structure and equipping Emergency Response Team members with less-than-lethal weapons – use of which would previously have required deployment of the Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) (OPP 2006a). Together these reforms emphasized improved decision-making based on the assumption that having more and better tactical intelligence would serve a preventative function and avert recourse to physical force, but also would contribute to developing future-oriented strategic intelligence.

The operationalization of these policing practices begins with the definition of “critical incident” itself, which implies a situation that is out of the ordinary, or, an exception to “normal” circumstances. According to the “Framework” (OPP 2006b, 2), a critical incident is

An incident where the source of conflict may stem from assertions associated with Aboriginal or treaty rights, e.g. colour of right, a demonstration in support of a land claim, a blockade of a transportation route, an occupation of local government buildings, municipal premises, provincial/federal premises or First Nations buildings.

There is an expanded definition in the OPP’s “Aboriginal Initiatives: Building Respectful Relationships” (2006c, 49):

All incidents assessed to be high-risk on a First Nations’ territory or involving an Aboriginal person, and where the potential for violence requires the activation of the OPP Integrated Response (Level 2 Incident Commander, ERT, TRU and Crisis Negotiators); or any incident where the source of conflict may stem from assertions associated with Aboriginal, inherent or treaty rights.

Through the two-part definition, the implication is that any incident involving an Indigenous person or relating to treaty or Aboriginal rights is considered “high-risk”, which comes with the deployment of the highly coercive integrated response. 5 As noted

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5 It should be noted that it was a member of the Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) that fatally shot Dudley George. According to the OPP’s guidelines, the TRU is activated as part of the integrated response after a decision by the Incident Commander confirming the incident as “high risk” (OPP. 2006. OPP Emergency Response Services: A Comparison of 1995 to 2006. Accessed March 11, 2008. http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/projects/pdf/Tab4_OPPEmergencyResponseServicesAComparisonof1995to2006.pdf)
by Commissioner Linden (2007) in his final report of the Ipperwash Inquiry, despite the vast majority of protests by Indigenous peoples having been characterized by little to no violence, there is a persistent perception and representation of such events as risky and threatening based on a perceived potential for violence. The “risk” posed by Indigenous resistance to the settler state provides the rationale for surveillance – and the production of intelligence – on Indigenous communities as a normalized colonial practice.

Securing the Infrastructure of Settler-Colonialism: Surveillance and Security

These official shifts in police forces’ policy must be more broadly contextualized as an aspect of what Neocleous (2008) describes as an intensification of securitization since September 11, 2001, which challenges the perception that this is a novel or substantially different project from what was happening before. The intensification and expansion of the state security apparatus is directly linked to capital’s expansionist logic. This is evident in the case of Indigenous struggles, which have long been cast as “problems” of “national security” because of the nature of the conflict. Self-determination struggles that hinge on the importance of land threaten settler state sovereignty.\(^6\) In 2007, INAC noted – in a presentation to the RCMP – that the “vast majority of Hot Spots are related to lands and resources” and that “most are incited by development activities on traditional territories”.\(^7\)

With the on-going expansionist impulses of capitalism, the Canadian state has amplified its role in facilitating further “development” of land and resource extraction to maintain “competitiveness” in the global economy, imminently threatening Indigenous communities’ land and self-determination. In this context, reclamations and blockades of “development” projects have been characterized as threats to (national) security because of their potential disruption of the critical infrastructure of the state, defined in both physical and economic terms. In its National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, Public Safety Canada (PSC) defines “critical infrastructure” as “processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” (Public Safety Canada 2009, 2). Critical infrastructure is further categorized into ten sectors: energy & utilities, finance, food, transportation, government, information & communication technology, health, water, safety (emergency preparedness) and manufacturing. Because critical infrastructure is defined as essential to the functioning of the state, its actual or potential disruption is defined as a national security threat. This

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\(^6\) On distinctions between self-determination and sovereignty, see e.g. Monture-Angus 1999; Alfred 2005; Corntassel 2008.

\(^7\) INAC. 2007. Aboriginal Hot Spots and Public Safety [Presentation slides]. March 30. Obtained through ATI request to RCMP, no. GA-3951-3-00060/11.
national security framing therefore legitimates surveillance and other forms of intelligence-gathering as “preventative” and pre-emptive measures. In the current context of the dialectical intensification of conflict between capital’s expansionist push and Indigenous resistance (see Alfred 2005; Gordon 2010), there has been an augmentation of intelligence networks, which include private sector “stakeholders” and government departments such as Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.

The importance of critical infrastructure to national security, and its implications for Indigenous resistance, is reflected by organizational changes to both the RCMP and CSIS. The establishment of the National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) Branch in the RCMP reflects the “securitization” of the police institution after September 11, 2001 to more prominently include national security within its jurisdiction. According to an NSCI orientation guide, the branch is “alone in attempting to prevent and/or investigate incidents where the state itself (and not necessarily any citizen in particular) is the direct target” (27). This includes “terrorist activities” as defined by the Anti-Terrorism Act, and offences “arising out of a threat to the security of Canada” as defined by the CSIS Act (32). Within the NSCI, the Critical Infrastructure Criminal Intelligence (CICI) section currently focuses on the energy and utilities, transportation, and finance sectors, as well as cyber-security threats as they impact on these three sectors. Members of the CICI section actively cultivate relationships with private owners and operators in each of these sectors to encourage the exchange of information.

According to a 2007 RCMP briefing note, 85 percent of Canada’s critical infrastructure is under private ownership and operation. It is not surprising therefore that the CICI section relies heavily on partnerships with third parties who are both “clients” (recipients of intelligence) and sources of information and intelligence. As part of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, CSIS, RCMP and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) have jointly hosted bi-annual meetings since 2005 during which energy companies are briefed on classified intelligence. The purpose of these meetings, according to NRCan, is to assist owners and operators “to plan and develop measures to protect their facilities.” Yet, the subject matter of these briefings has included topics such as cyber-security, intellectual property rights and the 2010 Toronto G20 Summit. According to NRCan, the breadth of this subject matter is part of the “all-hazards” emergency management approach guiding the Strategy (Groves 2012). This reflects an increasingly formalized symbiosis between corporate entities and the Canadian state in the security project.

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Since 2004, the production of intelligence relating to national security threats has been centralized by the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) – renamed in June 2011 as the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre – which was established as part of Canada’s National Security Policy. ITAC produces intelligence and threat assessments that are used to inform the coordinated response to national security threats by the Government of Canada. These products are developed through the exchange of intelligence with law enforcement and intelligence partners in Canada as well as a wide range of government departments and external domestic and international sources including counterparts in the US, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. ITAC’s intelligence products are also disseminated to other levels of government, international partners and the private sector. While ITAC is a component of CSIS, it is staffed by representatives from its domestic partner agencies including the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, National Defence, and Transport Canada. Personnel from departments such as Health Canada, Environment Canada, and NRCan may be brought in when needed (ITAC 2012). INAC may also be seconded to ITAC, as was the case with the 2007 National Day of Action. In 2007, the Assembly of First Nations adopted a resolution calling for a National Day of Action on June 29 to raise awareness about issues affecting Indigenous communities. Although promoted as a “peaceful” event, several communities organized actions considered “militant”. In preparations for the day, representatives from INAC were placed in ITAC to facilitate the exchange of information and to “enhance [its] analytic capacity” in producing threat assessments on “aboriginal protests”.10

Historically, the contribution of INAC to the integrated production of national security intelligence stems from the department’s colonial knowledge base of the social, political and economic dynamics, geographies and legal situations of the Indigenous communities under its administration. In 2006, INAC and Public Safety Canada (which includes RCMP and CSIS) developed an operational plan on “aboriginal occupations and protests” aimed at enhancing collaboration, communication and information-sharing between the two entities.11 The exchange of intelligence information among INAC and law enforcement and intelligence agencies is a long-standing practice that can be traced back to the relationship between Indian Affairs and the North West Mounted Police in the 19th century (see Smith 2009). Surveillance, as Smith (2009) argues, was the main


modality of colonial power in this period, backed by the omnipresent threat of coercive police or military intervention. Since the early 2000s, INAC has been enhancing and systematizing its own internal production of intelligence. While these contemporary practices adopt new means, formats and configurations, they are continuous with Indian Affairs’ historical surveillance practices as a key mechanism of settler-colonial pacification.

As part of the Canadian government’s implementation of the *Emergency Preparedness Act* in 1988, INAC established an Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP). Initially, the EMAP was limited to coordinating assistance for fire suppression services and search and recovery operations for reserve communities. The scope of “emergencies” was expanded in 2004 to include a wider range of activities relating to health and safety, as well as infrastructure and housing. In 2007, the federal government introduced the *Emergency Management Act*, which set out four pillars of emergency management reflecting a preventive “all-hazards” approach: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Significantly, the Act also broadened the definition of emergency to include “civil disobedience”.12 A 2007 INAC review of its EMAP recommended the establishment of a dedicated section to administer the program and the inclusion of “civil disobedience” within its formal mandate.13 These recommendations were implemented in 2008 as INAC established the Emergency and Issues Management Directorate (EIMD) to manage the EMAP in line with the four pillars. “Civil unrest” was gradually incorporated into the formal purview of the EIMD as a form of “human induced emergency”—a category that also includes “terrorist acts”. According to a 2010 evaluation of the EMAP, the rationale for monitoring civil unrest in Indigenous communities stems from the fact that “the outcomes of these events have a direct impact on First Nations and, by extension, on the Department”. This includes civil unrest that occurs *off of reserves*, which is outside INAC’s authority (INAC 2010, 18, 32). All potential and occurring “unrest” and events “are closely monitored and, in cases of escalation, INAC’s regional offices are in a position to provide assistance to first responders in order to better understand issues that may have triggered these protests and to mitigate risks to individuals and property” (INAC 2010, 39). Of course, in the case of protests, “first responders” would be the police forces of jurisdiction.

INAC’s surveillance – or to use its own terminology, “monitoring” – of Indigenous communities is coordinated by the national headquarters’ Emergency

12 Under the *Emergency Management Act*, all federal departments are expected to implement measures consistent with this all-hazards framework.
Management Operations Centre (EMOC). On-the-ground monitoring and operations are carried out by each of INAC’s ten Regional Emergency Management Operations Centres, which report events and activities occurring within the region to the national EMOC. The regional offices are responsible for developing and maintaining direct relationships with reserve communities, and a range of other “partners” including provincial and territorial emergency management offices, non-governmental organizations, private sector representatives, Indigenous peoples’ organizations and municipal governments (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2011). Monitoring is not limited to INAC’s own activities but draws on information from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Northern Resources Canada, federal negotiation teams, media and police intelligence. Both the regional and national EMOCs produce a variety of “situational awareness products” that are shared with INAC senior management, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and other first responders (such as fire services), and other agencies on a continuous basis. The products include situation reports and notifications about specific events, which are produced and disseminated as events or “issues” emerge. Based on an analysis of these records obtained through access to information requests, it is common for two or three notifications to be issued for a single event. Weekly summary reports are produced that provide a roundup of issues coming onto the EIMD’s radar for that week. Weekend summary reports are notices of events to watch for, providing contact information for an on-duty EIMD officer to report to. The reporting system had been referred to informally as the “hot spots reporting system”, particularly in reference to protest “hot spots”. Based on an analysis of summaries produced between 2007 and 2011 by HQ and Ontario Region, the most common types of issues appearing in these summaries are forest fires, flooding and “civil unrest”. Since 2009 the EIMD appears to be devoting more resources to monitoring and analysis of “civil unrest” with an interest in identifying trends. This is reflected in the production of incident reports beginning in 2009-10. According to the 2009-10 report, 109 of 217 reported “incidents” were protests; in 2010-11, 91 of 251 incidents were protests.

It is of significance to note that the Emergency Management Act giving rise to the EIMD and its focus on “civil unrest” received assent on June 22, 2007 – seven days before the planned National Day of Action. On March 30, INAC representatives made a

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14 Each province and territory has its own regional office except for the Atlantic provinces, which are served by one Atlantic regional office.
presentation to the RCMP, highlighting its “hot spot reporting system” as a key source of information about protest risks. According to the presentation there is a “synergy” between INAC’s system and those of CSIS, ITAC, RCMP and the Government Operations Centre.18 In 2009, INAC developed a Police Interchange Program through which a police officer is seconded to the EIMD office to provide advice and support from a law enforcement perspective. The program is intended to enhance collaboration between INAC and Canadian law enforcement organizations. This interfacing of INAC operations and police-security institutions is directly connected with the state’s prioritization of securing territory and resources – “critical infrastructure” – as issues of national security (see Diabo and Pasternak 2011).

INAC’s “monitoring” of protests is intertwined with its responsibility for claims and negotiations relating to Indigenous land and treaty rights. The conflict of interest in INAC’s double-role as both negotiator and defendant to Indigenous challenges is compounded by its direct participation in the policing of protests that often arise out of frustrations with the political-legal processes of the state and with INAC itself. In the context of the 2007 NDA, INAC’s involvement was not limited to contributing information to the intelligence gathering of law enforcement and intelligence partners; the department’s bureaucratic and political power – deriving from its administration of land claims, policy and funding arrangements – was also deployed as a key strategy in the state’s pacification efforts.

Paralleling the negotiation-based approach to public order policing discussed above, INAC representatives (including the minister of Indian Affairs) played a direct role in “negotiations” with First Nations leaders aimed at preventing potentially disruptive direct actions. Email exchanges within PSC and the Department of National Defence (DND) discuss INAC’s active role in attempting to convince leaders to “stand down their plans” for the NDA.19 A priority in the state’s overall policing strategy was to contain “hot spots”. One “hot spot” of particular concern to INAC, police and intelligence organizations was the on-going reclamation by the Haudenosaunee of Six Nations of Grand River. In February of 2006, members of the community “occupied” land near Caledonia, Ontario, which halted construction of the Douglas Creek Estates housing development by Henco Industries. A pre-dawn raid on the site by the Ontario Provincial Police on April 20 had escalated tensions and fuelled several disruptive solidarity actions.20 The situation at Caledonia was identified by PSC, RCMP, CSIS, and INAC as a

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18 The Government Operations Centre is PSC’s emergency operations centre into which all other departmental emergency management systems are connected.
20 For more on the reclamation, see Laura DeVries. 2012. Conflict in Caledonia: Aboriginal Land Rights and the Rule of Law. Vancouver: UBC Press. For an analysis of the policing operation, see Tia Dafnos. 2012. Beyond the Blue Line: Researching the policing of aboriginal activism using access to information, in
“militant” one that had the potential to further galvanize other Indigenous communities; as such, there was concern to avoid overt confrontation.21 The Six Nations of Grand River have a number of outstanding land claims with INAC, including the one encompassing the reclaimed land that was trickling through the system as Henco began construction. One month before the National Day of Action, a secret DND email revealed that INAC had “made a significant offer related to Caledonia and plans to make some broader policy announcements in the coming weeks as preventative measures. Everything will be timed carefully”.22 In its contribution to the coordinated government strategy in policing the NDA, INAC offered a $125 million settlement in four of the other Haudenosaunee claims, contingent on ending the reclamation and providing assurances that future reclamations would not occur (Daly 2007). The offer was rejected and the reclamation continues today while the land claim remains in the institutional system.

Conclusion

These fragments or snapshots of contemporary pacification in Canada show how the ideological binaries of liberal-legalism and security logic fall apart when we adopt an anti-security approach that understands policing as pacification. By focusing specifically on the pacification of Indigenous self-determination, we can see how a wide range of policing practices work in and through each other – continuous and simultaneously – to contain resistance while securing intertwined interests of settler state sovereignty and capitalist accumulation. The fluidity and inter-connectedness of these strategies defy categorization as being either/or soft-hard, low-high, or public-private. Re-appropriation of the term pacification is, as Neocleous (2011) argues, a political move, and one that is imperative in countering the denial or erasure of the reality of settler-colonialism in dominant discourses. The association of pacification with inter-nation warfare, applied as a lens through which to understand policing practices and institutions of the Canadian state, keeps the colonial and imperial dynamics of the state at the fore. This is perhaps especially vital as the acceleration of neoliberalism continues to intensify struggles. Instead of a decline of state violence as implied by liberal legalism, Gordon (2010) argues that there has been an increase of coercion directed at Indigenous resistance, enacted

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Obtained through ATI request to PSC, no. 1336-A-2009-0052.

22 DND, email, May 31 2007. Obtained through informal ATI request to DND, no. A-2007-00590. The reference to policy changes likely refers to proposals for a Specific Claims Tribunal, and the eventual release of an action plan Specific Claims: Justice at Last, which outlined four pillars of impartiality, transparency, faster processing of claims and improved access to mediation. These measures received assent in 2008 (see Pasternak, Collis and Dafnos, 2013).
through both lawfare and more direct coercive, intrusive policing. This intensification of pacification also extends to poor and working class people, who are disproportionately people of colour, women and migrants, targeted by increasingly punitive social policies and the expanding prison-industrial complex.

The emergence of the Idle No More movement, and associated actions, at the end of 2012 that has continued into 2013 reflects a culmination of frustration, distinguished by its duration, diversity of tactics, and geographical scope. The movement has included a significant number of disruptions of railways, highways and border crossings. While front-line police forces have been most visible in responding to protest activities, the national security, political, legal and administrative apparatuses are very much active in this exercise—in partnership with the private sector. The potential scale of coordinated resistance by Indigenous peoples and the escalation of direct actions disrupting critical infrastructure, pose a significant threat to Canada’s political economy, which creates the conditions for further exposing the settler-colonial politics of security-liberal ideology through the state’s response.

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Research Note

PACIFYING THE ‘ARMIES OF OFFSHORE LABOUR’ IN CANADA

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Abstract
An exploration of the link between pacification and global apartheid in the context of the racialized effects of neoliberal labour migration is undertaken. Drawing on the general layout of Canada’s temporary labour migration regime, the legal regulation of migrant labour is taken as a project of pacification that enforces apartheid conditions. Juxtaposed against the construction of migrant labour as menace or threat to ‘host’ communities in Canada, the growing need for ‘armies of offshore labour’ presents an especially acute challenge for capital and national states. Despite certain perceptions that it is freed from national state constraints owing to the hyper-competitiveness of contemporary migration, capital remains deeply beholden to the politico-legal interventions of states, both sending and receiving. Situated within the hierarchical and uneven logic of the nation-state system and global capitalist development, pacification becomes a way in which capital and states attempt to mediate contradictions and govern not “insecurities” surrounding human mobility but rather the need to fabricate productive labour, a need contingent upon the complex transnational legal regulatory dynamic of unfree migrant labour which itself relies upon and perpetuates apartheid.

Keywords
unfree migrant labour, pacification, global apartheid, racialization, anti-security.

Introduction

A recent dispute over the relocation of migrant worker housing makes evident the contradictory reasoning of contemporary labour migration. In a lament for small-scale

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industrial agriculture in southwestern Ontario, a community resident remarking on the “alarming rate” of acquisition and consolidation of small farm holdings by large ones noted “the need for armies of offshore labour ... to run these huge operations”.² This particular framing, wrapped up as it is with an explicit ‘NIMBYism’, runs head-on into the securitized discourse in which contemporary migration practices are shrouded. The expressed concern, which encapsulates sentiments held more widely, posits at once the necessity of migrant labour in contemporary agricultural production and the threat posed by invading outside forces on pristine and unsuspecting local communities. This “outsider threat” – and the othering processes on which it is formulated – turns on the perception of imminent danger wrought by migrant farm hands (or, perhaps more aptly, at the hands of migrant labour), the same hands which also are portrayed as necessary to rural economic development.

The premise of this article is that the construction of migrant labour in security terms is deeply flawed. Rather than migrant workers rendering local communities “insecure”, the legal regulation of labour migration engages in a project of pacification with dire implications for migrant labouring bodies. Ultimately, through the articulation of an anti-imperialist, anti-security analytical account, I aim to show that the pacification of neoliberal migration masks the skewed calculus by which the migration of temporary labour to Canada occurs. That calculus, contingent on the faulty logics of the hierarchical nation-state system and uneven capital accumulation, results from and in “racialized structural inequality” (Galabuzi 2006) on a global scale or, more succinctly, global economic apartheid.³

An introductory section sketches the contours of an anti-security account grounded in pacification. Next, the discussion situates neoliberal migration within the context of a global apartheid. In the final section I mount an anti-security analysis illustrating how Canada’s temporary labour migration regime serves as a form of pacification in which labouring bodies are rendered productive in racialized, unfree and migrant forms. This offers a necessarily general account of Canada’s migration regime as it relates to pacification and apartheid, instead of opting to focus on narrow and limited conceptions of the legal regulation of labour migration. Existing understandings of the role of law in migration tend to operate within analytical frameworks artificially

² Elsewhere, I have examined written objections of Norfolk County community residents to the migrant housing proposal with a view to understanding how their consciousness about law informs actions of exclusion undertaken by these same residents and by the state. See Smith 2013.

³ Racialized groups in Canada are disproportionately relegated to precarious employment (Galabuzi 2006. See also Vosko 2005) based on “a logic similar to that of the apartheid regime in South Africa” (Galabuzi 2006, xiv). For Grace-Edward Galabuzi, economic apartheid marks the segmentation of labour markets through racialized segregation and exploitation the result of “the persistent structures of racialized undervaluing of human capital, racialized under compensation for labour, and racialized income inequalities to benefit capital accumulation” (Galabuzi 2006, 249).
truncated and constrained by disciplinary distinctions. Take, for instance, prevailing approaches to the study of labour and employment law. These approaches develop (and remain) within discrete sub-disciplines which cannot alone capture the full complexities of legal regulatory controls imposed to channel migratory flows. Bounded disciplinary inquiry curtails appreciation of the imposition of myriad controls on migrant labour. The analytical approach is reflected in practice where certain left labour lawyering agendas address the imposition of controls on migrant labour in discrete and insular silos (see e.g. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser). This was evident in the arguments of unions and worker associations in the Fraser case at the Supreme Court of Canada, concerned with the freedom of association rights of agricultural workers in Ontario, where the post-war industrial unionism model of labour relations was promoted as an appropriate basis on which to organize migrant labour without meaningful recognition of the impediments posed through other areas of law, especially immigration law.

There is a need for a new conception of the migrant labour and legal regulatory relationship, one that transcends prevailing disciplinary orthodoxies, including within the fields of labour law and immigration law. Taking as a point of departure the pacification of labour, the challenge is to unmoor conceptions of legal regulation of labour from strict association with collective bargaining and employment standards alone. This unmooring would allow for more systematic analytical engagement with immigration, criminal, business and other legal regulatory regimes which, whether possessed with official authority over labour or not, serve to discipline and regulate ‘it’. That said, although the ongoing centrality of law proves crucial, it is not law alone which shapes and disciplines peoples’ everyday lives. We must also, therefore, engage with how other social processes – most notably, racialization – interact with legal regulatory phenomena to produce and reproduce migrant labour.

**Pacification and Neoliberal Migration**

Under neoliberal capitalism, we have seen a deepening of efforts to have immigration policies work in service of the accumulation of capital. Yet, few legal theorists have paid attention to capital accumulation and its material impacts on workers. Instead, critical approaches to the role of law within neoliberal migration focus on national security (Macklin 2001; Aiken 2001; Dauvergne 2007). Narrow and insular, the bourgeois conception of national security resting at the heart of immigration enforcement instruments and policies produces what Audrey Macklin calls “the immigrant-as-security-threat leitmotif” (Macklin 2001, 384). This accords with the characterization of new immigrants as “dangerous foreigners”, evident in early twentieth-century Canada, as Donald Avery’s (1983) classic study attests. Although far from new, early twenty-first century attempts to couple anti-terrorism measures with immigration
regulation has “institutionalized in law the figure of the immigrant as archetypal menace to the cultural, social, and political vitality of the nation” (Macklin 2001, 392. See also Dauvergne 2007; 2009). This has resulted in an erosion of citizenship rights for specified targets of the post-9/11 agenda, especially those perceived as Arab or Muslim,4 as Canada’s anti-terrorism measures were designed “to alienate the subject from social citizenship, even if legal citizenship is already secured” (Macklin 2001, 398).

With respect to racialization, national security has been subjected to critique in critical discussions of the phenomenon of racial profiling (Bahdi 2001; Choudhry 2001). The reliance on “race as a proxy for risk” or as a “substitute for real knowledge about an individual’s connection to, or propensity for, terrorist activity” (Bahdi 2001, 295), is said to produce insecurity for those subjected to this form of objectification. Yet the charge of racial profiling does not aptly register the full depth of disagreement. In one sense, the prevailing take on racial profiling draws attention to a set of practices constructed as alien or exceptional, even when perceived as troubling. In discounting systemic and historical challenge, these accounts fail to capture “a racialized culture of hegemonic whiteness” and economic apartheid as endemic within migration policies as well as within the wider formation of the Canadian state and associated nation building project (Bakan 2008; Gordon 2007; Banaji 2000; Thobani 2007). In another sense, these interventions resort to the same deeply problematic logic of security. In particular, invocations of ‘risk’ and ‘insecurity’ and of ‘security’ as a common good reproduce rather than question and interrogate the neoliberal security discourse of ongoing threat.

A trenchant set of recent interventions take aim at orthodox security studies and left critiques of it. Reorienting the confrontation with (in)security as an analytical and political, anti-capitalist project, the articulation of anti-security studies found in the work of Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos, both separately and together (Neocleous & Rigakos 2011; Neocleous 2008), confronts the fundamental assumption that security remains good and necessary even in the face of critique (Neocleous 2008, 3-4). This assumption, while deeply flawed, is far from surprising for, as Rigakos notes, “Security is not just hegemonic, it is hegemony. To be against security today is to stand against the entire global economic system. It seems almost unthinkable” (Rigakos 2011, 58). Malleable and ubiquitous as it appears, the concept of security, and its critical counter insecurity, serve as a shield for exploitation and displacement endemic to capitalism. Thus, as Rigakos continues, “[t]he ability for security to latch itself on to most aspects of

4 Here the names of Canadian citizens Abousfian Abdelrazik, Abdullah Almalki, Maher Arar and Ahmad El-Maati (among others) are synonymous with the most egregious effects of the so-called war on terror, including detention, rendition and torture. And we also might point to efforts to ‘protect’ (Muslim) women from Muslim men evident, for instance, in Canada’s official citizenship guide, Discover Canada (2012), which states: “In Canada, men and women are equal under the law. Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings,’ female genital mutilation, forced marriage or other gender-based violence” (9).
human relations must... be recognized as an analytic and political blockage” (Rigakos 2011, 60).

In the context of the political economy of policing and capital, Neocleous and Rigakos deploy the concept of pacification to challenge security’s obfuscation, reification and ultimately objectification within contemporary security orthodoxy and the surrounding academic ‘cottage industry’ of apology and critique. That is to say, ‘security’ obfuscates resistance to injustice by recasting it as an ongoing threat; it is reified and as such obscures unequal social relations; and it is objectified as a topic that shapes academic disciplines and discourse. Problematizing (in)security’s objectives and rejecting “the roundly positive associations now inextricably bound up with the bourgeois concept of security” (Rigakos 2011, 62), pacification instead highlights what Neocleous calls “the fabrication of a social order” (Neocleous, 2000; Rigakos 2011, 62, 64). Because the “‘population’ will never feel secure”, police power and capital accumulation are inextricably twinned through a never-ending purpose: rendering the labouring population productive (Neocleous, 2011; Rigakos 2011, 64).

Embedded within an anti-security application of pacification is an interrogation of private property relations and the violence which underwrites it (Rigakos 2011, 64). Yet this violence is met with challenge of varying degrees and kind. Migrant workers self organize and mount resistance through, for instance, shirking, foot dragging and collective withdrawals of their labour power (Smith 2005). Whereas a focus on (in)security portends toward passivity, pacification does not (Rigakos 2011, 64). Resistance, therefore, is a presupposition of the need for pacification, as other essays in this volume also suggest.

Here, I extend the anti-security account of pacification into the policing of migratory status, citizenship and national belonging focusing specifically on temporary labour migration to Canada. In this respect, I attend to the role of Canada’s migration regime in the fabrication of productive labour. Constructed on the basis of what Rigakos terms “the global interconnectivity of pacification” (2011, 64), that regime is reliant upon a complex transnational regulatory dynamic and requires attentiveness to racialized and gendered class dimensions of pacification globally. It is this latter point which I develop within the context of a discussion of global apartheid.

Identifying Global Apartheid

A marked level of ambivalence surrounds the explanatory utility of global apartheid. A number of scholars deploy the term without making explicit the empirical and normative bases for doing so (Köhler 1995). The 1973 adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid established “the crime of apartheid” as a “crime against humanity”
which, among other things, “violat[es] the principles of international law” and “constitut[es] a serious threat to international peace and security” (Vandewoude 2010). South African apartheid, of course, provided the exemplary instance. In his 1984 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in Oslo Desmond Tutu posited that the crime of apartheid in South Africa rests “on a whole phalanx of draconian laws”. Interestingly, while not referring to “global apartheid”, Tutu understood South African apartheid as “a microcosm of the world and an example of what is to be found in other lands in differing degree”. In obvious reference to the Convention, Tutu spoke of the absence of “peace and security” due to the lack of justice in South Africa – “a land bereft of much justice, and therefore without peace and security” – and tied this to the “global insecurity” of the Cold War era and the threat of “nuclear holocaust”.

