Article

# 'CLEARLY BLOWN AWAY BY THE END OF THE MORNING'S DRAMA': SPECTACLE, PACIFICATION AND THE 2010 WORLD CUP, SOUTH AFRICA

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**Abstract**

The massive security assemblages surrounding major sporting events and political summits embody two layers of spectacle. On the one hand, security operations are central to the governance of entertainment and media imagery. Simultaneously these security measures are profoundly theatrical and calibrated for the maximum visual impact: the spectacle of security itself. Some critical thinkers have described this dual spectacle as indicative of a contemporary state-corporate obsession with image and perception management, an obsession which detracts from 'valid' security concerns. By contrast I argue that spectacle and theatricality are in fact highly functional components of the pacification projects of state and capital. With reference to Guy Debord's conception of 'spectacle', this article highlights how mega-events reveal, in highly dramatised form, the logic of pacification. Using the 2010 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) soccer World Cup as a case study, the article demonstrates how police and military power are mobilised to secure accumulation, to enforce social control and to extend the power and arsenal of the state security apparatus. What is truly spectacular about mega-event security is not just the incorporation of media templates into the working of state forces. Rather, the rhetoric and concept of security itself becomes a form of spectacular power as it serves to both obscure and justify how mega-events are ultimately projects of class power.

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During one of a series of preparatory exercises held ahead of South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) took part in what a press release described as an " action packed" training simulation:

> Heavily armed criminals tried to flee the scene, but no sooner had the thought emerged when they stopped in their tracks thanks to an armed response team, with one arrested and another fatally wounded, all in the space of ten minutes. Armed criminals were then chased as they fled their vehicle, into a building, where a shootout ensued as members of the Special Task Force intervened – but the criminals refused to surrender. It was time to call in the members of the National Intervention Unit. Fully armed and protected they arrived on the scene by helicopter, as well as parachutes, to assist the officers on the ground. Live ammunition lit up the sky while the SAPS units apprehended the criminals who surrendered after one was shot dead on the scene.... cracking down on the terrorists by firing live missiles.... After a gun battle ensued, all suspects were shot and arrested within 15 minutes after refusing to cooperate (Ndawonde 2009).

The release goes on to detail how watching members of the press and officials, including the Minister of Police, "looked clearly blown away by the end of the morning's drama" (Ndawonde 2009). This example of a policing display aestheticised and calibrated to have the maximum amount of media and visual impact is indicative of a general trend evident in the extensive, militarised security operations at major sporting events and political summits throughout the world: 'security' becoming part of the spectacle itself (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). In the case of the temporary states of siege which accompany major political meetings the agents of participating governments aim at communicating "spectacular security (for authorities, police and security agents, corporate elite, political leaders) and spectacular insecurity for protestors (and indeed anyone who just happened to be passing by)" (Rimke 2011, 196). While adopting many of the same tactics, security operations at sporting mega-events are less overtly hostile: as the former commissioner of the SAPS put it "[as] security agents we must behave in a way that ensures a peaceful time for entertainment and enjoyment that visitors enjoy to the maximum"(FIFA World Magazine 2010, 29). This intersection between entertainment and coercive state mobilisations results in a situation where "Mass citizen.... mega-sports and entertainment events now automatically produce martial law conditions.... Yet the erection of cordons, walls and enclosures, often for whole cities or systems of cities within which the spectacles are staged, is as much about managing global branding and TV imagery as it is about keeping risks at bay" (Graham 2010, 125). Indeed the size and scope of these operations appears to dwarf the actual practical requirements of guarding such

events, becoming ever more "dystopian and surreal" as novelist China Miéville (2012) observed of the plans for the 2012 Summer Olympics which included the mobilisation of helicopters carrying snipers, warships in the Thames, jets in the sky, and more British troops on duty in London than in the warzone of Afghanistan.

However this does not mean that we should lament how the politics of "public spectacle" (Graham 2010, 382) has superseded apparently less bombastic and somehow more 'practical' forms of security. Instead as part of the wider anti-security project this paper will maintain that rather than being synonymous with public safety, security is at heart a mechanism for ensuring an order based on " both sustained capital accumulation and a constant political policing" of society (Neocleous 2008, 153). Or rather as Mark Neocleous (2011) argues the fundamental goal of security is *pacification*, the on-going deployment of the police and war powers in fabricating and fortifying the rule of capital and bourgeois class power, of state domination and social hierarchy. What this implies is that 'pacification' entails not just repression but also production: overt violence and coercion are one aspect of wider process of securing territories and populations for accumulation and creating political docility and acquiescence. This article argues that mega-events offer, in a highly dramatised form, a vivid example of the nexus of 'police-war-accumulation' captured within the concept of pacification, as Neocleous argues in this volume. And as Sebastian Saborio shows in his article in this volume, the governance of mega-events pivots around wide-ranging societal transformations which go substantially beyond deploying state forces and military equipment at tournament venues and transport nodes. Event 'preparations' are in fact far more extensive, ranging from evictions of poor communities and the gentrification of urban areas to extensive expansions in the power and arsenal of the host state. Central to all these interventions is the role of image and performance, both in the projection of state security forces as highly mobilised and prepared for any eventuality and in wider efforts to ensure that host cities and countries are portrayed as clean, safe environments for tourism and business.

For Boyle and Haggerty (2009) the centrality of image to mega-event security evokes Guy Debord's famous *Society of the Spectacle* (1967). Debord's book maintained that the texture of modern life is subject to the perpetual dissemination and bombardment of images, slogans, false promises and instructions delivered by a confluence of bureaucratic governments, the media and advertisers. This serves to alienate and distract people from politics, anesthetise them with representation and to erode the capacity for individual and collective action (Retort 2004). However, Boyle and Haggerty (2009, 262) tend to focus on the visual and theatrical aspects of mega-event governance and the convergence of state and business interests in using mass media to display an "appearance of absolute security". As with much of the secondary literature on Debord, and the Situationist International more generally, this focus on the visual and media downplays the radical and Marxist content of his work: his core concepts of reification and the commodity are ignored, and so too is the demand for self-

management and the transformation of everyday life (see Leeper 2012). For Debord (1994, 12), spectacle is not "a collection of images but rather a social relationship between people that is mediated through image". Nor is it a distortion of reality or a "decorative element added to the world" but instead emerges as a direct product of the capitalist mode of production: "news or propaganda, advertising" and entertainment work to serve as a "total justification of the conditions and aims of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence of that justification, for it governs all time spent outside the production process itself" (Debord 1994, 12-13). And rather than supplanting the violence and repression inherent to the rule of both capital accumulation and the state with more diffuse forms of control, spectacle serves to augment it. Writing in the 1960s, Debord was as critical of the bureaucracies which had arisen in China and the USSR as he was of the governments in the consumer societies emerging in the 'West', arguing that these had maintained the role of the state as an authoritarian instrument for accumulation and the violent enforcement of class domination, whilst ruling their proletariats with a spectacle based on pseudo-revolutionary language and image.

Debord thus asserts that "the dominion of the spectacle… means the dominion too of the police" (42) and in a later work suggested that "We should expect, as a logical possibility, that the states' security services intend to use all the advantages they find in the realm of the spectacle, which has indeed been organised with that in mind for some considerable time" (Debord 1990, 25). Spectacle also serves as a specialised role as the "spokesman for all other activities, a sort of diplomatic representative of hierarchical society at its own court, and the source of the only discourse which that society allows itself to hear… by means of spectacle, the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power" (Debord 1994, 18-19). These representations, birthed by social and material relationships, appear to behave as independent things outside the control of human beings (Jappe 1999, 8).

This article uses Debord's original conceptualisation of spectacle to better illustrate how 'security', and in particular the fetishisation of security evident at major events, is an "illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion" (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011, 15). In particular, I aim to develop linkages between security and spectacle in a different direction from prior research which has tended to focus upon the intersections between state power, war and the media and entertainment industries (Retort 2004; Stahl 2009). Although I will discuss the importance of aesthetics, image and theatricality to the policing regime initiated throughout South African cities for the 2010 World Cup, my main goal is to explore how the very *concept of security* functions as the alienated spectacle described by Debord. That is to say that 'security' and the grip its holds over urban space and policy making appears to function as an autonomous force, which both obscures its basis in social relations of exploitation and class domination while simultaneously serving to extend and justify these relations under the guise of public

protection.  Indeed, as I will argue, the policing operations at mega-events are no longer about the events as such but, rather, have become security spectacles in their own right. These security spectacles allow states to experiment with new forms of power and ensure vast profits for franchise and brand owners. And as this article aims to demonstrate, these spectacles can be considered as an increasingly prominent front in the "long durée of pacification under capitalist relations" (Rigakos 2011, 80) and the continual efforts to extract resources, to control populations and to entrench the domination of the state.