By the early 2000s the idea of global apartheid garnered considerable salience for reformists within the global ruling elite. Two prominent examples can be found in the words of Juan Somavía (2000), then Director-General of the International Labour Office, and Thabo Mbeki, the presidential successor to Nelson Mandela who, along with Mandela himself, acted as a key architect of neoliberalism on the African continent. In a speech in 2000 reflecting on the unequal composition of labour markets around the globe, Somavía noted how “we can begin to see the shape of a new global apartheid, based on [one’s] options for work, for sustainable livelihoods”. Within a couple of years, and almost two decades following Tutu’s intervention and three since the adoption of the Convention, Mbeki described international political economy as “a global system of apartheid” unsympathetic to nature and human life.5

Around the same time and in similar terms, albeit backed by heterodox sensibilities, economist Samir Amin (2001) makes a more pointed use of the concept in linking the logic of neoliberal globalization with “that of organizing apartheid on the global scale”, or what he terms “the new apartheid global imperialist system”. Amin points to the WTO’s development of an “international business law which is given priority over any national legislation”, the “scandalous project of a ‘Multinational Agreement on Investment’ prepared in secret by OECD countries”, and NATO, as examples of the “project of legalizing apartheid on a global scale”. Similarly, political economist Patrick Bond refers to “the Bretton Woods component of global apartheid” (Bond 2004a, 103). From this perspective, global apartheid implicates international and regional institutional structures, especially institutions of trade, finance, militarism and

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5 In his August 2002 speech at the Welcoming Ceremony for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Mbeki stated: “We have all converged at the Cradle of Humanity to confront the social behaviour that has pity neither for beautiful nature nor for living human beings. This social behaviour has produced and entrenches a global system of apartheid. The suffering of the billions who are the victims of this system calls for the same response that drew the peoples of the world into the struggle for the defeat of apartheid in this country” (cited in Bond 2004b, 817).
economic integration. These so-called “financiers of global apartheid” (Booker & Minter 2001) facilitate trans-border flows of capital and capitalists.

The relative salience of these understandings notwithstanding, I adopt a different meaning of the concept of global apartheid. I generally accept its conceptual application to deepening labour market segmentation and intensifying social differentiation of international institutional policies. But there is a need to problematize the perpetuation of security as a greater good and insecurity as a critical tool transcendent of the failings of liberal theory. This perpetuation and fetishization of security masks or obfuscates the dangerously illusionary premises of the idea (Neocleous & Rigakos 2011, 15). What it misses, therefore, is the opportunity to interrogate apartheid’s machinations as pacification. Apartheid is not indicative of insecurity; it is indicative of pacification.

On the account adopted here, the conceptual deployment of global apartheid extends beyond semantics, metaphor or even slur, and for that matter beyond the exceptional treatment of racialization evident in a focus on racial profiling. This account, quite crucially, also reorients attention away from the neo-institutionalism of heterodox global political economy. Whereas Amin, Bond and others emphasize (and perhaps essentialize) global institutional bodies, here I stress the impacts of neoliberal migration on labouring bodies and, consistent with the work of Nandita Sharma and Anthony Richmond, on migrant labouring bodies in particular. The pivotal concern turns on the structuring of temporary labour migration by and through apartheid, understood as a racialized and gendered class phenomenon directed at rendering the labouring population productive.

For Sharma, the “ever-widening differentiation” of global apartheid occurs “through restrictive immigration policies” which “imprison[s] impoverished people within zones of poverty” (2006, 29; also Richmond 1994). Global apartheid’s instruments of enforcement are, according to Richmond, “interdiction, passports, visas, residence permits, work permits, denial of citizenship rights, including access to education, government-funded health and welfare services” (Richmond 2002). These of course cover the range of immigration admissions policies but particular consideration has been given to those related to asylum seeking (Richmond 1994), human trafficking and temporary labour migration (Sharma 2005; 2006). In this latter respect, Sharma’s incisive intervention has attended to the “oppressive practices” of national border creation and maintenance as understood through the impact of nationalist ideologies and “the exclusionary notion of homelands” (2006, 30). The focus here rests more with those instruments and practices specific to Canada’s temporary labour migration regulatory regime.
Canada’s Apartheid Migration Regime As Pacification

Unfree labour is introduced here to operationalize the regulation of migrant labouring bodies. The concept connotes the imposition of political and legal compulsion coupled with, in certain instances, the use of physical force (Miles 1987, 31; Satzewich 1991). Workers characterized as unfree labour provide their labour power by dint of not merely “dull” economic compulsion but also by politico-legal and/or physical compulsion. Shunning the apparent binary distinction between “free” and “unfree”, socio-legal historians and theorists have developed more nuanced understandings reflective of an intricate continuum of compulsions (Hay & Craven 2004).

Despite the economic pressures or compulsion faced by workers, capital accumulation processes cannot satisfy the subsistence needs of all people subject to them. The ever-expanding or globalizing logic of these processes creates “countervailing tendencies” in which we find “a tendency of capital to increase the labour population, as well as constantly to posit a part of it as surplus population” (Marx cited in Satzewich 1991, 5). The formation of this surplus population, or what Marx called a reserve army of labour, facilitates capital accumulation just as it undermines that same reserve army so that reservists, again to follow Marx, “always stand with one foot in the swamp of pauperism” (cited in Satzewich 1991, 5). Migration, both within national territorial borders and across them, provides something of an alternative to pauperism and to the unevenness of capitalist development, but it, in turn, may also reproduce capital accumulation. In Vic Satzewich’s words, “Capital accumulation initially propels or forces certain groups of people to migrate because of the associated economic dislocations which accompany it. Capital accumulation is also the stimulus to migration to the extent that it constitutes the conditions which give rise to labour shortages and points of attraction for wage labour” (1991, 8). However, as Satzewich maintains, this is contingent on the distinct forms that migration takes under capitalism, or the modes of incorporation of foreign-born workers, which is structured through state intervention. Of the four such modes deployed in twentieth-century Canada -- free immigrant labour, unfree immigrant labour, free migrant labour and unfree migrant labour -- the latter best characterizes Canada’s approach to temporary labour migration in the twenty-first century.

Throughout its history as a white settler colonial society, accumulation processes in Canada have relied upon labour migration. Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), Live-In Caregiver Program and Low-skilled Pilot Project (known formally as the Pilot Project for Hiring Foreign Workers in Occupations that Require Lower Levels of Formal Training), all components of the early twenty-first century Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) (See Satzewich 1991; Stasiulis & Bakan 2005; Sharma 2006; Choudry et al. 2009; Fudge & McPhail 2009), turn on the deployment of unfree migrant labour whereby dull economic compulsion is sharpened through
politico-legal compulsion. Although the use of migrant workers through the TFWP relies on economic compulsion generally, migratory status is the fundamental politico-legal mechanism of labour unfreedom. The pivotal instrument is the temporary work permit or authorization which subjects non-citizens to the constant threat of repatriation (Sharma 2006; Goldring, Berinstein & Bernhard 2009. See also Walia 2010). Unfree migrant labour is deployed in Canada on a time-limited basis, anywhere from several weeks to upwards of eight months under the SAWP, or for a maximum of four years under the Low-skilled Project. These migrant workers are tied exclusively to a specific employer within a defined geographic locale. For instance, workers under the SAWP are not permitted to circulate freely in the labour market and must return home at the end of their work authorization or at any other moment determined by employers. These workers experience severely circumscribed labour market and geographic mobility within Canada (Smith 2005). They are permitted to remain in the country only for the duration of their employment arrangement and, on the prerogative of growers, can be forced to leave sooner. During their authorized period of stay, seasonal agricultural workers may not alter the conditions of their authorization, change occupations or take on additional employment without the written approval of a federal immigration official, and a transfer contract approved by a representative of their home government and the prospective employer (Smith 2013).

The essential claim, then, is that Canada’s temporary labour migration regime is organized on the politico-legal compulsion of migrant labour unfreedom which functions for the purposes of pacification. Migrant labour is pacified to the extent that it is rendered unfree in practice, through the imposition of state-sanctioned limits on labour market and geographic mobility and on migratory status. Within this regime, the rendering of migrant labour as productive is recurring and transnational. Elsewhere I have attempted to further conceptualize the legal regulation of migrant labour through the dynamic of what Mohapatra (2004) calls “mobilize to immobilize”, in order to capture its transnational contours. In other words, TFWP workers are mobilized to cross territorial borders only to be immobilized within Canada. Most notably, the SAWP workers who make the annual trek to Canadian fields and greenhouses to harvest crops are governed by the regulatory dynamics of mobilization and immobilization which frame the specific relations and conditions of unfreedom in which they find themselves. In this respect, the regulatory outcome is not the construction of “desirable future citizens”, to employ Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s words (cited in Walia 2010 at 79-80). Nor is the focus on simply jettisoning “undesirables” (See Pratt 2005). Rather transnational regulation of temporary labour migration produces and reproduces productive labour which is racialized, unfree and migrant.6 Because this occurs on a

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6 An area in need of sustained inquiry relates to transnational legal relations. The role of law as one of the definitive forces that shape the experiences of migrant workers typically is focused on ‘destination
recurring basis through restrictive instruments of apartheid, especially the temporary work permit, the outcome shifts between the construction of racialized unfree migrant labour as ‘desirable undesirables’ during moments of mobilization and ‘undesirable desirables’ during immobilization. In both instances, to reference a long-standing slogan, workers so categorized are deemed good enough to engage in paid work in Canada, but not to stay.

The temporary labour migration regime accords with the historically selective nature of the Canadian nation-building project. Working to deepen hegemonic whiteness, the TFWP is a project of pacification designed to produce and reproduce social conditions in which labour is rendered productive on devaluing and inferiorizing terms. As a project of pacification, the TFWP becomes the way in which capital and states attempt to mediate their fundamental reliance on the surplus value of labour. It forms a sort of “spatial vent”, release or fix against “the problems of accumulation and legitimation” (Samers 1999, 188 and generally) within Canada and within sending states, and against not only the intensely exclusionary urges of the polity in Canada but also the aspirations and objections of migrant workers themselves. But this approach merely displaces or forestalls concerns - it cannot do away with them forever. The particularized construction and devaluation of migrant labouring bodies on the terms discussed herein re-produces global apartheid. Yet these remain contested terms. In anticipation of the threat of resistance of migrant workers (and their allies), and due to actually existing resistance, migrant labour is subjected to the pacifying forces of temporary work permits, repatriation and tenuous migration status to mobilize yet immobilize these workers.

The Canadian State and Pacification

A key contradiction of temporary labour migration stems from the growing need for “armies of offshore labour” within Canada and on a global scale. The ‘structural necessity’ claim (see Thomas 2010) presents an especially acute challenge for capital and the Canadian national state.7 Despite certain mainstream perceptions that it is freed from countries’. Conceptions of legal regulation bounded by the nation-state constrain understandings of the regulatory dynamics of certain labour migration regimes. A transnational articulation need not undermine sustained analysis of the role of national states, and especially the Canadian state, in the regulation of labour migration. Indeed, it is precisely the need to account for the imperialist commitments of the Canadian state, coupled with the neoliberal developmentalist commitments of the sending states, which calls for a trenchant, anti-imperialist framework of analysis. I do not mean to downplay the “heavy lifting” performed through sending state apparatuses. Rather, I aim to accept that, because the SAWP rests upon the hierarchies of the national state system and uneven capitalist development, as discussed below, the imperialist project of the Canadian state ultimately structures relations within the SAWP. From this perspective, any serious analysis must hold the role of the Canadian state to account.

7 The claim is wanting for sustained interrogation, but I cannot do it justice in the present analysis. There is a need to interrogate it on a number of bases including through an interrogation of capital’s incessant need
national state constraints owing to the hyper-competitiveness of contemporary migration on a global scale, capital remains deeply beholden to the politico-legal interventions of states, sending and receiving. In this way, the nation-state system orchestrates these moves, thereby constructing what amounts to a “global interconnectivity of pacification”. What is evident, therefore, is that this interconnectivity is set within the hierarchical and uneven logic of national states and global capital accumulation. To the extent that the contemporary Canadian state wields imperial or sub-imperial power, and there is ample evidence to this end (see e.g. Gordon 2010), especially within the key migrant-sending region of Latin America and the Caribbean, but also more widely through the WTO and other international institutions (and, in this respect, we might reintroduce the neo-institutional intervention of heterodox global political economy), inequalities between national states are brought to bear on labour migration.

Yet the ultimate focus of an anti-security account of migration regulation must rest not on institutional bodies but on labouring ones. After all, it is the efforts and exertions of labouring bodies that provides the most significant source of wealth within global capital accumulation; and it is from these bodies that resistance emanates. An anti-security intervention attentive to pacification captures the active and ongoing processes in which labouring populations are rendered productive. The challenge to anti-security is to perceive global apartheid as systemic outcome and integral feature of labour’s productive rendering. There remains a longstanding need within leftist theory and practice in Canada, including within Marxist praxis, to take seriously the racialized and gendered, class dynamics of global capitalist order. Although not merely reducible to it, apartheid is not distinct from capitalist development either. It is not a historical accident that exploitation and displacement so crucial to capitalist relations takes on racialized and gendered proportions within territorial borders and across them. It is out of the deeply troubling constructions of labour as productive – in racialized, unfree and migrant forms – that the perception of outsider ‘security’ threat flourishes. But how then can some claim that migrant labour is a structural necessity within contemporary capitalism in Canada? How do these seemingly contradictory claims co-exist together? Their co-existence, I contend, owes a great deal to the work that migrant labour regulation performs in normalizing and enforcing the apartheid conditions of global capitalism. The continuing construction of racialized and gendered class relations within and between national states serves to bolster capital accumulation. Thus global apartheid appears as one face of the transnational pacification of racialized working class people. Those interested in pacification, as an alternative to ‘security’ studies, ought to turn their attention to this crucial dynamic of contemporary global capitalism.

for labour and the socio-cultural construction of ‘skill’, only the former of which I concern myself with here.
Conclusion

In the contemporary context of migration management, Canada’s temporary labour migration regime forms a project of pacification that enforces global apartheid. The ‘structural necessity’ of migrant labour in Canada presents the especially acute challenge for capital and national states to render labour productive. This makes capital deeply beholden to the interventions of sending and receiving states. These states intervene by imposing conditions and relations of unfreedom through transnational migrant labour regulation. Canada’s apartheid migratory regime is situated within the hierarchical and uneven logic of national states and global capitalist order. Pacification is the way in which this regime mediates capital’s contradictory yet continuing reliance on unfree migrant labour -- and worker resistance. Through the regulatory dynamics of mobilization and immobilization, ‘foreign’ subjects are classified and then rendered racialized, unfree and migrant, productive labouring bodies. It is on this basis that migrant labour also is perceived as a menace or ‘security’ threat to the composition of local communities.

To say that Canada’s labour migration regime pacifies is not to ignore the role of worker resistance and political struggles. Indeed, the idea of pacification necessarily accounts for it. As a project of pacification, the regime aims to create the conditions in which resistance is quelled to render labour productive or pacified. This amounts to a reading or accounting of resistance as a defining feature of historical developments for ordinary people. In this respect, the existence of pacification marks an anticipation of resistance, not a denial of it. The anti-imperialist, anti-security challenge is to strengthen and consolidate actually existing resistance to force a rupture in global apartheid, and in the contradictory logic of global capitalism. Status on arrival, unrestricted labour market and geographic mobility, collective organization with a robust right to strike, and extended family reunification, all serve as pivotal oppositional demands on which migrant workers and their allies might push the limits of the prevailing order. But this calls for a deep and broad-based solidarity of migrant and non-migrant workers within Canada and across borders. Solidarity of this kind cannot be constructed without meaningful engagement with the racialized and gendered nature of class articulations in Canada and elsewhere. It cannot be conducted within the outmoded confines of industrial unionism and its insular focus on nationally-bounded labour laws. Nor can it be found within social democratic politics which imprison Canadian left thinking and action in the neoliberal moment, demanding, at most, only modest improvements to welfare within a national context – demands directed only at citizens. The anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist task demands an overt and sustained, oppositional politics in which capital and the supporting national states, beginning with the imperialist Canadian state, are confronted for their ongoing crimes against humanity.
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Research Note

THE PERPETUAL OBJECT OF REGULATION: PRIVACY AS PACIFICATION

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Abstract
This article theorizes the relationship of privacy to capital and projects of security and, in doing so, situates privacy in context to pacification. In particular, the article provides an interrogation of the contradictory structuring of privacy as both an object threatened by security and the role of privacy as a means to resist or limit projects of security. Through an analysis of Thomas Hobbes’ writings, this contradictory dual-deployment of privacy is unseated to reveal that far from challenging security, privacy has historically been presupposed and structured by security projects. Moreover, by acclimatizing us to our existence as atomized individuals, alienated from our collective social power, privacy in fact pacifies us. This process is explored through an examination of the Passenger Flight List agreement (PNR) between the United States and EU member states. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our reliance on privacy has for challenging the logics of security and pacification, especially with the emergent technology of Drones.

Keywords
Privacy, Capital, Pacification, Passenger Flight Lists, Anti-Security

There is a conviction today that privacy is in a state of irretrievable crisis. In addition to the collection and sale of day-to-day personal activity by telecommunications services and social networking sites, programmes of surveillance and registration have allegedly eroded what were previously understood as the firm borders between public and private spheres of relations. That this has happened or is in the process of materializing

1 Aarow Henry is a PhD candidate at Carleton University reading Sociology and Political Economy. Acknowledgement: I would like to thank George Rigakos for his support and encouragement in my studies into anti-security. I would also like to thank Mark Neocleous for his help in editing this paper into a more readable version. Finally, a huge intellectual debt is owed to Justin Paulson whose guidance in reading Marx informs much of what follows. This paper was completed with support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Any errors are the sole products of my labour.
has taken on the weight and opacity of a social fact. Yet, while privacy is said to be in a state of crisis, the ‘right to privacy’ is often trumpeted by liberals as the counterweight to balance the intrusion of state projects into the lives of individuals. Indeed, this appears to be the general sentiment that rests behind initiatives like the ‘Orwell Award’ given to companies that have violated privacy, or the American Civil Liberties Union recent mobilization against Drones as a privacy concern. Thus, privacy is presented as means to make intrusions into the life of the individual proportional to the objectives of security projects, and in some instances security projects are legitimized for the forms of privacy they safeguard (Cavoukian, 1999, 13). To this end, privacy is subject to a rather peculiar positioning as both a relation threatened by security and as a regulative principle capable of ensuring the ‘acceptable’ limits of security projects.

What I want to demonstrate in this paper is that the relation of privacy to security as both an object threatened by security and as a means of regulating security projects is the product of a longstanding relation between privacy, security and capital. This relation is expressed in two ways. First, while privacy has been invoked as a means to resist projects of security, I argue that privacy is in fact deployed as a means to structure the fields of relations through which security interventions are made. In this sense, when the power of state or capital intervenes upon the individual, privacy emerges as a concept. Privacy, a retroactive concept, exists as a means to assuage individuals that the duration and scope of security projects will be ‘reasonable or proportional’; thus, security presupposes and delimits privacy. Second, in the course of defending the individual’s freedom and autonomy over their inner world, privacy reinforces private property and private life, the very relations projects of security safeguard. Thus, privacy acclimatizes us to a mode of existence where we are alienated from our collective social power, and so we confront relations of domination and exploitation as private individuals. This commodification of our selves is, I suggest, part of the condition of pacification.

First, I attempt to theorize how security and its relation to capital render it not only generative of privacy but structure its perimeters. I demonstrate the formation of this relationship between security and privacy through a critical reading of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. Second, I offer a contemporary example of this relation between privacy and security through an analysis of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement between the United States and the EU. Finally, I conclude by reviewing how privacy as desirable form of existence constitutes a form of pacification insofar as it not only fails to challenge capital but has further entrenched the logics of security into social life.

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2 In this sense, I am taking a different stance from scholars like Steve Nock, who have argued that demands for privacy have engendered more complex and extensive projects of surveillance (see Nock 1993).
Capital, Security, Privacy

The relation between capital and the formation of the private sphere/privacy is hardly a novel study. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx lays out the relationship between the different historical formations of property-relations and corresponding forms of political association to demonstrate that it is with the advent of private-property that the totality of social life is split into the duality of private and public selves (Marx, 1973, 486; Marx, 1975, 222; see Neocleous, 2002,). In many respects, Jurgen Habermas’ seminal work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* reworks Marx’s insight. Habermas locates the formation of private life and, therein, the bourgeois public sphere in the “social precondition…[of] a market that, tending to be liberalized made the affairs in the sphere of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people” (1991, 74). To this end, the duality of private and public life is the product of a capitalist market with a form of state authority that exists to guarantee this private life with the liberal political virtue of “freedom”: freedom of movement, of trade, and of conscience. While Habermas’s study effectively links capitalist development to the formation of private life, the relation of private life to security projects remains underdeveloped. In fact, taking private life as the space where liberal freedoms are articulated autonomously through the ‘free space’ of civil society ignores the logics of security in capitalist society. Thus, it can be argued that adopting Habermas’ view leaves us vulnerable to falling back on the contradictory position of privacy as a relation that is both threatened by and regulative of, security. We can perhaps move past this contradictory perception of privacy by trying to think through privacy in relation to security and capitalist production.

What is, then, the relation of security to capital? No doubt any answer to this question will be partial. Nevertheless it is useful to open this question by noting that Marx declared “security the supreme social concept of civil society; the concept of police” (1975, 43). To this end, Marx’s reasoning behind this appears to be that the concept of security not only ensures egoism but that the only “bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property” (1975, 43). If we take a liberal perspective, the matter is settled: security exists to guarantee the supremacy of the individual in their private life so that they may in turn pursue their own private interests; thus, security does not serve capital but private individuals who express themselves in what happens to be capitalist society (see Von Mises 1962, 68). But, to take this position is to overlook Marx’s further insight that private life in capitalist society is nothing more than an abstraction (Marx, 1978, 22). Private-life, its mode of articulation and form of existence is nothing more than abstract reflection of real relations between private-property. Thus, security ensures the liberty to buy and sell labour, the freedom of mobility, freedom of conscience. More broadly put, it ensures the “separation of man from man” and does so in the course of solidifying and entrenching the social relations
that stand behind these freedoms: the relations of private property (Marx, 1978, 46). Not only has this point been well established (see Rigakos, and Hadden 2001; Rigakos 2011; Neocleous 2007) but, further still, as the guarantee of private property first and the freedom of the liberal subject second, security perpetually determines and conditions liberty (Neocleous, 2007).

Thus security pertains not to the freedoms of the individual as they actually exist actively but in terms of the abstract universal freedoms that are determined by the formation of private-property relations. This point is effectively borne out in the understanding of police in eighteenth century thought. Adam Smith is quite clear that police, as having jurisprudence over public-security, must be deployed as a means to safeguard not only the industry of people but also the conditions of industry itself. In particular, security is necessary to protect “the industry of individuals from the rapacity of their neighbours” as individuals who “find themselves every moment in danger of being robbed of all they posses [have] not motive to be industrious” (2009, [1763, 157]). Moreover, security should be utilized to establish commerce and manufacturing, as the independence these [activities] provide is the “best police in preventing crimes” (2009, [1763], 152). In short, security or police for Smith are not rooted so much in safeguarding the individual but in safeguarding industry and commerce themselves; in other words, maintaining above all else the social relations of private property as these social relations produce opulence and thus order. Patrick Colquhoun is even less abashed about the relation of security to capital as he simply states in his Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis that the function of police as the “prevention and detection of crimes” but the “internal regulations for the well ordering and comfort of civil society” (Colquhoun, 1800 [1795], 244); thus, as others have noted, this well-ordering and comfort of civil society pertain above all else to the continuity of capitalist social relations (Rigakos 2011; Neocleous 2000). All this has been established. What remains elusive here though is how this relation between security and capital relates to private life. In this sense, why is it that far from confronting security, private life and privacy are in fact generated within security? The writings of Hobbes are useful in sketching out the emergence of this conditioning relation between security and privacy.

Much of Leviathan is devoted to the ‘Mortal Sovereign’ as a necessary form of political covenant. The necessity of the covenant, arguably, stems from three positions. Foremost, each individual, by the law of nature, has the liberty “to use his own as he will himself for the preservation of this nature; that is to say, of his own life” and, consequently, “has a right to every thing; even to one another’s body” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 189-190). Second, while each individual is not only by nature free to use their own

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3 The literature on alienation and its various social forms in capitalist society has a vast literature, see for instance, B. Ollman’s classic 1971 work: “Alienation: Marx’s conception of man in capitalist society” or István Mészáros, 1970, “Marx’s Theory of Alienation”.

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powers as they see fit, nature itself has accorded each individual with the same, or roughly the same, material powers and needs (Macpherson, 1973, 226). Third, and perhaps more importantly, in the course of having equal powers and equal rights to use these powers each individual seeks out society so they “may receive some honour or profit from it” and, moreover that each will come into frequent and potentially violence conflict as they “[have] the appetite to the same thing”. Taken together, each individual has a right to anything and relatively equal powers to obtain it; and thus, everyone has a claim to everything. For “if there be no power erected or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 223); thus, each individual’s right to life, liberty, and profit, amount to nothing (Macpherson, 1973, 227). The only solution is the formation of “a common power to keep [all] in awe and to direct [the action of all] to a common benefit” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 227). In short, a supreme common power provides the essential security to defend the population against foreign attack and injuries from one another, so that “by their own industrie and by the fruite of the earth” each individual “may be able nourish themselves and live contentedly” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 227). In the course of asserting the Mortal Sovereign, Hobbes goes on to make a series of distinctions between liberty, security and publique and private domains.

Chapter XXII of Leviathan is entitled “Of Systems Subject, Politicall, and Private”. By systems, Hobbes informs us he means, “any number of men joined in one interest or business”. Of these some are absolute and independent (i.e. the Commonwealth) and others are dependent, to the Commonwealth as a person or group persons operating as ‘representative’ subjects (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 274; for a discussion Hobbes and authors and actors see Neocleous, 2003, 73). Yet subordinate to these systems are further systems, some “politicall and some private” (Ibid, 274). Private, according to Hobbes, are those “constituted by subjects amongst themselves, or by authorities from a stranger” as no authority from a foreign power in the dominion of another sovereign can be but ‘private’ (ibid, 275). “Of these private systems some are lawful; some unlawful: lawfull are those which are allowed by the commonwealth” (Ibid, 275). Most of these private systems are irregular. They have no representative (that is, no embodiment of state) and “consist only in the concourse of people…such as the conflux of people to markets or shews or any other harmless end” (ibid, 275). However, if the intention of these irregular private systems “are evil or (if the number [involved is] considerable) unknown, they are unlawful” (ibid, 275).

Hobbes’ attempt to partition forms of activity into the categories of ‘politicall’ and ‘private’ is noteworthy for several reasons. First, as other scholars have noted, the ‘private’ as a sphere of activity remained for much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries indistinct from the state of being secret (see Abizadeh, 2013, Neocleous, 2002; Sennett, 1974). In this sense, rather than positing private as a state of being concealed, hidden or
solidary from others (the terms that had been applied to both privacy and secrecy)\(^4\)
Hobbes links the act of being in private to a certain form of association other than that of
forms of association posited by the commonwealth. Thus, private life and privacy is
foregrounded in Hobbes not as a condition of visibility or boundaries of the home –
which is for Hobbes the state of secrecy\(^5\) – but in terms of whether the interest of the
individuals involved are ‘apart’ or separate from organizations and associations that are
representations or subordinate elements of the sovereign. What makes this distinction all
the more intriguing is that Hobbes arrives at it after outlining the relation of ‘particular’
(that is, ‘private’) liberty and the security and liberty of the sovereign.

It is the role of the sovereign to provide security and public defense to all subjects.
As such, the subject’s liberty exists only in activities and relations that “the sovereign hath
permitted” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 264). To this end, Hobbes is quite explicit about the
forms of activity that are permitted: “the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise contract
with one another, to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life and
institute their children as they themselves think fit and the like” (Hobbes, 1968, 264). This
liberty, though, is permitted precisely because the liberty (liberty defined by Hobbes as
the absence of “external opposition”) does not abolish or limit “the sovereign power of
life and death” (Hobbes, 1968, 264). Rather, the existence of this form of liberty of
‘particular men’, the freedom to engage in a private trade or calling, is the product of the
security provided by the sovereign, the guarantee of the publique sword and its role in the
defense of private men (Hobbes, 1968 386). Furthermore, that there exists inheritance,
the propriety of goods or land for private individuals, is not the product of private liberty
particular to each man but is, rather a product of the limitation of this liberty by the
sovereign’s provision of security (Hobbes, 1968 266). There are a few points I want to
draw from here.

First, at a cursory glance here it may seem as if I have declared nothing more than
that security trumps and presupposes liberty; a feature of capitalist society that Mark
Neocleous (2007) has already argued persuasively. However, if Hobbes lays this relation
of security to liberty bare, his writings also reveal that it is from this relation that private
life itself becomes inscribed as its own distinct sphere of activity. Thus, private life as a
sphere of activities that the individual may regulate ‘as they see fit’ emerges not in
opposition to security or sovereign force but, rather, as the \textit{product} of security. Hobbes
demonstrates that it remains the sovereign’s prerogative to intervene upon and prohibit
certain activities that make up this private association. In particular, private interests are

\(^4\) See, Arash Abizadeh 2013 for a discussion on theologists and Calvinists William Perkins and William
Strutcher and their use of the words secret and private.