**Saturation Policing and Spectacular Power**

The 'spectacular' nature of World Cup security was most overtly demonstrated by the preparations of the South African government. The SAPS allocated over 41,000 officers to the tournament and embarked upon a major procurement drive of operational equipment including new helicopters, CCTV and riot equipment. Dedicated police escorts were provided to teams, referees and members of the FIFA delegation, while "saturation policing" (ESPN 2009) tactics were used at land, sea and air borders, across transport routes and around hotels, tournament events and tourist attractions. Stadiums were surrounded by mechanised units such as police pursuit vehicles and motorbikes, Casspir armoured personal carriers, Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, mobile command centres and emergency ambulances. During the planning stages stadium preparations were even more extensive, including proposed 'community processing centres' for 'non-compliant match spectators' (SAFA 2003: 9.4).  The police also implemented spatial cordons in the ten kilometres around stadiums with a "focus on preventing domestic extremism, including strike actions and service delivery protests" (World Cup South Africa Online 2010). The tournament saw the largest ever domestic deployment of the South African National Defence Force, exceeding in size even its missions during the various states of emergency declared by the Apartheid government in the 1980s. The justification offered was that this was part of a "security rather than a defence operation" intended to prevent "people with a cause" from disrupting the event (Szabo 2009). From the outset, security operations in the nine host cities were organised to ensure a massive visual impact. This was given particular consideration in the South African context because of the country's dangerous international reputation due to high incidences of violent crime. According to one government planning document, the image of South Africa enabled by security measures was as important as the actual pre-emption of violence: "operational planning shall concentrate on the security operations at all airports to ensure that the all-important first impression that is created is one of a safe, secure and stable country and region"(OA /NATJOINTS 2008, 30). This aesthetic fetish went beyond just perceptions of personal safety: "security is not just about crime", claimed one Cape Town official, "it is also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service delivery is also a part of our security planning" (Richard Bosman, interview with author, 20 July 2010).

The press releases and media statements which accompanied the unveiling of security systems were infused with depictions of seamless functioning and total control. According to Lieutenant General Andre Pruis (2010, 13) technology created a feeling of "police omnipresence" and allowed the police to "make South Africa a very small country". The King Shaka International airport outside Durban, the construction of which was fast-tracked for the World Cup, opened with the "best, latest security technology" including X-ray machines "capable of detecting everything from drugs to bombs" (News24 2010). A particular focus was placed on automated technology, which included the purchase of remote-operated bomb disposal equipment that "had proved itself in Iraq" and "shows no fear", which the SAPS unveiled and demonstrated at a shopping mall (Smillie 2008). Such attempts to convey the image of absolute security and control were moderated by efforts to ensure that an atmosphere of consumer festival prevailed. For example, the spokesperson for one of the private security companies which provided support functions to the police suggested that "if one of our guys sees a chip packet lying on the ground that could potentially house an explosive device, he has to be diplomatic and gently move the danger out of the way without the fans even knowing it" (The Event 2010).

At the domestic level, the government claimed that such dramatic and expensive security measures were necessary not only for the country's international image but were intended to leave behind a 'security legacy' of increased police numbers and surveillance equipment.  Such an argument was reiterated by big business, the media, security intellectuals and opposition political parties. Expressing what seemed to be a common elite sentiment, one opposition Member of Parliament approvingly described the tournament as:

> The biggest spectacle and biggest opportunity to achieve a common national identity.  As South Africans, we are destined to achieve great things and that togetherness must be forged in the burning excitement which is the World Cup. Never mind the costs that we will have to carry, we as South Africans can use sport to achieve what other nations have done through war (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2010).

However, much evidence suggests that the scale and size of the security operations dwarfed the actual tactical requirements of providing public safety around tournament venues and events.  Police officials candidly acknowledged that the spatial distribution of South African cities favoured their tournament efforts due to the concentration of violent crime in poor, black townships and informal settlements rather than in the gentrified urban spaces where most events took place (The Star 2007).  Furthermore, the annual report of the SAPS noted that high levels of police visibility during the tournament had

little "noticeable effect on violent contact crime" (South African Police Service 2011, 9) throughout the rest of the country.

While this suggests that the theatre of state sabre-rattling during the World Cup was primarily motivated by a desire to manage international perception, the displays of government power also serviced domestic political goals. Most notably the SAPS used the tournament to project an image of efficiency and power in contrast with their public reputation for brutality and incompetence. The high-visibility of the tournament also worked to benefit the military which used it as an opportunity to leverage substantial funding increases from national government.

Outside of the internal politics of the security forces, mega-events such as the World Cup may serve a wider role in fortifying host states, through functioning as an "instrument of pacification by… mystifying citizens through a grandiose spectacle" ( Broudehoux 2007,99). In the case of South Africa, the state called for citizens to use the World Cup as a platform for "social cohesion" (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2008), to put aside antagonisms for the duration of the event and to forgo the often explosive community protests and labour strikes which reveal the simmering tensions within post-Apartheid society. Prior to the tournament President Zuma made official 'fact finding missions' to several of the most "most militant and dissatisfied areas" (Nhlapo 2010) in the country which was described by one activist as an attempt to:

> Make sure that, come the World Cup tournament, marginalised people don't protest and embarrass South Africa in front of an international media spotlight. What he is doing is like locking your children in a room so that they don't cry that they are hungry in front of a guest. He actually just wants service delivery protests not to erupt when the rest of the world is in our country.

These measures were accompanied by less subtle forms of control as security officials promised to show 'zero tolerance' to 'illegal' protests and put pressure on urban authorities to withhold permits for marches and gatherings (McMichael 2012). Indeed, while the government presented the security measures as a response to the dangers posed by armed, organised criminal gangs and terrorists, the rhetoric and preparatory tactics used by the state reflected a pronounced fear of the potential threat offered by society as a whole. Intelligence reports discussed the necessity of maintaining surveillance on labour issues and the need to ensure "mechanisms to control possible strikes and protest actions" (Republic of South Africa 2011:31).  Much of the police procurement drive was focused upon buying riot gear and after the tournament this equipment formed the basis for a revised, "aggressive" public order policy (Lukani, 2011). And indeed in the years since the tournament the most visible security legacy has been the deployment of purchases such as body armour and water cannons at political and labour demonstrations

which have been increasingly characterised by lethal police violence against protesters: notably some of these purchases were on display at the site of the 2012 Marikana massacre where SAPS special forces killed 34 striking miners. The extent to which protest was criminalised during the tournament also suggests that intimidation against the state's population is intrinsic to the theatre of state power during major events. Alongside reassuring tourists and demonstrating their 'crime fighting' capabilities, the spectacle also revealed to the citizen-subjects what would be done to them should they confront the established order. Mega-events thus provide another instance of how class violence and state repression are an implicit premise within the concept of security.

**Protecting FIFA's Brand**

The security mobilisation did not exclusively revolve around protecting the image of the South African state. Policing operations were as much about protecting FIFA's revenue stream and securing the advertising investments made by its corporate 'partners' and 'sponsors', including such major brands as Sony, Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Adidas. Under the comprehensive government guarantees which were signed as a condition of bidding for, let alone winning, hosting rights, the South African state was obliged to manage and cross subsidise all 'necessary' arrangements for FIFA's World Cup. These expenses ranged from stadium construction to granting legal and taxation exemptions for FIFA's operations during the tournament. Such a contractual framework ensured that security measures were continuously informed and structured by the commercial and branding imperatives of FIFA and its corporate allies, indicative of how the deployment of police power works to exact the paired ends of securing profit for capital and ensuring state control over urban space and populations.