\(^5\) In discussing forms of Worship Hobbes suggests that the first type is “secret” but the second is private and
carried out “in the sight of the multitude” (Hobbes, 1968, [1651], 401).
HENRY: The Perpetual Object of Regulation

lawful when they are productive and innocuous, but those which harbour evil intents or are simply unknown in motivation are unpermitted and subject to regulation. To this end, private life is presented as being presupposed by security but also and at the same time a perpetual object of surveillance and regulation. Thus, one has the contradictory positioning of private life as the guarantee of the sovereign’s security, the point where regulation ends, and private life as a continuum of endless risk to this very security. Taken from the standpoint of private life, privacy appears both as the limitation to security and as the point where this autonomous private life is comprised by sovereign power.

Second, if this is perhaps the relation of privacy to security, what, then, does Hobbes’ work tell us about the initial relation between capital, security and privacy? To answer this question in full and with certainty would be remiss given that the milieu Hobbes is writing in is that of early capitalist society, the coming rather than consolidation of bourgeois rule (Macpherson, 1973, 247). Nonetheless, what we can say is that Hobbes’s description of human nature as acquisitive and selfish and his imposition of the sovereign as a supreme power presupposes the sphere of accumulation. The Commonwealth is charged with a number of tasks: defense, public worship, security, courts and procreation, but in many respects, much of its purpose is to control what are the innate drives and mechanical processes of human beings. The ‘control’ of these drives, though, cannot be achieved by stamping them out or blunting them, for they are natural or innate. Hence the task is to atomize each individual’s mechanical drive, to instill fear into ‘all’ so that in the pursuit of profit, glory or status one does not deprive someone else of their own life or property; the sovereign thereby ensures “the absence of opposition” not between the commonwealth and the individual but rather between individuals. In this sense, Hobbes’ sovereign produces isolated men and women indifferent to each other as they pursue their own objects, and so ensures the conditions for the sine qua non social bond for capitalist society: “reciprocal independence and indifference” (Marx, 1973, 161). The establishment of market society, the pursuit of profit and accumulation without direct violence, thus requires not only the emergence of security but also the emergence of private life as a mode of mediating the interests of so-called acquisitive individuals.

Last, but related to these first two points, the state of being private, as Hobbes outlines it, is also a means of pacifying individuals to the logics of security. Not only does private life keep individuals apart and disinterested, it also restricts their capacity for rebellion. In particular, Hobbes is quite clear that what is needed to maintain political rule is a ‘common’ supreme power, to overwhelm individuals into ‘obedience’. The power of the sovereign to dictate the rights of life and death leaves individuals too fearful to rebel, but at the same time the very structure and limitations of private life equally restricts the private individual’s ability to act in political concert. Private life as a state of existence with neither ‘representation’ nor the right to ‘act’ on the behalf of the
commonwealth, denies individuals the capacity to form political rule. In fact, Hobbes is explicit on the point: it is when individuals gather in private in large numbers for unknown ends or ends that are contrary to the commonwealth that private life must be regulated or suspended. Thus private life, as envisioned by Hobbes, is its own form of pacification. Not only are individuals subjected to market relations but their very form of personal liberty and autonomy is premised on their restriction from forms of political representation or action that challenge sovereign power. The continuity and the effects of this relation between privacy and security can be demonstrated through an examination of the recent agreement on Passenger Name Records (PNR) between the United States and the European Union.

Security and the Perimeters of Privacy: The Passenger Carry Code Agreement

In 2011 the European Union and the United States ratified The Passenger Carry Code Agreement (PCC). The legislation pertained to the “use and transfer of Passenger Name Records (PNR) to the United States Department of Homeland Security”. The document is four chapters in length and outlines the forms of information that airline carries are required to pass along to the EU and the United States government, and the techniques that will be used to protect the privacy of all individuals subject to this legislation. The ratification of the act requires all airlines to implement systems capable of gathering PNRs on nineteen forms of passenger information ranging from the name of the passenger, date of reservation/issue of ticket, personal information such as date of birth, address, gender and in some instances occupation. I will, briefly, review the specifics of the PCC Agreement.

The preamble of the document reads as follows:

RECOGNIZING, right and responsibility of states to ensure the security of their citizens and protect their borders and mindful of the responsibility of all nations to protect the life and safety of the public including those using

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7 The United States had sought such an agreement with a number of countries. A similar arrangement with Canada was ratified in March 2012 with amendments to the Aeronautics Act to by Bill-C42. The Act allows passenger flight information to be sent to the USA and for Canadians to be subject to the restrictions of US no fly lists even if aboard a flight that only enters US airspace on route to another destination.

8 Full list is as follows: PNR record locator code, date of reservation/issue of ticket, date(s) of intended travel, name(s) on PNR including all available contact information (this includes home addresses if available through the mode of books), all available payment/billing information, travel itinerary for specific PNR, Travel agency/travel agent, code share information, split/divided information, travel status of passenger (including confirmations and check-in status) ticketing information, baggage information, seat information including seat number, general remarks (including special service remarks and special service request (SSR) and information from the advance passenger information system, all historical changes to the PNR listed under points 1-18.
international transport systems…and that information sharing is an essential component in the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime and that in this context, the processing and use of passenger name records (PRN) is a necessary tool that gives information that cannot be obtained by other means.

Mindful of the EU’s commitments pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union on respect for fundamental rights, the right to privacy with regard to the processing of personal data as stipulated in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the principles of proportionality and necessity concerning the right to private and family life, the respect for privacy, and the protection of personal data.

The document then goes on to outline the actual mechanisms in place to facilitate the collection, transfer and sharing of these records. In particular, to ensure the accuracy, security and integrity of the information obtained through PNRs and “to respect the privacy of individuals”, PNR data is subject to both sorting and storage procedures (PNR, 2011, 11). All PNR files are to be encrypted, stored in databases secured by “physical intrusion controls” and accessed only by listed authorized individuals. The use of the files will be documented and logged by the Department of Homeland Security. Furthermore in the actual collection of the passenger information of individuals all ‘sensitive data’ such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, or health/sex of the individual will be filtered through automated systems that will censor such information from the DHS (PNR, 2011, 15). In this sense the life of the individual will be filtered through automated systems that will censor such information from the DHS.

This sensitive data will be deleted not later than thirty days after it has been received but in the case of security issues can be retained as required by law enforcement agencies. To this end, while sensitive data should be masked from DHS officials, such sensitive data can be made available to the DHS (PNR, 2011, 15). Furthermore, non-sensitive data can be stored for up to five years and after six months it is to depersonalized by the removal of names, other names on PNR, all available contact information, general remarks and advanced passenger information. Following this active period the document calls for all PNR depersonalized data to be moved to a dormant database for no longer than ten years. The PNR information held on the database can be ‘repersonalized’ and activated for the purposes of law enforcement operations with identifiable case, threat or risk.

The document concludes by outlining both the safeguards put in place to protect the individual’s privacy and a rather meager account of the modes of redress available to individuals who believe their privacy has been violated. These include: the individual’s
right to request copies of the information held about them; to challenge the DHS if they have been “delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they were wrongly identified as a threat” (PNR, 2011, 21); the right of the individual to have their record withheld from the public; individuals will not face any form of unlawful discrimination in the collection and utilization of their PNR; and, finally, that the individual’s request for PNR information is circumscribed by the United States law which may limit the individual’s request if such a request conflicts with the necessity to “safeguard privacy-protected, national security, and law enforcement sensitive information” (PNR, 2011, 19). There are three key points that can be made developed here.

First, the PNR agreement reveals that privacy is subservient to the objectives of securing national borders and populations. In this sense, within this document privacy by no means confronts security, challenges it or sets its limits. Rather, those who drafted the agreement have decreed that privacy begins merely where the project of security ceases; thus, what information is excluded, who will access this information, what details are considered sensitive and non-sensitive and the duration of records form the guarantee of privacy. Far from privacy circumscribing security, it is security that circumscribes privacy. Security decrees the activities and relations that can be declared to form the individual’s privacy.

Second, it is noteworthy how privacy is constructed and verified within the PNR system. In particular, there is in the document a distinction between the anonymous, non-sensitive depersonalized subject of security and that of the visible individual attributed by trade union membership, religious beliefs and political opinions, sex life and health whose privacy must be ‘ensured’. In particular, the agreement reveals a conscious balancing between information that is constituted and arranged in such a way to form the abstract object of security projects and information that is constitutive of personhood and, therein, accorded privacy. In this sense, this partitioning has arguably directed the politics of the PNR agreement away from the definite security practices of monitoring and recording individuals, their movements, their families, travel plans, available contact details (addresses), their political affiliations, to whether or not said individual can be personally identified by authorities who have access to elements of this information. I do not believe this represents so much a retrenchment of security by privacy but rather the expression of a longstanding tendency in the relations between security and liberalism.

If the project of liberalism, as Michel Foucault has claimed, is at once the deployment of apparatuses of security, apparatuses that prefigure liberty and simultaneously in their course of operation ‘let things happen’, this scheme encounters the private individual of capitalist society in a rather contradictory manner (Foucault, 2007, 48). In particular, as mentioned earlier, projects of security are deployed to ensure that civil society, the sphere of the ‘egoistic individual’, remains functional and orderly. Thus the task of security is largely to ensure that market relations are maintained and that
the relations to production are not disrupted or destroyed. The difficulty that arises here, however, is that much of what ensures that these economic relations retain their order is the individual’s freedom to engage in the buying and selling of labour, consumption and commerce. Thus, one has a contradictory stance as the private subject’s activity and proclivities must be ‘let to happen’ and unfold and, at the same-time, the same individual must be policed and monitored to ensure the security of the very economic relations that structure their very appearance as private individuals. Thus privacy and private life are infringed upon by projects of security while these same projects justify their operation through the promotion of the private sphere as a site where the individual remains unfettered and unobstructed in their realization of the liberty of market exchange (Neocleous, 2002, 103). It is arguable that the PNR agreement circumvents this contradiction by rendering abstract life, the anonymous objective features of the social body as permanent objects of registration while positing the real definite lives of the individuals who make up of this social body and, therein, the ‘material of registration and surveillance, as that which has the ‘right’ to exist beyond the remit of projects of security.

Third, the use of privacy in this document arguably serves to sublimate what are direct and repressive relations of rule and coercion into a set of contractual terms. In particular, in practice PNR is used to restrict the mobility of some individuals, to cross-check (excuse the pun) and add individuals on the DHS ‘no fly’ list and to track individuals in the hopes of preempting them from compromising national and public security, be this settling in a country ‘illegally’ or smuggling cocaine. It would be remiss not to state, that there is of course nothing ‘random’ about which individuals are targeted by PNR. Rather, PNR is a racialized and gendered processes: it is, for instance, far more likely that Muslim men will be subject to PNR targeting rather than white American/European women. However, whether one wishes to participate in this system of relations, let alone challenge it, is non-negotiable.

Yet the inclusion of privacy as an obstacle that security must respect and acknowledge, offers the illusion of personal control. The absence of choice in being recorded, monitored, split into multiple identities stored in separate databases is made palatable by our ability to confront the system. We are given the right to receive our own records: to see ourselves as the authorities see us. If we are delayed or detained we may inquire as to why and, above all, we are assured that our right to privacy ensures that we will be stored in a manner that restores us to anonymity. All of these measures are not only retroactive but pre-determined by the limits of security to begin with: if we receive our own records it is only because they were already recorded; if we are returned to anonymity it is only because we were initially targeted and specified. Yet, further still, not only is privacy then fully inscribed into security, but the success of privacy, its very completion, offers nothing more than a return to the freedoms of private life, which is a return to the freedoms that conditioned and deployed the apparatuses of security in the first instance.
All of this should be enough to throw-out the concept of privacy or, at the very least, to cease to see security and privacy as counter-veiling forces. Yet I think there are further implications that the advancement of privacy as a right has on social life in capitalist society.

**Security, Privacy and Pacification**

We have established the idea that ‘privacy’ has the effect of disassociating security from the fabrication of private life or, rather, privacy creates the conception that security is distinct and balanced by liberalism. What does any of this have to do with privacy and the further alienation of our collective social power? It is not enough to state that privacy is the means whereby security extends itself into social life and assures us of its own proportionality or reasonableness. Rather, privacy not only fails to challenge capital, as Neocleous has demonstrated (2002, 106) but, further still, lends itself to the reification of capitalist social relations and the further separation of the individual to their own social power and objective conditions of life. Privacy not only numbs us to the logics of security and its reasonable agreement to let certain areas of our lives occur seemingly unencumbered by security projects. Rather, it ensures, through the limits privacy sets on our experiences of collective life, the forms of political activity and social engagement that appear possible to us, that in advancing privacy we only further reinforce security and its colonization of “all aspects of human practices and thinking” (Rigakos, 2011, 62).

As Marx noted “labour is, therefore, the objectification of [human] species life,” reality is constructed through and mediates upon the social, economic, and biological conditions through which humans contemplate their own objectively constituted existence (Marx, 1975, 76). It follows that species being, as both the object and will of one’s practical activity and as the objective reality contained and represented in the products of labour, is estranged by the condition of labour in capitalist society. Thus, in the course of making the worker’s product nothing more than the “means to our physical existence” in equal measure species-life itself becomes [merely] a means” as well (Marx, 1975, 77). The estrangement of life and labour from nature and other people force both nature and other people to “appear as objects other than and differentiated from” [the labourer] (Marx, 1975, 78). As such, relations that one confronts independently of one’s own particular labour, forces of ‘nature’ and other individuals appear “as something alien and objective, confronting [individuals] not as their relations to one another but as our subordination to relations which exist independently of [us]” developing merely from the collisions between mutually indifferent individuals (Marx, 1973, 157). To this end, with the advent of capitalist relations, the individual’s understanding of themselves as part of a species life dissipates and instead the predominant social bond between individuals is that of “a spontaneous interconnection, [a] material and mental metabolism…independent of
the knowing and willing individuals [which] presupposes their “reciprocal independence and indifference” (Marx, 1973, 161). Consequently, as the contemplation of social life of life-activity as a shared social product wanes and in its place individuals increasingly find themselves “ruled by abstractions” as objective relations of dependency, the reciprocal relations of production appear separate and autonomous to the individuals who constitute these very relations (Marx, 1973, 164).

My point is not that ‘privacy’ produces these conditions; the estrangement of individuals from species-life is innate to capitalist production. My point is that privacy serves to further acclimatize us to this reification of species-life as nothing more than the atomized world of the ‘individual’. Which is a way of saying that privacy is part and parcel of the process of pacification, a key mechanism in the fabrication of bourgeois order. In particular, it is only in the absence of species-life, when our relations of our social dependence take on the fantastic form of relations between things and relations between people appear as forces alien to us, that the partitioning of social life into private isolated, ‘natural’ individuals becomes feasible; “liberty is... the right to do everything which does not harm others” it is essentially “the right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into him/herself” (Marx, 1975, 42). Thus, the demand for privacy is not merely forever circumscribed by the logics of security but it entrenches the very separations between people presupposed by capitalist social relations that security is used to enforce and maintain. Privacy, then, promises a life apart, a mode of existence separate from others and to this end is presupposed by our appearance as individuals who are autonomous from another and can, therefore, ‘choose’ to be further detached and apart. Before concluding I think there is an overarching political implication from this relation between privacy, security and capital. This appearance of choice, of course, serves only to further obfuscate the social nature of human existence and our inextricable tie to unequal class, gender and race relations.

By agreeing to live in the form of privacy that is carved out by security projects, we live as individuals who perceive their primary social bond with society to be nothing more than a spontaneous, indifferent and independent set of connections. Any social forces we are confronted by are, by definition, abstractions of the concrete real relations of society. As such, increasingly structural forces such as unemployment, ecological catastrophe, fears about old-age or even general depression or dissatisfaction have the appearance of existing completely suspended from our society and our mode of social (re)production. In this sense, adhering to privacy, as a mode of resistance does not just leave one apart from society but it ‘displaces’ the social with the ‘personal’. In this sense, it is only partially true, as Tocqueville claimed, “as the extent of political society expands, one must expect the sphere of private life to contract” (1968, [1840], 782-3). It may be true that as political society grows, it develops to include new apparatuses to consolidate and legitimate dominant relations of rule (Abrams, 1977, 58); but in capitalist society the growth of political society in any substantive sense (i.e. the common deliberation on life
in its totality not merely in its forms of abstraction) is utterly antithetical to conditions of accumulation in capitalist society; after-all, the egotistical person “is [in capitalist society] the foundation and presupposition of the political state” (Marx, 1975, 45). However, the opposite holds; as political society shrinks the larger the sphere of ‘private social life’ looms.

In particular, the less leave we are given collectively to contemplate and organize the objective conditions of social reproduction (education, labour, health-care, old-age) and the more private market relations come to dominate our social experience, the more private life becomes our only mode of contemplation and action. Indeed, although we should not conflate privacy and privatization, the latter historically presupposes the emergence of the former, privacy has increasingly become a force of further commodification. Not solely in terms of direct commodification but in eschewing one’s existence as a social being, individuals are increasingly left with no other expression or mode of contemplation outside their own private milieu. As such, when confronted by social, economic and political forces the recourse of the private individual is not to confront these forces as the products of our own objective activity or even as incidents that can be challenged collectively but as personal threats or risks. Thus, each, in the scale of their own atomized sense of reality, manages these personal risks and effects through the only sphere of relations open to the private individual: commodification and correlative security projects. Thus, we purchase security against disease, security against disability, theft, unemployment, old age, etc. as these things crowd into our ‘lives apart from society’ as nothing more than personal concerns abstracted from the objective concrete relations that determine them. To the extent that human life becomes monadic and takes on the appearance of being assailed by alien forces, the more the demands for protection from these forces is expressed in purchases of private or individual security from these forces; which, in turn, only makes social life all the more atomized and ‘apart’. Thus, in the course of drawing on privacy as a means to confront economic and political domination, we are not only acclimatized to the existence of these relations but we are pacified, or at least deterred, from radical, collective forms of political action.

“Security is not just hegemonic, it is hegemony”, says Rigakos (2011, 58). Attempts to reveal the tensions and points of incoherency within security projects simply seem to drive the greater refinement of these very projects. In many respects, it is the hegemony of security, its analytical inscrutability that has prompted the turn to pacification both as a concrete historical formation of rule and as an analytical concept, a means to reveal its contingencies, its overlaps, and points of formation (Rigakos, 2011, 61; Neocleous, 2010). The other problem posed by the hegemony of security, implicit to the first problem perhaps, is that in attaining hegemony it has colonized a number of social forms. This means that some relations that appear like sites of possible resistance, such as privacy, in fact form capillary points in the economy of relations behind security. With this problem in mind I have tried to tease out the historical relation of privacy to security.
in capitalist society, so as to demonstrate how the former was, from the outset, entangled with the latter. Security presupposes privacy, decides its scope of power and the facets of social life to which it applies. Furthermore, not only does security condition privacy but also privacy itself, as a mode of life, has the effect of pacifying us to the further penetration of security into social life. Thus, privacy will be in existence for as long as the logics of security remain in play; for, as I outlined earlier in this discussion, it is the private sphere of relations, the sanctity of homo-economicus, that the project of police has long since had as its object. We on ‘the Left’ would do well to consider these aspects of privacy. As suggested by Tyler Wall’s paper in this collection, it is by making appeals to privacy, that drones in the United States have made the transition from battlefield technology to a component of the ‘domestic’ security apparatus. Following the insights from this paper, it can be argued that challenging drones through privacy will ostensibly experience moderate success. Drones perhaps will only be flown at certain times, in certain areas, and will contravene these rules only when vital security or safety concerns arise. The footage they capture will perhaps even be handled in a manner similar to the PNR data. Yet it is the security apparatus itself, not privacy, that will determine how these limits operate. These limits not only become our measure of freedom and autonomy but also structure our pacification. Thus, in a society that approaches security through the right to privacy, the proliferation of the conduct of war abroad and at home, the organization of human potential into a dehumanizing economic mode of production, will continue apace; insofar as these forces will continue to confront us as happenstance things, filtering in and out of each individual’s private, insular existence. To live this pacified mode of life is no less the promise of privacy than it is the guarantee of security.

References


**Primary Documents**

‘CLEARLY BLOWN AWAY BY THE END OF THE MORNING’S DRAMA’: SPECTACLE, PACIFICATION AND THE 2010 WORLD CUP, SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract
The massive security assemblages surrounding major sporting events and political summits embody two layers of spectacle. On the one hand, security operations are central to the governance of entertainment and media imagery. Simultaneously these security measures are profoundly theatrical and calibrated for the maximum visual impact: the spectacle of security itself. Some critical thinkers have described this dual spectacle as indicative of a contemporary state-corporate obsession with image and perception management, an obsession which detracts from ‘valid’ security concerns. By contrast I argue that spectacle and theatricality are in fact highly functional components of the pacification projects of state and capital. With reference to Guy Debord’s conception of ‘spectacle’, this article highlights how mega-events reveal, in highly dramatised form, the logic of pacification. Using the 2010 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) soccer World Cup as a case study, the article demonstrates how police and military power are mobilised to secure accumulation, to enforce social control and to extend the power and arsenal of the state security apparatus. What is truly spectacular about mega-event security is not just the incorporation of media templates into the working of state forces. Rather, the rhetoric and concept of security itself becomes a form of spectacular power as it serves to both obscure and justify how mega-events are ultimately projects of class power.

Keywords
Mega-Events, Spectacle, Police, Accumulation, Pacification.

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During one of a series of preparatory exercises held ahead of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) took part in what a press release described as an “action packed” training simulation:

Heavily armed criminals tried to flee the scene, but no sooner had the thought emerged when they stopped in their tracks thanks to an armed response team, with one arrested and another fatally wounded, all in the space of ten minutes. Armed criminals were then chased as they fled their vehicle, into a building, where a shootout ensued as members of the Special Task Force intervened – but the criminals refused to surrender. It was time to call in the members of the National Intervention Unit. Fully armed and protected they arrived on the scene by helicopter, as well as parachutes, to assist the officers on the ground. Live ammunition lit up the sky while the SAPS units apprehended the criminals who surrendered after one was shot dead on the scene.... cracking down on the terrorists by firing live missiles.... After a gun battle ensued, all suspects were shot and arrested within 15 minutes after refusing to cooperate (Ndawonde 2009).

The release goes on to detail how watching members of the press and officials, including the Minister of Police, “looked clearly blown away by the end of the morning’s drama” (Ndawonde 2009). This example of a policing display aestheticised and calibrated to have the maximum amount of media and visual impact is indicative of a general trend evident in the extensive, militarised security operations at major sporting events and political summits throughout the world: ‘security’ becoming part of the spectacle itself (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). In the case of the temporary states of siege which accompany major political meetings the agents of participating governments aim at communicating “spectacular security (for authorities, police and security agents, corporate elite, political leaders) and spectacular insecurity for protestors (and indeed anyone who just happened to be passing by)” (Rimke 2011, 196). While adopting many of the same tactics, security operations at sporting mega-events are less overtly hostile: as the former commissioner of the SAPS put it “[as] security agents we must behave in a way that ensures a peaceful time for entertainment and enjoyment that visitors enjoy to the maximum” (FIFA World Magazine 2010, 29). This intersection between entertainment and coercive state mobilisations results in a situation where “Mass citizen…. mega-sports and entertainment events now automatically produce martial law conditions…. Yet the erection of cordons, walls and enclosures, often for whole cities or systems of cities within which the spectacles are staged, is as much about managing global branding and TV imagery as it is about keeping risks at bay” (Graham 2010, 125). Indeed the size and scope of these operations appears to dwarf the actual practical requirements of guarding such
events, becoming ever more “dystopian and surreal” as novelist China Miéville (2012) observed of the plans for the 2012 Summer Olympics which included the mobilisation of helicopters carrying snipers, warships in the Thames, jets in the sky, and more British troops on duty in London than in the warzone of Afghanistan.

However this does not mean that we should lament how the politics of “public spectacle” (Graham 2010, 382) has superseded apparently less bombastic and somehow more ‘practical’ forms of security. Instead as part of the wider anti-security project this paper will maintain that rather than being synonymous with public safety, security is at heart a mechanism for ensuring an order based on “both sustained capital accumulation and a constant political policing” of society (Neocleous 2008, 153). Or rather as Mark Neocleous (2011) argues the fundamental goal of security is pacification, the on-going deployment of the police and war powers in fabricating and fortifying the rule of capital and bourgeois class power, of state domination and social hierarchy. What this implies is that ‘pacification’ entails not just repression but also production: overt violence and coercion are one aspect of wider process of securing territories and populations for accumulation and creating political docility and acquiescence. This article argues that mega-events offer, in a highly dramatised form, a vivid example of the nexus of ‘police-war-accumulation’ captured within the concept of pacification, as Neocleous argues in this volume. And as Sebastian Saborio shows in his article in this volume, the governance of mega-events pivots around wide-ranging societal transformations which go substantially beyond deploying state forces and military equipment at tournament venues and transport nodes. Event ‘preparations’ are in fact far more extensive, ranging from evictions of poor communities and the gentrification of urban areas to extensive expansions in the power and arsenal of the host state. Central to all these interventions is the role of image and performance, both in the projection of state security forces as highly mobilised and prepared for any eventuality and in wider efforts to ensure that host cities and countries are portrayed as clean, safe environments for tourism and business.

For Boyle and Haggerty (2009) the centrality of image to mega-event security evokes Guy Debord’s famous Society of the Spectacle (1967). Debord’s book maintained that the texture of modern life is subject to the perpetual dissemination and bombardment of images, slogans, false promises and instructions delivered by a confluence of bureaucratic governments, the media and advertisers. This serves to alienate and distract people from politics, anesthetise them with representation and to erode the capacity for individual and collective action (Retort 2004). However, Boyle and Haggerty (2009, 262) tend to focus on the visual and theatrical aspects of mega-event governance and the convergence of state and business interests in using mass media to display an “appearance of absolute security”. As with much of the secondary literature on Debord, and the Situationist International more generally, this focus on the visual and media downplays the radical and Marxist content of his work: his core concepts of reification and the commodity are ignored, and so too is the demand for self-
management and the transformation of everyday life (see Leeper 2012). For Debord (1994, 12), spectacle is not “a collection of images but rather a social relationship between people that is mediated through image”. Nor is it a distortion of reality or a “decorative element added to the world” but instead emerges as a direct product of the capitalist mode of production: “news or propaganda, advertising” and entertainment work to serve as a “total justification of the conditions and aims of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence of that justification, for it governs all time spent outside the production process itself” (Debord 1994, 12-13). And rather than supplanting the violence and repression inherent to the rule of both capital accumulation and the state with more diffuse forms of control, spectacle serves to augment it. Writing in the 1960s, Debord was as critical of the bureaucracies which had arisen in China and the USSR as he was of the governments in the consumer societies emerging in the ‘West’, arguing that these had maintained the role of the state as an authoritarian instrument for accumulation and the violent enforcement of class domination, whilst ruling their proletariats with a spectacle based on pseudo-revolutionary language and image.

Debord thus asserts that “the dominion of the spectacle… means the dominion too of the police” (42) and in a later work suggested that “We should expect, as a logical possibility, that the states’ security services intend to use all the advantages they find in the realm of the spectacle, which has indeed been organised with that in mind for some considerable time” (Debord 1990, 25). Spectacle also serves as a specialised role as the “spokesman for all other activities, a sort of diplomatic representative of hierarchical society at its own court, and the source of the only discourse which that society allows itself to hear… by means of spectacle, the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power” (Debord 1994, 18-19). These representations, birthed by social and material relationships, appear to behave as independent things outside the control of human beings (Jappe 1999, 8).

This article uses Debord’s original conceptualisation of spectacle to better illustrate how ‘security’, and in particular the fetishisation of security evident at major events, is an “illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion” (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011, 15). In particular, I aim to develop linkages between security and spectacle in a different direction from prior research which has tended to focus upon the intersections between state power, war and the media and entertainment industries (Retort 2004; Stahl 2009). Although I will discuss the importance of aesthetics, image and theatricality to the policing regime initiated throughout South African cities for the 2010 World Cup, my main goal is to explore how the very concept of security functions as the alienated spectacle described by Debord. That is to say that ‘security’ and the grip its holds over urban space and policy making appears to function as an autonomous force, which both obscures its basis in social relations of exploitation and class domination while simultaneously serving to extend and justify these relations under the guise of public
protection. Indeed, as I will argue, the policing operations at mega-events are no longer about the events as such but, rather, have become security spectacles in their own right. These security spectacles allow states to experiment with new forms of power and ensure vast profits for franchise and brand owners. And as this article aims to demonstrate, these spectacles can be considered as an increasingly prominent front in the “long durée of pacification under capitalist relations” (Rigakos 2011, 80) and the continual efforts to extract resources, to control populations and to entrench the domination of the state.