Police and military operations focused on maintaining an image of South African cities in general and tournament events in particular, which was considered amenable to the 'brand identity' of the World Cup. Early FIFA reports on South Africa's suitability indicate that the association was impressed by the states capacity to enforce the desired image of festival despite some concerns.

General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the Inspection Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was possible to read press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit…. We therefore came to the conclusion that as long as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within certain boundaries; they should not encounter any trouble. With regard to organising security for a possible 2010 FIFA World Cup in the country, the Inspection Group received an excellent, comprehensive work schedule from one of the high commanders of the national police, covering stadiums,

media centres and main hotels, that will doubtless satisfy every requirement for the event. After the presentation we concluded that they have enough experience with this kind of event to handle them without difficulty. We must say that the security business is a flourishing industry in the country (FIFA 2004).

At the level of practical deployment the spatial protection of FIFA's brand was indicated by the government's tactic of saturation policing around stadiums, fan parks and association related locations such as FIFA's temporary headquarters in Johannesburg. Aside from providing direct close protection to elites, such as FIFA and corporate delegates, and dramatically assuring foreign tourists and the international media of the safety of South African host cities, this also ensured that corporate logos and brands would not be associated with images of crime or unrest through the state working to manage "particularly attractive parts of ... host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for…. commercial partners" (Klauser 2011, 9). In the enforcement of the image desired by FIFA, the security forces adopted a dual approach which combined concessions and coercion. On one hand, the police took a lenient stance towards certain behaviour of tourists and fans, such as public drunkenness. But on the other, people who breached FIFA restrictions, for such infringements as unlicensed ticket sales, faced rapid arrest and sentencing through the 56 'special courts' which were established to try crimes related to the tournament.  These courts tried both South Africans and foreign nationals and reserved particularly harsh sentences for both citizens caught robbing tourists *and* for commercial violations, with one man received a three year sentence for the possession of thirty match tickets.

The severity with which commercial infringements were handled indicates the wider influence which the interests of FIFA and World Cup advertisers exerted upon security measures. In particular state authorities were enrolled in the business of guarding and prosecuting attempts at 'ambush marketing' by unlicensed operators attempting to capitalise on the opportunity for visual and media exposure afforded by the tournament. FIFA's list of prohibited activities and signage included:

> branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible to the street), aerial advertising (blimps, balloons, or other airships), unauthorised street trading or vendors, any political and religious demonstrations (Cape Town Partnership 2009).

As a result, restriction zones and blockades were established around stadiums in which joint units of police and FIFA personnel patrolled for signs of commercial infractions. In turn, the efforts to ensure the visual domination of accredited brands during the World Cup was presented to the South African public as a safety issue comparable to violent

crime or attacks by political extremists. Replicating the 'zero tolerance' rhetoric used by government officials, FIFA representatives claimed that infringements would "be shown no mercy" (Barnes 2010) and "We need to be strong. We need to protect our brand" (Business Day 2010). Urban municipalities distributed promotional material designed to warn the public about the dangers of ambush marketing which included urging individuals to self-police their own behaviour and aspirations "Most often, if you think that something you are planning may be considered ambush marketing, it probably is" ( Cape Town Partnership 2009). Such an approach ('the enemy within') mirrors the police logic most recently displayed in the war on terror, in which "because the suspect communities are always already among us, we are all under suspicion, all potentially guilty"- albeit with suspicion being intensified by racial and gender factors with the black poor being far more likely to be targeted for state 'intervention' in the case of South Africa (Neocleous 2011, 49). Noticeably the same security rhetoric used by the state in the name of fighting crime or terrorism, the talk of 'no mercy' and control over urban space, was similarly assimilated and deployed within FIFA's projects of assuring dominance over visual signage.

Under FIFA's commercial restrictions 'political and religious demonstrations' around stadiums were listed as forms of ambush marketing. In turn, municipal authorities presented this requirement as a security measure necessary to the "smooth functioning and running of FIFA World Cup matches" (City of Cape Town 2010a). Using this rationale SAPS issued an unofficial directive to cities to not allow marches and demonstrations for the duration of the event due to not having "the capacity to police marches and the World Cup simultaneously" (Duncan 2010). Such cases illustrate how security restrictions served a combined purpose for the state and FIFA. Bans on visible demonstrations both maintained the pristine 'apolitical' image of the World Cup brand, while cohering with the government's attempts to discipline civil society through enforcing a moratorium on political protest.