Saturation Policing and Spectacular Power

The ‘spectacular’ nature of World Cup security was most overtly demonstrated by the preparations of the South African government. The SAPS allocated over 41,000 officers to the tournament and embarked upon a major procurement drive of operational equipment including new helicopters, CCTV and riot equipment. Dedicated police escorts were provided to teams, referees and members of the FIFA delegation, while “saturation policing” (ESPN 2009) tactics were used at land, sea and air borders, across transport routes and around hotels, tournament events and tourist attractions. Stadiums were surrounded by mechanised units such as police pursuit vehicles and motorbikes, Casspir armoured personal carriers, Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, mobile command centres and emergency ambulances. During the planning stages stadium preparations were even more extensive, including proposed ‘community processing centres’ for ‘non-compliant match spectators’ (SAFA 2003: 9.4). The police also implemented spatial cordons in the ten kilometres around stadiums with a “focus on preventing domestic extremism, including strike actions and service delivery protests” (World Cup South Africa Online 2010). The tournament saw the largest ever domestic deployment of the South African National Defence Force, exceeding in size even its missions during the various states of emergency declared by the Apartheid government in the 1980s. The justification offered was that this was part of a “security rather than a defence operation” intended to prevent “people with a cause” from disrupting the event (Szabo 2009). From the outset, security operations in the nine host cities were organised to ensure a massive visual impact. This was given particular consideration in the South African context because of the country’s dangerous international reputation due to high incidences of violent crime. According to one government planning document, the image of South Africa enabled by security measures was as important as the actual pre-emption of violence: “operational planning shall concentrate on the security operations at all airports to ensure that the all-important first impression that is created is one of a safe, secure and stable country and region” (OA /NATJOINTS 2008, 30). This aesthetic fetish went beyond just perceptions of personal safety: “security is not just about crime”, claimed one Cape Town official, “it is also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service delivery is also a part of our security planning” (Richard Bosman, interview with author, 20 July 2010).
The press releases and media statements which accompanied the unveiling of security systems were infused with depictions of seamless functioning and total control. According to Lieutenant General Andre Pruis (2010, 13) technology created a feeling of “police omnipresence” and allowed the police to “make South Africa a very small country”. The King Shaka International airport outside Durban, the construction of which was fast-tracked for the World Cup, opened with the “best, latest security technology” including X-ray machines “capable of detecting everything from drugs to bombs” (News24 2010). A particular focus was placed on automated technology, which included the purchase of remote-operated bomb disposal equipment that “had proved itself in Iraq” and “shows no fear”, which the SAPS unveiled and demonstrated at a shopping mall (Smillie 2008). Such attempts to convey the image of absolute security and control were moderated by efforts to ensure that an atmosphere of consumer festival prevailed. For example, the spokesperson for one of the private security companies which provided support functions to the police suggested that “if one of our guys sees a chip packet lying on the ground that could potentially house an explosive device, he has to be diplomatic and gently move the danger out of the way without the fans even knowing it” (The Event 2010).

At the domestic level, the government claimed that such dramatic and expensive security measures were necessary not only for the country’s international image but were intended to leave behind a ‘security legacy’ of increased police numbers and surveillance equipment. Such an argument was reiterated by big business, the media, security intellectuals and opposition political parties. Expressing what seemed to be a common elite sentiment, one opposition Member of Parliament approvingly described the tournament as:

The biggest spectacle and biggest opportunity to achieve a common national identity. As South Africans, we are destined to achieve great things and that togetherness must be forged in the burning excitement which is the World Cup. Never mind the costs that we will have to carry, we as South Africans can use sport to achieve what other nations have done through war (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010).

However, much evidence suggests that the scale and size of the security operations dwarfed the actual tactical requirements of providing public safety around tournament venues and events. Police officials candidly acknowledged that the spatial distribution of South African cities favoured their tournament efforts due to the concentration of violent crime in poor, black townships and informal settlements rather than in the gentrified urban spaces where most events took place (The Star 2007). Furthermore, the annual report of the SAPS noted that high levels of police visibility during the tournament had
little “noticeable effect on violent contact crime” (South African Police Service 2011, 9) throughout the rest of the country.

While this suggests that the theatre of state sabre-rattling during the World Cup was primarily motivated by a desire to manage international perception, the displays of government power also serviced domestic political goals. Most notably the SAPS used the tournament to project an image of efficiency and power in contrast with their public reputation for brutality and incompetence. The high-visibility of the tournament also worked to benefit the military which used it as an opportunity to leverage substantial funding increases from national government.

Outside of the internal politics of the security forces, mega-events such as the World Cup may serve a wider role in fortifying host states, through functioning as an “instrument of pacification by… mystifying citizens through a grandiose spectacle” (Broudehoux 2007, 99). In the case of South Africa, the state called for citizens to use the World Cup as a platform for “social cohesion” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008), to put aside antagonisms for the duration of the event and to forgo the often explosive community protests and labour strikes which reveal the simmering tensions within post-Apartheid society. Prior to the tournament President Zuma made official ‘fact finding missions’ to several of the most “most militant and dissatisfied areas” (Nhlapo 2010) in the country which was described by one activist as an attempt to:

Make sure that, come the World Cup tournament, marginalised people don’t protest and embarrass South Africa in front of an international media spotlight. What he is doing is like locking your children in a room so that they don’t cry that they are hungry in front of a guest. He actually just wants service delivery protests not to erupt when the rest of the world is in our country.

These measures were accompanied by less subtle forms of control as security officials promised to show ‘zero tolerance’ to ‘illegal’ protests and put pressure on urban authorities to withhold permits for marches and gatherings (McMichael 2012). Indeed, while the government presented the security measures as a response to the dangers posed by armed, organised criminal gangs and terrorists, the rhetoric and preparatory tactics used by the state reflected a pronounced fear of the potential threat offered by society as a whole. Intelligence reports discussed the necessity of maintaining surveillance on labour issues and the need to ensure “mechanisms to control possible strikes and protest actions” (Republic of South Africa 2011:31). Much of the police procurement drive was focused upon buying riot gear and after the tournament this equipment formed the basis for a revised, “aggressive” public order policy (Lukani, 2011). And indeed in the years since the tournament the most visible security legacy has been the deployment of purchases such as body armour and water cannons at political and labour demonstrations.
which have been increasingly characterised by lethal police violence against protesters: notably some of these purchases were on display at the site of the 2012 Marikana massacre where SAPS special forces killed 34 striking miners. The extent to which protest was criminalised during the tournament also suggests that intimidation against the state’s population is intrinsic to the theatre of state power during major events. Alongside reassuring tourists and demonstrating their ‘crime fighting’ capabilities, the spectacle also revealed to the citizen-subjects what would be done to them should they confront the established order. Mega-events thus provide another instance of how class violence and state repression are an implicit premise within the concept of security.

Protecting FIFA’s Brand

The security mobilisation did not exclusively revolve around protecting the image of the South African state. Policing operations were as much about protecting FIFA’s revenue stream and securing the advertising investments made by its corporate ‘partners’ and ‘sponsors’, including such major brands as Sony, Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Adidas. Under the comprehensive government guarantees which were signed as a condition of bidding for, let alone winning, hosting rights, the South African state was obliged to manage and cross subsidise all ‘necessary’ arrangements for FIFA’s World Cup. These expenses ranged from stadium construction to granting legal and taxation exemptions for FIFA’s operations during the tournament. Such a contractual framework ensured that security measures were continuously informed and structured by the commercial and branding imperatives of FIFA and its corporate allies, indicative of how the deployment of police power works to exact the paired ends of securing profit for capital and ensuring state control over urban space and populations.

Police and military operations focused on maintaining an image of South African cities in general and tournament events in particular, which was considered amenable to the ‘brand identity’ of the World Cup. Early FIFA reports on South Africa’s suitability indicate that the association was impressed by the state’s capacity to enforce the desired image of festival despite some concerns.

General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was possible to read press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit…. We therefore came to the conclusion that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries; they should not encounter any trouble. With regard to organising security for a possible 2010 FIFA World Cup in the country, the Inspection Group received an excellent, comprehensive work schedule from one of the high commanders of the national police, covering stadiums,
media centres and main hotels, that will doubtless satisfy every requirement for the event. After the presentation we concluded that they have enough experience with this kind of event to handle them without difficulty. We must say that the security business is a flourishing industry in the country (FIFA 2004).

At the level of practical deployment the spatial protection of FIFA’s brand was indicated by the government’s tactic of saturation policing around stadiums, fan parks and association related locations such as FIFA’s temporary headquarters in Johannesburg. Aside from providing direct close protection to elites, such as FIFA and corporate delegates, and dramatically assuring foreign tourists and the international media of the safety of South African host cities, this also ensured that corporate logos and brands would not be associated with images of crime or unrest through the state working to manage “particularly attractive parts of … host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for…. commercial partners” (Klauser 2011, 9). In the enforcement of the image desired by FIFA, the security forces adopted a dual approach which combined concessions and coercion. On one hand, the police took a lenient stance towards certain behaviour of tourists and fans, such as public drunkenness. But on the other, people who breached FIFA restrictions, for such infringements as unlicensed ticket sales, faced rapid arrest and sentencing through the 56 ‘special courts’ which were established to try crimes related to the tournament. These courts tried both South Africans and foreign nationals and reserved particularly harsh sentences for both citizens caught robbing tourists and for commercial violations, with one man received a three year sentence for the possession of thirty match tickets.

The severity with which commercial infringements were handled indicates the wider influence which the interests of FIFA and World Cup advertisers exerted upon security measures. In particular state authorities were enrolled in the business of guarding and prosecuting attempts at ‘ambush marketing’ by unlicensed operators attempting to capitalise on the opportunity for visual and media exposure afforded by the tournament. FIFA’s list of prohibited activities and signage included:

- branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street),
- branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street),
- aerial advertising (blimps, balloons, or other airships),
- unauthorised street trading or vendors,
- any political and religious demonstrations (Cape Town Partnership 2009).

As a result, restriction zones and blockades were established around stadiums in which joint units of police and FIFA personnel patrolled for signs of commercial infractions. In turn, the efforts to ensure the visual domination of accredited brands during the World Cup was presented to the South African public as a safety issue comparable to violent
crime or attacks by political extremists. Replicating the ‘zero tolerance’ rhetoric used by government officials, FIFA representatives claimed that infringements would “be shown no mercy” (Barnes 2010) and “We need to be strong. We need to protect our brand” (Business Day 2010). Urban municipalities distributed promotional material designed to warn the public about the dangers of ambush marketing which included urging individuals to self-police their own behaviour and aspirations “Most often, if you think that something you are planning may be considered ambush marketing, it probably is” (Cape Town Partnership 2009). Such an approach (‘the enemy within’) mirrors the police logic most recently displayed in the war on terror, in which “because the suspect communities are always already among us, we are all under suspicion, all potentially guilty”—albeit with suspicion being intensified by racial and gender factors with the black poor being far more likely to be targeted for state ‘intervention’ in the case of South Africa (Neocleous 2011, 49). Noticeably the same security rhetoric used by the state in the name of fighting crime or terrorism, the talk of ‘no mercy’ and control over urban space, was similarly assimilated and deployed within FIFA’s projects of assuring dominance over visual signage.

Under FIFA’s commercial restrictions ‘political and religious demonstrations’ around stadiums were listed as forms of ambush marketing. In turn, municipal authorities presented this requirement as a security measure necessary to the “smooth functioning and running of FIFA World Cup matches” (City of Cape Town 2010a). Using this rationale SAPS issued an unofficial directive to cities to not allow marches and demonstrations for the duration of the event due to not having “the capacity to police marches and the World Cup simultaneously” (Duncan 2010). Such cases illustrate how security restrictions served a combined purpose for the state and FIFA. Bans on visible demonstrations both maintained the pristine ‘apolitical’ image of the World Cup brand, while cohering with the government’s attempts to discipline civil society through enforcing a moratorium on political protest.

Indeed, it is striking how at virtually every juncture security plans offered tactics and procedures which maintained an interchangeable applicability for both policing and commercial purposes. For example, under by-laws passed within host cities, FIFA was allowed to declare all the routes to and from airports, training venues and designated hotels as “commercial exclusion zones” (The Mercury 2009) which aligned with the security forces strategy of enforcing cordons around these sites. Such combined restrictions were thoroughly worked into the details of planning from an early stage. For instance, the creation of remote search parks and airspace restrictions around and above stadiums were not only intended to prevent possible terror attacks but to also to restrict unlicensed commercial material and aerial advertising from entering the exclusion zone (McMichael 2012, 524,526). Of course, this geography of security was also marked by class segregation and de facto racial apartheid, with ‘backstage’ security operations in
working class and poor black neighbourhoods and ‘clean’ policing displays targeted at the middle and upper classes and affluent international tourists.

Moreover, while the “absolute security” (Boyle and Haggerty 2009, 262) ethos espoused by tournament organisers penalised unaffiliated companies attempting to capitalise on the presence of the World Cup it nonetheless created markets for businesses attempting to sell another commodity: security itself. Companies both offered their services as ‘support’ to the state-managed security regime and attempted to benefit from fears about the government's perceived inability to protect tourists. Manufacturers incorporated the ‘legacy’ rhetoric of the state with the helicopter company Robinson (2008, 4) claiming of its equipment that “While the R44 Raven II Police Helicopters will play integral roles in the security effort for the World Cup, they are also part of a sustained effort to create a safer environment that will continue to benefit the citizens of South Africa long after the World Cup concludes”. On the other hand, the local subsidiary of Mercedes Benz used the tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest ranges of luxury armoured vehicles:

[the] Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-Benz E-Guard, which provide occupants with protection from attacks by firearms and explosives. The Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard has armour to resist military standard small-arms projectiles that have almost twice the velocity of bullets fired by a revolver, and provides protection against fragments from hand grenades (IOL 2009).

Notably, this ‘security’ is a luxury commodified for the bourgeois, both for the South African and foreign tourist elite, and aimed against the implicit threat posed by the racialized ‘dangerous classes’. The saleability of event security as a commodity has continued long after the World Cup. In April 2013 the South African based defence manufacture Paramount Group announced the sale of a number of its armoured plated and “hand grenade attack protected… Maverick internal security vehicles” (Radebe 2013) to the state government of Rio de Janeiro. According to a press release by the company, the vehicles (which are intended to be used by special forces such as BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais-Saborio, 2013) “play a critical role in the security infrastructure for both” the World Cup and Olympics” (Paramount Group 2013). The integration of South African manufactured hardware into the arsenals of police shock units being used to reorder favelas in Rio ahead of mega-events in Brazil is exemplary of the transnational union of pacification projects, with advanced technologies of attack and control developed in one environment being readily transferable into another, as Tyler Wall argues in his contribution to this volume (Wall 2013).

More generally, capital and state both cohered around a certain image of secure South African urban spaces. Beyond the shared desire to flood the streets with security
forces and to offer a bombastic rhetoric of ‘no mercy’, the South African government and FIFA – that is, state and corporation – shared an ideal of nothing less than the pacified city. The dream of the “fantasy city” (Samara 2010) is a dream of order, and as the other articles in this special issue argue, such order can be realised only through the classic pacification technique: removal of ‘undesirable’ and ‘disorderly’ elements. These messages of ‘no mercy’ and the ‘fantasy city’ while two sides of the same project, are aimed at quite different populations. Hence, the poor, mainly black population is targeted with the message ‘no mercy’ the condition for bourgeois whites and black to ensure their ‘fantasy city’.

Throughout the country municipalities used police and private security guards to remove vagrants and potential petty criminals. In the city of Durban street children were cleared from visible areas such as the CBD and beachfront, which was described by a municipal official as a standard procedure “We often remove them from the streets when there are big events like the World Cup and major conferences, because some of them mug tourists and damage the image of the country” (The Mercury 2011). These expulsions were often presented as public health measures with the City of Cape Town describing removals as an attempt to protect indigents from the harsh winter climates in the centre of the city (City of Cape Town 2010b). Such actions were further encouraged by the FIFA by-laws which each host city implemented for the duration of the tournament which used the language of ‘beautification’ and ‘access control’, to minimise the presence of poverty. Most overtly, this included provisions against begging in “public open spaces controlled or managed by municipalities” (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 32) and placed incredibly stringent restrictions on street trading (43). In a more subtle manner, it also employed a wide-ranging definition of prohibited ‘nuisances’ near access controlled and special event sites. These included any “public building which is so situated, constructed, used or kept so as to be unsafe or to be injurious or dangerous to health”, “any occupied dwelling for which no proper and sufficient supply of pure water is available under a reasonable distance” and “any area of land kept or permitted to remain in such a state as to be offensive” (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 13). Although this was presented as a matter of ‘health security’ it also implied that squatter camps and illegally occupied buildings, which often lack on-site amenities, could be defined as nuisances, as has often been the case with other urban redevelopments.

The proximity of the World Cup also provided an impetus to state-led efforts to eradicate, rather than to upgrade, informal squatter settlements for the benefit of “tourists and investors…. The provincial legislature of KwaZulu Natal drafted a ‘Slum Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill’ which included “repressive direct measures used during the apartheid era” (Huchezemeyer 2011: 13, 17). After a national court action by the shack dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the proposed act was eventually ruled unconstitutional. Nonetheless the evidence suggests that a pattern of attempting to aggressively evict shack dwellers was merely encouraged, rather than
imposed, by the presence of FIFA and the World Cup. The process of the state securing valuable areas of cities for business and leisure is indicative of a post-Apartheid development strategy that is actively resegregating cities on the basis of class. What the World Cup offered was a heightened version of the on-going efforts to regulate and discipline people, spaces and consumer behaviour under the guise of creating ‘world class cities’ for investment and tourism. Furthermore these efforts to maintain an uninterrupted campaign against the urban poor, whether in the name of safety or health, offer an excellent example of the long historical logic of pacification and the use of police power. This is perhaps even more glaring in the South Africa context, given the specific history of official Apartheid and segregation, but the World Cup is emblematic of how a more generalised logic of security enforces a neo-apartheid that is simultaneously based on class and race.

Conclusion

As with major sporting, entertainment and political gatherings throughout the world, the 2010 World Cup saw the enforcement of a desired aesthetic regime and social order through the deployment of a vast, multi-city “police network” (Rigakos 2011, 79) which included the substantial involvement of the military and private security companies. In the sense identified by much of the critical research on these mega-events, the operations of this network were designed to be spectacular. From the outset the tactics of the government’s security forces were planned to capture exposure and attention, organised like the unveiling of a new commercial brand or product. Simultaneously, these measures were enrolled in the protection of the brand image of FIFA and the assemblage of corporate institutions affiliated with the tournament. However, as this article has argued, the spectacular component of these policing assemblages goes beyond the focus on the demonstrative and the decorative. Instead it has focused on the spectacular content of the concept of ‘security’, with its infinite capacity to incorporate elite political and economic goals into vaguely defined rhetoric about protecting the public from harms. And while I have not emphasized this is my contribution, in addition to being about class and race, ‘security’ is clearly also an affair saturated with gender. The masculine sporting spectacle of the FIFA World Cup is echoed by the overwhelmingly male displays of police and military force to guarantee ‘order’.

It might therefore be said that security functions as the ‘spokesperson’ of power-gendered, racialized, rooted in class inequalities- and the “permanent justification of the conditions and aims of the existing system” (Debord, 1994, 12). Through the continual appeal to ‘security’ huge expenditures and resources are poured into operations clearly designed to protect the interests of elites and designated consumers, whilst increasing the repressive capacity of states through appeal to ‘legacies’. But rather than being the result
of emergency or exceptional conditions such events bring to the fore a heightened version of normal politics, in which security is used to mould urban space and society according to the dictates of state and capital.

In that sense, at the heart of the security of the mega-event is the logic of pacification. More tellingly, at the heart of the spectacle of security we find nothing less than the **spectacle of pacification**.

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Research Note

THE PACIFICATION OF THE FAVELAS: MEGA EVENTS, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS, AND THE NEUTRALIZATION OF MARGINALITY

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Abstract
Rio de Janeiro is preparing to host two major sporting events in the coming years: the 2014 FIFA World Football Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. Local authorities are promoting these mega events as an opportunity to increase the global competitiveness of the city. But in order to attract private capital from the global economy it is not enough for Rio to showcase the city as capable of organizing and implementing these events. Rather, the authorities must also demonstrate that what has been considered one of the most dangerous cities in the world can now become a safe place for business. To do so, what has been promoted as a new model of ‘community policing’ the UPP (Pacifying Police Units) has been implemented since 2008 in 107 favelas. The majority of the favelas involved in the program are situated around the sites where these mega events will take place and around other wealthy areas of the city. This article analyses the relation between mega events, global competitiveness and the neutralization of local marginality.

Résumé

1Sebastian Saborio is a Sociology PhD candidate at the University of Urbino, Italy. His doctorate project is based on the pacification of the famous ‘Favelas’ in Rio de Janeiro. He examines the ways in which mega events, global competitiveness and the neutralization of urban marginality plays into the relationship between repression and assistance within the UPP (Pacifying Police Units) program, and its role in the reduction of urban violence and the transformation of police practices within poor communities. Sebastian Saborio est un aspirant au doctorat à l’université d’Urbino en Italie. Son projet de PHD se base sur la pacification des Favelas à Rio de Janeiro. Il examine quelle importance ont les événements mondiaux, la compétitivité internationale et la neutralisation de la marginalité urbaine dans la relation entre répression et assistance au sein du programme UPP (Pacifying Police Units), et son rôle dans la réduction de la violence urbaine et la transformation des pratiques policières dans les communautés pauvres. Contact: sebastian.saborio@gmail.com.
Cependant, il n’est pas suffisant pour attirer les capitaux privés de l’économie mondiale que Rio soit valorisée comme une ville capable d’organiser et de gérer ces événements. Les autorités doivent aussi démontrer que, ce qui auparavant était considéré comme une des plus dangereuses villes du monde, peut maintenant devenir un endroit sûr pour les entreprises. Dans ce but, l’UPP (Pacifying Police Units) a été mis en place en 2008 dans 107 favelas et est décrit comme le nouveau modèle de la police communitarian. La plupart des favelas intégrées dans le programme sont situées autour des lieux qui accueilleront les événements et dans d’autres endroits confortables de la ville. Pour cette raisons, cette article analyse les relations entre les événements mondiaux, la compétitivité mondiale et la neutralisation de la marginalité locale.

**Key words**
Pacification, Favelas, Rio de Janeiro, Mega events, Global competitiveness

**From the War on Drugs to the Armed Peace**

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the *favelas* in Rio Janeiro, or ‘communities’, as its residents prefer to call them, have been associated with marginality and violence (Valladares 2000). In the last thirty years in particular, the *favelas* have experienced confrontation among criminal rival gangs, such as the Comando Vermelho and Terceiro Comando which contend for the control of the drug market (Misse 1997). Furthermore, police brutality and corruption exacerbated the situation in the most vulnerable territories of the city that were, and in the most cases still are, controlled by organized crime and by physical violence.²

The first Pacifying Police Unit (the Unidade de Policia Pacificadora or UPP) was launched in December 19th 2008 in the Santa Marta *favela* by the Security department of the State of Rio de Janeiro, with the support of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, the Federal government and private sector funds. At the moment, 30 different UPPs have pacified ‘just’ 107 of the almost 1000 *favelas*. To achieve this pacification, the *favelas* underwent what is essentially a military occupation. Each pacification starts with the arrival of the Special Police Operations Squad, otherwise known as ‘BOPE’,³ supported by the military naval and air forces, and finishes with the implementation of the UPP, which ensures the constant, pervading presence of the Military Police within the communities.

Before the creation of UPPs, smaller security programs like the Integrated Centre of Community Police in 1983 and the Special Areas Policing Group of Rio de Janeiro’s

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²"Since the inception of the large-scale drug trade, violence has increased over 54 percent" (McRoskey 2010, 95).

Military police force in 2000, had been advertised by the Security Department as community policing programmes (Cardoso 2011). However, the UPP project was intended to be a "new model of public security that bridges the gap between population and police". Yet, Rio de Janeiro is used to such declarations of police innovation. Thus, Frühling has documented how "since the 1990s, every proclamation for police reform in Latin America led to the launching of a community policing programme designed to improve police community relations" (2012, 76). These kinds of programmes represent an easy way to create a political consensus between the local population and, in Rio de Janeiro’s case, international public opinion. Scholars (Barbosa 2012, Cano 2012, Fleury 2012, Machado da Silva 2010) have criticized the idea that the UPP is a community policing programme, arguing that it fails to meet the majority of criteria that characterise community policing philosophy, such as developing strong relationships with the community, ongoing consultation, dealing with concrete security issues and being proactive rather than reactive (Frühling 2012, 78). Principally, as Barbosa (2012) pointed out, there is no active engagement on behalf of the residents in maintaining the ‘security and order’ imposed by the arrival of the BOPE nor is the community actively involved in the subsequent UPP patrolling of the territory. In fact, the UPP implements what appears to be a military operation (Yutzy 2012).

Armed control of the occupied territories is done little different to the control operated by the drug gangsters (Misse 2011), in fact the Pacification Police’s first objective is to affirm the presence of the State in the favelas. Hence the first step is the presence of police officers patrolling the streets on foot and in vehicles, acting promptly to impose the laws and The Law. The Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, Sergio Cabral, used explicitly military terms borrowed from the colonial matrix to define his project of neutralization of local marginality: pacification. By using the term ‘pacification’ and by promoting the occupation of the favelas as an important step forward in the war on drugs, Cabral disclosed what the mainstream Brazilian media tried to hide: that pacification was to be an act of war, dressed up as peace (Neocleous 2010, 14). The declaration that peace has to be brought inside the favelas and the application of the same logic that sees the favelas as the enemy in the ‘war on drugs’ was a communicative tactic used to legitimize the militarization of civilian territories. At a rhetorical level, the description of it as a war and the criminalization of internal groups of citizens as part of this war was a way of managing public opinion towards accepting the state’s repression of both the working and underclass that compose the communities in question.

The stated objective of the pacification of the favelas is to take back the control of these territories by expelling or disarming traffic dealers, in order to implement, with parallel programs, social services and economic activities that are supposed to benefit the most disadvantaged population of the city. Targeting traffic dealers as the only dangerous
category of the favelas, the rhetoric partially overcame the paradoxical stereotype that considered the poor as a dangerous class when living in favelas but not whilst working in the less guaranteed and worst paid jobs inside the ‘legal city’. This paradox enabled the economic forces to exploit an important labour resource without requiring the State to provide adequate social services and infrastructures in the favelas. Yet to understand the real causes of the pacification of the favelas we need to go beyond the mainstream rhetoric. As Rigakos explains, the term pacification is less ubiquitous than the term security, and it allows us to ask, “Who is being pacified? Why are they being pacified and why are they resisting?”. In other words, it allows us to ask: “What are the real objectives of this pacification project?” (Rigakos 2011, 63).

Our starting point is the fact that the pacification process started around the time when Rio de Janeiro was selected as the host city of two of the major sporting events of the world. The city was selected as the host of the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup on 30 October 2007 and as the host of the 2016 summer Olympic games on 2 October 2009; the pacification process started on 19 December 2008. In this context, the decision to ‘bring peace’ to the favelas coincided with city administrators’ desire to uphold promises given to the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and to the FIFA regarding the improvement of security in certain areas of the city. The majority of the pacified favelas are in fact not located within the metropolitan areas that have a higher violent death rate. Most of the UPPs are located in the southern tier of the city or around the famous Maracanã stadium, creating an ‘urban security belt’ around the venues where the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games are to be held. The remaining favelas located near sporting venues, major tourist attractions and access points to the new public transport system that is being constructed, are on the list of areas to be formally pacified as part of the program.

The pacification process itself is intended to ensure the actual physical safety of visitors, such as occurred at the South African 2010 FIFA World cup where sporting venues and other leisure areas like the ‘fan parks’ (Giulianotti & Klauser 2010), housed tourists in highly militarized and surveyed perimeters of the city, as Christopher McMichael has discussed elsewhere in this volume. In the first year of Sergio Cabral’s administration, the 2007 Pan American Games provided Rio with an opportunity to experiment with security techniques during sport mega events. On that occasion, a temporary security wall was erected around the sporting venues (Curi 2011) and the Alemão Favela complex was occupied by the police and military in an operation that resulted in the death of 19 civilians (Freeman 2012). Rather than security walls as such,

5 Unlike South African cities, where the “concentration of violent crime in poor, black townships and informal settlements” (See Christopher McMichael in this special issue) were located far away from the Game’s venues, some of the Rio’s favelas are in the same areas where the FIFAifa World Cup and the Olympic Games will be held.
Rio de Janeiro plans to spend around US $100 million in CCTV cameras for both events, and for the 2014 FIFA World Cup alone over 53,000 new police agents will be enlisted in Brazil’s Special Task Force (Dossiê do Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro 2012). Moreover, it is highly likely that the favelas will be further militarized as the events get closer, and certainly during the events themselves.

**Pacification: A Consensus Machine**

The actual pacification undertaken by police is not just oriented to securitizing the venues hosting such events, but also to creating a consensus between internal elites and international public opinion. Mainstream local media has almost unanimously demonstrated an ‘uncritical enthusiasm’ (Machado da Silva 2010) for the UPP project, as it has been presented and thus welcomed as the solution for urban violence. The rhetoric of authorities used to legitimize the pacification process is different, however, when directed to a local audience compared to an international one. For Rio de Janeiro voters, the success of a mega event cannot be considered a priority in comparison to public safety and social wellbeing. So, at a local level, the UPP will gain public approval as long as they secure elite residential areas and promise to improve the conditions of life of the dwellers of the favelas. At the international level, in contrast, the issue is presented as the security of visitors, behind which lies the reputation of the city itself. In other words, whereas in Brazil the pacification of favelas is not presented in terms of its necessity for the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games, at the international level it is. Hence, for example, on the Portuguese version of the UPP web page (http://www.upprj.com/) the official Olympic Games logo does not appear, whereas on the English version web page (http://www.upprj.com/index.php/as_upps_us) it did –this has since been changed -- underlining the links between the UPP and the staging of the Olympics. Furthermore, under the ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ (FAQ) section of the Olympic Games web page one finds the question “how will security be ensured at the Games?”. The answer offered is that “the general population is already reaping the benefits of the project of the deployed Rio de Janeiro Pacifying Police Units (UPP) based on responsible and careful planning” (rio2016.com, my italics). The relationship of the UPPs to mega events is better acknowledged in the international press than in the Brazil media. Indeed, on the IOC international website, the UPP is acknowledged as part of a ‘responsible’ process of ‘careful planning’ as we have just seen.

For the city to demonstrate ‘responsible and careful planning’, questions about the UPP’s violence and repression are ignored. Instead, the pacification of the favelas is presented as improving human rights and general levels of security, to an international audience that is better acquainted with Rio’s long history of police corruption and brutality. Yet the UPP’s provide another important function, which is to delegitimize
political protest. If we consider that mega events are “important because they provide a political opportunity structure unlike any other on the world stage” (Cottrell & Nelson 2011, 732), then in the case of Brazil the opportunity to delegitimize political protests has been seized. Protest against the security measures themselves is presented as unnecessary or anachronistic. Insofar as pacification is successful, ‘protest’ is redundant; all that matters is the ‘security’ of the ‘community’. Moreover, even though episodes of police violence and corruption during the pacification of the favelas have undermined the ‘community-friendly’ approach of the UPP, it is still promoted as part of the mega events social legacy for the entire city.

The idea that mega events are an opportunity to improve social conditions is also fundamental to legitimizing the huge amount of public expenditure, that, as many studies demonstrate, do not have a positive economic impact for the hosting cities (Szymanski 2011, 91). In particular, there is no evidence of any economic benefit for the poorest groups of citizens (Minnaert 2012).

This creation of a consensus around the mega-event and the necessity of pacification is especially important given the relative absence of democratic decision-making with respect to public spending connected with the Olympics and related ‘security’ ventures and expenses. The APO (Public Olympic Authority) is an extragovernmental institution, formed as a joint-venture between the Federal Government, the State and the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. The APO will control a R$30billion budget, which is expected to be surpassed. Further, it has the authority to acquire land through eminent domain and acts as the central coordinating authority for Olympic security (Gaffney 2010, 25). The Olympic Plan, which will shape the urban infrastructure and involves, as noted, significant public funds, was formulated by the unelected Brazilian Olympic Committee and the APO, excluding institutional decision-making mechanisms that already exist within Brazilian society (Vainer 2011) and largely bypassing any democratic discussion. Although 90% of the Olympic and FIFA World Cup funds in Rio de Janeiro come from the public sector (Dossiê do Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro 2012), profits remain in the hands of international sport institutions and private investors. Why, then, did the city decide to bid and stage these mega events?

Mega events put Rio de Janeiro on the map of global, competitive cities. Hence, the staging of the event can be understood as an effort to signal Rio’s attractiveness to foreign investors. But, according to the definition of ‘sustainable competitiveness’ of the World Economic Forum (Schwab 2012), the city of Rio does not, in fact, have a sustainable, competitive business plan. Economic, social, and environmental factors are never equally balanced when attempting to meet the requirements of these mega events. The need to achieve the general infrastructural requirements demanded by the OIC and FIFA places the interests of capital in the foreground, without serious consideration for the real needs of the local population. The ‘Legacy Plan’ for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics Games proclaims that mega events are aimed at creating “a better Rio for its
inhabitants, by promoting structural changes in the transportation system, urban infrastructures, environment and social development (Costa 2012), but it is rare for any such mega event to leave such a legacy. (Minnaert 2012). Since improved public housing, transportation, sanitation, education and public space, are rarely genuinely considered in the plans for such events (Bienenstein et al. 2010, 8), it is perhaps not surprising that improved local welfare is rarely the outcome of staging such global sporting events. However, there are benefits for capital and for ‘security’, by which I mean not actually improved safety for the vast majority, and especially the poorest, but the pacification of potentially rebellious subaltern classes and groups.

Compete Globally, Lose Locally: Mega Events and the Securitization of Private Capital

As noted, central to the ways in which political authorities and the mainstream media talk about such mega events is the idea that they will enhance Rio de Janeiro’s global competitiveness by creating the necessary conditions for investment. However, to be accepted by the population, the competition-oriented strategy of the city is presented as indispensable to the planning and implementation of an urban renovation to solve certain structural problems. The current urban planning objectives are based on the desire to integrate poorer communities into the urban system through the urbanization and pacification of some favelas, in order to recover urban sites that have been ghettoized, and improving the public transport system. Yet, the emphasis has not been on cooperating to fairly allocate existing resources. Instead, the promoters of these mega events have fostered the idea that sites should compete in a ‘war of cities’, in an effort to attract foreign capital on a worldwide market (Arantes et al. 2002).

Towards 2016: A More Integrated and Competitive Rio is the title of the Municipality’s Strategic Plan for 2009-2012. It clearly outlines how, until the end of the Olympic Games in 2016, a mega event-oriented strategy will support the city’s competitiveness. Under this prospect, mega events are promoted as opportunities for cities to showcase their material and symbolic resources and so attract capital flows from the global market. Rio is to realise its role as the ‘Marvellous City’, as the city now calls itself in an aggressive branding campaign (Jaguaribe 2012). This branding aims to sell an image of the city as a fertile, productive site, where investors can find optimal conditions to develop their businesses. Just as with any other product in the market, the city is being advertised for its positive features, both real and purposely built to attract tourists, entrepreneurs, real estate developers and multinational corporations. This emphasis on foreign investment means that the needs of local populations are at best secondary considerations, promoted only if compatible with the needs of both domestic capital and foreign investors.

6 My translation.
The Carioca Carnival and samba culture, together with other traditional tourist attractions such as the world famous beaches, have always allowed Rio de Janeiro to compete in the global tourist market. However, the exponential increase in urban violence in the last thirty years or so has progressively curbed the city’s appeal to foreign visitors. The UPP’s project is helping to change the perception of tourists by showing Rio de Janeiro, or at least the gentrified southern tier where the mega events will be hosted, as a safe place to visit and invest. By taking advantage of the ‘touristification’ of the favelas (Russo 2012), the pacification process is slowly transforming and making urban spaces previously considered as ‘no-go areas’ accessible for tourists and middle-class individuals. Tourism has thus increased within the pacified favelas. Indeed, it can be argued that befitting a purely voyeuristic spectacle of urban poverty, the favelas are now offering tourists the spectacle of pacification itself.

Yet tourism plays only one role in the city’s strategy of becoming more ‘business friendly’. To attract capital, mega events facilitate deregulation policies based on a supposed demand for labour flexibility and to neutralize other restrictions on accumulation. Thus the successful implementation of the mega events helps give legal form to what otherwise might not have a legal form (Agamben 2003, 10), allowing the state to enact ad hoc legislations and special authorizations that facilitate accumulation (Vainer 2011) – but to do so in the name of Olympic pride rather than explicitly ‘for businesses’. Witness, for example, the General Law of the World Cup, effective from May 2012, which privileges the FIFA with commercial advantages in Brazil, so disregarding fundamental rights protected by existing legislation, such as the Consumers Defence Code (Costa 2011).

Capitalist accumulation is thus facilitated given the supposed urgency of implementation, due to the shortened time frames of mega-events. At the same time, urban transformation is very much part of an existing strategy of capitalist accumulation. In this way, although mega events are not the original causes of the ‘depredatory planning’ implemented in the Global South (Graham 2012), they certainly accelerate and legitimate it. In fact, for countries of the Global South such as Brazil and South Africa “hosting a mega event is often first and foremost a political mega project, undertaken by elites to fortify the State and to engineer societal transformation” (Cornelissen 201, 3222). Mega events thus rhetorically legitimate the forced removal of some poor communities with neither fair compensation or decent reallocation (Araujo de Assumpção & Schramm 2012), the securitization and ‘beautification’ of other poor communities, and further real estate speculation in increasingly gentrified urban areas (as Christopher McMichael also shows in this volume).

For the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016 in Brazil, more than 170,000 Brazilian families have already had their housing rights violated. Forced evictions had been carried out, counter to Brazilian and international human rights law, in order
to build the new stadiums and transport infrastructure and supposedly guarantee security in the areas of the mega events in question (Dossiê da Articulação Nacional dos Comitês Populares da Copa 2012). However, Davis (2011) points out that forced evictions occurring before a mega event usually continue afterwards. Moreover, similar illegal removals also occur in cities that have entered a bid for a mega event but have not been awarded with hosting it. This allows us to see the extent to which mega events are an instrumental tool to reconstitute the urban landscape around the logic of security and the needs of capital. The process of ‘urban growth’ which we are told is necessary to host any mega events, absorbs the surplus produced by capitalism, guarantees high profits to private industrial corporations and entrenches new security measures (Harvey 2012). The improvements for high-income populations are dependent on the securitization of poor communities, which is a way of saying that the wealth of one class is dependent on the pacification of another.

In 2011, the real estate market in the city experienced a 44% boom compared to 2010 (Rolnik 2012). In particular, the increase affected areas immediately adjacent to the pacified favelas. For example, some properties before pacification cost around R$30,000, but after pacification were selling for R$200,000 or more (Freeman 2012). Moreover, in May 2010, only a year and a half after the implementation of the first UPP, real estate value increased by 400% in the favelas involved in the pacification project. As a consequence, rent inflation is forcing the poorest residents to abandon their homes. Besides, current land tenure regularisation policies mean that owners with financial difficulties may be relatively easily “persuaded to trade in that asset for a cash payment at a relatively low price” (Harvey 2012, 20). Harvey has predicted that “if present trends continue, within fifteen years all those hillsides now occupied by the favelas will be covered by high-rise condominiums with fabulous views over Rio’s bay, while the erstwhile favela-dwellers will have been filtered off to live in some remote periphery”.

The outcome is that the existing differences between poorest and wealthiest urban areas are exacerbated. When the city wakes up from its Olympic dream, its class divisions will be even more apparent, written into the urban infrastructure. A higher number of global citizens will visit, inhabit and invest in the city, while the working class will struggle with labour flexibility, residential uncertainty and violent repression at the margins of these urban centres.

**Pacification: An Incomplete Project**

The pacification of the favelas is part of the mega events legacy. In practice, it aims not only to mitigate urban violence but also to allow the state to implement social and infrastructural changes. Contrary to official claims, however, as soon as a UPP is established in a community, social improvements are disregarded as a main priority. The
arrival of the Pacification units does not significantly change the classical governmental approach in relation to the favelas. The historic uncertainty of the juridical situation of such informal settlements, stigmatized as loci of urban violence even when they experience urbanization, legalization and securitization processes, is used to justify the lack of public investment (Gonçalves 2006). Even José Mariano Beltrame, the head of the Security department of the State of Rio de Janeiro, has noted the lack of real investment in social programs and failure to implement basic services such as garbage collection (see Elenilce Bottari, Liane Gonçalves, 2011).

Here we should note the role of the UPP Social, a parallel program to the UPP. The former, managed by the institute responsible for municipal urban planning (Pereira Passos Institute), promotes a proactive dialogue between different stakeholders from government, entrepreneurs and civil society. However, as Fleury (2012) outlines, besides being implemented in the favelas with a remarkable delay – in some cases three years after the initial pacification process – it is not clear which actions have been undertaken to effectively implement new social policies. As a result, no significant policies in healthcare, education or concerning basic needs have followed the implementation of the UPP (Vieira da Cunha 2012). Instead, pacification is used to achieve a beautification strategy of the favelas visible from the mega events sceneries but not to bring about meaningful improvements in social welfare.

Pacification partially integrates the favelas into the urban system, but seeking to incorporate them into the mainstream market economy. Utilities such as electrical power, water and pay-TV that were previously supplied by illegal connections are now being managed by regular private companies. Beyond the obvious economic profits for service providers, the population of the favelas is reaping some benefits from the regularization process. For example, Light, a private power company, is substituting dangerous electrical installations with safer ones (Vieira da Cunha & Mello 2011). Residents that can afford price increases may be happy to pay for more reliable and safer services. But for the most needy segments of the pacified communities, higher bills are forcing them to seek dwellings in other cheaper localities, as we have noted, where they find the same inadequate living conditions they left.

It is important to recognize that by substituting armed gangs with less violent police control, the government is transforming each favela in important ways. However, the tactic was driven first and foremost by the effort to recover and re-occupy strategically important urban areas in order to reassure domestic capital and attract foreign investment; the safety and needs of the favela populations have always been secondary to these other considerations. The occupation of these favelas is allowing Rio de Janeiro to enhance its global competitiveness by curbing street criminality in the surrounding well-to-do areas that receive global investments and are of the most interest to capital. Moreover, the presence of police in the favelas neutralizes the marginal population by
forcing it to accept market rules in their communities; the favelas are policed reserve armies of labour, sometimes the proletariat, but these populations are not allowed to exist as de commodified spaces of community solidarity.

When Neocleous (2011) reconstructs the origin and evolution of the term pacification, he explains that the destruction of an established social system and the consequent reconstruction of what is promised to be a ‘brighter and nicer new life’, is put into place to secure the capitalist accumulation process. To induce a pacified population to accept the new order, Neocleous continues, the state uses a careful combination of ‘force and politics’, of repression and ideological indoctrination. If the pacification strategy is successful, then alongside strategies of control one sees the construction of market relationships and new forms of exploitation. In one sense, this is what is happening in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Yet, in another way, this is not being fully accomplished. For no ‘balance’ between force and politics, repression and indoctrination, is necessary if there is no opposing force to jeopardize the global competitive strategy adopted by the city. To put it another way, we must always ask where is the possibility of resistance?

Community organizations in Rio are already reacting against the price of an imposed peace. Some of the existing associations inside the communities have joined forces by creating networks in order to implement preventive actions against police brutality and to fight for a ‘brighter and nicer new life’ against and beyond the UPP forces.

In Santa Marta Favela the association Visão da favela (Favela’s Vision) with other associations and NGOs such as Justiça Global (Global Justice) created a handbook to distribute to residents that clearly explains their rights related to the police presence in their community. The same is currently being carried out in other favelas that have not yet been pacified, such as the Maré favela, where a civil society campaign is preparing residents for the arrival of a new UPP, by sharing strategies about how to avoid and fight police brutality. Networks such as Rede Contra a Violência (Network Against Violence) and the Favela Favela Não Se Cala (The favela does not shut up) struggle against the police repression and forced removals.

“Peace without voice is not peace, it’s fear!” is one of the most quoted mottos in the anti-UPP demonstrations. The possibility of improving social conditions inside the favelas increases when residents take advantage of the political opportunity structure produced by the mega events and collaborate with networks like the Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro, to challenge the unequal benefits of the Olympics and to call for peace rather than pacification. For instance, this Committee is a civil society network that denounces the human rights violations related to the organization of the mega event and to challenge the unfair redistribution of social and economic benefits associated with them. Indeed, a major challenge for the UPP is to contain the daily forms of micro-resistance of favela dwellers (Cano 2012) and the spontaneous riots after the
pacifying forces have killed dwellers of the occupied territories.

This struggle against pacification and the UPP has not been easy, not least because it is inevitably also a struggle against the mainstream media and public opinion. But it does suggest that pacification is an incomplete project. As long as local residents, often the poorest and more vulnerable, refuse to accept living in armed peace as normal or even necessary, there will always be the possibility of resistance.

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SECURITISATION AS DEPOLITICISATION: DEPOLITICISATION AS PACIFICATION

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Abstract
This article considers the development of the liberal state’s approach to national security in the era of the ‘war on terror’. The analysis focuses on state security strategies, considering how the state positions the politics of security historically through its representation of the current security ‘environment’. Drawing upon a critical analysis of the various layers of official strategy produced by the UK, US and Australia in this era, the article considers in the first instance the process of depoliticisation that defines the official understanding of security threats. The effects of depoliticising the issues and individuals deemed to constitute a threat to national security are subsequently considered through the theory of pacification plotting the links between securitization, depoliticisation and pacification. In doing so the analysis demonstrates how the framing of national security is pivotal to the official representation of ‘extremism’ and to the subsequent policing of protest and political activity. The article therefore suggests that the liberal state’s politics of security are defined by a pacification process that seeks to produce citizen-subjects who are unable and unwilling to resist the current social order.

Keywords
Securitisation, depoliticisation, pacification, national security, extremism

In the context of the so-called ‘war on terror’ much of what has passed for critical work in the social sciences has failed to understand the behaviour of the liberal state. This failure stems from the absence of a critique of security at the core of analyses of state violence. The attempt to provide a critique of the liberal state whilst accepting the illusion
of security – in many cases demanding that the state do security better or differently – has rendered much critical scholarship at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, merely reinforcing the seemingly unquestionable status of security in contemporary political discourse. Fundamentally, the failure to reject the logic of security has compounded an analytic and political blockage that prevents critical work understanding the violence of the liberal state and thus precludes such work from contributing to a truly alternative politics that has to be against security and devoid of reformist appeals to the liberal state.

The analysis in this article seeks to contribute to the process of finding a way out of this dead end. Ultimately, the project here is to contribute to the further development of an anti-security politics (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011) and the analysis seeks in Heidi Rimke’s terms to address, challenge and move beyond the hegemony of security (Rimke 2011, 194). It aims to do this by arguing that we need to understand the politics of security through the liberal state’s order-building, and the violence involved therein, both in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and beyond. More specifically, the analysis seeks to consider how national security as a – if not the – central state concern has been formulated in the post-9/11 period, suggesting that this gives us a vital insight into the liberal state’s role in the development of security politics. Through a focus on national security and counter-terrorism strategies produced by the UK, US and Australian governments the analysis is concerned with how these states conceive security in the current epoch but, moreover, how they define the current situation within which security strategy is developed and employed. This requires situating the politics of security historically.

The emphasis here is to establish a further understanding of how the official presentation of national security serves to legitimate the current security regime and the wider status quo. To do this the analysis considers two components of liberal security politics. In the first instance the analysis treats the process of securitization as a process of depoliticisation. Focusing upon what is essentially a process of marketing security politics through strategy documents the analysis seeks to demonstrate the legitimising effects that result from stripping security threats – and security in general – of any political dynamic in the official presentation. Secondly, the process of depoliticisation is considered as pacification. There exists a pivotal relationship between depoliticisation and pacification, and a focus on official security strategies reveals much about the behavior of the liberal state and its role in fabricating order.

Securitisation as Depoliticisation: National Security at the End of History

While the defense of the nation is clearly not a new concern of the state the emphasis on the term ‘national security’ as a specific concern of state policy is a feature of the latter part of the twentieth century (Neocleous 2006). The production of specific
'national security strategy' documents began in the US under Regan and has continued through to the current era with each President providing their own revised version. It is however only in the post 9/11 period that UK and Australia governments appear to have adopted this US model and developed their own national security strategy documents. This article seeks to consider the content of these documents and examine the points of convergence between more recent strategy documents produced by US, UK and Australian governments. From their inception these security strategy documents have had as their central role the provision of an official vision of the current national and global security environment. These public documents published directly by heads of government give little direct detail about state policy and legislation and arguably serve instead to market the state’s vision of security, to ‘sell’ to the public the state’s account of the threats faced and the responses required. Their content and the importance afforded to the publication of these documents by new administrations demonstrate the importance to the state of maintaining an idealised image of security (see also McMichael, this volume) and the strategy documents produced by the US, UK and Australia have from their inception played a vital role in presenting a very specific, state sanctioned vision of the world. While much of what these documents set out is not new, a consideration of official security discourse as articulated through layers of security strategies makes it possible to understand how the politics of security is historically located and positioned in relation to (and as an integral part of) the broader politics of the liberal state.

In what follows, I draw on a number of the national security strategy documents published in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia since 2002 and a number of official statements on national security from the same period to create an ‘ideal-typical’ narrative of securitization in the post 9/11 period. Although there may be some cross-national differences, overall, the story is a remarkably similar one, emphasizing the ‘end of history’ and the dawn of a new era of security in the face of

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2 The general concern of the state in these documents – national security – is clearly not itself novel but the publication of a distinct publicly available strategy document of this nature, and under this title, published by the White House in the US since 1987, the Cabinet Office in the UK since 2008, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in Australia since 2008 is. The concern of this article lies with the content and specific function of these documents considering if and how the adoption of this US model by the UK and Australia is indicative of a shared framing of the issue of national security.

3 Changes in government or changes in leader in each of the three countries in focus has brought about a new, revised or updated version of the national security strategy. In the US there have been 15 versions of National Security Strategy with each President from Regan through to Obama publishing their own documents and revising and updating at regular intervals (see www. http://nssarchive.us). In the UK the first national security strategy was published in 2008 and has been revised twice firstly in 2009 and then again by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. In Australia the first National Security Statement to Parliament was published in 2008 and the first comprehensive national security strategy document was produced in 2013.
unfamiliar and unprecedented terrorist threats. In the first instance each of these
documents make clear to the reader that the contemporary threats to national security
and the state response to them have to be understood in line with how the world has
changed in the twenty-first century. The twentieth century ended, albeit eleven years
early, with a “decisive victory for the forces of freedom” that left “a single sustainable
model for national success” defined by “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” (Bush
2002, iv). The struggles of the twentieth century have been overcome with the “forces of
freedom’ unanimously victorious. The defining opposition of this period, that between
“two power blocs” driven by ideology (and located either side of a freedom/tyranny binary),
has been replaced by “more complex and unpredictable sets of relationships”
leaving a “transformed international landscape” (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 3). Essentially,
this “transformed landscape’ is one on which there remains no defining opposition
between nation states, “power blocs” or ideologies. There is now in the post-1989 context
no “sustained global challenge to the liberal, market-oriented vision of a free society” (UK
Cabinet Office 2009, 5). We have reached the end of history (Fukyama 1992); the age of
political oppositions is over.

The “victorious forces of freedom” have therefore carte-blanche to define this new
era in their own image and, as a result, this is an age of freedom, democracy and human
rights starkly distinguished from a previous era blighted by war, barbarism and
inhumanity. The “militant visions of class, nation and race which promised utopia and
delivered misery have been defeated and discredited” (Bush 2002, 1) and in its place we
have a vision of the world defined by human rights. The vision of freedom presented here
is central to the liberal state’s role in maintaining bourgeois order. Free-market capitalism
is presented post-1989 as the victorious economic model and in turn as an inevitable
defining feature of the current era. In an apparent drive to consolidate ‘capitalist realism’
(Fisher 2009), there is, we are told, now no possibility, but also no desire, for an
alternative model.

The market economy, in its current form, is taken as both as the defining feature
of the current global situation and as the end point for the development and
consolidation of the new post-political era. Free trade is understood to be “real freedom”

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4 While this emphasis on the end of the twentieth century is true to each of the documents produced since
2001, the notion of a changed and changing world has been central to the official narrative in national
security strategy documents since their beginning: the first US document drafted under Regan in 1987 set
out the issue of national security against the backdrop of a ‘complex and changing world’ (Regan 1987, 2)
and for George Bush the fall of the Berlin Wall and ‘crisis of communism’ meant that the national security
challenges facing the US in 1990 had to be understood in an ‘environment that is today dramatically
changing’ (Bush 1990, 4). Each consecutive President from Clinton to George W Bush to Obama has
stressed the need for the public to understand the challenges the state and the nation as a whole face in
terms of security threats arise from the ways in which the world has changed and is changing at the time of
(Bush 2002, 18) and the capitalist economy is presented in this formulation as the
overcoming of the political. The question of capital is thus depoliticised – the age of
politics in which economic models and political ideologies were opposed has given way to
an “age of freedom” defined by free-trade and the free-market. As history is here divided
in two eras on either side of 1989, global capitalism (or moreover the economic sphere in
general) is withdrawn from consideration; the end of history marks the end of
questioning the role and form of the economy. This framing is central to the logic of
national security.

It is from this starting point that the UK, US and Australian security strategies
need to be understood. Such strategies are “grounded entirely in human rights” (HM
Government 2009, 55). Terrorism threatens these rights and thus constitutes the primary
threat to security – defined by the US as the “common foe” (Executive Office of the
President 2003, 2) – for the international community. This ‘community’ is here defined
by its commitment to human rights as those who reject their validity are “isolated” or,
more accurately, excluded. The terrorists’ unwillingness (or inability) to justify their
actions inside the language of human rights posits them as relics of the previous age of
politics; they are in George W Bush’s words the “heirs of all the murderous ideologies of
the twentieth century…..following the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism”
(Executive Office of the President 2003, 5). Given that in the state’s vision this ‘age of
ideology’ is over, the terrorist’s commitment to politically motivated violence and
ideology is seen to distort political action.

Legitimate forms of political action are those defined exclusively by (the values of)
liberal democracy. What this means is that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks on the United States, all counterhegemonic movements were redefined as
structurally ‘on the same side’ as these terrorist acts. Hence, for instance, the ‘anti-
globalization’ movement, which in fact posits an alternative, sometimes non-capitalist
form of globalization, was assimilated to Al-Qaeda, as if there were no meaningful
differences between these two movements (Coburn 2011). The goal of the liberal state
here is to bring about a consensus around one vision of politics and political action
defined through human rights; a vision of political action that is ultimately incapable of
challenging the current status quo.

The presentation of the current threat(s) to security involves at its core the
construction of an enemy that defines the ‘war on terror’ distinguished from ‘us’ not in
terms of a political opposition but through its inability or unwillingness to share the
vision of the world set out by the liberal state. The ability to locate the threat of
contemporary terrorism historically – as a new form of threat to state integrity – has a
fundamental effect on the content of counter-terrorism strategy and the provision of a
historical narrative has become a more prominent feature in the most recent strategy
documents. For example, one of the key revisions to the UK counter-terrorism strategy in
2009 was the addition of a historical account of the emergence of the contemporary
terrorist threat to the UK, explaining what led to its emergence and considering how it may continue to evolve in the future. The space afforded to this type of historical account is a result of the fact that the provision an official history of terrorism is crucial to the state’s attempt to legitimise its counter-terrorism strategy.

The historical account provided in UK strategy affirms the official diagnosis of the threat as driven, in Gordon Brown’s terms, solely by a “violent extremist ideology” (Brown in HM Government 2009, 4) identified by a shared attachment to Islam and only tied together in the contemporary era by the Al Qa’ida ‘organisation’. This account serves, by way of an introduction, to further homogenise and as a result depoliticise the whole range of movements and causes that are lumped together under the banner of international terrorism (Cole 2003). The fact that the only common link is supposedly provided by Al Qa’ida and their ‘extremist ideology’ further dismisses the idea of coherent grievances deriving from common causal factors. The history of Western imperialism in the Middle East is perhaps unsurprisingly not part of the official history of the evolution of the contemporary terrorist threat. For example, the role of UK foreign policy in inciting the terrorist threat is restricted to “perceptions” of such policies held by those with a distorted and inaccurate view of global events.5 The official historical analysis is set in opposition to the “fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history” (HM Government 2010, 10) and the “subculture of misinformation and conspiracy” that are said to be at the root of an extremist ideology (Executive Office of the President United States 2006, 10).

This account is reinforced by the continued emphasis on the distinctive nature of the contemporary terrorist movement. The previous threat is presented as having been manageable through conventional methods and distinct in both motivations and strategy from the modern threat. The distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism is based on the partial acknowledgement of the political goal and resulting political status of previous threats that is now conclusively absent in discussions of the modern threat. This distinction is based on a revisionist account of state responses to previous terrorism that allows the current strategy to attribute to it a political cause. This is arguably most pronounced in UK security and counter-terrorism strategy in which the official history provided marks a fundamental departure from the official line on the IRA in the 1970s and 1980s defined as it was predominantly through a process of criminalization (see O’Dowd et al 1980). This revised understanding of past terrorist movements allows the UK government to point toward a relationship between the devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the decline of terrorist groups in this context.

5 Tackling these “unfounded” views of British imperialism is a central component of British counter-terrorism strategy and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the New Labour government sent senior diplomats on “roadshows” to “terror hotspots” in the UK and abroad to talk to young Muslims about the “reality” of foreign policy. See Butt (2009).
Importantly, it also allows them to depoliticise and dismiss outright all dissident Republican groups that continue to oppose the post-Good Friday Agreement situation in Northern Ireland.

Accordingly, in this official account there existed a political and to some extent ‘legitimate’ terrorism that was confronted (and ultimately defeated) in previous decades, whereas there is now a ‘new’ terrorism driven exclusively by a violent extremist ideology underpinned by a religious fundamentalism. The ‘culturalisation’ of contemporary international terrorism in security strategy is both explicit and comprehensive. The religious ideology that supposedly underpins all contemporary terrorist activity is understood as apolitical because it stands outside of what constitutes politics in the liberal framework. The contemporary terrorist is thus in the liberal mind a fanatic summoning what Alberto Toscano has described as a “spurious form of political simplification, an ersatz intelligibility that leaves us none the wiser about religious politics and global conflicts” (2010, 101). The official representation of security aims precisely to reinforce this obfuscation.

The UK National Security Strategy 2009 sought to challenge the “climate of intolerance and distrust in which violence as a tool of political discourse becomes acceptable” (UK Cabinet Office 2009, 78). This understanding of the relationship between intolerance and violence is central to official security discourse as ‘intolerance’ has become a “code-word……for fundamentalism identified with the non-West, with barbarism and with anti-Western violence” (Brown 2008, 16). The “climate of intolerance” is in this sense associated with the Islamic terrorist who focuses their intolerance toward the West. The terrorist’s intolerance is understood to be entirely irrational, driven by culture and religion and indicative of the void between the opposing forces in the ‘war on terror’. Through this interpretation the distinction between these opposing sides cannot be overcome, but neither can it be contested politically: it is reduced to cultural difference, the response to which can only be tolerance.

The opposition between the tolerant and the intolerant that frames security strategy (with particular emphasis in relation to counter-terrorism) involves, according to Wendy Brown, a fusion of the 19th century opposition between the civilized and the primitive and the Cold War opposition between freedom and tyranny, given that tolerance is aligned in contemporary liberal discourse with civilisation and freedom and intolerance equated with fundamentalism and barbarism (Brown 2008, 6). In this sense, civilisation remains the reserve of the ostensibly apolitical liberal. Political conflict is effaced; the irreducible confrontation is instead between those with the capacity for tolerance (the civilized) and those without (the barbaric).