Indeed, it is striking how at virtually every juncture security plans offered tactics and procedures which maintained an interchangeable applicability for both policing and commercial purposes. For example, under by-laws passed within host cities, FIFA was allowed to declare all the routes to and from airports, training venues and designated hotels as "commercial exclusion zones" (The Mercury 2009) which aligned with the security forces strategy of enforcing cordons around these sites. Such combined restrictions were thoroughly worked into the details of planning from an early stage. For instance, the creation of remote search parks and airspace restrictions around and above stadiums were not only intended to prevent possible terror attacks but to also to restrict unlicensed commercial material and aerial advertising from entering the exclusion zone (McMichael 2012, 524,526). Of course, this geography of security was also marked by class segregation and de facto racial apartheid, with 'backstage' security operations in

working class and poor black neighbourhoods and 'clean' policing displays targeted at the middle and upper classes and affluent international tourists.

Moreover, while the "absolute security" (Boyle and Haggerty 2009, 262) ethos espoused by tournament organisers penalised unaffiliated companies attempting to capitalise on the presence of the World Cup it nonetheless created markets for businesses attempting to sell another commodity: security itself. Companies both offered their services as 'support' to the state-managed security regime *and* attempted to benefit from fears about the governments perceived inability to protect tourists.   Manufactures incorporated the 'legacy' rhetoric of the state with the helicopter company Robinson (2008, 4) claiming of its equipment that "While the R44 Raven II Police Helicopters will play integral roles in the security effort for the World Cup, they are also part of a sustained effort to create a safer environment that will continue to benefit the citizens of South Africa long after the World Cup concludes".   On the other hand, the local subsidiary of Mercedes Benz used the tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest ranges of luxury armour-plated vehicles:

> [the] Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-Benz E-Guard, which provide occupants with protection from attacks by firearms and explosives. The Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard has armour to resist military standard small-arms projectiles that have almost twice the velocity of bullets fired by a revolver, and provides protection against fragments from hand grenades (IOL 2009).

Notably, this 'security' is a luxury commodified for the bourgeois, both for the South African and foreign tourist elite, and aimed against the implicit threat posed by the racialized 'dangerous classes'.   The saleability of event security as a commodity has continued long after the World Cup. In April 2013 the South African based defence manufacture Paramount Group announced the sale of a number of its armour plated and "hand grenade attack protected… Maverick internal security vehicles" (Radebe 2013) to the state government of Rio de Janeiro. According to a press release by the company, the vehicles (which are intended to be used by special forces such as BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais-Saborio, 2013) "play a critical role in the security infrastructure for both" the World Cup and Olympics" (Paramount Group 2013). The integration of South African manufactured hardware into the arsenals of police shock units being used to reorder favelas in Rio ahead of mega-events in Brazil is exemplary of the transnational union of pacification projects, with advanced technologies of attack and control developed in one environment being readily transferable into another, as Tyler Wall argues in his contribution to this volume (Wall 2013).

More generally, capital and state both cohered around a certain image of secure South African urban spaces. Beyond the shared desire to flood the streets with security

forces and to offer a bombastic rhetoric of 'no mercy', the South African government and FIFA – that is, state and corporation – shared an ideal of nothing less than the pacified city. The dream of the "fantasy city" (Samara 2010) is a dream of order, and as the other articles in this special issue argue, such order can be realised only through the classic pacification technique: removal of 'undesirable' and 'disorderly' elements. These messages of 'no mercy' and the 'fantasy city' while two sides of the same project, are aimed at quite different populations. Hence, the poor, mainly black population is targeted with the message 'no mercy' the condition for bourgeois whites and black to ensure their 'fantasy city'.