If we understand that “the governmentality of tolerance as it circulates through civilisational discourse has as part of its work the containment of the (organicist, non-Western, non-liberal) Other” (Brown 2008, 166), then the role of tolerance in security strategy becomes clearer; it serves to delineate the defining oppositions that apparently
colour the current security environment. That the opposing forces are non-Western and non-liberal is to be taken as given against the back drop of a culturalised framing of terrorism. However, the notion of an organicist Other defined through the notion of tolerance has wider implications. Here, we must understand that tolerance in liberal discourse can only be generated by autonomous individuals and thus those who are intolerant are defined by their rejection of (liberal) individualism. The rule by culture and/or religion that defines the intolerant, and in this case definitively marks the contemporary international terrorist, illustrates their opposition to and devaluation of the autonomous individual. The liberal individual is itself naturalised, posited as a universal norm that only the non-liberal fundamentalist would seek to challenge.

The utility of the alignment of tolerance in security strategy with human rights is here illustrated more clearly when one considers how the discourse of tolerance reinforces the idea that, in Alain Badiou’s terms, any “collective will to the Good is dismissed as an Evil” (2001, 13). Any collective identity is presented as the sole reserve of the non-liberal intolerant other. In a circular fashion their intolerance is a product of their collective identity and their intolerance compounds their rejection of liberal individualism. It is ultimately this devaluation of the autonomous individual that defines the intolerant as so opposed to the liberal model that it is to be understood as intolerable.

Framing security strategy through tolerance serves in this sense to defend the boundary between the free and the fundamentalist and render it insurmountable. The backdrop to security strategy – the opposition not between cultures or civilisations but between secular liberalism and the religious fundamentalist – is comprehensively depoliticized, thereby removing any formal consideration of a political response to terrorism from the security agenda. By framing the terrorist as intolerant and equating intolerance with fundamentalism and anti-Western violence, the terrorist is depicted as intolerable. This construction justifies the use of the most extreme violence to oppose a threat that is both incapable of being tolerated and unable to be confronted politically.

Depoliticisation as Pacification: Pacifying the Internal Threat

Since its beginning, the ‘war on terror’ has relied on this thinly veiled construction of the external threat to legitimate interventionist strategies and provide a legitimising gloss to the broader politics of security. Yet in recent years there has been an intensification of the domestic components of this ‘war’ as it has been increasingly directed at populations within those nations at the forefront of the ‘war on terror’. This component has been couched in the language of counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism and for the countries in focus here it has been to a large extent developed along the lines of the UK model. The concern here has been with the identification of an internal enemy supposedly revealed through the domestic terrorist attacks orchestrated
by those with citizenship in the target nation. The London bombings of July 7, 2005 have been presented as the prime example of this internal threat (see Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010) and the official approach to radicalisation and extremism has developed significantly since 2005. The distinction between the domestic and foreign component of the ‘war on terror’ is ultimately a false one (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011) but a focus on the development of domestic counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism strategies demonstrates usefully the further diffusion of the logic of security throughout state institutions and civil society.

UK and Australian counter-terrorism strategies share an emphasis on radicalisation and violent extremism understood to be the most important strategic factors in the encouragement of terrorism and thus a predominant focus in current strategy.6 UK strategy presents and discusses the causes of radicalisation in some detail as the backdrop to a counter-radicalisation strategy that forms a significant component of counter-terrorism work (HM Government 2009, 2010). The UK approach to (counter-)radicalisation has been cited as a model toward which the Australian government has sought to develop their approach7 and more recently the US have cited both UK and Australian counter-radicalisation programs as “possible templates” for the development of a US strategy to counter violent extremism.8

The analysis of radicalisation provided in strategy documents involves a continued rebuttal of “perceptions” of Western foreign policy that are understood to define the radicalised individual who is, as a result, “vulnerable” to the lure of terrorist movements (see HM Government 2009; Benjamin 2010). Beyond those grievances that underpin the radicalised subject there exists “a range of social and psychological factors” (Benjamin 2010, 42) that lead to radicalisation. This explanation focuses on the “vulnerability” of individuals and points to “a crisis in identity and, specifically, to a feeling of not belonging” (HM Government 2009, 42). The emphasis on the “psychological frailties” of these “vulnerable” individuals aligns them as Judith Butler has suggested with the mentally ill positioned as they both are “outside of reason” (2004, 72). Opposition to Western imperialism is framed as a result of the individual social and psychological issues attributed to Muslims demonstrating a continued concern with the

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6 The US were slower to take up the idea of a specific counter-radicalisation strategy or strategy to counter violent extremism but under the Obama administration efforts have been made to establish such a program with domestic and international projects. See, (Benjamin, 2010).

7 As indicated by First Assistant Secretary to head the Office of National Security in Australia, Angus Campbell in 2007 (see Campbell, 2007).

8 In 2010 the US Department of State had on detail a senior member from the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Counterterrorism Research Group from whom there was hope to gain “greater understanding of the UK’s experience with countering violent extremism as well as how the U.S. government can create effective, locally-targeted programs and enhance its efforts to counter extremist narratives.” (Benjamin, 2010, 4).
“Arab and Muslim ‘mind’” that Toscano notes has been a “long-term concern of the Atlantic discourse on Islam” (2010, 162).

The program of counter-radicalisation work that sits in UK strategy in the Prevent component of UK counter-terrorism strategy is diffused into all aspects of government, widening the state’s policing of ‘suspect’ populations. All local authorities in the UK have the accommodation of Prevent built into their “performance framework” as the facilitation of this program has been installed as an integral part of governance and an internal measure of its success (HM Government 2011, 36). Diffusing counter-terrorism work throughout government and public services is possible as a result of the fact that those orchestrating the ‘war on terror’ have sought to break “old orthodoxies that once confined out counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain” (Executive Office of the President 2006, 1). However, presenting the fight against terrorism as not simply the work of the police (although of course central to policing) has allowed such policing measures to expand beyond the criminal justice domain and infiltrate all aspects of government. The logic of security is all pervasive defining the work of a whole range of disparate institutions and services whose role in the fabrication of order is transformed through this new (or intensified) policing function.

This policing function is imposed in the UK upon schools, colleges and universities as well as children’s services, health services, social workers and community groups who are all expected to facilitate the monitoring and reporting of extremist ideas (HM Government 2010). This project of countering extremism is a state project in the true sense; it unites a multitude of state institutions and also demonstrates the difficulty of marking clearly a state – civil society distinction in the case of security politics. The development of this element of security strategy demonstrates Neocleous’ argument (2011) that security is pacification. The state’s desire to police dissenting subjects is made clear here with no age group or place of sanctuary off limits, but more importantly counter-radicalisation strategy reveals the productive dimension to the pacification process. What effectively plays out as the policing of school age children, of community groups, of those under the watch of social services, is driven by the desire pacify any flickers of resistance, no matter how embryonic, and produce the docile citizen-subjects necessary for the maintenance of bourgeois order.

The official presentation of extremist ideology and the flexibility of its definition provided by in official strategy have the ability to denounce all substantive political criticism of the current security agenda – as well as criticism of the current political and economic status quo – as extremist. The rejection of “shared values” is sufficient to be

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9 The diffusion of counter-terrorism measures across government was presented in the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 as a means to ‘maintain momentum’ and ‘keep the global war on terrorism in the forefront’ (Executive Office of the President 2003, 19).

10 “The terms ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ are at times defined in practice by the degree to which Muslims support or oppose central government or local authority policies.” (Kundnani 2009, 35).
labeled as an extremist; indeed, a personal opinion that illustrates an “uncompromising rejection of the principle of the rule of law and the authority of any elected Government in this country” (HM Government 2010, 9) is sufficient to be an indicator of (vulnerability to) extremism. A rejection of the legitimacy of liberal democracy or indeed a strident political critique of its failings is easily classified as extremist marking the individual out as a sign of disorder and thus the target for police action.

The problem posed by the radicalised individual is made clearer in Australian strategy. Here the problem of radicalisation is that it discourages “full participation in Australia’s social and economic life” (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2010, iv) illustrating that the opposition to liberalism posed by radicalisation cuts to the heart of the liberal production of the subject. Radicalisation prevents the subject from fulfilling their productive potential – that is, their potential as productive subjects – and clearly must be opposed. The concern with the marginalisation of the radicalised Other is genuine but not driven by a concern with the participation of the individual in social and political life. Pacification understood as a police project (Rigakos 2011) becomes vital here to counter the real threat posed by the radical and the aim of counter-radicalisation needs to be understood in line with the police dream of pacified workers (Neocleous this volume). In this sense radicalisation does pose a threat to liberal order, to capital, and counter-radicalisation becomes more pertinent once liberal states realise that they have a problem with an ‘internal enemy’. The possibility of unproductive subjects outside the West is troubling, but the idea of internal forces who seek to reject the validity of the current domestic order requires decisive action. This is a point noted explicitly in Australian strategy but implicated throughout the approach in the UK and US.

The official response then seeks to return the radical to mainstream (liberal) politics by undermining extremist ideas and essentially by enforcing a convergence on liberal shared values. The process of deradicalisation is therefore a process of fashioning the docile subject who fulfills their productive potential and shares these values accepting the legitimacy of what Badiou (2008) has termed “capitalo-parliamentarism”. The ‘return’ from radicalisation is facilitated by “mainstream” or “moderate” voices that support the state in the central “battle for ideas” that defines counter-radicalisation. These voices are selected on the basis that they essentially do not question – or are willing and able to extenuate – the culturalisation of terrorism and extremism. In the UK the role of the organisations who promote these voices is integral to counter-terrorism. State funded organisations like The Quilliam Foundation (QF) seek to “challenge extremism” and

\[\text{Of the key factors that contribute to radicalisation, the Australian Counter Terrorism White Paper makes explicit that these include “the identification with, and adoption of, particular ideologies and belief systems that are hostile to liberal democratic norms and values” (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010, 66). The US Institute of Peace (established and funded by Congress) has defined “cognitive radicalization” (radicalisation that falls short of violent expression) by the refutation of “the legitimacy of the existing social order” (Vidino, 2010, 4).}\]
“advance liberal democratic values’ (2013) serving only to legitimise the dominant, official understanding of the causes and necessary responses to terrorism. In this account the causes remain confined to the Muslim community (domestically and internationally) and QF advocates that the response to extremism should at its core involve “a more self-critical approach (to) be adopted by Muslims” in which “Westophobic ideological influences and social insularity needs to be challenged within Muslim communities by Muslims themselves” (2013). The broader solution to the problem of Islamic extremism advocated by these moderate voices is epitomised by the co-director of QF, Ed Hussain, who has suggested a need for the creation of “an apolitical Western Islam” (in Kundnani 2009, 36). The extensive funding channeled to QF and similar organisations is highly unsurprising given that they play a central role in the pacification of Muslim communities assisting in the project to produce the ‘ideal’ Muslim citizen-subject free of a commitment to a political Islam – understood in this sense as the “communism of the twenty-first [century]” (Toscano 2010, 239) – and willing to submit itself to the current order.

The idea that counter-terrorism be defined by a battle for ideas is of course not new. The development of a counter-radicalisation strategy along the lines set out above has become a major point of convergence for contemporary counter-terrorism strategy through which the UK, Australian and US government have been involved in a mutually beneficial, multi-directional exchange of policy ideas. The discourse now contains discussion of a “struggle over narratives” (Benjamin 2010, 2) between the West and the terrorists that maintains the opposition between ‘their’ ideology and ‘our’ values. A battle between narratives is but the most recent framing of an opposition that is essentially depoliticised and the central construction of the Islamic terrorist through the idea of the fanatic demonstrates its continued application as a “remarkably resilient and adaptable weapon in a wide array of political and philosophical confrontations” (Toscano 2010, 249). The inauguration of a counter-radicalisation strategy complete with legal sanctions enhances the process of marginalising radical ideas and continues the project of policing the ‘suspect’ populations who harbor them that defines the ‘war on terror’. From the more recent ‘realisation’ of an internal threat (ostensibly from 2005 onwards) this process of pacifying internal populations has been made more explicitly a central component of the ‘war on terror’.

This has been achieved in part by a widening of the security agenda. Post-1989 ‘national security’ has become simply the banner under which the state continues its essential task of self-preservation and the preservation of the current order. The liberal state in the current era presents itself – and its security strategy – as a reactive force in a changing security environment. The development of national security strategies in the UK, Australia and the US is based ostensibly on the state’s response to a fundamentally changed and continually evolving set of threats to national security. The liberal state’s relationship to security is thus constructed in terms of a necessary and proportional
response, playing no direct active role in the prioritisation (and fetishisation) of security. However, the presentation of the contemporary security environment in these strategy documents reveals much about the state’s role in defining security as well as the effects of such a (re)definition.

The “clear security threat” that defined the Cold War era has been replaced by a “diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks” (UK Cabinet Office 2008, 3). Understanding the “diversity” of the new threats illustrates that the need for new strategy is premised on a major reconceptualisation of what constitutes (a threat to) national security. The novelty of the current era lies in the fact that the state now has to confront both “traditional” and “non-traditional” security threats (Rudd 2008) that combine to create an increasingly “complex and unpredictable” security landscape (HM Government 2009, 10). The distinction between these two strands of the threat lies in the fact that traditional threats are those that threaten the “interests and integrity of the sovereign state” while non-traditional threats instead target “citizens and respective ways of life” (Brown and Rudd 2009). Terrorism is defined as a traditional threat whilst the non-traditional strand encompasses diverse phenomena such as threats to the environment, global poverty, trans-national crime, energy security, pandemics and natural disasters. The contemporary threat is distinguished by its dual stranded composition but the seemingly diverse threats are presented as linked, enabling a “coherent” (Rudd 2008, 3) and overarching strategy. This formulation, presenting the threat as both diverse and interconnected, forms the basis of joint agreements between UK and Australian governments (Brown and Rudd 2009) and provides the backdrop to more recent US national security strategy (Obama 2010). The connections between the diverse threats legitimate the continued revision and expansion of security strategy into “uncharted territory” necessitating new measures previously uncalled for.

Beyond justifying the continual development of security policy and the increasing prominence afforded to security in official discourse, the implications of this broadened conception are more insidious. Fusing counter-terrorism with the fight against climate change for example allows the state to co-opt popular support for state action and thus bolsters support for the wider security agenda. Arguably, this is done by building on the depoliticised approach to climate change that defines state strategy in both the UK and Australia.12 Climate change is understood in official discourse to be an unintended consequence of human action definitively disconnected from the capitalist mode of

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12 The UK government has attempted to construct climate change as an issue for the UN Security Council a move that constructs climate change as predominantly, if not exclusively, a security issue. The issue of climate change in this approach becomes one of “climate security” or “energy security” and the response is monopolised by the (permanent) member states of the Security Council. Referring climate change to the Security Council as opposed to the Economic and Social Council of the UN is a clear indication of the securitisation of the issue as well as its withdrawal from any discussion of the political and economic framework in which it has emerged as a global problem (see Hulme 2009).
production. The response to it does not require a questioning of the current order let alone its transformation; instead it stands to open up new opportunities for investment and entrepreneurialism (Cameron 2010). The liberal-capitalist order is not at the root cause of the crisis of the environmental or global poverty and conversely is presented as its only possible savior. This approach arguably defines the liberal response to climate change more generally to the extent that is has been argued that the hegemonic approach to climate change is not simply a symptom of depoliticisation but that this approach “ultimately reinforces processes of depoliticisation and the socio-political status quo” (Swyngedouw 2010, 214).

The liberal state’s response to climate change is defined by an ideology of market environmentalism within which a “carbon capitalism” seeks to “extend property rights to the atmosphere” (Hulme 2009, 300-303) – through the commodification (and subsequent fetishisation) of CO₂ – and solve the problem by trading these rights regulated only by an “invisible green hand”. By securitising climate change this inherently conservative approach is rendered closed to critique. In relation to campaigns around climate change that are aligned with alternative politics, securitisation of the issue undermines the possibility of a proper political act and enforces subservience to the state. As Neocleous has noted, “securitising’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state” (Neocleous 2008, 186). The aim here through ‘securitising’ climate change is to pacify climate change activism to produce environmental campaigners who see the response to climate change simply as an investment opportunity.

The current hegemonic approach to climate change expresses some of the classic tenets of populism that reveals much about the utility (and ease) of the fusion of climate change and traditional security threats for a conservative project. In the first instance climate change is constructed as a humanitarian issue positing no political subject but instead baring down on the ‘people’ as universal victims of a global threat. The presentation of climate change as a humanitarian issue is at the core of the rise of ecology understood through “the rights of Nature” that has been condemned as “a giant operation in the depoliticisation of subjects” rendering ecology the “contemporary form of the opium of the people” (Badiou 2008, 139). In addition, the detachment of the current political and economic order from the problem of climate change is secured by externalising ecological problems and their solutions (Swyngedouw 2010, 222); the solution is incontrovertibly to be found within the current system.

If we understand that through security “authority inscribes itself deeply into human experience”, (Neocleous 2008, 4), then the securitisation of these issues has major implications for the pacification of populations. It serves to neutralise political action that in the case of climate change has for decades sought to confront these issues outside of state structures. It serves to bring these issues into the state, place them under state control and as a result those with a desire for action must surrender themselves to the
state. Depoliticisation here is pacification. Securitisation in this sense serves to exclude in the first instance all but the state from the process of defining the problem and its solution. Those who wish to contribute must conform to the state’s position and ultimately must tailor their understanding of climate change or global poverty to fit with the current logic of security. The ideal climate change campaigner imagined and produced by this approach sees ‘green’ investments and recycling their rubbish as the limits to their activism. Framing political activism in these terms reveals the onward march of the liberal state’s “production of political docility in the name of security” (Neocleous 2011, 49).

On this basis, those who seek to politicise (or repoliticise) issues are in the current era marginalised, labeled as extremists and in many cases criminalised. In this context, the concept of “domestic extremism” has been developed and incorporated into counter-extremism policing. In the UK there have been since 2010 three national police units responsible for combating domestic extremism run by the "terrorism and allied matters" committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] (Lewis et al 2009). Domestic extremism refers to those involved in “‘single-issue’ protests, such as animal rights, environmentalism, anti-globalisation or anti-GM crops” (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011), and who conduct themselves outside of the acceptable forms of political expression are constructed as extremists. Reinforcing the foreignness of the Muslim Other this formulation also allows for an expansion of the strategy to facilitate the policing of all “individuals or groups whose activities go outside the normal democratic process and engage in crime and disorder” (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011). The causal relationship presented here between abandoning the democratic process and engaging in criminal activity obscures the real process by which the narrow parameters set to the “democratic process” allow alternative politics to be criminalised. Once issues become incorporated into the security agenda they are comprehensively closed off from any kind of alternative, critical analysis; in this sense politics – defined by an inherent antagonism – is extreme. Those who seek to question the status quo and by definition politicise these issues through a rejection of the impotent channels of liberal political expression available will be met by the full force of the state’s violence.

The caveat attached to extremism strategy that “legitimate peaceful protest is to be respected” is itself restricted to those actions that take place in a “peaceful and safe manner and does not cause unnecessary disruption to a community” (Association of Chief Police Officers 2011). Both the terms “disruption” and “community” are here left open to (the state’s) interpretation as we have seen in the policing of the Occupy movement (Giroux 2013) and climate change protesters (Monbiot 2009) through use of counter-terrorism powers (to name but two examples). Major corporations and financial markets themselves are the community who must not be disrupted by any form of protest that has the audacity to question their authority. Yet the policing of protest in the name of
security is a pacification process *par excellence* in which the crushing of resistance (and indeed all dissent) is only one part. The drive is to produce the ‘responsible’, ‘peaceful’, and ultimately disciplined political subject whose approach to political activism, to politics itself, is non-disruptive.

Much of the even the critical literature on protest policing has been concerned recently with the development in policing tactics and the effect on mobilisations and protest events. The focus on the police use of “strategic incapacitation” (Gillham 2013) for example reveals much about the immediate relationship between police and protestors but not about the broader function of police power in this context. The use of what Gilmore describes as an “increasingly authoritarian style of protest policing” (2010, 21) is not simply useful to hinder each individual protest event but to reinforce the idea, to existing and moreover to prospective protestors, that protest itself is extremist. It has then the effect of “forcing compliance” within protest movements and inducing public fear of protestors (Fernandez 2008, 77). The use of the term “eco-terrorism” used to refer to “any environmental action more radical than writing letters to your MP” (Monbiot 2009) is indicative of the equation of political action with terrorism and more clearly reflects the state’s drive to produce a political subject who is unable and unwilling to threaten the current order.

Policing protest is a, if not the, central function of policing and the development of counter-extremism strategies in this vein formalise further the police’s role in the fabrication of social order. The applicability of counter-terrorism powers to contexts seemingly beyond their remit is not simply a fortuitous coincidence; as Toscano has noted, “antiterrorism has become a full-fledged method of government, a willfully vague expedient in the arsenal of the modern state” (2009). The pacification process that defines counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism strategies is at the heart of contemporary security politics and demonstrates more clearly that the “war on terror” is a war of pacification” (Neocleous 2011, 48). We must not be lured into thinking this project is new and that new policing techniques are evidence of a radical shift in the role of police. The policing of dissent, of disruptive, unproductive subjects is vital to the pacification process that has always defined the role of police in the interests of capital and state (Neocleous 2000; Rigakos 2011).

Considering security strategy through pacification (and via depoliticisation) provides a critical understanding of the behaviour of the liberal state in the ‘war on terror’. We avoid here a discussion of the effects of counter-radicalisation and counter extremism strategies in terms of unintended consequences or ‘mission-creep’. The policing of Muslim populations and the policing of protest movements are part of the broader process of reproducing social order; a process that is underpinned by the production of subjectivities in which individuals are rendered docile to the point that the official idealized image of security is accepted wholesale. An anti-security politics rejects
the current depoliticised framing of security, and seeks instead a repoliticisation resisting
the political docility that results from the depoliticisation of politics itself in this context.
This repoliticisation involves then the production of our own subjectivity outside
‘security’ one that is able and willing to confront the politics of security. This involves
both exposing the ideological function of the idealized image of security presented in
official security discourse, and refusing to be drawn into the police project monitoring
‘suspect’ populations. The refusal of political docility enables us in the first instance to
understand the ‘war on terror’ as part of the fabrication of a social order in which global
accumulation is secured. An alternative politics must begin here.

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Article

THE PACIFICATION OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS:
A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

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Abstract
In this paper we operationalize and empirically test six core tenets of pacification theory derived from Marxian political economy using time series data for the USA from 1972-2009. Our analysis confirms that rising inequality is statistically significantly correlated to increased public and private policing over time and that increased public and private policing is also statistically significantly correlated to increased industrial exploitation as measured through “surplus-value”. While unionization correlates to strikes and lock-outs which suggests that unions have an important mobilizing role for the industrial reserve army, unionization also inversely correlates to total policing employment. As union membership decreases, policing employment increases, which gives credence to the notion that unions may also act as policing agents for capital. We conclude that when these findings are coupled with our previous international research of 45 countries for the snapshot year of 2004 (Rigakos and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, there appears to be significant empirical support for pacification theory. The relationships we have discovered recur both across time and international contexts despite the fact that variations in legal norms and institutional histories of policing are varied and complex.

Keywords
Pacification, policing, inequality, unions, United States

It is now accepted wisdom that the widening gap between rich and poor in the United States is a matter of significant public policy concern (Thompson, 2012). The ‘gap’ issue has been embraced by liberal thinkers as one of equity (Huffington, 2011), by venture capitalists as one of sufficient consumption and the spectre of economic stagnation (Buffet, 2012), and by security experts as one of national stability. Witnessing...
falling real wages alongside soaring profits, of course, comes as no surprise to critical political economists (e.g. Wolff, 2011) who have long held that if capitalism were deregulated, left to its own devices, and allowed to operate unfettered, it would produce gross disparities in relative wealth and income. In Marx and Engel’s (1850) terms “[s]ociety as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat”. In the United States, resultant political discussions about the decline of the ‘middle class’ have turned to a more progressive income tax system as a solution (Buffet, 2012) that might act as a leveler for inequality and a method by which worker insecurity may be alleviated. Yet, worker insecurity is of significant benefit to capitalists both domestically and internationally (e.g. Klein, 2008). After all, worker uncertainty and exploitation is considered ‘productive’ for the economy as it significantly tempers demands and drives down real wages. Capitalism ushers in “everlasting uncertainty and agitation” (Marx and Engels, 1850). In this way, we might say that an insecure workforce is one important step toward a pacified workforce. It is therefore the nature of capitalism to engage in warfare (both open and subterranean) against its workers in order to produce a consistent, beneficial insecurity: a state of anxiety that can only ostensibly be satiated by consumption. In fact, during the economic bubble of the late 1990s and just ahead of the Great Recession, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan argued that “growing worker insecurity” played a pivotal role in workers’ having stopped asking for wage increases which was by extension beneficial for US capital (Uchitelle, 1997). Of course, this insecurity took place during a period that witnessed a massive rise in corporate profits, a decline in real income (Wolff, 2011) and consistent increases in public and private policing (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011).

In this paper, we build upon our previous international research (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) that investigated the relationships between four resilient and seemingly unrelated trends: (1) the consistent erosion of union-membership; (2) an increase in income polarization and inequality; (3) a dramatic resurgence in popular protest; and (4) a steady rise in public and private policing employment. We analyze the relationship between these variables in the context of a theory of pacification which argues that the role of “policing”, broadly defined, has both historically and contemporaneously been designed to “make workers productive” (Rigakos, 2011) by “fabricating a social order” (Neocleous, 2000) that seeks to protect private property relations in support of bourgeois interests. In this sense, we treat total policing employment in the United States as an empirical barometer of bourgeois insecurity conditioned by two elements of Marxian political economy: (1) relative deprivation (income inequality) and (2) the rise of an industrial reserve army, or manufacturing unemployment through successive deindustrialization. We also examine how both worker exploitation (as measured by surplus value) and labour militancy (as measured by strikes and lockouts per 100,000 population) interact with declining union membership. Our goal, in the simplest terms,
is to empirically test the central tenets of pacification theory through a statistical examination of macroeconomic trends in the United States from 1972 to 2009.

This paper is organized into five sections. The first section introduces the reader to the basic theoretical tenets of pacification and policing. For us, the most important aspect of this review is to glean from the perspective a number of assertions that may be operationalized in a manner that will allow us to statistically test their veracity against our available U.S. time-series data. The general relationships measured in this paper all revolve around policing employment as a contemporary barometer of bourgeois insecurity, yet it is important to note that this is only one aspect of the broad project of police and its relationship to capital. The next section on methodology outlines our approach. More specifically, we lay out the various sources for the variables we examine including our calculations for creating second-order variables, such as surplus value and cumulative deindustrialization. The following three sections, entitled “inequality”, “surplus-value” and “de-unionization and deindustrialization” explain and contextualize the results of our analysis.

Policing as Pacification

Pacification is the continuum of police violence upon which the fabrication of capitalist order is planned, enforced and resisted. The Oxford English Dictionary defines pacification as a state or sovereign action that attempts ‘to put an end to strife or discontent’ and ‘to reduce to peaceful submission’ a rebellious population. Neocleous (2011: 38) argues that the Dictionary’s reference to the Edicts of Pacification of 1563, 1570 and the Edict of Nantes in 1598 as the first instances of the usage of the word ‘pacification’ are important because “they are the point of departure for the period in which the insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured.” It is at this point that a politics of security, a need to fabricate an order necessary for the functioning of the bourgeois state becomes central to the development of liberal philosophy both domestically and imperially (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). Pacification was to be achieved through a science of police that aimed to proactively shape a new social order.

This police science (Polizeiwissenschaft) has a rich analytic history, going back to the 17th century, that is tied to the development of a technical need to order populations and to fabricate conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation. Much of what we now come to understand as policing is based on Enlightenment thought concerning the best organization of populations for the “welfare of all” and the maximization of wealth either for an absolutist monarchy or, later, as part of the market dynamics of a liberal state. These organizing principles of police and capital have historically revolved around an intentional class-based ordering, including the proper establishment of work-houses, the best method of keeping accounts of persons and goods as well as their movements, the formation of a pauper police, and the systematic categorization of worthy and unworthy
poor. These innovations in police thinking played a prominent and pronounced role in the establishment of the 19th century constabulary that the English-speaking world, including the United States, has inherited. The “new police” of London were a bourgeois innovation that were made necessary by an unregulated migration of “masterless men” and other “vagabonds” to the emerging industrial heartlands of England. The police were set up to methodically inculcate a wage-labour system that made wealth accumulation more predictable. The great police thinker Patrick Colquhoun sought to set up a system of enforcement as a method to regulate the compensation of labour conducive to capital accumulation. At the heart of 19th century imperial England, Colquhoun set about creating an experimental police that would replace “chips and perquisites” of all types among dock workers and that would enforce a dress code and system of inspection that would “eliminate pilfering” altogether. Colquhoun’s methods were centred on the enforcement of wage labour and his success was catalogued empirically. As Rigakos (2011: 70-1) notes, Colquhoun “clearly realized that social control… was geared to the benefit of a particular class of property holders” and that this was “consistent with his emphasis on managing the various classes of persons who he said threatened commercial interests.” Thus, the main target and concern of police has, from its inception, been the working class and the poor. “That is, its mobilizing work was the mobilization of work” (Neocleous, 2000: 20).

Colquhoun, however, was also an imperialist. A former Virginia colonist and Loyalist, he even raised an army out of Scotland to assist in putting down the American rebellion. Like other police intellectuals, Colquhoun focused on both imperial planning by means of fabricating a wage-labour system and putting an end to domestic instability (see Rigakos et al., 2009). He was, in the strictest sense, both a theorist and practitioner of pacification. In the American context, labour unrest and its policing also has a very long history. Like the British context, there were experiments with private policing, such as the Coal and Iron Police, who worked directly for industrial interests and were often brutal in their methods of strike-breaking and unscrupulously infiltrating and undermining worker associations (Friedman, 1907). As American railroad baron and financier Jay Gould once put it: “I can hire one half the working class to kill the other half.” When private security companies such as the notorious Pinkerton Detective Agency (Morn, 1982) proved too controversial and local guardsmen proved too unpredictable by galvanizing further resistance (Hogg, 1944), states across the union began to move to state-level law enforcement in an effort to create a more centralized, less locally dependent, and ‘professional’ service (Couch, 1981). In the same way it was clear to workers and political agitators in nineteenth century London, it was not lost on American labour activists of the day that the legislative move towards the use of state “troopers” and “rangers” was a direct threat to their ability to mobilize. At every step, pacification anticipates resistance.
It is within this historical backdrop, both domestic and international, that the interconnected role of police and capital can be viewed as part of a large-scale project of pacification. Thus, there are at least six tenets that may be distilled from current thinking about pacification that are useful to our study:

1) **Public-private.** Given their institutional interchangeability yet identical targets of enforcement, to rigidly distinguish between public versus private forms of policing is to further reify a false binary that obfuscates far more than it reveals. Put another way: “The public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The question is therefore not ‘public versus private’ or ‘civil society versus the state’, but the unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the name of security” (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 15-16). In the context of both pacification and a Marxian political economy (see Rigakos and Ergul 2011: 338-340) it makes no sense to operationalize public and private policing separately and so, in this paper, we * operationalize public and private policing employment into one variable.*

2) **Inequality.** The more capitalism *naturally* matures the more unequal the distribution of wealth. Adam Smith admitted as much but defended the emergent class distinctions that sprang from early capitalism by unapologetically arguing that the “accommodations” of “an industrious and frugal peasant” always “exceed[ed] that of many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages” (Smith 1937: 18). He held that *absolute* poverty is reduced wherever capitalism flourished. Marx, however, (1977: 33) pointed out that poverty was *relative* rather than absolute arguing that since our gains and possessions “are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.” Despite the fact that “living conditions may have improved for the lowest rungs of society, they improved much more significantly for the bourgeoisie whose source of wealth was directly tied to the exploitation of workers” (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 341). If policing is aimed at the fabrication of an order that seeks to promote capital accumulation and the valorization of private property then the larger the threat to that order the greater the aggregate need to secure it. Rising inequality is a threat to the capitalist order because it amplifies relative deprivation. For us, this means that, over time, unfettered capitalist systems become more and more unequal and as they do so this inequality, if not

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2 In his historical examination of private detective industrial policing in the US from 1850-1940, Weiss (1978: 63) argues that “the public/private distinction can be seen as bogus” even though “this arrangement has had decided benefits in upholding the interests of capital”. Similarly, in his analysis of the Coal and Iron Police, Couch (1981: 90) asserts that the move to state policing was as a result of the need to “guarantee stability of class and property relations” when the company cops proved too controversial. In the end, public and private police have historically been used interchangeably in the American pacification of the working class.
addressed by other means, must necessarily occur alongside more and more policing. *Inequality will positively correlate to total policing.*

3) **Surplus value.** Long before the Thames River police and in the preceding pre-capitalist economic epochs some form of coercion has always been required to realize a surplus (Rigakos et al., 2009). The historical and institutional goal of police science, both in terms of planning and enforcement, is to produce an environment conducive to the promotion of capital accumulation, to make workers productive. This is accomplished by facilitating the practice of exploitation necessary for the functioning of the capitalist system. Exploitation, in Marxist terms, is unpaid labour time or surplus value: the amount of time that a worker works without getting paid and for which the capitalist realizes a surplus (Marx, 1972). A system of police is vital to the extraction of surplus value because it is based on the use and threat of coercive force. *Surplus value will positively correlate to total policing.*

4) **(De-)Unionization.** There is ambivalence among Marxian thinkers about the relative role of unions with respect to the revolutionary goals of the proletariat. Gramsci (1968: 34) argued that unions “cannot be the instrument[s] for a radical renovation of society”. Luxemburg (1971:68) lamented that unions suffered from a “bureaucratism and a certain narrowness of outlook” because their goal was to ameliorate and resolve class conflict as much as possible. Trotsky (1974: 43) chastized “the reformist bureaucracy and the labour aristocracy who pick the crumbs from its banquet table” and derisively dubbed this emerging labour aristocracy the “lieutenants of capital” (Trotsky 1969: 54). By 1872, Marx (1987: 90-93) complained in his speech to the General Council of the International Workers’ Association that “[t]rade unions are praised too much; they must in the future be treated as affiliated societies and used as centers of attack in the struggle of labour against capital.” Despite these critiques Marxian scholars still held out hope for a radicalized union movement that would assist a revolutionary socialism. In our own previous work we have argued that “[i]n sum, the general position toward trade unions by Marxists is that unions alone cannot be the vehicles for the radical transformation of the social relations of production” because by “their very nature trade unions do not seek to unleash the war between the bourgeois and the proletarian classes but rather act to keep the peace: to behave, as Trotsky put it, as policing agents for capital” (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 334). If we are to believe that unions are indeed agents of capital, then they also acquire a police function in society and so we should see that more union membership per capita will result in lower police employment numbers, and the inverse should also be true. *Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing.*
5) **The industrial reserve army.** It is fair to say that there has been no greater preoccupation among the police scientists of the Enlightenment than with that of the idle, the indigent and the poor. To a large extent, planning for control over and policing of vagabonds and masterless men, the creation of policy to discern between the deserving and undeserving poor, and motivating people classified in these categories to become productive have guided much thinking about the proper use and deployment of police (Neocleous, 2000). Marx also had much to say about this reserve army of workers for they act as both a pressure release on the demands of workers by lowering expectations – lest they be replaced by the unemployed – and also appear as a threat to the system itself by acting as a ready reservoir of agitated revolutionaries. Marxian historians have offered significant insights into how the emergent bourgeois state made it a central organizing mission to pacify this body of transient workers through forced migration, immigration policy and the use of public and private police to crush revolutionary agitation (see Couch, 1981; Weiss, 1978). Both in the formative logics of bourgeois systems of police and within the radical philosophy of revolutionary politics, the industrial reserve army plays a pivotal role. Much of the revolutionary fervor of the nineteenth century around the unemployed and this persists today. Strikes and lockouts may act as catalysts for revolutionary actions (Priestland, 2009) and union agitation becomes paramount; yet, with ever-decreasing union membership it is likely that strikes and lock-outs will also become less frequent. Following from the above we can hypothesize: *Unionization will positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs and cumulative deindustrialization will positively correlate to total policing.***

We have now laid out six tenets of Marxian political economy, generally, and pacification more precisely. We have operationalized these tenets in a hypothetico-deductive manner for the purpose of statistical testing. We must admit, however, that in setting up these hypotheses we have been significantly aided by our previous international research (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) that investigated identical relationships across 45 countries for the comparative “snapshot” year 2004. In that study we sought to develop a “nascent theory” with the “exploratory” aim of producing an empirically-grounded Marxian political economy of policing. This study, therefore, builds directly on that international study in that we are far more confident of the veracity and explanatory power of Marxian political economy and believe that pacification theory effectively captures what we were already seeking to map analytically: the material, macroeconomic connections between police and capital. We are also taking two important analytic steps by choosing to conduct a time-series study of the United States. First, pacification theory demands that we take stock of what is happening in the heart of Empire (i.e., Hardt and Negri, 2001) – the domestic is the imperial according to pacification (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 17). Second, while discovering significant relationship between police and
capital transnationally is indeed significant, it would further solidify our claims if similar relationships were observed over time in a single national context.

**Methodology**

We have already gone some way in the preceding section toward mapping out how we intend to operationalize concepts gleaned from Marxian political economy and pacification by translating these notions into empirically testable hypotheses. Here, we detail the source data used in the analysis. Our variables are as follows: (1) total policing employment per 100,000 population which is the sum of (a) public police employment per 100,000 population and (b) private security employment per 100,000 population; (2) inequality; (3) surplus value; (4) union membership; (5) cumulative deindustrialization (which is the cumulative annual difference of manufacturing job losses subtracted from manufacturing job gains); and (6) strikes and lock-outs.

Our data-set generally reflects a time-series analysis of the United States from 1972-2009. Prior to 1972, there is no reliable annual statistical information on public police or private security employment in the United States other than national census data. Similar gaps are present with data on manufacturing job losses and gains. While the variables used in this study equate to those in our previously published international study (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011), the sources have changed, as has the construction of one key indicator: the industrial reserve army. Our decision to employ a longitudinal analysis in this article has led us to replace our manufacturing unemployment variable with a new “cumulative deindustrialization” measure. The reason for such an alteration derives from the statistical restrictions that the use of manufacturing unemployment data generates in a longitudinal analysis. The Current Population Survey produces “unemployment by industry” data by asking for the identification of the last job that the persons participating the survey held. This poses a problem for our longitudinal analysis because people who were laid-off from manufacturing sector employment could be hired and again laid-off from jobs in another sector prior to the survey. Considering that displacement is a major issue for manufacturing sector employees (Brauner, 2008), manufacturing unemployment as a variable loses its reliability over time. Therefore, in our analysis, we have created a measure of cumulative deindustrialization: which, as mentioned, is the net change in deindustrialization calculated by subtracting the annual “job destruction” or job losses from “job creation” or job gains. It is a cumulative measure because we add the number of each year’s net change to the following year.

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3 It should be noted that there are isolated data points where earlier statistics are available for certain variables. Whenever available, we make use of these data-points though they are sometimes not shown graphically.
Our data are gleaned from the following pre-existing data sources: Public police and private security data are added to make up our measure of total policing. They are derived from: (1) a combination of census and FBI Law Enforcement Employment Bulletins and (2) Occupational Employment Statistics by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). For inequality, we used the Gini coefficient from the Income Inequality database, Earnings and Poverty Reports. The Gini coefficient is currently the most widely used measure of income inequality. It is the ratio of the area under a line of equality where one axis is the cumulative share of income and the other axis is the cumulative share of people from the lowest to the highest. It produces a range from zero to one which is often multiplied by 100 (we also use this convention in our Graphs). The higher the Gini coefficient, the higher the rate of income inequality. The data required for the calculation of surplus value consists of the number of employed production workers, manufacturing value added, and annual earnings of manufacturing workers (production workers). This is the most widely accepted measure by Marxian scholars. We also adopt this calculation.

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SV = \frac{\text{gross value added} - \text{total manufacturing workers' earnings}}{\text{total manufacturing workers' earnings}}
\]

This data is retrieved mainly from: (1) Current Employment Statistics on Employment, Hours and Earnings, produced by BLS; (2) Gross Domestic Products Accounts by Industry, created by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; and (3) Annual Survey of Manufacturers and American Fact Finder, prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data regarding union-membership is retrieved from three major sources: (1) “Union Membership Trends” (Mayer, 2004); and (2) News Releases prepared by the BLS; and (3) “Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by State and Sector, 1983-2011” (Hirsh and Macpherson, 2012). The data for “job destruction” and “job creation” as well as job losses and job gains which we add as a measure of cumulative deindustrialization is retrieved from Business Dynamics Statistics released by the U.S. Census Bureau, and Business Employment Dynamics Statistics produced by the BLS. National level data concerning strikes and lockouts is obtained from Economic News Releases produced by BLS.

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4 For more detail on the calculation of Gini coefficient see Gini (1921).
5 While there have been diligent attempts to more closely proximate the rate of surplus value using existing economic measures (Amsden, 1981; Cuneo, 1978, 1982, 1984; Lynch, 1987; Lynch, 1988; Moseley, 1985; Varley, 1938; Weisskopf, 1985; Wolff, 1975, 1979) we have chosen the simplest and most widely applicable measure adopted by Marxian scholars (Cuneo, 1978; Lynch, 1988; Lynch, Groves and Lizotte, 1994).
This is a simple correlational study. While the nature of our general tenets sometimes hint at causality, our time-series data are insufficient to conduct multivariate tests. Causality in a time-series can also be asserted by time-shifting backwards the presumed independent variable. The strength of the associations we have discovered, however, would make this shifting rather artificial. That is to say, where powerful and statistically significant relationships already exist, one or two-year shifts makes no difference in the result. Causality may also be conveyed epistemically by demonstrating that an expected association is predicted by the theory. In this case, as a direct function of the theoretical assertions being tested, from time to time we take liberties in this direction but it should always be remembered that our statistical tests are nonetheless correlational and not causal.

Inequality

Graph 1: Total Policing and Income Inequality

(Pearson r = -0.940, n = 38, p < 0.001)

- Total Policing
- Gini

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Since the late 1960s U.S. income disparity has become the widest among all major industrialized nations (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006; Smeeding, 2005; Morris and Western, 1999). The Gini co-efficient rose from 38.6 in 1968 to 46.8 in 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) to 46.9 in 2010 (Levine, 2012). While this is the measure of inequality we use in this article, it is important to note that other measures have produced similar results.

Income disparity is also explained by a comparison of the ratio of the median income level (50th percentile) to that of 10th percentile income level (the ratio of 50-10) as well as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile (the ratio of 90-50). On the basis of this comparison, it is suggested that growth in overall income inequality is a result of those near the bottom of the distribution falling further behind the typical household income while those near the top are far ahead of the typical household income. Thus, according to Levine (2012:5), increased inequality in the upper half of the distribution might be accountable for most of the overall increase in inequality between 1961 and 2002. Such pattern in which the benefits of economic growth are being accrued by largely those near the top of the income distribution has continued throughout 2007 (Diaz-Gimenez, Rios-Rull and Glover, 2011). According to Census Bureau data, the bottom fifth quintile’s share of income has changed little – at less than 4% – for the last few decades. On the contrary, the income share of the top fifth quintile increased significantly. While the bottom 20%’s share of income was 4.2% in 1968, it fell to 3.3% in 2010. In contrast, the top 20%’s share of income increased from 42.6% in 1968 to 50.2% in 2010. More importantly, the share of the top 5% rose from 16.3% in 1968 to an astonishing 21.3% in 2010. To put it more clearly, the top 5%’s income “accounted for more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution” (Levine, 2012). Moreover, the income share of the middle three quintiles (second to fourth) declined from 53.2% to 46.5% (Levine, 2012) while the income share of the top 1% increased drastically from 8.35% in 1968 to 12.98% in 1990 to 17.42 in 2010 (Alverado, et. al., 2012).

The inevitable question in this context is: What has been driving the increase in income inequality in the United States? The two explanations most commonly offered for

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6 Income inequality has increased throughout the world over the past three decades both within and between countries (Milanovic and Kaya, 2007; Wade, 2004). Income inequality within countries was stable or declining from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, but it has increased sharply and steadily across the globe since (Galbraith, 2002; Galbraith, 2007; Wade, 2004). In advanced industrialized countries, the average income of the richest 10% is almost nine times that of the poorest 10%, a ratio of 9 to 1. The Gini co-efficient was 0.29 in OECD countries in the mid-1980s; however, it rose by almost 10% to 0.316 in the late 2000s (OECD, 2011). For more detail on the rising income inequality in the world see Berger, et al. (2010); Brandolini and Smeeding (2006); Smeeding (2002). However, neoliberal theorists refute the idea of the rising inequality in the world since 1980s. For more detail see Dollar (2005); Dollar and Kraay (2002); Nielsen (2007); Wolf (2000).

7 For an analysis of individual income inequality trends in the US see Bryan and Martinez (2008).
the trend toward greater income inequality in the U.S. are: globalization and technological advancement (Levine, 2012). In the contemporary world, globalization is promoted through a neoliberal form of capitalism in which the goals of the economy are set as growth and development and these goals become possible mainly through openness to trade and investment. However, trade liberalization and financial globalization result in income inequality across the globe (Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). In the context of the U.S., the improvement of the conditions of free trade and flows of goods, services, and capital have placed less skilled U.S. workers in more vulnerable position by putting them in direct competition with less skilled workers abroad. Shifting the production of goods and services overseas has reduced demand for workers in the United States, and in turn put downward pressure on their wages (Levine, 2011; Levine, 2012).

The argument that is commonly found most convincing, among economists, in explaining rising inequality, across the globe and in the U.S., is technological change. Technological development, it is argued, has led to “the comparatively rapid growth in the wage premium paid to more highly skilled (productive) workers since 1979” (Levine, 2012: 8). In other words, technological changes have resulted in turning information technology employees into low-skilled workers while raising the demand for high-skilled employees and thus increased their wages (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). Here, the relationship between technological advancement and education is utilized in order to explain rising inequality.

Of course, these two explanations, i.e., globalization and technological development, cannot be separated from one another. For, as Marx and Engels (1992: 6) argue, “[t]he bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.” That is to say, the spaces of capital in which it operates, the social relations within which these operations take place, and “with them the whole relations of society” have to be continuously re-constructed, re-created, and re-structured as a response to the untameble desires of capital. Therefore, neither technological changes nor the processes of globalization can be divorced from capital and its needs.

A less popular explanation for the increasing wage inequality in the U.S. draws attention to the relationship between the decline of unionization and the increase in wage inequality and argues that “unions help to institutionalize norms of equity, reducing the dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries” (Western and Rosenfeld, 2011: 1). While the union effect on inequality is alternately considered modest (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008), indirect – through technological change (Acemoglu, 2002), or secondary – to the effects of other institutions, such as minimum

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8 It should be noted that the U.S. and the UK are the countries with the largest decline in unionization rate, and they are also the countries that have experienced the largest increase in income inequality in the last three decades among the industrialized nations (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004).
wages (Card and DiNardo, 2002), or minute and primarily affecting men (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004), the decline of unionization explains as much of the increase in inequality as the growing stratification of wages in relation to education (Bruce and Rosenfeld, 2011). Considering the vitality of the effect of relative deprivation on the immiseration of multitudes in the Marxian theoretical framework, it is necessary for our analysis to examine the relation of income inequality, unionization and radicalization to state and corporate insecurities and their manifestation in the increasing numbers of public and private police. The growth of private security in the U.S. has been well-documented (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971; Cunningham, Strauchs and van Meter, 1990) as has the role of private security agents in both domestic and foreign pacification (Rigakos, 2011). These activities, of course, have a long lineage (Couch, 1978) but today encompass increasingly concentrated (Rigakos, 2000; 2005) multinational security companies, parapolice (Rigakos, 2002) and private mercenary armies (Scahill, 2008) charged with overseas imperial projects.

Our time-series analysis of the U.S. from 1972 to 2009 demonstrates that there is an almost perfect positive correlation between total policing and inequality ($r^2 = .940$, $n=36$, $p<.001$, see Graph 1). The strength of the association is quite astonishing. In our international study we found that inequality was also statistically significantly positively correlated to total policing ($r^2=.344$, $n=43$, $p<.05$) (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 356) although this association was not nearly as strong as in the U.S. Our analysis demonstrates that increasing inequality in the U.S. has risen in almost synchronous lockstep with a rising body of public and private policing agents in the last four decades.

**Surplus-Value**

Surplus value is both the aggregate effect and the driving engine of capitalism. In Marxian terms, capitalism does not exist without surplus value. Surplus value is the unpaid labour-time a capitalist must steal from a worker in order to create profit or margin. As a basic maxim of capitalism one must drive down labour costs to increase surplus, to maximize profits. As inequality rises in the U.S. alongside declining unionization (as we shall see in the next section) it makes perfect sense to presume that this will facilitate the further economic exploitation of manufacturing workers. Job losses breed insecurity which fuels wage concessions. The more pacified the labour force, the more ‘productive’ it is in the eyes of capital. But this widespread unease, immiseration and exploitation, as we have already mentioned, produces unease on the part of the bourgeoisie which necessitates more policing.
Our analysis of the U.S. shows a very strong positive correlation ($r^2 = .855$, $n=39$, $p<.001$, see Graph 2) between the rate of exploitation (the rate of surplus value) and policing. We did not observe a similarly significant relationship in our international study (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) though the direction was also positive. This difference between the U.S. and the rest of the world may also be explained by intervening variables such as the relatively more well-developed social safety net in OECD countries, especially in Europe (Åslund, 2007) that may ameliorate the need for more policing in cases of higher exploitation through alternative state initiatives.
De-unionization and de-industrialization

The industrial reserve army plays an important role in Marxian political economy – it acts as a calibrating body that drives down wages in times of economic downturn through heightened competition for work. But these dispossessed industrial workers can also threaten the system of exploitation if organized – a proto-revolutionary force ready to seize the means of production. Marx was contradictory in his assessment of the industrial versus the service sector. While he (Marx, 1976: 1044) was quick to distance himself from Smith whom he accused of “fetishizing” the production of vendible commodities as supremely productive, he also later dismissed the service sector, leaving it entirely out of
his account and returning to manufacturing as “productive labour” par excellence (see Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 331). The industrial army, therefore, plays a key role in the sense that it makes goods, is most productive and ripe for revolutionary action. Understanding and measuring the industrial reserve army, that mass of workers made redundant by the rising organic composition of capital, and the rate of exploitation they indirectly help foster are thus central Marxian concerns. The most important mechanism used by workers to offset this exploitative relationship is collective bargaining.

The origin of the labour movement in the U.S. can be traced back to the trade societies, or guilds, of the 18th century (Commons, et al., 1966). However, it was not until the early 19th century that American workers felt compelled to organize against their employers in order to protect themselves from falling wages in the face of rising prices, and to reduce work hours from twelve to ten (Zieger and Gall, 2002). Although these trade societies mounted an effective resistance against new capitalism they were, in effect, restricted “craft” unions. In the second half of the 19th century, however, the penetration
of the factory system, which led to the reduction of wages, the intensification of work, longer work hours, and strict discipline, generated the rise of a permanent factory proletariat. During the Civil War the strength of the labour movement increased. The number of trade unions rose from 79 to 270 between 1863 and 1864, and the estimated number of organized labour was over 200,000. These developments culminated in the establishment of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) in 1886 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984).

The industrial expansion experienced in the U.S. between the Civil War and the end of the 19th century increased prosperity and improved standards of living for workers. However, as Marxian political economy predicts, capitalist growth never occurs without recurring depressions whose effects are mostly felt by the working class. Dulles and Dubofsky (1984) thus argue that the depressions of the 19th century increased workers’ persistence to form and sustain unions. However, the response to the efforts of workers to obtain recognition for their unions was very hostile, resulting in warfare between the workers and employers. Throughout this period, workers received no support from either federal or state governments, or from the courts. Conversely, factory owners were endowed with the power to use police and military troops as well as private security – including the notorious Pinkerton Detective Agency (Morn, 1982; Hogg, 1944) against the labour unrest. In this context, most of the unions turned towards the protection of the AFL whose union practices were both restrictive to the affiliated unions and skilled-workers, and exclusive toward the semi-skilled, unskilled, migrant, female, and black workers.

The 20th century came with promises of reform and peace in industrial relations but in the face of the growing power of unions, capitalists altered their attitude of searching for peace in industrial relations and adopted destructive strategies and means – such as encouraging the use of “yellow dog” contracts, playing into ethnic-religious fractions within labour movement, exchanging blacklists of workers accused of having radical views, hiring detectives, special deputies and spies, and calling for court injunctions – through which they set organized labour back in almost all areas. The anti-unionism accompanied with the domination of the AFL within the organized labour

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9 In the U.S., the 19th century was the century of violent encounters between workers and police forces – both public and private. To name a few: Tompkins Square Riot (1874), Haymarket Square Riot (1876), Great Railway Strike (1877), Rolling Mills Workers Strike (Bay View Tragedy) (1886), Sugar Cane Workers Strike (1887), Homestead Strike (1892). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984); Couch (1981); Weiss (1978).

10 The period from 1901 to 1917 is called the “progressive era” in the U.S. (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 177).

11 One of the most important allies of the employers during this period was the courts which generally made non-membership in a union a condition of employment, sustained the employers in their counterattacks to union boycotts with the claim that boycotts were a restraint on trade. Accordingly, the membership of the AFL declined in 1905 and remained the same for the next five years. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 185-190).
made it almost impossible to organize or sustain a union of any significance in the most important industries, such as steel, automobiles, tobacco, machinery and electrical manufactures, public utilities, and meat-packing. This meant that more than 90% of the labour force in the U.S. was still unorganized.  

The entrance of the U.S. in WWI created the conditions for organized labour to be officially recognized as an important player within the national economy. The *Clayton Act* (1914) exempted unions from prosecution under the anti-trust laws in recognizing the right to organize and to bargain collectively. President Wilson also established a National War Labour Board (NWLB) in 1918 to serve as a final court of appeal to settle all industrial disputes if they could not be solved through other means. These developments resulted in a gradual rise of wages and an increase in union membership to over a million from 1916 to 1919 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 219). However, when wartime restraints were removed and the NWLB was disbanded, the contest between the workers and employers started anew. The year of 1919 witnessed an industrial strife on a scale greater than the country had ever experienced. The labour movement, which came out of the war organized and confident that with the government’s support it would be able to extend its rights, lost ground in the face of the capitalist counterattack since the governmental intervention and injunction laws were on the side of capital once again.

The emergence of New Deal policies in the 1930s represented a change in the approach of the U.S. government to industrial relations. Following the principles set in...

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12 But, the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the emergence and growth of new unions, such as The United Mine Workers (UMW), the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), whose fundamental goal was to eliminate the distinction between skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers, and to overcome the obstacles created by ethnic-religious fractions and gender issues within the union movement. These efforts had fundamental effects on the U.S. labour movement, the most important of which is the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) in 1935 as an alternative to the AFL. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984); Zieger and Gall, 2002).

13 There were more than 3,500 strikes that were joined by over 4,000,000 workers in 1919 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984; Zieger and Gall, 2002).

14 From 1920 to 1923, the union membership fell from over 5,000,000 to 3,500,000. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 220-232). Expanding production and prosperity between 1922 and 1929 meant increasing wages for workers and an increase in their purchasing power. Therefore, during 1920s, trade unions adopted a strategy of complying with the promises of economic expansion while capitalists started to see unions as a “regulatory mechanism” within industrial relations. The “regulatory unionism” was also called “the new unionism”, “trade-union capitalism”, “business unionism”, “job conscious unionism”, or “class collaboration” in the U.S. This new unionism meant the restriction of union goals to narrowly defined immediate material issues, and the instrumentalization of unions by the capitalists as a means of policing the working class (Gordon, 1994). The number of strikes in 1928 was 604, which was the fewest on record in the U.S. labour movement history since 1884. In 1929, there were only 900 work stoppages involving just 1.2% of the labour force (Zieger and Gall, 2002: 45).
the *Norris-La Guardian Act* (NRA) (1932)\(^{15}\), the *National Industrial Recovery Act* (NIRA) (1933) took a definite step toward implementing the right to organize and collective bargaining. The NIRA and the NRA did not go far enough to protect workers and so, a new act, the *Wagner Act*, or the *National Labour Relations Act*, was passed in 1935. This Act recognized and imposed “the right of wage earners to organize without making any such corresponding concessions to management as had been incorporated in the NIRA. It was prepared to strengthen the bargaining position of the workers” (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 266). With this Act, it was finally recognized that labour could gain equal terms of bargaining power at the table with capital, only with the support of the government. The importance of this Act resides therefore not only in the affirmation of the right of workers to organize, but also in the banning of all employer attempts against the realization of this right. The significance of the 1930s for the labour movement can then be summarized as the establishment of the legal foundations for organized labour in industrial relations.\(^{16}\)

At the beginning of 1940, the U.S. economy started to recover from the depression as a result of orders placed by the Western European countries for the ongoing war. Such orders led to a rise in production, a decrease in unemployment, and an increase in wages. The booming industry and growing union power prepared the stage for one of the most tumultuous years in the U.S. labour history. The number of labour disputes in 1941 reached a higher total than any other year, except 1937. There were 4,288 strikes bringing together more than two million workers. In a pattern that would replicate itself time and time again, anti-unionist propaganda from capitalists framed these strikes as having paralyzing effects on national defense and therefore being un-democratic and un-American.\(^{17}\) As a result, the National War Labour Board was established in 1942 (Dulles

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\(^{15}\) The *Norris-La Guardian Act* is the embodiment of laws that aimed at profound changes in the role of federal government and federal institutions in the regulation of labour disputes. This Act consisted of banning of "yellow dog" contracts, barring the federal courts from issuing injunctions against nonviolent labour disputes, and creating a right of organization and collective bargaining for the industrial workers (Winter, 1960). Section 7 (a) of the Act states the recognition of the right to association and collective bargaining. The New Deal reformulated Section 7 (a) of this Act more carefully in the *Wagner Act* (1935) and the *Fair Labour Standards Act* (1938). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 265-268).

\(^{16}\) With the New Deal policies, the role of labour in politics had become more crucial than ever. Both the AFL and the CIO played a significant role in the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936. However, the close relationship between the President of the CIO, John L. Lewis, and Roosevelt cooled as a result of the U.S. foreign policy and the loosening of New Deal reforms. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984, 307-311).