Throughout the country municipalities used police and private security guards to remove vagrants and potential petty criminals. In the city of Durban street children were cleared from visible areas such as the CBD and beachfront, which was described by a municipal official as a standard procedure "We often remove them from the streets when there are big events like the World Cup and major conferences, because some of them mug tourists and damage the image of the country" (The Mercury 2011). These expulsions were often presented as public health measures with the City of Cape Town describing removals as an attempt to protect indigents from the harsh winter climates in the centre of the city (City of Cape Town 2010b). Such actions were further encouraged by the FIFA by-laws which each host city implemented for the duration of the tournament which used the language of 'beautification' and 'access control', to minimise the presence of poverty. Most overtly, this included provisions against begging in "public open spaces controlled or managed by municipalities" (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 32) and placed incredibly stringent restrictions on street trading (43). In a more subtle manner, it also employed a wide-ranging definition of prohibited 'nuisances' near access controlled and special event sites. These included any "public building which is so situated, constructed, used or kept so as to be unsafe or to be injurious or dangerous to health", "any occupied dwelling for which no proper and sufficient supply of pure water is available under a reasonable distance" and "any area of land kept or permitted to remain in such a state as to be offensive" (eThekweni Municipality n.d, 13). Although this was presented as a matter of 'health security' it also implied that squatter camps and illegally occupied buildings, which often lack on-site amenities, could be defined as nuisances, as has often been the case with other urban redevelopments.

The proximity of the World Cup also provided an impetus to state-led efforts to eradicate, rather than to upgrade, informal squatter settlements for the benefit of "tourists and investors…. The provincial legislature of KwaZulu Natal drafted a 'Slum Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Bill' which included "repressive direct measures used during the apartheid era" (Huchezemeyer 2011: 13, 17). After a national court action by the shack dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the proposed act was eventually ruled unconstitutional. Nonetheless the evidence suggests that a pattern of attempting to aggressively evict shack dwellers was merely encouraged, rather than

imposed, by the presence of FIFA and the World Cup. The process of the state securing valuable areas of cities for business and leisure is indicative of a post-Apartheid development strategy that is actively resegregating cities on the basis of class. What the World Cup offered was a heightened version of the on-going efforts to regulate and discipline people, spaces and consumer behaviour under the guise of creating 'world class cities' for investment and tourism. Furthermore these efforts to maintain an uninterrupted campaign against the urban poor, whether in the name of safety or health, offer an excellent example of the long historical logic of pacification and the use of police power. This is perhaps even more glaring in the South Africa context, given the specific history of official Apartheid and segregation, but the World Cup is emblematic of how a more generalised logic of security enforces a neo-apartheid that is simultaneously based on class and race.

**Conclusion**

As with major sporting, entertainment and political gatherings throughout the world, the 2010 World Cup saw the enforcement of a desired aesthetic regime and social order through the deployment of a vast, multi-city "police network" (Rigakos 2011, 79) which included the substantial involvement of the military and private security companies. In the sense identified by much of the critical research on these mega-events, the operations of this network were designed to be spectacular. From the outset the tactics of the government's security forces were planned to capture exposure and attention, organised like the unveiling of a new commercial brand or product. Simultaneously, these measures were enrolled in the protection of the brand image of FIFA and the assemblage of corporate institutions affiliated with the tournament. However, as this article has argued, the spectacular component of these policing assemblages goes beyond the focus on the demonstrative and the decorative. Instead it has focused on the spectacular content of the concept of 'security', with its infinite capacity to incorporate elite political and economic goals into vaguely defined rhetoric about protecting the public from harms. And while I have not emphasized this is my contribution, in addition to being about class and race, 'security' is clearly also an affair saturated with gender. The masculine sporting spectacle of the FIFA World Cup is echoed by the overwhelmingly male displays of police and military force to guarantee 'order'.

It might therefore be said that security functions as the 'spokesperson' of power- gendered, racialized, rooted in class inequalities- and the "permanent justification of the conditions and aims of the existing system" (Debord, 1994, 12). Through the continual appeal to 'security' huge expenditures and resources are poured into operations clearly designed to protect the interests of elites and designated consumers, whilst increasing the repressive capacity of states through appeal to 'legacies'. But rather than being the result

of emergency or exceptional conditions such events bring to the fore a heightened version of normal politics, in which security is used to mould urban space and society according to the dictates of state and capital.

In that sense, at the heart of the security of the mega-event is the logic of pacification. More tellingly, at the heart of the *spectacle* of security we find nothing less than the *spectacle of pacification.*

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