\(^{17}\) Following the coal strike of 1941, anti-labour laws of different severity were passed in many states, and thirty bills were introduced in the Congress to curb union power (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 317).
and Dubofsky, 1984: 223-230; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 130-136) and organized labour was asked to surrender its right to strike (No-Strike Pledge) as a wartime necessity.\footnote{Exceptions to this surrender occurred during the war. The most important one of which was the coal strike led by the United Mine Workers in 1943. The victory of the UM\textsuperscript{W} in this strike resulted in the passing of the Smith-Connally Act (1943), whose goal was to limit economic and political power of organized labour. \textsuperscript{1}}

After WWII, stable trade unions in mass production became essential for the smooth functioning of the economy.\footnote{During this time, the struggles between the workers and employers were not as violent as previous times. The union officials functioned as “managers of discontent” and work stoppages were merely designed for the improvement of existing contractual relations (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 334-341; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 134).} Increasing productivity and the U.S. economic domination facilitated rising capital accumulation, which made capitalists more agreeable to contracts with unions that guaranteed rising living standards. However, this did not mean that the corporate community’s distaste for the increasing power of organized labour ceased to exist. The \textit{Taft-Hartley Act of 1947} was the fruition of this opposition.\footnote{This Act guaranteed safeguards for the rights of the management. For example, employers were ensured full freedom of expression regarding union organization; they were also authorized to call for elections to determine the appropriate bargaining units in wage negotiations. Moreover, it was declared that any attempt of unions to coerce employers to collective bargaining was declared an unfair labour practice (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 345; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 134-148).} The \textit{Act} directly aimed at the unions through banning closed shops, complicating the voting procedure for forming a union shop, and more importantly, leaving the door open for more severe anti-union legislations to be passed by the states.\footnote{Section 14 (b) of the \textit{Act} made the adoption of the “right-to-work” laws possible in various states. These laws made it “illegal for a group of unionized workers to negotiate a contract that requires each employee who enjoys the benefits of the contract terms to pay his or her share of costs for negotiating and policing the contract” (Gould and Shierholz, 2011: 1). Therefore, these laws did not only restrict the financial viability of unions but also decreased their ability to negotiate favorable contracts and benefits. Twelve states passed the so-called “right-to-work” laws within couple of years. Today, these laws are in place in twenty-two states in the United States, especially in the South and Southwest. Gould and Shierholz (2011) argue that in RTW states, wages are 3.2% lower, while the rate of employer sponsored health insurance is 2.6% lower and the rate of employer-sponsored pension is 4.8% lower than those in non-RTW states. For discussion of the effects of RTW laws on union density, organizational activities and industrial development see Moore and Newman (1998); Moore and Newman (1985).} In the 1950s and 1960s, trade unions reached a peak point both in their social and political impact and in their overall membership. Private sector union density reached its peak at 36\% in 1953 and 1954 while many public employees joined trade unions during the same time (Hirsch, 2010). The union membership rate for all wage and salary workers was at its highest (34.8\%) in 1954 (Mayer, 2004). However, it was not long before this process was systematically reversed. The U.S. has been experiencing a steady decline in trade union membership rates over the last forty years, reaching a seventy-year-low in 2010. This decline is seen largely as a private sector phenomenon (Lipset and Katchanovski, 2001;
Farber and Western, 2001; Hirsch, 2010; Hirsch and Hirsch, 2006). According to Hirsch, the decline in private sector union density has been gradual, but unremitting. Union density in the private sector was 24.5% in 1973, 16.5% in 1983, 11.1% in 1993, reaching its lowest point at 6.9% in 2010. While private sector union density was in decline, public sector union density had increased rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though the size of the public sector has grown since the 1970s, union density has remained relatively constant, rising from 32.8% to 36.7% in 1983, and falling to 35.9% in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 2-3). Union membership rate of all wage and salary workers was 30.9% in 1960, 22.3% in 1980, 12.9% in 2000 (Mayer, 2004) and 11.9% in 2010 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011).

These changes must be viewed within the overarching context of the intensification of production in the wake of a paradigm shift away from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the beginning of the 1980s. The macro-management of the economy and social protections as well as the regulation of the population by the government have been replaced by deregulation, decentralization and extensive privatization. As a result, the hospitable New Deal policies have been replaced with the enactment of discouraging, if not hostile, labour legislations, the decentralization of collective bargaining, labour market deregulation, and the flexibilization of production in capital-labour relations (Katz, 1993; Palley, 2005). The steady increase in the rates of deunionization in the U.S. has been coupled with a precipitous decline in manufacturing employment. Marxist interpretations identify the manufacturing sector as the source of productive labour par excellence and the prime vehicle for both capitalist growth and its demise. That is to say, manufacturing employment and unemployment speak directly to core Marxist maxims dealing with the rate of exploitation, value creation, and the composition of the industrial reserve army. Therefore, from the perspective of Marxist political economy, the process of deindustrialization and its implications on the workers is quite significant for an analysis whose attempt is to reveal the relationship between deunionization, policing and capital.

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22 Union density demonstrates “the number of union members as a percentage of the number of people who could be potentially be union members” (Wallerstein and Western, 2000: 357).
23 While union density fell in the private sector, nonunion wage and salary employment in the private sector increased from 47 million in 1973 to 103 million in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 2).
24 The increase in public sector union density is related to the enactment of public sector labour laws within the states and at the federal level. For more detail see (Freeman, 1986; Freeman and Valletta, 1988).
25 Along with the decline of union membership, and hence organized labour, has come the decline in the number of strikes and lockouts. The number of major strikes and lockouts lasting one shift and involving 1,000 or more workers was 424 in 1950, 222 in 1960, 381 in 1970, 187 in 1980, 44 in 1990, 39 in 2000 and 11 in 2010 (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012).
26 Marx has been widely criticized by contemporary scholars for his contradictory assertions about mental versus manual labour, productive versus unproductive labour. For more detail see Becker (1977); Carchedi (1977); Mandel (1975).
The U.S. has also been experiencing a steady decline in the manufacturing sector’s share of overall employment since its all-time peak in 1979 (Baker, 2011).27 The job losses in the manufacturing sector have been even more substantial since 2000. Following the 2001 recession, employment in manufacturing fell by 17%, and by the end of 2007 “had edged down further” (Brauner, 2008) and has continued to fall subsequently.28 This steep decline has been explained with reference to two interrelated factors: (1) rapid development in productivity, and (2) increased competition in the world market (Brauner, 2008; Fisher, 2004). Along with productivity growth and increase in global competitiveness, Brauner (2008) relates the decline in manufacturing employment to the imbalance between job losses and job gains. On the one hand, the rates of job losses had spiked during the 2001 recession and by the end of 2003 had fallen below the levels witnessed in the late 1990s and has remained low since then. On the other hand, the rate of job creation, which had began its decline in the late 1990s, has also continued its descend. Moreover, since the 1980s manufacturing workers have become an important part of the population of “displaced workers”.29 They have been more likely than other sector workers to be displaced, and those who had lost their jobs have been more likely than other sector employees to have remained jobless and have experienced significant losses in their earnings even when they have been reemployed (Brauner, 2008).

The development of American industrial production is the history of worker resistance and pacification. Various eras have seen progress and regression by unions and workers. In each of these historical formations, in the lead-up to, during and after the two World Wars, police force and legal authority have played a decisive role. It is within this historical backdrop of pacification that we analyze the relationship between total policing, the unionization rate and strikes and lock-outs in the U.S. from 1972-2009.30

27 The decline in the manufacturing sector employment is not unique to the U.S. On the contrary, all advanced industrial countries have been experiencing a steady decline in their manufacturing employment rates. For more detail see Bernard (2009); Commission of the European Communities (2009); Pilat, et al. (2006); van der Zee and Brandes (2007).

28 The manufacturing sector lost 15% of its workforce during the period between December 2007 and June 2009 (Baker, 2011). It is argued that although there has been a continuous decline in the manufacturing employment in the U.S. for almost over a half-a-century, manufacturing production and value-added continued to grow as a result of high productivity (Pilat, et al., 2006). Despite this high productivity rate, the share of the manufacturing sector in the total economic activity and value-added have continued to decline in Western economies due to increased economic integration, demographic effects, productivity growth and the fluctuations in exchange rates (Alderson, 1997; Brauner, 2008; Pilat, et al., 2006).

29 Displaced workers are defined as “people who had 3 or more years of tenure on a job they had lost or left because of plant or company changes or moves, insufficient work, or the abolishment of their positions or shifts” (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012). For more detail on “displaced workers” see Current Population Survey (2012).

30 Data for unionization and strikes and lockouts goes back further than total policing employment and this is represented in Graph 3.
Graph 3 indicates that both unionization ($r^2 = .932, n=39, p<.001$) and strikes and lock-outs ($r^2 = .818, n=39, p<.001$) are statistically significantly inversely correlated to total policing. That is, as unionization has declined so have strikes and lock-outs while the number of total police per 100,000 population have increased. In fact, while total policing employment has climbed by 64.8% from 1972 to 2009, strikes and lock-outs have declined by 99.2% and the overall unionization rate has dropped by 55.4%. A pacification approach to unions would hold that these organizations play a surrogate policing role. Certainly, our international study reinforces these statistically significant findings (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 2) – as unionization decreases, policing increases. Similarly, as unionization decreases so does the frequency of strikes and lock-outs decrease both internationally (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) and in the USA ($r^2 = .923, n=50, p<.001$, not shown).

Not surprisingly, as both unionization and strikes and lock-outs have decreased consistently since the early seventies so has deindustrialization increased. That is, as cumulative job losses in the industrial sector mount, so does unionization wither ($r^2 = -.823, n=32, p<.001$, not shown) and strikes and lock-outs decrease ($r^2 = -.691, n=32, p<.001$, not shown). As might be expected, this upward trend in industrial job losses has coincided with rising total policing employment numbers ($r^2 = .705, n=32, p<.001$). Graph 4 illustrates this trend line since 1972. Again, as in our study of the relationship between the industrial reserve army and total policing internationally ($r^2 = .462, n=34, p<.01$, see Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) more industrial unemployment coincides with more policing.

Conclusions

At the outset of this paper we produced five testable hypotheses that were gleaned from our reading of Marxian political economy, studies of pacification, and our own previous international research. Our aim was to examine the explanatory power of these approaches for assessing the relationship between policing, inequality, exploitation, unionization, strikes and lock-outs, and deindustrialization in the USA over the last four decades. This empirical assessment used existing macroeconomic statistics that were operationalized to suit our analysis and to conform to the core concepts being tested. The analysis confirmed the following five hypotheses:

- *Inequality will positively correlate to total policing;*
- *Surplus value will positively correlate to total policing;*
- *Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing;*
- *Unionization will positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs;* and
- *Cumulative deindustrialization will positively correlate to total policing.*
When coupled with our previous international research of 45 countries for the snapshot year of 2004 (Rigakos and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, these finding are simply remarkable. The associations we have discovered are powerful and recurring both over time and across international borders where variations in legal contexts and institutional histories of policing are many and complex. The empirical verification of these basic tenets of a Marxian political economy of policing are significant for both the study of pacification as well as policing and security research more broadly.

Although aimed at the level of a larger political economy, the effect of increased policing, decreased unionization, and more inequality has profound institutional effects that structurally condition our everyday social relations. As Althusser (1972: 174) once mused: if a police officer simply says: “Hey, you there!” in public, the individual who turns around “by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion… becomes a subject”. The multiplication of these institutionally mediated (interpellated) effects have significant implications on how we see the world, the power of ideology, and the rise to prominence of security as hegemony (Rigakos 2011; Rigakos and Manolov, 2013: 16-19). Thus, these empirical results may usefully inform a general social theory and resistance that increasingly identifies “policing” – broadly defined – as a core element of the global pacification of labour and the enforcement of capitalist relations (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011).

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Books Reviewed


Reviewed By Patrice LeClerc


Reviewed By Scott M. Aquanno


Reviewed by Elaine Coburn


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It is impossible to read this volume of essays from a 2009 conference on “Aboriginal Policy Research” without consideration of which “eyes” the reader is wearing, and which “eyes” each of the authors present, especially considering the last issue of Socialist Studies’ Mini Symposium on Indigenous Research (Vol. 9, #1). Questions raised include identity (and who defines it), culture, diversity, tradition, rights and legitimacy. Also important are conceptions of laws, land, governance, nationalism, and gender. Of course, who is Metis (especially after the 2003 Powley decision) remains problematic; four of the 13 authors define themselves in the “Contributors” section as such (though one prefers “Half-Breed”). They are from the academy, government and arts community.

Each of the four major sections, and the cover, are introduced by depictions of patterns of Metis shawls (wish they had been reproduced in colour instead of black and white), and some essays include poems, photos, art, and letters. Some are strictly academic, others are self-reflective; some are both.
In the introduction, the editors do address some of the complexity of these issues. They are clear with those that are not discussed, and recognize that these essays cannot share a “theoretical terminological framework” (xv). They also indicate that identity still remains a contested term, as “it is not at all clear that the set of people who self-identify as Metis are exactly the same set of people who are affected by the issues raised” (xvii).

The Identity section ranges from issues of self-presentation: dress, jewelry, art, literature and material culture (Gloria Jane Bell), emphasizing fluidity and how these were perceived by the Metis and those viewing them (illustrated wonderfully by art). Laura-Lee Kearns offers discussions of women’s identities and how they relate to the “blood memories” of ancestors, and she supplements her stories in poetry. Editor Greg Dahl shares his pride in his choice of identity as a “half-breed” and an exploration of fluid meanings and their revisions and attempts at management, as well as ethnic racism and resistance to colonialism, using legal discussions and poetry. Overall, this section carefully expresses and examines some of the aforementioned issues in scholarly and personal ways.

History is examined in Darren O’Toole’s contribution “From Entity to Identity to Nation”, parsing collective identity, culture, ethnicity and collective action, strategies, institutions, manipulation, and possible use of social movement tools. Liam Haggarty takes on economic sharing and exchange, including combined systems of sharing and mercantilism, concluding with the changes and challenges brought about by externalities such as technologies (refrigeration) and government restrictions such as government licensing. Finally, Glen Campbell and Tom Flanagan offer three new letters by Louis Real (one when he was a boy), along with poetry (in English). The most interesting is one written in 1869, just after he took control of the Red River Colony in which he expresses his thrill with having “seized control and temporarily quelled opposition, and excite[ment] with the potential power that he sees awaiting the movement”. The letters are reproduced in the original French.

The Law section is primarily about court cases and rights/laws. Ian Peach provides a very useful overview of court cases related to identity, especially the confluence (or not) of Metis and Aboriginal classifications. Here again we see the problematics of interpretations of organized communities, modes of life, relationship to land, and self-identification. He has hopes that the Powley decision will lead to more positive outcomes than in the past. Jeremy Patzer continues the discussion of court cases and the problematics of defining cultural rights and definitions of authentic past. He is wary of the current position of the courts and their evaluations of authenticity and relationships with rights, and he calls for a more explicitly political-power analysis of the role of law.

The section on Politics begins with a discussion of how Metis people have organized to deal with provincial and the federal governments. Kelly L. Saunders describes how, while recognizing the tradition of self-government, the Metis have created western-style political structures. While she has hope for the future of such structures,
more reflection is needed on the persistent threat of co-optation. Siomonn F. Pulla’s chapter describing the development of Metis political organizations, Christopher Adams’ discussion of using interest group strategies, and Janique Dubois’ focus on Metis governing structures in Saskatchewan, each in their own ways sensitive to self-government issues, all suggest that Metis political structures must become more reflective of western ones.

This collection, for the most part, does attempt to reflect the diversity of the Metis peoples, the importance of self-determination and identification, and the issues of legitimacy and representation. It also recognizes the reality of the long histories of the Metis, the variations within communities, and the conflicts of western laws and values in attempts to come to mutual understandings. It draws attention to the many outstanding problems, including that the definition of Metis still varies significantly among the Metis themselves and from the courts as well, whose interpretations not only essentialize but also fail to account for the contingent nature and realities of people’s history and lives.


**Reviewed By Scott M. Aquanno**

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Mark Blyth’s latest text examines the ongoing retrenchment of state budgets and responsibilities in the European periphery as a response to the 2008 financial crisis. The main premise of the book is to challenge the rise of austerity politics as an appropriate solution to the Eurozone crisis and to call out for new directions in economic planning. For Blyth the prescription of austerity - defined as voluntary deflation aimed at restoring competitiveness by cutting state budgets/debts - as an antidote to the current malaise rests on a misappraisal of the nature of the subprime financial crisis. Far from being a distinctly public sector crisis, the meltdown of the US housing market and the ensuing destabilization of the US and European banking system rather had its origins in a series of wrongheaded private sector decisions which served mainly to bolster bank profitability in the lead-up to the crisis. As a result, the image of profligate government spending undermining long-term economic prosperity does not align well with the socio-economic script surrounding the crisis. It is in this sense that the book blames the crisis on the
structure of financial instruments and markets as well as the management of risk within the financial sector, and then contests the turn to austerity as the 'greatest bate and switch in modern history' (73).

For Blyth, austerity is not merely a means of distorting economic reality and amplifying socio-economic inequalities but also, more foundationally, a bad economic idea. Chapters four and five argue that there is a ‘can’t live with it can’t live without it’ paradox built into economic liberalism’s treatment of the state that, in turn, leads to a terrible fear of government debt (100). As state budgets become big enough to cut back, this fear informs the development of the first austerity programs in the 1920s. These doctrines are ultimately overturned by economic reformers associated with Mill’s brand of New Liberalism, as epitomized, above all, by Keynes’ intellectual victory over Schumpeter, but they fade from prominence rather than disappear entirely and eventually lead to the development of two key intellectual movements, ordoliberalism and Austrian economics. Blyth argues that the current turn to austerity in Europe resulted from the success of these epistemic projects in the context of the broader triumph of neoliberal ideas about the natural rate of employment, central bank independence and the political business cycle -- ideas which themselves are subject to critical scrutiny. In particular, ordoliberalism is credited with creating an institutional monetary and economic framework in Europe that led almost inevitably to the adoption of austerity measures at the very outset of the Euro crisis.

What makes the idea of austerity so problematic, then, is that it rests both on an irrational fear of state debt which originates in the privileged social location of economic liberalism’s foundational thinkers as well as a series of economic arguments, such as Ricardian equivalence and modern business cycle theory, that have been principally discredited. The conceptual reproduction of austerity therefore hinges on an intellectual separation from the key economic principles born from Keynesian macroeconomic theory. In this context, it is no surprise that the various historical episodes of austerity have largely ended in economic and social failure. Chapter six offers a rigorous empirical analysis showing that the successful cases cited to justify the application of austerity in fact offer little support for public sector retrenchment as a means of igniting economic development.

Overall, the book contributes a rich critical analysis of the recent turn to austerity that prompts meaningful political dialogue. Blyth highlights the unequal distributive impacts of public sector retrenchment but also confronts austerity on its own terms by demonstrating that the arguments upon which it rests are intellectually weak, if not entirely wrong. This position is important in contesting and overturning official responses to the crisis which has been responsible not for a weakening but rather a strengthening of the very same modalities of power that underwrote the development of financialization. Yet it is at the same time important to recognize that the organizing framework Blyth adopts to explain both the crisis and the contradictions of austerity
perfectly accommodates the states versus markets distinction that runs throughout the mainstream IPE literature on the global financial marketplace. Such narratives have a very difficult time identifying the complex ways in which states constitute markets, particularly in the neoliberal context, let alone the structures of market authority that make policy managers and politicians only relatively autonomous from capitalist configurations of power. In understanding the recent turn to austerity, it is very significant that it both served in the interests of the financial ruling bloc and took place in the context of a relatively weak international labour movement.

It is this irresolvable link between ideas and social relations that ultimately goes missing in Blyth’s analysis and it is in this regard, above all, that the implications of the assessment are not pushed nearly far enough. To be fair, there is an implicit recognition of the social context running through Blyth’s analysis, nonetheless the overriding tendency is to bracket out material interests and power systems in presenting ideas as an autonomous explanatory force. This separation between ideas and class power in fact relates to a broader conceptual problem within the constructivist institutionalist framework from which the book is ultimately born. This framework takes ideas seriously by rejecting the treatment of agents as ‘mere bearers… of systemic logics’, but it accomplishes this by ignoring the social configurations within which ideas are embedded (Hay 2011, 79). The result is that abstract individual level emotions, desirers and interests gain casual influence at the expense of the power systems that inform inter-subjective beliefs. Thus to the extent that Blyth offers a multicausal analysis, he focuses on ideas and institutions, with the former consolidating the latter, rather than the interdependency between power, knowledge and ideology.

The book therefore relies on a limited conceptual framework that thwarts an understanding of the constellations of power within the market economic logic. It is precisely this narrow layering of social reality that leads Blyth to lament the collapse of Keynesian economics, overemphasize the role of Hume, Schumpeter and Hayek in the development and reproduction of austerity politics, and assess the subprime crisis without regard to US financial power and neoliberal wage relations. It is hardly surprising, in this context, that Blyth ends up arguing for progressive tax increases as a solution to current budgetary constraints in Europe and the US. This ‘alternative’ may offer short-term relief but it is both unlikely to succeed given the modalities of contemporary power and especially incapable of offering a progressive and equitable solution to the current crisis.

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Liberal capitalisms have always separated the economy from politics, narrowing political life to formal electoral politics dominated by the capitalist class. This dashed early socialist hopes that the working class vote would accomplish transformative, even revolutionary change through parliamentary processes. In the current historical moment of capitalism, this restrained, inadequate vision of politics has become even narrower: national and international technocrats, like the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission and the European Central Bank in Greece and Portugal, decide human fates in the name of an economic expertise that is said to be merely technical, not political. Of course, to much of the world’s population this is not new, with oppressed classes in the developing world collapsing under the supposedly expert advice and interventions of the IMF and the World Bank, nevermind non-governmental organizations and Foundations offering “neutral” aid. But this technocratic, economistic approach to managing social life is arguably now increasingly globally dominant.

As Jean-Pierre Dupuy explains, his book is born out of shame at this development, particularly the spectacle of political men (sic) abdicating political will to what he calls the fantasy of the “markets” (p.9). And as Dupuy observes, calling markets a “fantasy” is not to say they are without real, devastating effects both human and ecological. At the same time, the book brings together Dupuy’s successive intellectual infatuations, combining his own particular take on the works of thinkers as varied (if as white, male and usually European) as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls, Ivan Illich, Günther Anders, René Girard and more, into a new configuration that is more than the sum of the parts. The result is a strikingly original argument against the ravages of contemporary economic technocracy and for a new civilization that he describes as a “post-economic modernity” (p.200). Even more than that, it is a wide-open existential call to arms against the economic fatalisms that reduce the human horizon to the limited possibilities of social life here and now.
As he describes it himself, Dupuy’s “conceptual pamphlet”\(^1\) (p.15) is an argument against the “incredible reduction that economic thought operates in the ways that it deals with human affairs” (p.15). In vivid, sometimes withering prose, he calls for nothing less than a revolution against the “economystification” of human life on earth. However, this is not a Marxist revolution based in actually-existing class struggles. Rather, in an idealistic twist that many historical materialists are unlikely to appreciate, to their loss, his revolution is based in metaphysics.

Ultimately, following earlier work, Dupuy calls for an “enlightened catastrophism” (see also Dupuy 2002). By this, Dupuy means a dramatized but rational prophesy of doom to be held up against the “obscene optimism” (p.157) of mainstream economists with their promises of future growth, in a context where growth is sacralized as the central aim of social life. Through such realistic apocalyptic prophesies, humanity will be galvanized to un-do the inevitable, tragic future that awaits them. Dupuy maintains this is only an apparent paradox, because dramatic pronouncements of doom collapse the gap between knowing and believing. Without such dramatization “we don’t believe what we know” (p.289). For instance, we “know” about global warming but fail to truly “believe” it is happening and so fail to make the necessary changes in our individual and collective behaviours. By collapsing the gap between knowing and believing through dramatic narratives, Dupuy argues, a new metaphysical time is created between the present and the coming catastrophe (p.264). This is a profoundly political moment when human beings take their fates fully into their own hands, no longer combatting the phantom of the “market” – which is nothing more than humanity’s “own violence, reified, externalized” (p.289) – but instead directly combatting human violence itself.

In making this argument, Dupuy tackles a range of contemporary social actors. In ways that sometimes recall Marx’s own reservations about the organized working class, for instance, Dupuy is disdainful of the ecologically-unsustainable productivism of some unions. Recalling a French union that violently demanded the continuation of the Concorde programme, he asks “Should one think that (the union) was thus seeking to hasten the emergence of a society without classes, in which all the ex-proletariats would fly supersonically?” (p.136). His answer is, “Of course not” -- the union was only seeking work for its members in an industrial, capitalist context in which work has, however, become a kind of torture for many, perhaps most people (p.136). The failure of unions to move beyond this model is an imaginative failure to grasp that the issue is not work, but the need for “a new civilization” (p.136), one in which torturous work will no longer be “necessary” for economic growth and, so it is implied, human wellbeing.

Some might argue that Dupuy’s solution to what he describes as the “gordian knot” of an industrial capitalist world in which the finality is work, whilst economic rationality makes this work tortuous, is demagogic. He does not call for popular revolt by

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\(^1\)All translations from the French text are mine.
the working class-for-itself or similar revolutionary mass actors. Instead, he demands that “prophets” replace “experts” (p.118), where the prophet is more modest than the expert, since s/he knows that there is “there is no truth independent from how it's transmitted” (p.118). In other words, the performance of truth is part of the truth. This is an argument we are more used to hearing from Black feminists like Patricia Hill Collins (2009), who reminds us that we believe Aretha Franklin's call for “R-E-S-P-E-C-T” because and not despite the way she sings it (p.127), than from mathematically trained European philosophers like Dupuy. Rationality is here deemed inadequate as the measure of truth and as the stimulus for transformative social change; there is a necessarily dramaturgical, emotional element to both.

Dupuy's privileged role for the prophet may be dangerous in its apparent dismissal of ordinary people, especially the oppressed. But I think Dupuy is right to insist on the dangers of the cold-blooded “rationality” of mainstream economics, with its “trivial”, “obscure and futile” (p.157) mathematical models and its unimaginative self-satisfaction, both with the world-as-it-is and with the state of the economics discipline itself. Dupuy calls for prophetic politicians, but arguably what he is really seeking are revolutionary artists of all kinds, both popular and elite, who make immediate –not only rationally but emotionally – the real threats to human wellbeing and even human survival within an ecocidal capitalist system. If Dupuy “overlooks” such potential contributions from among oppressed peoples, there is nothing in his argument that is incompatible with it. Indeed, Marx’ own impassioned, hence unforgettable writing about “spectres haunting Europe” arguably comforts Dupuy's argument that the urgency provided by drama (in this case dramatic prose) does matter to inspiring human beings to extraordinary action. This dramatic, emotional urgency does not undercut rationality, rather it is wedded to it, closing the gap between cognitive recognition of the need for radical action and actual engagement in necessary movements for social change.

Throughout the book, Dupuy's most sustained targets are not productivist working-class unions, however, but contemporary apologists for the violence of capitalist markets. Their responsibility is carefully contextualized – they are seen as symptoms rather than the source of the problem. Nonetheless, after citing Milton Friedman’s glowing description of capitalism as a society of mutual indifference, Dupuy observes:

This utopia of a society where the men would neither need to speak to each other nor to love another to live together, where mutual indifference and the withdrawal into the self would be the best garantors of the common good, is so monstrous that one tells oneself that only a very strong motive could result in this (utopia) coming into existence and being taken seriously by so many great minds (p.64).
The future of the economy and of economics – the title in French *L’avenir de l’économie* is deliberately ambiguous (p.23) – may also be read as the future *according to* economics. The future of humanity imagined by Friedmanite economics replaces human beings with “zombies” that are without potentially destructive passions and rivalries but without meaningful humanity either.

Indeed, Dupuy argues that this perverse vision is not far from the apocalyptic world Günther Anders foresaw, “the image of a paradise inhabited by murderers without wickedness and by victims without hate” (p.66).

Dupuy’s salutary denunciation of the horrors of mainstream economic thinking is, however, simply the beginning of what is an existential call for radical social change towards a more human world. Historical materialists ought to be sympathetic at once to this demasking of the moral and imaginative poverty of economics and to the call for profound social transformation through struggle that will be political, not “expert” and technocratic.

But it would be a disservice to Dupuy to say that socialists should read him because he has a congenial message. Rather, they should read him because it is rare to be stimulated by a thinker as original as Dupuy. He takes seriously insights from sources ranging from the neglected Adam Smith of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (2002) to Greek myths to the Bible. He is not afraid to tackle the biggest questions that we face today, including an “economystified” world in which economic rationality seeps into the pores of every aspect of life. He frontally addresses the ongoing, arguably heightened military menace of an atomic holocaust and the already-unfolding ecological disaster. He offers a lucid and therefore justifiably anxious look at the world in which we live, one that posits mimetic human violence – rather than kindness or sympathy – as one of the major engines of past and contemporary social life.

But Dupuy’s analysis does not stop with this apocalyptic vision. Instead, he reminds us that we all face the coming catastrophe of our own deaths and, on a bigger scale, the inevitable death of the world capitalist relations that now shape our lives. The urgency is to realize this for ourselves and for all of humanity, so that we can decide – not what we want to do but what we need to do – with the time that remains to us before our inevitable deaths and the inevitable death of capitalism. We need to be fatalists but only to seize life more fully, individually and together. In summing up his own argument, Dupuy justifiably concludes: “No, decidedly, fatalism is not there where one thinks” (p.268).

**References**


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